


**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



July 30, 1982

Dear Bill:

It has been nearly a year since President Reagan authorized me to direct and coordinate a vigorous overseas public affairs campaign to accurately project our society and policies and to counter Soviet propaganda. The implementation of the President's mandate for Project Truth has provided us with practical experience in drawing together the best contributions of the White House, State, the NSC, Defense, CIA, ACDA, and USICA in this initiative.

I have prepared this progress report to document the activities under USICA's chairmanship of the Project Truth effort. You will see that our traditional resources have been refined and refocused to support this endeavor. We have prepared a binder of representative products described in the report to give you a firsthand look.


We now have what we think is an effective structure for introducing the strategic public affairs dimension into the U.S. foreign policy process.

The success of our efforts has been due in no small measure to the continuing support and encouragement we have received from our colleagues in the various agencies participating in this effort. We look forward to Project Truth's second year with anticipation of working closely together to realize our mutual goal of a harmonious and efficient foreign policy operation drawing on the best contributions of the participating agencies.

This report is being sent to the principals of the agencies involved as well as to all the Cabinet Secretaries. Any comments or suggestions you may have from time to time will be welcomed.

Best regards.

Sincerely,


Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

REPORT ON PROJECT TRUTH

USICA

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"...a successful strategy must have diplomatic, political, economic, informational components built on a foundation of military strength."

Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University, May 21, 1982

PROJECT TRUTH

Undertaken pursuant to President Reagan's Directive of September 9, 1981

Progress Report as of July 20, 1982

TO: The President

The Honorable Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
The Honorable Edwin Meese III
The Honorable James A. Baker III
The Honorable Michael K. Deaver
The Honorable William J. Casey
The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Vice President George Bush
General John W. Vessey, Jr. USA
The Honorable William French Smith

The Honorable John R. Block
The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige
The Honorable Terrel H. Bell
The Honorable James B. Edwards
The Honorable Richard S. Schweiker
The Honorable Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.
The Honorable James G. Watt
The Honorable Raymond J. Donovan
The Honorable Andrew L. Lewis, Jr.
The Honorable Donald T. Regan

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REPORT ON PROJECT TRUTH

INDEX

PROGRESS REPORT ON PROJECT TRUTH

BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF PROJECT TRUTH PRODUCTS UNDER FOLLOWING TABS:

- A. Presidential Directive**
- B. Project Truth Members**
- C. Schedule of Meetings**
- D. Agenda Topics**
- E. "Fall Initiative"**
- F. Soviet Propaganda Alert**
- G. Countering Soviet Mis-Statements**
- H. Soviet Distortions and Fabrications**
- I. Dateline America**
- J. Satellite**
- K. Speakers and Briefing Teams**
- L. Foreign Press Center**
- M. Films and Videotapes**
- N. Wireless File**
- O. Special Publications**
- P. Magazines**
- Q. Voice of America**
- R. Exhibits**
- S. Special Guidance**

The blue binder "Project Truth Examples" which accompanies this report contains sample public affairs products under tabs corresponding to those listed above.

PROJECT TRUTH

I. Introduction

On August 17, 1981, at President Reagan's invitation, USICA Director Charles Z. Wick presented to the President, his top White House aides, and the National Security Council a proposal for the establishment of a committee on information policy coordination to arm the United States for effective battle in the war for men's minds to which this administration is committed. On September 9, 1981, President Reagan approved this proposal and directed that "USICA should take the lead in the interdepartmental process, with cooperation of all participating agencies." (See Tab A, Presidential Directive)

Thus emerged a vigorous overseas campaign, "Project Truth," for projecting an accurate image of the policies and ideals of the United States, and to counter Soviet Propaganda. National security data developed by the departments of State and Defense, the NSC and CIA could hence be coordinated, declassified (as practical) and disseminated worldwide through the existing USICA apparatus, in the context of a coherent public affairs program.

Less than one year later, through the supple mechanism provided by Project Truth, the USG can for the first time plan strategically in public affairs. The "informational component of national strategy," which Judge Clark emphasized in his Georgetown CSIS speech in May, can thus be said finally to have the priority to which it is entitled. Public affairs is, today, at the heart of the substance of foreign policy.

This report highlights the various activities of the Project Truth interagency overseas public affairs campaign.

II. Refinement of the Project Truth Process

The underlying rationale of Project Truth has been to forge from the coordinated arsenals of the USG the principal weaponry in the war of ideas. To further this objective, there has been a meeting of a Project Truth executive body several times each month since the Executive Committee was established in November, 1981. (See Tab C, Schedule Meetings and Tab D, Agenda Topics)

The experience of coordinating public affairs support during 1981 facilitated the introduction of two major operational refinements in 1982: the establishment of the Project Truth Policy Group and a reconstitution of the Project Truth Executive Committee. (See Tab B, Project Truth Members)

The Policy Group, at which each of the participating entities is represented by an officer charged with overseas public affairs, was established in January, 1982. It provides the Project Truth operation with its own "think tank" focussed on long-range public affairs strategy with which to guide the activities of the Executive Committee.

-2-

A prime example is the public affairs strategy paper forwarded to Judge Clark on April 23 to support President Reagan's European trip. This document demonstrated Project Truth's potential to contribute a strategic dimension to overseas U.S. public affairs campaigns. We have, accordingly, pursued this approach by preparing strategy papers on the public affairs follow-up to the President's trip. These documents are being forwarded under separate cover.

The second major structural innovation was the reconstitution of the existing Project Truth Executive Committee into an operational mechanism for the implementation of public affairs initiatives. This Committee now consists of representatives of the various State Department-chaired interagency working groups dealing with the Project Truth priority public affairs agenda (Afghanistan, Poland, El Salvador, Chemical Biological Warfare, Nuclear Issues). The Executive Committee also includes representatives from the State Department's Bureaus of Public Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, as well as the entire Project Truth Policy Group.

Telegraphic communications between Washington and our overseas missions carry a special slug for Project Truth Executive Committee messages; PAXCOM (for Public Affairs Executive Committee).

The Project Truth Executive Committee has become a clearing house for the government's overall public affairs implementation of foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, this forum is the only one where views are exchanged across agency--as well as geographic and thematic--lines, providing the Administration the means truly to "speak with one voice" on key issues.

III. Project Truth Products

Products have been introduced to counter Soviet propaganda (Tabs F, G, H) and to project an accurate image worldwide of the United States' policies and ideals (Tab I). The various public affairs materials traditionally produced by USICA have been refined and targeted to reinforce foreign policy initiatives coordinated by Project Truth. A series of brief descriptions of these USICA contributions to the interagency effort follows under the following tabs:

- K. Speakers and Briefing Teams
- L. Foreign Press Center
- M. Films and Videotapes
- N. Wireless File
- O. Special Publications
- P. Magazines
- Q. Voice of America
- R. Exhibits
- S. Special Guidance

The blue binder labelled "Project Truth Examples" which accompanies this report encloses representative samples of USICA products, and those of participating agencies, under tabs which correspond to the tabs in this binder.

-3-

IV. Project Truth Plans Currently in Progress

As noted above, one extremely important Project Truth innovation of recent months was the successful establishment of the first mechanism for interagency coordination of the public affairs aspects of priority foreign policy initiatives. This development, with far-reaching implications for the strategic planning process, represents the culmination of this Agency's efforts to direct and coordinate the project's interagency activities.

Project Truth plans a "Fall Initiative" in public affairs, in which will be launched a multi-dimensional campaign showing the U.S. to be the "peace party", with its defensive and deterrent-oriented military strategy; and the Soviet Union the party threatening world peace, with its offensive doctrine and deployment. (See Tab E, "Fall Initiative") In coordination with the NSC, State, ACDA, DOD and CIA, USICA through Project Truth is preparing new exhibits (based on the one for the US Mission to the UN, See Tab R, Exhibits), commissioning articles, sending speakers and briefing teams to target countries abroad, preparing special public affairs guidance, and undertaking extensive and innovative research to demonstrate graphically and credibly America's vocation of peace. Research already underway will show, to the highest scholarly standard, for example, the respect the U.S. already elicits as the "Peace Party", so that policy can be targeted in specific countries accordingly; and will show that the "arms race" is almost solely a product of the Soviet military building program.

We are planning a publication on the broad "correlation of forces," which will show the world power balance in its various (political, economic, military) dimensions: on all but one, the Soviet Union will be found gravely deficient. As an example, American economic aid will be compared with the now almost non-existent Soviet aid in the Third World. The Soviet overhang of strategic nuclear capability (the 308 SS-18s, for example) will protrude the more glaringly in this analysis. We will thereby generate important support for our peace initiative by showing that our claim to be the "Peace Party" is more than a matter of words: indeed that it is inherent in our interests in a plural world.

During this first year of Project Truth's establishment, we have learned much about the need for public affairs coordination within the U. S. Government. The evolution of the project has clearly demonstrated throughout the official foreign affairs community the essentiality of USICA's contribution to the policy process, as the locus of public affairs coordination.

Certainly the effectiveness of this operation from Moscow's point of view may be gauged by the unprecedented volume and vehemence of Soviet attacks on Director Wick and the entire Project Truth initiative. The chief Soviet propagandist Leonid Zamyatin, after a lifetime devoted to Anti-American propaganda, has unprecedentedly accused ICA of raising "'ideological war' to the level of government policy". The USSR has reason for concern: Project Truth has forged a truly effective government-wide weapon for the war of ideas.

A. Presidential
Directive

Presidential Directive

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 9, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Following the August 17, 1981 briefing by Charles Z. Wick, Director of the International Communication Agency, the President directed that the program proposals presented by the Director be subsumed under the National Security Council process, including interdepartmental meetings.

USICA should take the lead in the interdepartmental process, with the cooperation of all participating agencies. Policy decisions will be made within the framework of the NSC.

The President requests the assistance of all agencies in implementing this decision.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

CC: The Director
International Communication Agency

**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Director



ACDA
AID
Coordinating

October 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Counsellor to the President
The Director of Central Intelligence
Chief of Staff to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staffs

FROM:

Charles Z. Wick *[Signature]*

The attached Presidential directive through Richard V. Allen, dated September 9, 1981, designates USICA to take the lead in the interdepartmental process for a coordinated program to counter Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

In preliminary and informal discussion with you and members of your departments and Agencies, we have been setting up the operational machinery to implement Project Truth. Coordination of the release of the D.O.D.'s Soviet Military Power report together with Secretary Weinberger's satellite transmission was, in effect, Project Truth's initial undertaking.

Please let me have the name of the person you select to be your permanent representative on the Project Truth Coordinating Committee so we can move forward as quickly as possible in response to the President's directive.

ATTACHED LETTER SENT TO:

The Honorable
George Bush
Vice President
Executive Office Building


The Honorable
Edwin Meese, III
Counsellor to the President
The White House

The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President
The White House

The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Counselor of the Department
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520


CIA Headquarters Building

The Honorable
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

The Honorable
James A. Baker, III
Chief of Staff
to the President
The White House

The Honorable
Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

The Honorable
Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

The Honorable
General David C. Jones, USAF
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

STAT

Project Truth Members

**B. Project Truth
Members**

COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The following individuals were officially designated as representatives by their principals:

STAT

[Redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency

Bud MacFarlane
Department of State

General Robert Schweitzer
National Security Council

Michael Ledeen
Department of State

Dr. Fred Ikle
Department of Defense

Mark Palmer
Department of State

Lt. General Philip Gast
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Carnes Lord
National Security Council


David Gergen
White House

Lyndon Allin
White House

Joe Lehman
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

POLICY GROUP

STAT


Central Intelligence Agency

Richard Hechlinger
Department of State

Lewis Libby
Department of State

Lt. Col. Patrick Letellier
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joe Lehman
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Garnes Lord
National Security Council

Mark Palmer
Department of State

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Prior to its reorganization in May, 1982, the members of the Executive Committee were:

Elliot Abrams
Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs
(State)

Mark Palmer
Bureau of European
Affairs (State)

Lyndon Allin
The White House

Carnes Lord
National Security Council

Francis Gomez
Bureau of Public
Affairs (State)

[REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency

Edward Harper
ICA Liaison Officer
(DOD)

Lt. Col. Patrick Letellier
Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD)

Michael Ledeen
Special Advisor to the
Secretary (State)

Jon Thomas
Policy Planning Staff
(State)

John Lenczowski
Bureau of European
Affairs (State)

[REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency

Joe Lehman
Public Affairs (ACDA)

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THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

In May, 1982, the Executive Committee was reorganized to include representatives from each of the following State Department - chaired interagency groups on issues of major concern to Project Truth planning:

- Shaping European Attitudes
- Nuclear Issues
- Afghanistan
- El Salvador
- Chemical Biological Warfare
- Poland

Representatives from two Department of State bureaus have also been added:

- Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
- Bureau of Public Affairs

Schedule of Meetings

**C. Schedule of
Meetings**

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Executive Committee

November 4, 1981
November 18, 1981
December 2, 1981
December 9, 1981
December 16, 1981
January 6, 1982
January 13, 1982
January 20, 1982
February 3, 1982
February 17, 1982
March 3, 1982
March 17, 1982
March 31, 1982
May 5, 1982
May 19, 1982
June 16, 1982
June 30, 1982

Policy Group

January 13, 1982
February 24, 1982
March 10, 1982
April 7, 1982
April 15, 1982
April 19, 1982
April 20, 1982
May 26, 1982
June 9, 1982
July 7, 1982

Agenda Topics

D. Agenda Topics

November 9, 1981

PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Tuesday, November 10, 1981, at 4 o'clock

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
The Director's Conference Room
Seventh Floor
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20547

AGENDA

1. Afghanistan materials -- status report and strategy

Mark Palmer, State
Sam Wunder, ICA

2. Central America / Caribbean material -- status report

Ed Harper, DOD
Michael Ledeen, State

3. Chemical and Biological Weapons project -- status report

Jim Dobbins, State
Bill Keal, ICA
 CIA

STAT

4. Presidential speech -- November 1981 -- public relations strategy

Mike Schneider, ICA
Mark Palmer, State

5. Future PROJECT TRUTH initiatives

- analysis of neutralism/pacifism groups
- possible Presidential trip to Europe, June 5-6, 1982
- NATO document
- Crime and punishment in the Soviet Union

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, November 18, 1981, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
The Director's Office
Seventh Floor
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

UPDATE ON PROJECT TRUTH ACTIVITIES

- Afghanistan, List of experts - Mike Ledeen, State
- Central America/Caribbean/Cuba materials
 - Ed Harper, ICA
 - Mike Ledeen, State
- Chemical and Biological Warfare
 - General Review and Assessment
- Crime & Punishment
 - Status Report - Gifford Malone, ICA
- Tag/logo for PROJECT TRUTH field traffic
- TNF speech - Follow-up strategy
 - Mike Schneider, ICA
 - Mark Palmer, State
- Preparation for November 30 Arms Control talks

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During the November 18 Executive Committee meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

Afghanistan

- Provide ICA with list of experts on Afghanistan (Palmer)
- Identify cross-section of Afghani guerrilla leaders for January presentation of pamphlet (Palmer)
- Look into British efforts worldwide to place their films on Afghanistan (Shirley)
- Update ICA chronology on Afghanistan (Hughes staff)

Central America

- Provide ICA with INR chronology of loss of freedoms in Nicaragua (Ledeem)
- Consider distribution to posts of Hammond's Anatomy of Communist Take-Overs and travel of author as Ampart (Hughes staff)
- Coordinate declassification of material on Cuba and controlled release of such information (Ledeem, Harper)
- Invite Elliott Abrams to future Project Truth meetings to cover human rights issues (Hughes)
- Secure report of Inter-American Press Association on press situation in Nicaragua (Hughes staff)

Chemical-Biological Warfare

- Identify non-American experts, moral leaders, defecting Soviet scientists with CBW expertise to document and express outrage at Soviet use of CBW (Ledeem,)
- Provide collage of foreign press clippings on Soviet use of CBW
- Consider translations of Problems of Communism, and commissioned article on CBW (Hughes staff)

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USG Spokesmen

Renew efforts to provide ICA with USG officials for VOA and Wireless File interviews on above topics (Project Truth ExCom members)

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EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, December 2, 1981, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
The Director's Office
Seventh Floor
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

Follow-up on Tasking Memo from November 18 EXCOM Meeting (attached)

Update on Project Truth Activities

- Discussion of designation by participating agencies of officer in charge of fast response to Soviet misstatements
- Discussion of Afghanistan pamphlet and its release
- Discussion of material on Central America/Caribbean/Cuba
- Discussion of ways to use foreign press reaction clippings on Soviet CBW, review "Yellow Rain" program activities
- Discussion of response to Soviet document on military power
- Discussion on release of "Crime and Punishment"
- Report on public diplomacy aspects of Geneva Arms Control talks

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During the December 2 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Provide Executive Committee with list of experts on Afghanistan (Palmer)
- b) Check with PAOs to see if they can help local Grenada Films representatives place Afghanistan films (Wunder)
- c) Draft paper for NSC consideration of policy on declassification of satellite photos (Ledeem)

II Central America/Caribbean/Cuba

- a) Contact Public Policy Private Sector Committee (Heritage Foundation, et. al.) to request preparation of annotated bibliography on Communist take-overs (Wunder)
- b) Consider the preparation of a document on Communist take-over culled from "Problems of Communism" articles (Schneider)
- c) Secure ILO report on Nicaragua for Executive Committee (Abrams)

III CBW

- a) Explore possibility of persuading leading European or Israeli Socialist to examine the evidence of Soviet use of CBW in Asia (Ledeem)
- b) Provide Executive Committee with collage of foreign press clippings on "Yellow Rain" and Soviet use of CBW for VOA STAT

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Provide Executive Committee with special working group response to Soviet document (Gillespie)

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- 2 -

V Crime and Punishment

- a) Review "Crime and Punishment with CSCE representatives to include their input (Schneider)

VI Project Truth Cable Identification

- a) Draft cable for field on use of "PAXCOM" to identify cables dealing with Project Truth (Chikes)

VII US Peace Initiatives

- a) Draft public affairs plan to focus on historical US concern for peace and arms control (Schneider)

VIII Soviet Diplomatic Behavior

- a) Compile data on history of Soviet diplomatic "bullying" (Palmer)

IX Militarism and Communist Societies

- a) Explore possibility of Problems of Communism article on militarism as an inherent aspect of Communist societies (Schneider)

X Soviet Use of Proxies

- a) Prepare unclassified version of report of State working group monitoring activities of Soviet proxies (Thomas)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, December 9, 1981, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories.
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

During the December 9 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Look into possibility of briefing on details of Soviet military situation in Afghanistan (Harper) using Secretary Haig visit to Peshawar as peg (Harrod)

II Nicaragua, Cuba, Central America

- a) Draft memorandum requesting declassification of satellite photos (Ledeen)

III CBW

- a) Explore possibility of producing ICA pamphlet on CBW based on briefings and official compendium on "Yellow Rain" (Wunder)
- b) Follow-up Seagrave suggestions on "Yellow Rain" scientific and press contacts, photo sources, etc. (Hughes Staff)

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Provide Executive Committee with special working group response to Soviet document (Gillespie)

V Project Truth Cable Identification

- a) Send cable to field requesting use of "PAXCOM" designation for all Project Truth cables (Ledeen, Harper,)

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VI Soviet Diplomatic Behavior

- a) Compile data on history of Soviet diplomatic "bullying" (Palmer)

VII Soviet Use of Proxies

- a) Prepare unclassified version of report of State working group monitoring activities of Soviet proxies for February 3, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting (Thomas)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, December 16, 1981, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

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During the December 16 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Look into possibility of briefing on details of Soviet military situation in Afghanistan by Secretary Haig for December 27, the first anniversary of the invasion (Ledeen)

II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Draft memorandum requesting declassification of satellite photos for January 6 Executive Committee Meeting (Ledeen)

III CBW

- a) Memo from ICA Director Wick to Secretary Haig requesting close coordination of PM with Executive Committee on Project Truth (Chikes)

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Provide Executive Committee with special working group response to Soviet document (Gillespie)

V Project Truth Cable Identification

- a) Send cable to field requesting use of "PAYCOM" designation for all Project Truth cables (Ledeen, Harper,)

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VI Soviet Use of Proxies

- a) Prepare unclassified version of report of State working group monitoring activities of Soviet proxies for February 3, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting (Thomas)

VII Polish Crisis

- a) Explore possibility of a prominent non-government figure such as Dave Abshire or Leonard Marx making public protest against communications black-out imposed in Poland (Hughes, Kaminsky)

VIII "The Price of Peace" by Brian Crozier

- a) Report to Executive Committee on possible use of Crozier publication (Malone)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, January 6, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

During the January 6 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Invite Ambassador Helman to the January 20 Executive Committee Meeting to brief on his group's activities (Palmer)
- b) Secure articles from Le Monde and Nouvelle Observateur on Soviet bombing of hospitals in Afghanistan for Elliott Abrams (Chikes)

II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Geographic bureaus will be asked to identify targets for special briefings using highly classified materials, especially photos (Thomas)
- b) A memorandum from Director Wick to Director Casey suggesting the release of classified material for special briefings of selected media, political leaders, etc. (Chikes)

III CBW

- a) PM should consider contacting scientists Meselson and Robinson before releasing Burt testimony to pre-empt press skepticism (Thomas)
- b) USICA should look into using Dr. Rose from ABC Documentary "Rain of Terror" as AmPart and translating the script (Chikes)
- c) Check with DoD (Ikle and Perle) about decision on announcement re: US binary weapons (Harper)
- d) Look into CBW "Truth Squad" tour of Asian countries (Palmer)
- e) VOA should secure material on CBW from Burt, also record discussion between Seagrave and Meselson (Courtney)

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Agency should check into programming AmParts in Tokyo to speak on the Soviet military threat (Chikes)

V Project Truth Cables: PAXCOM

- a) Send cable to field identifying "PAXCOM" designation for all Project Truth cables (Thomas, Palmer,)

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- 2 -

VI Soviet Use of Proxies

- a) Final report, focussing on Libya and Cuba, still on February 3 schedule (Thomas)

VII Polish Crisis

- a) Explore possibility of filming interviews with members of "Solidarity in Exile" during Brussels January 8 meeting (EU)

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, January 20, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

During the January 20 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Prepare memo from Director Wick to Director Casey requesting the use of highly classified materials on a "not leave" basis for briefings of select foreign audiences (Chikes)

III CBW

- a) Secure from DOD material on Soviet deployment, stockpiling, specialized troops, etc., of chemical-biological weapons in Europe (Harper)
- b) Prepare guidance, interviews, WF articles, etc., on the deterrent nature of US production of binary weapons, US desire for negotiations, etc. (Thurber)
- c) Look into possibility of briefing team on CBW to tour Asian countries pegged to release of "all-source" compilation of material on Soviet use of CBW (Kiehl)
- d) Secure transcript of Burt Foreign Press Center briefing and contact Seagraves and Robinson for series on CBW (Harrod)

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

V Project Truth Cables: PAXCOM

- a) Check into State Department cable designating use of PAXCOM tag for Project Truth cables (Thomas)

VI Soviet Use of Proxies

VII Polish Crisis

- a) Consider possible uses of Wajda film "Man of Iran" (Thurber)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, February 3, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

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During the February 3, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Request Ambassador Helman to make available to the Executive Committee public affairs material from the Afghanistan Day organizers (Malone)
- b) Relay to VOA top management the Executive Committee's endorsement of broadcasting to Afghanistan in Pushtu (Courtney)

II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Send letter from ICA to Director Casey requesting use of highly classified materials for special briefings (Chikes)
- b) Consider arranging background briefing by St. Agnes Sisters on repression of Indians in Nicaragua (Thomas)
- c) Consider background briefing for European journalists on Sandinista repression touching on human rights, refugees and genocide themes in light of French agreement to provide weapons (Gomez)
- d) Request CIA material to show journalists during upcoming briefing on situation in El Salvador (Ledeem)
- e) Place on agenda for Policy Group consideration of Salvador as Project Truth topic in context of strategic implications of USG public diplomacy efforts (i.e., perhaps advisable to concentrate on areas within Soviet sphere of influence: Poland, Afghanistan, CBW, etc.) (Chikes)
- f) Consider possibility of pamphlet (c.f. Afghanistan pamphlet) on Nicaragua and/or "loose packet" of visuals for State use domestically on, f.x. theme of militarization (Thurber)

III CBW

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Ascertain if the Pentagon plans to respond to the Soviet document and secure from Pentagon talking points to refute factual errors in the publication (Harper)

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- 2 -

V Soviet Use of Proxies

VI Polish Crisis

- a) Consider possible follow-up of "Let Poland Be Poland" in pamphlet format (Thurber)

VII New Theme

- a) Consider as a theme the revival of Stalinism and the weakening of Moscow's grip on foreign communist parties (Thurber)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, February 17, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories.
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories.

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During the February 17, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Consider advisability of White House screening of ICA film on Afghanistan for diplomatic corps (Thurber)
- b) Consider possibility of increasing VOA broadcast time to Afghanistan on March 21 to mark Afghanistan Day (in conjunction with BEC broadcasting) (Grabell)

II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Determine objectives to be served by possible coverage of situation in Nicaragua by Spanish TV and best means of facilitating such coverage (Besom, Henze, Mathes)
- b) Prepare catalogue of visual material on militarization in Nicaragua and situation of Meskito Indians to offer European TV (Harper,)
- c) Transmit catalogue of visual materials when completed (above) to PAO Madrid to offer with facilitative assistance to Spanish TV (Henze)
- d) Consider Foreign Press Center briefing on situation in Nicaragua by ARA experts for selected European journalists (Thomas, Steiner, Gomez)
- e) Consider participation of appropriate Nicaraguan emigres in briefings for European journalists (Thomas,)
- f) Solicit advice of AmEmbassy San Salvador about what Washington can do to help assure balanced coverage upcoming elections (Besom)
- g) Prepare guidance cable for AR and EU on "Caribbean Basin Initiative" themes (Mathes)

STAT

STAT

III CEW

- a) Prepare joint State/ICA cable encouraging missions to support public affairs program on CEW as a priority item (Steiner, Thurber)

IV Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Prepare guidance cable on Soviet pamphlet, "Whence the Threat to Europe" (Steiner)

V Soviet Use of Proxies

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- 2 -

VI Polish Crisis

- a) Coordinate with EUR during preparation of ICA pamphlet on Poland (Thurber)

VII Soviet Propaganda Alert

- a) Suggest that PGM/R cite sources as appropriate throughout Soviet Propaganda Alert (Chikes)

VIII Problems of Communism

- a) Consider publication of Spanish language edition (Malone)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, March 3, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547.

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

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During the March 3, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) Determine restrictions governing domestic screening of ICA film on Afghanistan (Chikes)
- b) Attempt improvement of publicity for appointment of former Secretary Rogers to head private sector effort on Afghanistan Day (Steiner, Gomez)

II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Obtain declassified photos of burned Miskito villages for release in coordinated fashion to British and Italian TV, and perhaps by Jean Kirkpatrick STAT
- b) Develop plan for most effective release of declassified photos (above) (Steiner, Henze, Mathes)
- c) Contact Moravian Church for appropriate Nicaraguan emigres to brief European journalists; also Nicaraguans who attended Caracas meeting of Committee for Defense of Democracy in Nicaragua (Thomas)
- d) Contact PAO San Salvador to alert U.S. press to story of Salvadoran terrorists captured by Costa Rican police; also to send list for PA of foreign journalists in Salvador (Besom)
- e) Consider most effective release of captured Salvadoran guerrilla documents on plans to disrupt upcoming elections - perhaps to be released by Assistant Secretary Enders (Gomez)

III Soviet Publication on Military Power

- a) Develop guidance on overall thrust of Soviet propaganda line of which "Whence the Threat to Peace" is one manifestation (Gillespie, Hursh-Cesar, Steiner, Lenczowski)

IV Dateline America

- a) Develop themes for a series of articles stressing American ideals, i.e., ("what do we stand for?") for inclusion in the "Dateline America" feature service, among other outlets (Lenczowski, Schneider)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, March 17, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

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During the March 17, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments were agreed upon:

I Afghanistan

- a) The sense of the committee was that requests for Congressional exemption from the ban on domestic dissemination of ICA products (i.e., the film on Afghanistan) should come from outside the USG (i.e., former Secretary Rogers)

II CBW

- a) Advise DOD (Perle) of desirability of postponing DOD testimony on resumption of binary weapons production until yellow rain story has had time to develop fully (Harper)
- b) Discuss with members of CBW briefing team desirability of briefing Perry Robinson and other "doubters" on yellow rain during overseas tour (Kiehl)
- c) Check with PM about arranging briefings on contents of new report for Rosen and other US scientists (Thomas)

III Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America

- a) Check into availability for press of Costa Rican judge's interrogation of captured gun-runners to Nicaragua (Ledeen)
- b) Check with ARA on captured Salvadoran guerrilla documents re: availability, quality and possible release to press (Ledeen)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, March 31, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under listed subject categories
- II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, May 5, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Brief discussion of new directions for the Project Truth Executive Committee
- II. Report from Shaping European Attitudes group on public affairs plans on "Poland" topic
- III. Discussion of public affairs strategies for "Nuclear Freeze," "UN SSOD," "CBW" and "Afghanistan"

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ACTION MEMO

May 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM: Gifford D. Malone
SUBJECT: Project Truth Executive Committee Meeting of May 5

The following suggestions for Agency action resulted from the May 5 meeting of the Project Truth Executive Committee:

Poland: Request EU posts to collect and send in material published by Solidarity. Action: EU

Nuclear Freeze: Determine if there is a good article the Agency can use to put the U.S. nuclear freeze movement into perspective. Action: PGM/P

CEW: Maintain contact with PM to keep track of forthcoming articles on mycotoxins; determine if September 5 Vienna conference on mycotoxins will be useful public affairs event for U.S. case against Soviet use of CEW; request posts worldwide to redouble efforts to show ABC "Rain of Terror." Action: PGM/PACO

Request posts worldwide to submit articles from local media on Soviet use of CEW. Action: PGM/R

Afghanistan: Acquire early copy of forthcoming report from HA to prepare policy guidance and alert Wireless File to material on human rights violations in Afghanistan; determine availability of declassified material on Afghanistan from NSA. Action: PGM/G

Arrange screening of Agency VTR on Afghanistan for members of Executive Committee. Action: PGM/PACO

For clarification of any of these items please contact PGM/PACO: Mr. Chikes.

DISTRIBUTION:
EU - Mr. Henze
PGM/P - Mr. McGinley
PGM/PACO - Mr. Chikes
PGM/R - Mr. Hursh-Cesar
PGM/G - Mr. Thurber

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, May 19, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Discussion of Agency memo following up May 5 Executive Committee meeting
- II. Update reports on activities of interagency work groups
- III. Contacts with US religious groups

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, June 16, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Discussion of public affairs implications of previous meeting's presentation on Poland (Herspring)
- II. Update reports on activities of interagency working groups:
 - Shaping European Attitudes (Steiner)
 - Nuclear Issues (Pernick)
 - Afghanistan (Simmons)
 - El Salvador (Moser)
 - CBW (Celec, Kiehl)
- III. Discussion of follow up to President's European visit as part of an overall public affairs strategy: a promising case for interagency coordination (Schneider)

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, June 30, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Update reports on activities of interagency working groups:
 - Shaping European Attitudes (Steiner)
 - Nuclear Issues (DeBuck)
 - El Salvador (Besom)
- II. Discussion of promising public affairs opportunities: the "Fall Initiative" (Scott Thompson)

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, January 13, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 25047

AGENDA

- I. Purpose and Function of Policy Group and its Relationship to Executive Committee
- II. Discussion of Current Project Truth Initiatives and Suggestions for New Projects
 - a) Afghanistan
 - b) Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America (Declassification)
 - c) CBW
 - d) Soviet Military Threat
 - e) PAXCOM
 - f) Soviet Use of Proxies
 - g) Polish Crisis
- III. Relationship to Other Inter-Agency Foreign Affairs Working Groups
 - a) EUR/EU Group on "Shaping European Attitudes"

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, February 24, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Discussion of Memoranda on Ways to Strengthen and Improve Inter-Agency Coordination of Foreign Affairs Public Information programs
- II. Relationship of Project Truth Executive Committee to other Inter-Agency Foreign Affairs Working Groups (i.e., EUR/EU Group on "Shaping European Attitudes")
- III. Discussion of Current Project Truth Initiatives on El Salvador in Context of Strategic Implications of Overall USG Public Diplomacy Efforts (on Poland, Afghanistan, CBW, etc.)

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, March 10, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Discussion of Memoranda on Ways to Strengthen and Improve Inter-Agency Coordination of Foreign Affairs Public Information programs

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, April 7, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Discussion of strengthened structure for interagency coordination of information policy.
- II. Discussion of mechanics of tasking interagency working groups to carry out assignments issued by Executive Committee.
- III. Discussion of public affairs issues which should be addressed by the Executive Committee during the next three months.

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Thursday, April 15, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Presentation and Discussion of Paper on Public Affairs Strategy to Support Objectives of President's European Trip.

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Monday, April 19, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Briefing on US Economic Policy Objectives of President's European Trip.
- II. Discussion of Memo to Heads of Departments Participating in Project Truth to Implement Proposed Public Affairs Strategy Supporting President's European Trip.

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Tuesday, April 20, 1982, 4:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Briefing on US Economic Policy Objectives of President's European Trip.
- II. Discussion of Memo to Heads of Departments Participating in Project Truth to Implement Proposed Public Affairs Strategy Supporting President's European Trip.

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, May 26, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. President Reagan's European Trip: Public Affairs Follow up
- II. SSOD - Anticipating Soviet Surprises
- III. Project Truth Executive Committee: Critique and Observations on New Directions

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, June 9, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Perspectives on Poland: Implications for Public Affairs Strategy

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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, July 7, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

AGENDA

- I. Discussion of Public Affairs Strategy on Gas Pipeline (Schneider)
- II. Discussion of Interagency Tasking Assignments to Implement "Fall Initiative" (Thompson)

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“Fall Initiative”

E. “Fall Initiative”

"FALL INITIATIVE"

As the centerpiece of Project Truth's "Fall Initiative," USICA is undertaking an analysis of US-USSR strategic nuclear forces. The comparison extends the analysis of Albert Wohlstetter ("Is There An Arms Race") of US-USSR strategic capabilities from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s.

The project will bring up-to-date Wohlstetter's analysis (which stopped at 1972) of the relationship between U.S. estimates and actual numbers (estimates after deployment) of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles (ICBM, SLBM, LRB); as well as U.S. strategic capabilities: megatonnage, warhead numbers, equivalent megatonnage, and strategic force budgets.

The purpose of this project is to compare U.S. and Soviet deployment in order to provide data that will be used worldwide to:

- counter widespread public ignorance of the extent and pace of U.S. efforts to prevent an arms race;
- develop a greater appreciation of the U.S. commitment to peace; and
- demonstrate that U.S. nuclear strategies are based on a reality threat, not overestimation of Soviet strength.

Soviet Propaganda Alert

SOVIET PROPOGANDA ALERT

The single Project Truth product most familiar to U.S. government officials is the widely-read Soviet Propaganda Alert which is published monthly by ICA's research office. Inaugurated in October of 1981, this service is a summary and analysis of the Soviet propaganda medium which provides government officials, VOA, 200 overseas posts, and non-government audiences with a general overview of Soviet public affairs attacks. Soviet Propaganda Alert has proven a valuable background document calling attention to Soviet propaganda principles and techniques and is a respected example of a successful Project Truth initiative.

The ICA Office of Research is also responsible for a number of other contributions to the Project Truth process. Among them are:

Reports

- a guide to countering Soviet forgeries of U.S. documents
- a study of Soviet elites and their perceptions of the U.S.
- a study of Soviet cultural and information activities in third countries

Special Services

- supplied the raw-data for the "Soviet Distortions and Fabrications" series
- public opinion surveys of West European attitudes on arms control and the President's peace initiatives

Special Research Memoranda

- Poland
- Falkland Islands
- Yellow Rain (CBW)
- direct Soviet attacks on USICA and the VOA

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample products.

Countering Soviet Mis-statements

G. Countering
Soviet Mis-Statements

COUNTERING SOVIET MIS-STATEMENTS

This service is designed to provide field posts with immediate guidance to assist them in refuting Soviet or Soviet-sponsored propaganda and disinformation. Responses are initiated by specific post requests for guidance, are not limited to unclassified material, and are usually sent to particular posts where such allegations may arise in the future. The Department of State handles requests for guidance on Soviet "active measures," and our policy guidance staff works closely with State to coordinate responses to post requests for guidance.

Fast-response guidances provided to our posts have included advice on how to deal with such issues as:

- claims that the U.S. has developed and used Chemical-Biological warfare in South and Southeast Asia and in Latin America
- the World Peace Council
- disarmament and arms control
- U.S. military activities in El Salvador
- U.S. military exercises around the world
- allegations about U.S. Government officials.

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample product.

Soviet Distortions and Fabrications

**H. Soviet Distortions
and Fabrications**

"SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS"

At the end of April, USICA began a new unclassified service to expose current Soviet mis-statements about the U.S. and U.S. policies ("Soviet Distortions and Fabrications"). This new service is designed to supplement the broader analysis of themes contained in "Soviet Propaganda Alert" by rapidly giving our overseas posts an idea of the extent of current Soviet efforts in this field. The service is carried about three times a week to 200 overseas posts on our UNINFO telegram channel. Posts are able to distribute this product selectively as they deem best suited to local conditions.

Each issue of the service gives several examples of propaganda on a common theme and suggestions on how officers in the field can respond to the allegations. Over twenty issues of the service have been sent to the field since its commencement. Among the subjects discussed have been Soviet mis-statements on:

- the Falkland Islands crisis
- the situation in Poland
- the crisis in Lebanon
- the President's speeches at Versailles, the British Parliament, the German Bundestag, and the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament
- Chemical/Biological Warfare
- attacks on USICA officers and programs.

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample products.

Dateline America

I. Dateline America

DATELINE AMERICA

One Project Truth product geared to actively counter misleading impressions about the United States generated by Soviet propaganda is Dateline America. Designed to project a positive image overseas of American ideals, people, society, and institutions, Dateline America is a bi-weekly illustrated news feature service aimed at a mass audience via placement in the popular press by USICA Public Affairs Officers at more than 200 posts around the world. Each issue consists of approximately a dozen articles of 600 words or less from magazine, newspaper, USICA and other government agency sources. Thus far, eleven issues of Dateline America have been sent overseas, since its inception on January 22, 1982.

Nearly 132 articles or short news briefs have appeared in Dateline America, 36 of which were adapted from government agency contributions. To encourage increased participation in Dateline America, meetings have been held with representatives of 15 executive branch departments and agencies since the first of the year.

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample products.

Satellite

J. Satellite

SATELLITE TELEVISION PROGRAMS

"Let Poland Be Poland," perhaps the most ambitious satellite program ever transmitted by USICA, was produced on behalf of the Polish people following the imposition of Martial Law. In addition to the estimated 172 million people in 42 countries outside the U.S. who viewed the television program, we estimate that another 100 million people worldwide listened as "Let Poland Be Poland" was broadcast by both VOA and Radio Free Europe facilities in 15 languages. In the United States, PBS reports that at least 142 of its affiliated stations carried "Let Poland Be Poland" either live or in delayed broadcast.

The Video Dialogue is USICA's newest and most effective public affairs medium for satellite programming. A Video Dialogue is a televised satellite link-up between Cabinet level officials in Washington and key electronic and print media journalists in selected countries on major policy issues. Video Dialogues provide access for the Spokesman to explain our foreign policy on major overseas networks in prime time to large audiences.

Since September 1981, ICA has utilized the Video Dialogue seven times to bring leading spokesmen in touch with overseas audiences.

VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Dr. Murray Weidenbaum Chairman, CEA	U.S. Economic Recovery Program Sep 8, 1981; Sweden	With TV-2 Swedish Radio; technical problems hampered our judging final outcome of interview
Caspar Weinberger Secretary of Defense	U.S. Security Policy in Europe Nov 4, 1981; W Germany	With ZDF-TV (TV-2); live program seen by approx. 8 million West Germans with additional spillover into E. Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; program replayed by both ZDF and ARD-TV following day during noontime to additional audience; resulted in large amount of press play as well.

VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Caspar Weinberger Secretary of Defense	U.S.-Japan Security Issues Dec 16 1981; Japan	NHK-TV; viewed by 10 million; coincided with the climax of the Japanese Parliamentary Defense Budget debate; elicited great deal of press comment; thought to have had a positive impact on Parliament's decision to increase the percentage of money spent on Defense in 1982 beyond expected amount.
Malcolm Baldrige Secretary of Commerce	US-Japan Trade and Economic Issues Mar 30 1982; Japan	NHK-TV; 12 minute segment shown on prime time <u>NewsCenter 9</u> to an estimated 15 million viewers.
Thomas Enders Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs	US Policy toward Cen- tral America Apr 21 1982; Belgium	RTBF-TV; this panel show was broadcast in prime time to approximately 250,000 Belgians and resulted in additional commentary by the Belgian press.
Beryl Sprinkel Under Secretary of Treasury	U.S. Economic Policy and its impact on Germany Apr 28 1982; W Germany	ZDF-TV; shown on biweekly <u>Bilanz</u> (<u>Balance</u>) program to 7 million viewers. (Sprinkel was a last-minute stand-in for Secretary Regan.)

VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Lawrence Eagleburger Under Secretary of State	U.S.- West German Relations: The Presi- dent's Visit June 2 1982; W Germany	ZDF-TV; Live dialogue between Mr. Eagleburger and his counterpart in the West German Foreign Ministry Dr. Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher; broadcast on <u>ZDF Magazin</u> . 8 million viewers. This Video Dialogue originated at the request of ZDF-TV.

The following additional satellite transmissions were not considered to be Video Dialogues:

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
President Reagan	President Reagan's Foreign Policy Address Nov 18, 1981 Europe	Address on Foreign Color VTR and live multi- country satellite transmission on 18 Nov 81, President Reagan delivers his first major foreign policy speech before an audience at the National Press Club in Washington. He proposes mutual U.S.-Soviet reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe, and elimination of the risk of surprise nuclear attacks.
Caspar Weinberger	Announcement of DOD Pamphlet, Sept 29, 1981 Europe	Announcing release of DOD "Soviet Military Power" pamphlet, transmitted on closed circuit to NATO Headquarters, viewed by over 100 European journalists.

VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Secretary Haig	Versailles Summit May 24, 1982, Europe	Color satellite feed to Europe on 24 May 82.
President Reagan	Pre-Summit Interview June 1, 1982, Europe	Color satellite transmission to Europe on 1 Jun 82.
Director Wick	BBC Facilitative Satellite, Jan 21, 1982	Color satellite transmission to London on 21 Jan 82.
Assistant Secretary Elliot Abrams	Facilitative RAI Italy April 26, 1982	Satellite transmission Transmitted 26 Apr 82.
Under Secretary Walter Stoessel	Policy Toward Poland Dec 30, 1981, Poland	Interview deals with sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland. While portions of interview used by BBC and French television through their own correspondents, PGM/T satellited an edited version of the key segments to Italian television.
President Reagan	Reagan's Address on Caribbean Basin Policy, Feb. 24, 1982	Color satellite transmission on 24 Feb 82.
President Reagan	Pre-Summit Interview for European TV Networks, June 1, 1982	Color satellite transmission to Europe on 1 Jun 82, areas except EU which has only non- commercial CCTV or direct projection.
Secretary Haig	Press Conference Feb. 5, 1982	Color satellite transmission to the Middle East - Arabic - Transmitted 5 Feb 82.
Secretary Haig	Arms Limitation Nov. 30, 1981	Color satellite feed - English, Spanish, Portuguese - Transmitted 30 Nov 81.
Secretary Haig	Interviewed by RAI-TV March 24, 1982	English - Facilitative satellite feed to Rome - Completed 24 Mar 82.

TELEPRESS CONFERENCES

The TelePress Conference is an international conference call placed between a USG spokesman in Washington and a small group (5 maximum) of radio or print journalists in a particular country. The TelePress Conference spokesman is most frequently the highest level substantive policy-making official on a particular issue. (Office Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary is the norm; higher ranking officials have also used this medium.) The TelePress Conference is for tactical situations and has proven especially effective in clarifying issues in bilateral relations. They can be conducted at our VOA studios (to assure high quality sound) or at any office or residence where a conference phone outlet can be installed. These TelePress Conferences have uniformly resulted in front page coverage.

U.S. views on Project Truth themes have been the subject of some of our 19 TelePress Conferences thus far:

TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Myles Frechette Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, State Department	US-Cuban Relations Dec 14, 1981; Colombia	Articles in <u>El Espectador</u> , <u>El Tiempo</u> and <u>La Republica</u>
Myles Frechette State Department	US-Cuban Relations Feb 11, 1982; Peru	Article in <u>El Comercio</u>
Craig Johnstone Director, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, State Department	US Central American Policy Feb 18, 1982; Jamaica	Articles in <u>CANA</u> , <u>The Daily Gleaner</u> , <u>The News</u> ; broadcast by Radio Jamaica, Jamaica Broadcasting Company

TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Amb. Robert Ryan, Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, State; Stephen Lande, Asst. Special Trade Representative, USTR	Caribbean Basin Initiative Mar 3, 1982; Barbados	Articles in <u>The News- Advocate, The Nation,</u> CANA; broadcast by Caribbean Broadcasting Co., and Rediffusion Radio
John Penfold Deputy Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, State	Caribbean Basin Initiative Mar 4, 1982; Costa Rica	Broadcast by Radio Reloj, Radio Colombia and Radio Monumental
John Penfold State Department	Caribbean Basin Initiative Mar 8, 1982; Honduras	Articles in <u>El Tiempo,</u> <u>Tribuna</u> ; broadcast by Radio America and Honduras Radio Nacional
John Penfold State Department	Caribbean Basin Initiative Mar 9 1982; Dominican Republic	Articles in <u>Ultima Hora,</u> <u>El Nacional de Ahora, La</u> <u>Noticia</u> and TV Channel 2
Stephen Lande USTR	Caribbean Basin Initiative Mar 10 1982; Venezuela	Article in <u>El Nacional</u>
Don Holm, Office of Regional Econ. Policy, State Department; Bennett Marsh, Director for Caribbean-Central American Affairs, USTR	Caribbean Basin Initiative Mar 26 1982; Guyana	Broadcast by Guyana Broadcasting Corporation and Guyana News Agency

TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
Myles Frechette State Department	US-Cuban Relations Apr 22 1982; Honduras	Used by: <u>El Tiempo</u> , <u>Tribuna</u> , <u>Heraldo</u> , <u>La</u> <u>Prensa</u> , Honduras Radio Nacional
Donna Alvarado, Counsel Subcommittee on Immi- gration and Refugee Policy, Senate Committee on Judiciary	Status of Immigration Legislation Apr 23 1982; Barbados	Used by: <u>The</u> <u>News-Advocate</u> , <u>The Nation</u> , Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation, CANA
Marc Leland Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, Treasury Department	U.S. Monetary Policy Apr 29 1982; USEC	AFP, Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste Economic News Service, <u>Financial Times</u> , Reuter, <u>The Guardian</u> , European Report Agence Europe, <u>The Times</u>
Dr. Carlton Turner, Director, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy; Dominick DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters	U.S. International Narcotics Policy May 11 1982; Peru	<u>Caretas</u> magazine
Donna Alvarado Senate Staff	Pending Legislation on Immigration Policy May 14 1982; Jamaica	<u>The Daily Gleaner</u> , <u>The News</u> , CANA, Radio Jamaica, Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation
John Penfold State Department	Current Status of CBI Proposal May 26 1982; Jamaica	<u>The Daily Gleaner</u> , Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation, <u>The News</u> , CANA, <u>Financial</u> <u>Times/Economist</u> , Radio Jamaica, IPS

TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981

<u>SPOKESMAN</u>	<u>SUBJECT, DATE, COUNTRY</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
John Penfold State Department	Current Status of CBI Proposal May 27 1982; Barbados	<u>The News Advocate</u> , <u>The Nation</u> , <u>CANA</u> , Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (TV and radio)
Leo V. Mayer, Deputy Director, Foreign Agricultural Service, Agriculture Department	US Food Trade Policy Jun 16 1982; Japan	Used as backgrounder by: four leading newspapers — <u>Asahi</u> , <u>Nihon Keizai</u> , <u>Yomiuri</u> , <u>Sankei</u> , one news service —Kyodo, and NHK TV.
Eugene V. Rostow, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	U.S. Arms Control Policy Jun 22 1982; Australia	Questioned by <u>The Sydney Morning Herald</u> , <u>The Australian</u> , <u>Bulletin</u> . Covered in 3-column headline article in <u>The Australian</u> .
Lionel H. Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce, International Trade	U.S. Policy on the Soviet Gas Pipeline Jul 2 1982; Belgium and USEC	Questioned by 5 Belgian and 6 EC-accredited European journalists. TelePress Conference tape later played for major wire services. Articles appeared in British and Belgian papers. Story picked up by Hobart Rowen in 7/3/82 <u>Washington Post</u> .

Speakers and Briefing Teams

SPEAKERS AND BRIEFING TEAMS

USICA's speaker program has consistently supported Project Truth themes by providing authoritative speakers to the most demanding and vital of foreign audiences.

The following subjects have been addressed by USICA-sponsored speakers:

- Afghanistan - Four top speakers held programs in Western Europe, Argentina, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (March - May 1982)
- U.S. Peace Initiatives - A select group of 12 speakers is scheduled to cover Western Europe, Japan, Latin American and several individual countries (Summer 1982)
- Yellow Rain - Sterling Seagrave, author of Yellow Rain became a "media event" in four Western European countries (Fall 1981)

In addition agency officers have been members of special briefing teams, or "truth squads," made up of officials from various U.S. Government agencies sent to selected countries (mostly in Western Europe) to meet with government counterparts, academics, and the press in a coordinated effort to press home the administration's policy on key issues. Themes addressed by these briefing teams have been:

- Soviet Active Measures
- Chemical Warfare
- El Salvador

Reaction to the teams' visits has been very positive. On Yellow Rain, for example, the team's trip generated extensive press coverage and, most importantly, a public statement of agreement with the U.S. position from the British government.

Since January 1, 1982 the following topics supporting U.S. foreign policy initiatives have been addressed by USICA sponsored speakers:

<u>TOPICS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SPEAKERS</u>	<u>AREA</u>
Soviet Military Power	29	Europe
President Reagan's Zero Option Proposal	23	Europe
Martial Law in Poland	12	Europe
Pipeline/Sanctions	3	Europe
American Foreign Policy in the Middle East	12	NEA, EA
Cuban Hemispheric interference	3	Latin America
Caribbean Basin Initiative	4	Latin America

Foreign Press Center

L. Foreign
Press Center

FOREIGN PRESS CENTERS

Programming at the New York and Washington Foreign Press Centers has focused to a great extent on Project Truth themes. Special briefings for foreign correspondents provide coverage not otherwise readily available in leading foreign newspapers and magazines. During the past year the following themes have been addressed:

- International economic problems (fifteen briefings)
- U.S. policy towards Latin America (four briefings)
- Yellow Rain (briefing by Richard Burt)
- Afghanistan Day (briefing by U.S. Afghanistan Day coordinator, former Secretary of State William Rogers)
- U.S.-Soviet relations (briefings by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Helmut Sonnenfeldt)
- Soviet pipeline (briefing by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Lawrence Brady)
- U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (briefing by USICA's W. Scott Thompson)

The Foreign Press Centers also arrange programs for visiting journalists and excursions outside Washington and New York for the resident corps. For example, Project Truth-related themes (mainly security issues such as arms control) were the main interests of a group of NATO journalists as well as a separate group of Norwegian security writers.

Since September 23, 1981 the following officials participated in special briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center:

<u>NAME AND TITLE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President	State of the Union: Where We Go from Here	1/27/82
David R. Gergen, Assistant to the President and Staff Director	White House perspective one year after the election	11/4/81
Jerry Jordan, Member President's Council of Economic Advisors	International Trade and Monetary Policy, Interest Rates	2/18/82
Donald Regan, Secretary of Treasury	Preview of Upcoming Versailles Summit Meetings	5/25/82
Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce	Purpose/Results - Trip to Japan and Korea	11/12/81

-2-

Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Representative to U.N.	U.S. and the United Nations	3/1/82
Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	MX Program	10/2/81
Fred Ikle	Clarification of U.S. Position on Nuclear War	6/4/82
Beryl Sprinkel Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs	Upcoming annual IMF Meeting	9/23/81
Beryl Sprinkel	Multilateral Develop- ment Banks and Interest Rates	2/25/82
Beryl Sprinkel	U.S. - European Economic Relations	4/30/82
Beryl Sprinkel	Follow-up to the Versailles Summit Meetings	6/14/82
Ambassador Edward Rowny, Special Representative for ACDA	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks	6/24/82
James P. Wade, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense	Enhanced Radiation Weapon	10/5/81
Henry Nau, National Security Council	Caribbean Basin Initiative	2/25/82
James Rentschler, National Security Council	European Summit Meetings - Emphasis on NATO Meetings	5/28/82
Senator William V. Roth	Weapons Commonality and Interoperability	5/13/82
Senator John Heinz	International Trade Issues	2/9/82
Senator Henry M. Jackson	U.S. - Soviet Relations	12/3/81
Henry C. Wallich, Governor of Federal Reserve Board	Objectives for Monetary Policy	3/16/82

-3-

Dr. Alice Rivlin, Director
of Congressional Budget
Office

Economy and the Budget 4/6/82

Mayor Ed Koch of New York

General - from New York FPC 2/8/82

Films and Videotapes

M. Films and
Videotapes

FILMS/VIDEOTAPES

Following the agenda of the Project Truth Executive Committee, the USICA Television and Film Service has acquired or produced visual materials on such key themes as Afghanistan, Yellow Rain, Soviet Military Power and Poland. These materials have been placed extensively on third country television and used by our Foreign Service Officers overseas in small group discussions following private screenings. Some examples:

AFGHANISTAN

- "Afghanistan: The Fight to Regain Freedom Continues" is an Agency production based on the best available footage from virtually every available film source on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Producers then added interviews with former Afghan government officials, French doctors with experience in Afghanistan, and Soviet experts to produce a hard-hitting, highly credible program. This film/videotape was completed in time for use overseas in March 1982 in connection with Afghanistan Day, and became the centerpiece of many Afghanistan Day observances around the world. It has also been shown on television in many countries.

YELLOW RAIN

- The Agency acquired the ABC Close-Up program "Rain of Terror," and distributed copies of the program to our posts in over 50 countries, where it has been used in small-group showings with highly placed contacts. In at least two instances, showings to local TV station managers sparked commercial interest in acquiring the videotape directly from ABC for local showing. At present, the Television and Film Service is producing its own program on Yellow Rain which will highlight U.S. charges, scientific proof and third country statements in support of our position.

POLAND

- Poland: The Television and Film Service is currently completing production of a major film on Poland which will feature visual material only--no dialogue--designed to illustrate the continuing Soviet oppression in Poland since World War II. This film will be used overseas in conjunction with the Agency's Academy Award-winning film "Czechoslovakia 1968" which also used the news footage/no dialogue technique.

Additional films produced on Project Truth themes:

- SOVIET MILITARY POWER
- RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

The latter has proved especially useful in Arab Middle Eastern countries to illustrate the United States' commitment to protection of its interests in that area.

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for list of Agency film and VTR productions and acquisitions with Project Truth related items underlined.

Wireless File

N. Wireless File

WIRELESS FILE

The Wireless File is a key tool in communicating with our 200 field posts, and through them to our foreign audiences, on Project Truth themes. Of the hundreds of items carried on the five geographical branch files since January 1982, for example, well over 20% resulted from Project Truth inter-agency coordination. Several examples will illustrate:

- El Salvador - USICA formed a special task force to develop materials for the Wireless File on the elections in El Salvador. This task force worked closely with the State Department's working group on El Salvador, which was in turn represented in Project Truth deliberations. The result was a flood of material in the weeks leading up to the Salvadoran elections. Over 100 items ran on the file in the five weeks leading up to the Salvadoran election, most targeted specifically for use in Europe.

- Yellow Rain - The Wireless File has carried virtually every newsworthy item on Yellow Rain since the issue first surfaced in late 1981. By working through the Project Truth process with the Department of State and the inter-agency group on chemical warfare, USICA planned wireless file coverage for the release of the Department of State's Special Report No. 98 on March 22, 1982. The file has also acquired rights to outstanding foreign and domestic reporting on the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and run this material for possible reprinting by third country press. Special interviews and staff-written pieces round out the comprehensive coverage given this issue by the file.

- Afghanistan - Every two months the Wireless File updates a comprehensive Afghanistan chronology documenting the Soviet invasion. In addition to news items, the File frequently runs feature articles paraphrasing the Embassy Kabul situation report (which is designed for use in briefing the foreign press). This piece often provides more hard news than otherwise would be available and is an invaluable source of information to our posts.

- Peace Initiatives - In line with Project Truth Executive Committee decisions, the file began to run numerous items on U.S. arms control and peace initiatives beginning in April 1982. These items included an edited version of a USICA-produced "Peace Initiatives Chronology" which documents U.S. flexibility and Soviet intransigence on this issue. Obviously, concentration on this issue will continue during the START talks, especially for the Western European audiences.

In addition, the Wireless File has been running "VOA editorials" (see following pages).

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample products.

VOA editorials carried world-wide on the Wireless File:

Disarmament

UNSSOD 6/1/82.

US has presented framework for genuine disarmament 6/17/82.

President's European Trip

Reagan pursues economic & arms Reduction talks 6/2/82.

Falklands Crisis

Urges end to war & beginning of negotiations 6/3/82.

Poland

Blaming external scapegoats will not solve Poland's economic & political problems 6/4/82.

Growing Polish Resistance to martial law is evident 6/14/82.

Terrorism

Deplores terrorist attacks against diplomats 6/7/82.

UN Security Council

Israeli withdrawal should be linked to end of PLO attacks from Lebanon 6/8/82.

MBFR

Reagan rekindles MBFR talks 6/10/82.

USSR

NATO sends strong message to Soviets on arms control & security 6/11/82.

Arms Control

US needs to negotiate from position of strength 6/21/82.

Nuclear Weapons

USSR tests weapons in secret while discussing arms control in public 6/22/82.

Reagan's START proposal provides fresh beginning for arms control negotiations 6/28/82.

-2-

Lebanon

Resolution of war requires ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign press & strengthened Lebanese government 6/24/82.

US joins Lebanese government in seeking peaceful solution to conflict 6/30/82.

Technological Exchanges

US pipeline sanctions related to Soviet militarism 6/24/82.

US says pipeline decision is "matter of principle" 7/2/82.

Haig Resignation

Smooth transition from Haig to Shultz ensures continuity in US foreign policy 6/29/82.

Special Publications

**O. Special
Publications**

SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS

The Agency has made a concerted effort to produce or distribute special publications designed to highlight specific information about Project Truth themes. Although the Agency produces pamphlets on a range of issues, these Project Truth-related publications represent the culmination of close inter-agency planning. Many include information specifically declassified at the request of the Project Truth Executive Committee.

Two good examples are the Department of State's Special Report No. 98 on "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan" released March 22, 1982, and our Agency's pamphlet "Afghanistan: The Struggle to Regain Freedom.". The latter was done at the request of the State Department for presentation to high-level audiences throughout the world. The full-color pamphlet used government and non-government supplied photos and a text fully approved by the State Department. Copies were produced in five world languages and released simultaneously worldwide on Afghanistan Day, March 21, 1982. In all, our posts have distributed over 50,000 copies in five languages in over 60 countries.

The special report on chemical warfare came about in response to a Project Truth Executive Committee request for a basic, comprehensive public document on the subject. Since it was important to have this report available for release in the U.S. as well as overseas, the inter-agency group on chemical warfare decided to use the State Department Special Report format (USICA program materials cannot be released in the U.S.). An inter-agency team worked for several weeks to produce the declassified version of the report, while we made plans to carry the text of the report to the field on our Wireless File, cover the release on VOA and pouch copies to all posts on the day of release. The result was a coordinated release in Washington and overseas which resulted in considerable press play worldwide. We are now producing a pamphlet on Yellow Rain, designed for general audiences, which will summarize in an easily understood manner much of the evidence detailed in the special report.

Other examples of coordinated publication efforts are:

- Poland pamphlet - A full-color, prestige pamphlet on martial law in Poland is now being distributed worldwide in language versions.

- State Department Special Report No. 88 on Soviet Active Measures - This report appeared in the Wireless File and USICA pouched numerous copies to all our posts.

-2-

- Soviet Military Power - USICA participated in the drafting of this DOD report, acquired 12,000 copies and distributed them by air freight to over 40 key posts worldwide. In addition, USICA field posts have worked with local publishers to assure commercial translations in German, Korean, Turkish, Spanish, Japanese and several other languages.

- In Search of Peace - This multi-language Agency publication was offered to the field just before the President's trip to Europe and the opening of START talks and is intended to illustrate the historic U.S. dedication to achievement of nuclear arms control.

- NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons - USICA worked closely with State and DOD on planning the release of this report. We produced copies in English for our posts, and key quotes from the text were transmitted worldwide on the Wireless File on the day of release.

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample products.

Magazines

MAGAZINES

Several of our regular USICA publications, particularly Problems of Communism, have supported many of the Project Truth themes by featuring articles to enlighten their readers and to encourage fresh analysis. For example, articles on the following Project Truth themes have appeared in Problems of Communism over the last several months:

Afghanistan (two articles)

Poland (five articles)

Soviet Military Power (five articles)

Soviet use of Proxies (three articles)

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder, "Project Truth Examples" for sample copy of magazine.

The following USICA magazines are produced in Washington and distributed world-wide:

	<u>Where Principally Distributed</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Frequency (Issues Per Year)</u>	<u>Circulation Per Issue</u>
America Illustrated	U.S.S.R.	Russian	12	66,600
al-Majal	North East & North Africa	Arabic	12	19,200
Economic Impact	Worldwide	English & Spanish	4	63,000
Dialogue	Worldwide	English & 15 others	4	220,000
Problems of Communism	Worldwide	English	6	20,000
Topic	Sub-Saharan Africa	English & French	6	52,000

The following USICA publications are produced in the field and distributed locally:

Trends	Japan	Japanese	6	15,100
Span	India	English	12	79,125
Interlink	Nigeria	English	4	9,000
Boletim Comercial	Brazil	Portuguese	10	6,500
Trade USA	East Asia	English	6	16,775
Vocero Comercial	Latin America	Spanish	6	19,350

Voice of America

Q. Voice of America

VOICE OF AMERICA

The Voice of America is an integral part of all Project Truth deliberations, and Project Truth themes and programs have included a VOA program component. Broadcasting over 954 hours a week in 41 languages to an audience estimated at over 104,000,000 persons, the VOA is the U.S. Government's most effective medium for communicating rapidly and directly to mass foreign audiences.

Project Truth has been particularly valuable in providing VOA with support material for editorial treatment of such major issues as Poland, Afghanistan, "yellow rain", and the Administration's arms reduction initiatives. Discussion in the Project Truth forum has led directly to editorials on Soviet exploitation of Vietnamese laborers and on Soviet and East German double standards with respect to the peace movement.

VOA editorial coverage of the President's historic European trip was also the direct beneficiary of advance coordination through Project Truth.

A good example of VOA's involvement in Project Truth is coverage of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. VOA covered Afghanistan as a news item beginning with the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Programming also included numerous commentaries, editorials and news analyses as well as features. However, planning for Afghanistan Day, March 21, 1982 included a new facet; VOA announced the establishment of Pushtu language service on Afghanistan Day in recognition of the need of the Afghanistan people for more outside news in their most prevalent language. This announcement was the result of a Project Truth initiative and represented a major highlight of the U.S. Government's Afghanistan Day program. (See memorandum from Project Truth Executive Committee to VOA included under this tab on following page.)

A recently instituted editorial procedure at VOA strengthens VOA's advocacy of the Administrations foreign policy and eliminates any ambiguity about VOA's responsibility to support our national interest as well as to report the news.

The daily "VOA editorials" are intended to communicate the USG position on international issues and to persuade listeners of the validity of our point of view.

The Wireless File regularly carries VOA editorials to 200 posts in 124 countries. (See samples in accompanying blue book "Project Truth Examples" under Tab N, Wireless File)

March 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: VOA - Mr. Charles E. Courtney
FROM: John Hughes *JH*
SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Afghanistan

As Chairman of the Project Truth Executive Committee, I wish to relay the sense of the Committee on two matters related to VOA broadcasting to Afghanistan.

The Executive Committee, during its February 3, 1982 meeting warmly endorsed the suggestion of one of its members that VOA begin broadcasting to Afghanistan in Pushtu at the earliest opportunity.

In addition, the Executive Committee on February 17, endorsed a second proposal that VOA consider an increase in broadcast time to Afghanistan on March 21 — ideally in conjunction with the BBC — to mark the international observance of Afghanistan Day. Perhaps Pushtu broadcasting could commence on that day as part of this special treatment.

As you know, the Project Truth Executive Committee consists of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense (as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff), CIA, ACDA and the National Security Council. The Committee serves the Project Truth Coordinating Committee, chaired by Director Wick, which has been charged by President Reagan with coordinating the inter-Agency overseas public affairs campaign known as Project Truth.

Exhibits

R. Exhibits

Special Guidance

S. Special Guidance

POLICY PROPOSALS AND GUIDANCES

Central to the Agency's contributions to Project Truth are the public affairs strategy papers and policy guidances developed by our policy guidance staff. In the past year they worked closely with NSC, State and Defense Department officers in shaping U.S. public posture on:

- Soviet military strength
- chemical weapons -- both Soviet use and supply and the rationale for U.S. production
- Soviet active measures and disinformation
- U.S. approaches to the presentation of the U.S. position on arms reduction issues and East-West relations
- the U.S. public response to Soviet/Cuban intervention in Central America and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Poland.

The Policy staff prepared:

- the Project Truth sponsored public affairs strategy for the President's trip to Europe
- public affairs proposals regarding responses to the anti-nuclear, pro-freeze movement and the U.S. position on the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

They are now preparing followup proposals for U.S. public affairs strategy to maintain the momentum of the President's trip to Europe, and in particular:

- to support U.S. economic goals after Versailles
- security objectives after Bonn
- to implement the President's proposal for strengthening democratic institutions throughout the world.

SPECIAL GUIDANCES

In recent months, the guidance staff has prepared for USICA posts abroad and Agency Washington elements a number of guidances on:

- the anti-nuclear movement
- the President's trip to Europe
- the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

-2-

A number of guidance cables were sent to the field on various issues on:

- arms reduction
- East-West relations
- Poland
- Afghanistan
- chemical/biological warfare
- El Salvador and Central America
- the Pipeline issues
- Soviet military expansion.

The guidance staff also researched and wrote the Agency "Chronology of U.S. Arms Reduction Initiatives," and edited and helped coordinate the Agency pamphlet "In Search of Peace."

Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for sample product.

PROJECT TRUTH EXAMPLES

USICA

CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT TRUTH EXAMPLES

INDEX

REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF PROJECT TRUTH PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATERIALS ARE ENCLOSED
UNDER THE FOLLOWING TABS WHICH CORRESPOND TO THE TABS IN THE BLACK BINDER,
"REPORT ON PROJECT TRUTH":

- F. Soviet Propaganda Alert
- G. Countering Soviet Mis-Statements
- H. Soviet Distortions and Fabrications
- I. Dateline America
- M. Films and Videotapes
- N. Wireless File
- O. Special Publications
- P. Magazines
- R. Exhibits
- S. Special Guidance

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Propaganda Alert

== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 8

June 8, 1982

Summary

In May, Soviet external propaganda stressed:

Arms Control and Disarmament. Attacks on proposals made by President Reagan in his Eureka College speech comprised a major portion of Soviet external propaganda. President Brezhnev's proposals in his speech to the Communist Youth Organization Congress were lauded as reasonable and fair in contrast to those of the U.S. The U.S. was accused of trying to force the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally and of seeking military superiority. The antinuclear movement in the U.S. was portrayed as strong and growing. The U.S. was charged with stalling at the Geneva INF talks.

Falklands Crisis. Soviet propaganda carefully avoided supporting the Argentine regime *per se*, but came out strongly against the British, accusing them of aggression and colonialism. The U.S. came under attack for allegedly stalling while pretending to be neutral in order to give the British fleet time to get in position. The U.S. was also accused of desiring military bases in the Falklands. Soviet commentators emphasized the damage done to U.S.-Latin American relations, and predicted the collapse of the OAS. Soviet Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America were especially tendentious.

Chemical and Biological Warfare. Although attention to CBW remained at a high level, with the main emphasis being on alleged U.S. preparations for CBW, few new themes were developed.

Moscow Conference of Religious Workers. Commentary thus far has been low-key, stressing peace and disarmament themes.

NATO Spring Session. Soviets came out swinging as they attacked Secretary Haig for demanding further build-ups in all fields and for allegedly pressuring the NATO allies to get in line with the U.S.'s "aggressive course."

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.**

-1-

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Soviet propaganda in May concentrated on arms control and related issues. While Soviet propaganda always pays great attention to this topic, President Reagan's Eureka College and President Brezhnev's Young Communist League Congress speeches raised the salience of arms control and disarmament themes. With new arms control talks a real possibility, a major part of the increased attention can also be attributed to Soviet Party and government use of their media to justify their positions before their own and the world public.

U.S. Build-Up Real, Soviet "Threat" A Myth

Two standard and long-time themes form the background against which Soviet arguments on arms control are made. The first is that the U.S. is engaging in a relentless--although ultimately futile--attempt to achieve military superiority which can be used to blackmail politically or perhaps even annihilate physically the Soviet Union. A typical example is a May 10 Radio Moscow English broadcast taking the U.S. to task for refusing to agree to a total nuclear test ban suggesting that the U.S. plans for "unprecedented" nuclear rearmament in the next few years and is making "energetic preparations for nuclear war."

On the other hand, Soviet propaganda dismisses the idea that the USSR constitutes a nuclear or conventional threat to the West. A Yurii Soltan commentary on Radio Moscow English (May 12) innocently asserted:

The Soviet Union has never initiated an arms race, including a race in nuclear armaments. The Soviet Union has never spent on defense a single ruble beyond what is absolutely necessary to guarantee its own security and that of its allies. The same can be said about the future.

Implicitly contrasting Soviet and U.S. policy, an April 29 S. Vishnevskii Pravda article entitled ". . . Pot Calling The Kettle Black" somewhat more aggressively spoke of:

. . . the strictly defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine which rules out preventive wars and the first-strike concept. And, of course . . . the Soviet Union has never blackmailed anyone with the threat of the use of military force, and still less that of nuclear weapons.

(over)

-2-

President's Eureka Speech Dismissed As Propaganda

Apart from the occasional grudging acknowledgment that President Reagan's Eureka College speech signaled a new willingness on the part of the U.S. to negotiate, Soviet commentaries were totally negative--some vociferously so. A Vladislav Koz-
iakov Radio Moscow English commentary on May 13 was typical:

There are two major points in President Reagan's speech One is the repetition of numerous slanderous accusations against the Soviet Union . . . and the other is the assessment of proposals aimed at achieving unilateral military superiority.

Koziakov went on to call the U.S. proposals "insincere and intended to conceal the large-scale nuclear rearmament program planned by Washington." He concluded by saying that this "propaganda trick invented by American policy-makers" will not work.

The Soviets make it clear that while they do not view the START proposal as a new or particularly positive development, they regard the Reagan offer to begin START talks as a "step in the right direction."

Leonid Brezhnev's May 18 speech to the Young Communist League Congress provided the first official high-level reaction. Brezhnev reiterated many of the themes in gentler, more subtle terms than those used by media commentators. He also relied heavily on bland, general statements on the Soviet desire for peace, the importance of negotiations, and similar subjects.

In general, Soviet media emphasized the following points:

- o Arms limitation agreements between the U.S. and the USSR must be based on "equality and undiminished security," principles to which the START proposal does not adhere.
- o The U.S. is seeking unilateral advantage: the Reagan proposal tries to exploit force asymmetries, requiring the USSR to reduce its ICBMs considerably while the U.S. makes only symbolic reductions in its missiles.
- o The START proposal is encountering strong criticism from prominent figures in the U.S. and from "the public." Soviet media highlight critical statements from Western sources.
- o "Some critics" of the Reagan proposal see it as "part of a secret plan by advocates of a tough course to sabotage disarmament so that the United States can continue the rearmament programs without hindrance." (Soviet commentators generally promote this theme by carefully citing Western media sources.)

-3-

Antinuclear Movement Highlighted

Almost every commentary on the subject of arms control and disarmament took note of the antinuclear movement in the U.S. and West Europe. The impression given was that the Pentagon and the White House were virtually besieged with demonstrations and protests against present U.S. policy and plans for building up nuclear and conventional forces.

Speaking on Moscow domestic radio's "International Observers' Roundtable" program on May 3, Vitalii Kobysh gave his account of the antiwar movement:

I was in America recently and can say as an eyewitness that America is literally on the boil and gripped by the antiwar movement. It is moving horizontally, gripping one state after another and one town and county after another; and is also moving vertically, gripping various strata and classes of society.

Washington-based Izvestiia correspondent M. Sturua, in a May 29 dispatch, also testifies to the strength of the movement, describing it as "spreading here faster than a forest fire." The driving force behind it is not any mythical Soviet threat, according to Sturua; it represents "a defensive reaction against the intensified playing with nuclear fire which American imperialism is indulging in."

Writing in the May 16 edition of Pravda, Pavel Demchenko reviewed the worldwide antiwar protests which took place on May Day, and noted the "mass demonstrations [which] were held the other day in Washington at the Pentagon's walls. . . ." The demonstrations supposedly culminated peace marches from Los Angeles and New Orleans which passed through many U.S. cities and which were "everywhere greeted warmly by representatives of public and religious organizations."

Soviet observers see the effects of the antinuclear movement perhaps not as forcing the U.S. Administration to change its policies, but certainly as causing it to shift its propaganda strategy. President Reagan's Eureka proposal for arms talks falls into this category, as do alleged Administration attempts to defuse protests against its policies by claiming that it sympathizes with the basic principles of the movement. On the May 9 edition of Radio Moscow's "International Observers' Roundtable," Gennadii Shishkin commented:

Until quite recently, the Washington Administration was not particularly concerned about propaganda ploys to camouflage its militaristic course. . . . Clearly in response to criticism, Washington is now making quite

(over)

-4-

an effort to make certain adjustments to its propaganda activity and to try to instill in the public the idea of the peace-lovingness of the Reagan Administration. . . . The President even tried to pass himself off as a peace campaigner, and very nearly as a participant in the anti-war movement! He attempted to seduce the people who have joined this movement with a promise to remember peace. . . .

Resumption of Geneva INF Talks

The resumption on May 20 of the INF talks in Geneva was met by Soviet propaganda with strong assertions of the reasonableness of the Soviet position and the absurdity of that of the U.S. Commentaries drew heavily on President Brezhnev's May 18 Young Communist League speech which set out the Soviet attitude toward disarmament in terms "free from any selective approach to the problem" and--in contrast to the attitude of the U.S.--free from seeking "unilateral advantage for itself."

A flurry of print and broadcast commentaries attempted to portray the Soviet Union as the long-suffering promoter of peace and compromise while painting the U.S. as unreasonable, intransigent, and dishonest. Yurii Soltan, in a May 20 Radio Moscow English program, described U.S. behavior thus:

Unfortunately, during the first phase of the talks, the American delegation mostly used the tactics of procrastination. It kept putting forward proposals they knew were unacceptable to the other side, proposals frankly aimed at ensuring for NATO as much as double superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons.

Soltan concluded by warning that the "reasonable approach" which U.S. delegation leader Paul Nitze said the U.S. had drafted during the break in the talks was welcome, but Nitze's statements to the press "set analysts on their guard."

A very strong element of Soviet propaganda, both with regard to INF and strategic weapons, is that tabling totally new proposals is not acceptable. Speaking of INF in a May 20 Radio Moscow domestic service broadcast, Nikolai Shishkin noted:

Of course, it would be important for both the United States and the countries of NATO . . . to pay attention to the Soviet approach--that we do not want to start these talks with a clean sheet. We want these talks to include everything of value which was gained by efforts over a period of many years within the framework of Moscow-Washington talks on the problems of arms limitations.

-5-

FALKLANDS CRISIS

The Falklands crisis occupied a major place in Soviet reporting and commentary during May. The Soviets were careful not to be seen as supporting the Argentine regime, but rather to be seen as defenders of the principle of decolonialism. While there may have been little overt pro-Argentine slant in Soviet commentary, there was a vociferous anti-British line which absolutely denied any legitimacy to British claims and condemned the British as unreconstructed colonialists.

Early U.S. Neutrality Called Ruse

The British were not the main target of Soviet propaganda, however; that honor was reserved for the U.S. Charging that the U.S. had never really been neutral in the dispute, an Anatolii Gan Radio Moscow English broadcast on May 3 typified this line:

In reality the much-publicized shuttle diplomacy of Secretary of State Alexander Haig was nothing but a screen to cover up the Anglo-American compact against Argentina. Haig moreover was winning time to enable the British naval armada to reach the area of the Falklands.

U.S. Said To Want Falklands As Military Base

The main U.S. motive in "giving Britain the green light" was its desire for control of the South Atlantic, mainly by establishing bases on the Falklands. Writing in Pravda on May 9, Nikolai Prozhogin noted:

Indeed, there can hardly be any question of neutrality when from the very start of the crisis Washington has been trying to get its own hands on the subject of the conflict--the Falkland Islands--and establish itself there under the cover of the transfer of the islands to rule by a "tripartite administration--that is, with the participation of the United States itself."

U.S. Involvement Not Limited To Falklands

But Soviet commentators stress that the U.S. involvement goes beyond the Falklands or even the South Atlantic. Yuri Kornilov, in a May 6 Radio Moscow domestic service broadcast, noted:

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-6-

U.S. actions in support of the British militarists fall into the same category as Washington's attacks on Nicaragua, its threats against Cuba and its interference in the affairs of El Salvador. These are all links in the same chain and an integral part of the global imperialist course of the United States, which is based on a reliance on force and attempts to use the big stick to reshape the map of the world, and to dictate its wishes to sovereign countries and peoples.

Yurii Zubkov generalized this theme to the entire Third World in a May 5 Moscow television commentary:

The aggressive actions in the South Atlantic show that [the U.S. and Britain] have need of military... might primarily for blackmail and pressure against those developing countries of the Third World which conduct an independent course, and to strengthen and expand the NATO sphere of activity.

Hypocrisy, treachery, brute force--anything will do for the U.S. Administration's diplomacy and actions in order to create yet another military base, in order to consolidate in yet another part of the world, in order to take another step toward military superiority.

Soviets See Possibility of OAS Collapse

Soviet glee at the damage caused to U.S.-Latin American relations by U.S. support of Britain was barely restrained. Moreover, many commentaries speculated that the U.S. action would lead to the complete collapse of the inter-American alliance. Radio Peace and Progress, broadcasting in Spanish to Latin America on May 11, quoted former Uruguayan Foreign Minister Rovira to that effect, and pushed his idea for replacing the OAS with a regional UN organization for Latin America without the participation of the U.S. Novoe Vremia on May 7 also published a long article entitled "Will President Monroe Spin In His Grave?" which purportedly proved the need for a fundamental reorganization of the OAS.

Other broadcasts and articles pounded away at the theme of the U.S.'s "betrayal" of its hemispheric allies and its failure to live up to its obligations under the Rio Treaty. Yurii Kornilov, in a May 3 TASS commentary, pointed out:

It was not long ago that Washington bristled on every occasion . . . with highfalutin talk to the effect that the United States was all but the most "loyal friend" and "dependable ally" of the Latin

-7-

American countries and that it was prepared, if need be, to honor the commitments assumed and take part in the "collective defense" of these countries.

But now there has emerged a situation in which one of the Latin American states, Argentina, is indeed threatened with the British mailed fist. The Washington "friend" has not only "forgotten" the inter-American assistance treaty, not only pointedly refused to subscribe to the decision of the consultative conference of the foreign ministers of the OAS countries, . . . but openly stated its support for London.

Moscow Spanish Takes The Low Road

Moscow's Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America were definitely more strident and inflammatory than the Russian or English. For example, a Radio Peace and Progress Spanish broadcast on May 12 speculated on the presence of nuclear weapons aboard British ships. Recalling that the Pentagon had often advocated using nuclear weapons in limited wars, the broadcast pointed out:

The United States in every way approves the aggressive operations carried out by its NATO ally and it may even suggest to England to prove that a nuclear war is feasible.

OTHER MAJOR TOPICS

Chemical and Biological Warfare

There were few noteworthy developments in Soviet themes on chemical and biological warfare (CBW) in May. The usual charges, countercharges, and denials resurfaced (see April "Propaganda Alert"), and no new themes were developed. Several articles and broadcasts discussed alleged U.S. (or U.S.-sponsored) CBW use in Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

TASS analyst Askold Biriukov charged that President Reagan's Eureka College comments on U.S. policy regarding CBW had no connection with U.S. deeds:

Neither nice words nor frauds will help Washington cover up preparations for a large-scale chemical warfare which are under way in the United States. The peoples who have still fresh in their memory

(over)

-8-

acts of genocide committed by the United States toward the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, are not confident that the United States will not commit new crimes against mankind.

Moscow Conference Of Religious Workers

The Moscow conference of "Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe" came off without a hitch and can be considered a subtle propaganda success for the Soviet Union. While no ringing endorsements of Soviet policy were issued and the U.S. was never directly taken to task, the Soviets accrued some credits by sponsoring the conference. The conference was not given a great deal of play in the media. The propaganda points will probably be scored in the future as the final document is used to support attacks on U.S. weapons policy (among others, it called for a ban on the use of enhanced radiation warheads).

NATO Council Spring Session

The NATO Council session was characterized as being devoted to attempts by the U.S. to bring its allies into line. TASS on May 18 saw the session as:

opening against a background of U.S. and NATO leaders' intensifying pressure on West European countries aimed at forcing them to agree unreservedly to a course of confrontation in the international sphere and the activation of military preparations proclaimed by Washington.

Secretary Haig is said to have demanded a further build-up of NATO military potential in all fields. According to the Soviets, he "unleashed frantic activity" in an effort to whip recalcitrant allies into line with the U.S.'s aggressive course. The final communique--especially the passages on economic sanctions--came in for special condemnation.

AROUND THE WORLD

Western Europe

The U.S. and NATO were accused of attempting to convert Cyprus into a Middle East outpost. Norway was taken to task for acceding to U.S. and NATO plans for making it a jumping-off place for conventional and nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union. Secretary Haig's trip to Greece was portrayed as an attempt to bring the country to heel and return it to the

-9-

NATO fold. The U.S. was accused of intolerable interference in the internal affairs of France when the U.S. Ambassador allegedly criticized the government for permitting communists to become ministers. The machinations of the U.S. and its NATO allies in Poland came in for the usual heavy treatment.

The Netherlands gave the excuse for perhaps the nastiest anti-U.S. comment of the month. Speaking of the monument to slain Dutch journalists in El Salvador placed in front of the U.S. consulate in Amsterdam, Radio Moscow English commentator Viktor Olin spoke of its appropriateness:

The Dutch journalists were killed with United States bullets, fired from United States rifles. They were killed by soldiers trained by United States instructors and led by officers trained at United States schools. They were killed on orders from people fully obedient to Washington.

Latin America

Several commentaries on Cuba stressed the armed blackmail represented by the Ocean Venture-82 exercises.

Asia

Vice President Bush's visit to China commanded heavy attention. Commentaries stressed that, despite allegedly duplicitous U.S. behavior with respect to the Taiwan issue, there was little possibility of a U.S.-PRC split over Taiwan. Japan was described as being turned into a dangerous "springboard for U.S. expansion into the Far East" contrary to the wishes of its people.

Africa

U.S. complicity in South Africa's raids on Angola was allegedly proven by the fact that they took place shortly after a visit by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker. The U.S. is supposedly turning Kenya into one of its strongholds in the Indian Ocean.

Middle East

Israel's raids into Lebanon were tied to the arrival of U.S. envoy Richard Fairbanks. The U.S. is purportedly exploiting the Iran-Iraq war to widen the split among the Arab countries.

-10-

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-11-

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-12-

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== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 7

April 30, 1982

Summary

This special edition of the alert contains some of the more outrageous charges against the U.S. made by Soviet propagandists in the past few months. The term "disinformation" best describes this output, which is distinct from ordinary Soviet propaganda. These accusations cover a variety of topics, but the majority focus on chemical and biological warfare, as has the overall Soviet propaganda effort in this period.

As a reminder to our readers, the Soviet Propaganda Alert is a series of reports on current Soviet external propaganda. These reports are based on cable reporting, primary source material, and secondary sources such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) publications. The purpose of the alert is to highlight and analyze major Soviet propaganda themes.

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.**

- 1 -

DISINFORMATION

Soviet media often use propaganda techniques that are rather refined and sophisticated. The Soviet propagandist generally relies more on distortion, one-sided and slanted presentation of information, insinuation and manipulation of facts, than on outright, blatant falsehood. But the latter is by no means overlooked.

A whole range of methods is brought to bear in disinformation campaigns conducted by the Soviets using both their own and non-Soviet media conduits. Described briefly below are several of the more outrageous fabrications which the Soviets have circulated recently. These items obviously fit in with broader Soviet propaganda objectives--for example, the "CIA kidnappings in Honduras" story is part of the campaign to fuel anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America, to strengthen the myth of the powerful, evil, and omnipresent CIA, and to create an image of Americans as inhumane exploiters. The first item below appears to be part of Moscow's effort to divert public attention from the evidence of Soviet use of toxins in Afghanistan and Soviet complicity in their use in Southeast Asia.

Moscow Launches Disinformation Offensive against University of Maryland Medical Research Center in Pakistan

The February 3 issue of the popular Soviet weekly Literaturnaia gazeta featured a two-page spread on alleged chemical and biological weapons research and use by the U.S. In addition to a fearsome science-fiction sketch of giant insects hovering over a city skyline, an article appeared entitled "Incubator of Death" which took up three-quarters of one page. This sensationalistic narrative by veteran Soviet correspondent Iona Andronov deals with the University of Maryland's Pakistan Medical Research Center (PMRC) in Lahore. Here, charges Andronov, CIA-sponsored scientists are conducting research on "poisonous mosquitoes" in order to exploit them for "bacteriological warfare."

Andronov's article is fundamentally an account of his mission, undertaken on the spot in Lahore, to investigate the PMRC. Referring to such dubious publications as the Communist Party's Daily World and Philip Agee's Covert Action, Andronov notes by way of introduction that accusations against the Center surfaced over a year ago. According to various sources, such as one Abdul Aziz Danishyar, identified as the editor of the Kabul New Times, the PMRC was actually doing research on "bacteriological warfare" under the guise of studying malaria and similar diseases. One immediate goal of the research was alleged to be the staging of "mosquito military ventures" against Afghanistan--that is, starting epidemics in Afghanistan by infecting nomads and their herds in Pakistan with deadly mosquito-borne viruses which the nomads would transmit to Afghanistan during their seasonal migration there.

(over)

- 2 -

In the course of his story, Andronov hits all the requisite targets--the CIA, imperialistic and racist American attitudes, bloodthirsty and fanatical American researchers. His main themes include the following:

- o The activities of the Medical Research Center are funded by the Agency for International Development, which, Andronov glibly declares, is "in essence, the CIA." Offering no evidence whatsoever, Andronov depicts the Center as being under CIA control. The CIA is alleged to be applying PMRC's research in "germ warfare" in Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. For example, noting the high reproduction rates of female experimental mosquitoes shown him during his tour of the PMRC laboratory, Andronov concludes that only a fraction of the mosquitoes produced can be processed. Therefore, "it's evident that the rest are being sent from there to the CIA's Caribbean sabotage bases near Cuba."

- o The Center is harmful to the local Pakistani population. Andronov repeats a story that a year ago, "dozens of Lahore residents were attacked by swarms of mosquitoes belonging to a species unusual in that region. People who were bitten by them came down with yellow fever, hepatitis, and jaundice, and some went insane." The Lahore doctors, Andronov claims, could do nothing to help their doomed patients. But they did find the source of the disaster--"the African *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes [which] were being incubated by the thousands at the PMRC laboratory." Citing more groundless rumors as further evidence, Andronov asserts that the PMRC researchers have exhibited a careless disregard for the local population and have exploited them as human guinea pigs.

- o The U.S. personnel running the center are immoral, conniving, personally loathsome individuals totally lacking in respect for human life. Andronov resorts to extremely derogatory and crude descriptions of the two American scientists he dealt with at the center, trying in his physical characterization of them to underscore negative moral traits. They appear in his article as unbelievable caricatures of evil "mad scientists."

This story's unsubstantiated charges have been widely replayed by both Soviet and non-Soviet (especially South Asian) media. To cite just a few examples: TASS (Feb. 11) summarized the Literaturnaia gazeta story; Moscow Radio in an English-language broadcast (March 24) repeated and expanded upon it; a follow-up story was published in Literaturnaia gazeta on March 24; the Austrian Communist Party organ Volksstimme carried on April 3 an APN (Novosti) article containing the allegations against PMRC; the Pakistani mass-circulation daily Jang (in Urdu) printed an article based on Andronov's original; and the Times of India and the Patriot (India) carried on March 9 a Press Trust of India item quoting a TASS version of the story. Much use has been made of the radical Lahore weekly Viewpoint which has long been involved in developing and spreading propaganda against the PMRC.

- 3 -

The techniques used in "Incubator of Death" are not new or unusual, but Andronov employs them with considerable skill. Several of the most noteworthy are:

- o Incorporating some facts and elements of truth into a disinformation effort. A prime example of this is the impressive-sounding scientific background on malaria and disease-carrying mosquitoes. Such material is designed to enhance the writer's credibility and impart to the whole story, including the most absurd aspects, an air of "scientific truthfulness."
- o Playing on the sensitivities, fears, or prejudices of members of one's audience. Many in third-world--and other--audiences are conditioned to believe charges of "CIA involvement" and respond in a predictable fashion to the cry of "CIA." Another attempt in Andronov's story to play to third-world readers is a description of how he pretends to be "a typical American" in order to get past the guards at the Medical Research Center: "After all, the management here was American and the guards were Pakistanis, which meant that they were probably used to subserviently obeying fair-skinned Yankees. And I was right: The guards stepped back when, thrusting out my chin Texas-style, I walked with a swagger up to the forbidden door."

Short Takes: Samples of Soviet Disinformation

This section presents, in brief form, particularly offensive and/or outrageous offerings from the Soviet media.

- o Repeat play on CIA complicity in Dozier kidnapping. Moscow Radio on February 24 reiterated a charge which originally surfaced immediately after the release of General Dozier by Red Brigade terrorists. The broadcast alleged: ". . . [M]any people in America wonder whether the Dozier case was not from start to finish a provocation by the CIA. . . . Such an operation could have been prepared to direct public attention away from the Pentagon's dangerous plans in Western Europe and to reduce the intensity of the antiwar movement in NATO countries." Incidentally, the Italian daily Corriere della Sera (March 26) noted that another old Soviet line has reappeared in the journal Druzhba narodov ("Friendship of the Peoples")--the absurd charge of CIA complicity in the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro.

- o U.S. staging a "publicity show" around Pentecostal Lidia Vashchenko. The case of the Soviet Pentecostals who sought and obtained refuge in the American Embassy Moscow years ago and are still there, unable to receive visas to emigrate, is a complex problem. U.S. authorities have long tried--and continue to try--to resolve the situation satisfactorily. The recent hunger strike, hospitalization, and eventual return home of one of the Pentecostals, Lidia Vashchenko, was widely reported in the West. The situation--and the publicity accorded it--was a great source

(over)

- 4 -

of embarrassment to Moscow, particularly as it came at a time when Soviet authorities are going to extremes to demonstrate Soviet religious tolerance and win the support of international religious leaders and groups for Moscow's May propaganda-fest, the "World Peace Conference" nominally sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Patriarch. Thus Soviet propagandists, seeking to counter Western coverage, provided their own sketchy report of the Vashchenko episode, slanting it to portray the U.S. as "staging" various actions as "anti-Soviet publicity stunts." However--they noted reassuringly--this U.S. "anti-Soviet effort" was doomed to failure, since thinking people would immediately see through American behavior.

o "Children Kidnapped in Honduras" Reprinted from the FBIS translation (USSR Daily Report, February 23), here is a particularly absurd piece of Soviet disinformation.

Moscow Radio in Spanish to Latin America:

In Honduras, the CIA is kidnapping children of Salvadoran refugees. These operations are being carried out behind the facade of the religious organization, World Vision, which officially performs charitable activities in refugee camps. The shepherds of souls, who are in fact CIA agents, promised the mothers that their children will receive good nourishment and education in the United States. The poor peasants can only acquiesce since their children are threatened with death by starvation. They give their children to World Vision missionaries and thus hundreds of children of both sexes have been taken to camps in unknown places.

Some information about the whereabouts of those Salvadoran children who were sent to the United States has surfaced through delegates to the international encounter of Christian organizations in Cuernavaca, Mexico. One of those delegates, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, reported that those Salvadoran children have been taken to CIA special camps in the United States where they are submitted to tests before being separated in groups. Thus some groups are sent to special brainwashing schools where they are trained to spy and perform terrorist acts. Others who do not qualify for the special training are sent to research establishments of the CIA where the children are used as guinea pigs to test medicines and chemicals capable of changing human consciousness, to practice lobotomies and other experiments.

In the Cuernavaca encounter it was learned that World Vision had performed the same kind of activities in Vietnam.

Prepared by: PGM/R Staff

== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 6

April 26, 1982

Summary

In March and April, Soviet external propaganda has stressed:

- o Chemical and Biological Warfare. Soviets continued to deny vehemently that they have any involvement whatever in chemical/biological warfare (CBW). Attacks on the U.S. for alleged past and present use of CBW in many parts of the world--including Vietnam, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cuba, and even the USSR--have increased in frequency. As more evidence emerges of Soviet use or support of CBW, the more strident have become Soviet assaults on the U.S.
- o Arms Control and Peace Movements. The Brezhnev moratorium proposal of March 17 has formed the centerpiece of Soviet propaganda. Peace movements in Europe and the U.S. have been emphasized and played as if they completely support Soviet positions. President Reagan's March 31st press conference and Secretary of State Haig's Georgetown speech of April 6 have been cited as duplicitous justifications for U.S. attempts to gain military superiority and for the first use of nuclear weapons.
- o Falklands and Latin America. Soviets claim that the U.S. plans to exploit the Argentine seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in order to establish military bases in the South Atlantic. Other charges include alleged American subversion of Nicaragua and Cuba, collusion in the Guatemalan coup, and support of "bloody, repressive" regimes in Honduras and El Salvador.
- o Espionage, Plots, and Warmongering. In several other parts of the world the CIA stands accused of spying (Greece) and plotting coups (Iran, Zimbabwe), while American militarists purportedly are bringing Korea and Japan ever closer to war.

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- 1 -

CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The two main foci of Soviet propaganda in March and April have been chemical/biological warfare (CBW) and nuclear arms talks.

The primary purpose in the first theme remains to defend the USSR from charges that it is guilty of using chemical weapons in Afghanistan and of supporting chemical warfare in Southeast Asia. The more persuasive the American case against the Soviet Union has become, the more vituperative and hysterical has been the Soviet assault against the U.S. on this issue.

"A Lie Remains a Lie"

In the face of growing evidence demonstrating Soviet supplying of "Yellow Rain" in Southeast Asia and use of mycotoxins in Afghanistan, the only Soviet response has been a blanket denial of any wrongdoing. TASS (March 22) gave the typical line:

The fables about "Yellow Rains" in Asia and about "mycotoxins" of, allegedly, Soviet make--the fables meant for American philistines--are nothing but dirty lies which cannot cast a slur on the honest and consistent line of the Soviet Union, which, distinct from the United States, was among the first to join the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical weapons. . . . [The USSR] never used warfare toxic agents anywhere.

Summoning up his indignation, TASS political observer Iuri Kornilov proclaimed: "As to all sorts of inventions of the CIA around which Washington launches another propaganda hullabaloo, it can be said that a lie remains a lie no matter how many times it is repeated."

Attempted Refutation of U.S. Charges

TASS analyst Askold Biriukov (April 6) added to his denials the following:

The groundlessness of the claims made by the leading figures of the U.S. administration is obvious. International experts on chemical weapons and skilled medical personnel from different international organizations have more than once debunked the allegations about Soviet chemical weapons cooked up in the Washington kitchen of psychological warfare.

According to Biriukov, a team of U.N. experts had visited Pakistan and reported on their findings.

The experts investigated the claims of Western, primarily American, propaganda about the "use" of these weapons in

(over)

- 2 -

Afghanistan and unanimously concluded that they were not corroborated by facts. Some time earlier the same conclusion had been made by U.N. experts who had investigated the false assertions about "the use of chemical weapons of Soviet make" in Kampuchea.

The fact that no final report has been issued by the U.N. team that visited Pakistan has not deterred Soviet media from claiming exoneration by these outside observers.

Pointing the Finger

Soviet propagandists have felt that the best defense against U.S. accusations on chemical warfare is to go over to the offense. Soviet media are full of charges against the U.S. for its alleged use of chemical or biological warfare in nearly every corner of the world.

In particular, Soviets blast the American involvement in Vietnam. "There are numerous facts and even the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Richard Schweiker, had to admit that over 45 million quarts of various chemical substances were aerosol-sprayed over Vietnamese territory" (Radio Moscow, April 6).

In nearly every attack, Soviets cite statistics. For example, Radio Moscow observer Igor Aleksandrov recounted (April 6):

According to conservative estimates, the United States armed forces used over 100,000 tons of chemical substances. American bombers sprayed the defoliant Agent Orange known for its high toxicity. As a matter of fact, over 2 million Vietnamese civilians suffered. Tens of thousands of GIs also became the victims. Considerable damage was inflicted on the economy. Seventy percent of the coconut groves in South Vietnam were wiped out, together with 375,000 acres of tropical plants.

A Krasnaia zvezda publicist, A. Leontiev, was even more detailed in an item entitled "Poisoners' Orgy" (March 24).

In Vietnam alone American aircraft sprayed over 100,000 tons of toxins, as a result of which 43 percent of cultivable land and 44 percent of the forests suffered and 70 percent of coconut groves and 150,000 hectares of topical vegetation were destroyed.

But his clincher was a claim rarely repeated even in Soviet media: "Tens of thousands of Vietnamese died and the health of almost 2 million was ruined" (emphasis added). Only TASS back in February and, surprisingly, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his trip to Yugoslavia in early April have made similar claims about massive loss of life in Vietnam due to American chemical weapons.

Beyond Vietnam, claim Soviet propagandists, targets of American CBW over the years include Cuba, Afghanistan, Korea, Namibia, and

- 3 -

the USSR itself. Krasnaia zvezda's Leontiev, in his March 24 diatribe, wrote that "American intelligence agent R. Albertson, who took part in the intervention in the north of Soviet Russia in 1919, admitted [in a book]: 'We used chemical munitions against the Bolsheviks.'" Leontiev further stated that "in the early fifties the United States used chemical weapons in Korea" and that "American toxins are killing women and children in Namibia"

A recent lengthy piece in Literaturnaia gazeta (March 24) by Iona Andronov, a follow-up to his article on the same subject in Literaturnaia gazeta No. 5 for 1982, described in great detail purported U.S. biological warfare activities. Andronov accused the U.S. of searching the world for exotic poisons to use on various peoples and individuals. Among these poisonous substances were the gall bladder of a crocodile from Tanganyika (1962); "Chondo-dendron Toxicoferum" from the Amazon jungle, curare, and Venezuelan encephomyelitis (all 1966); and "oyster toxin" from Alaska. This does not even include the "killer mosquitoes" supposedly used by the U.S. in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s (the focus of Andronov's article) and the many plagues allegedly visited upon Cuba.

At Fort Detrick, Maryland, the CIA and U.S. Army have, according to Andronov, invented and stored 37 types of bacteriological weapons. On occasion these toxins are employed, as when "the Fort Detrick poisoners killed dozens of prisoner guinea pigs" during the Korean War. And in February 1982, stated Andronov, Salvadoran rebels were subjected to aircraft bombings with American "hemorrhagic conjunctivitis powder."

Still to come, in the view of Soviet propagandists, is use of American chemical weapons in Europe. Thus, Izvestiia (March 28) carries four separate articles by correspondents in Bonn, Rome, London, and Washington--all in a full-page feature entitled "The Pentagon's Gas Chambers"--which imply or declare that there exist "U.S. plans to use chemical weapons in Europe."

The most provocative charges along these lines came in a story by Aleksandr Liutii for TASS English (April 6). He claimed that a high Pentagon official "confirmed" that the U.S. has "launched active preparations for chemical and germ warfare" and that

the U.S. administration could not and was not going to rely on arms control, including that in the field of chemical weapons, and emphasized that the United States should constantly threaten the Soviet Union in that field, regarding chemical war as an integral part of any conflict.

According to Liutii, this Pentagon official stated that 14 percent of the Pentagon's "chemical budget"--\$705 million for the next fiscal year--will go for production of 155mm artillery binary shells, which

(over)

- 4 -

the U.S. military plans to site in the territories of its allies in Western Europe, "thus turning the continent's nations into [U.S.] chemical hostages."

The obvious intent of all these charges, besides diverting attention away from Soviet use of chemical weapons, is to sway world public opinion against the United States and to drive wedges between the U.S. and its European partners.

See the next alert--on Soviet disinformation--for more on CBW.

ARMS CONTROL & THE PEACE MOVEMENTS

The other most important theme of Soviet propaganda in this period has involved U.S.-Soviet negotiations on controlling nuclear arms, especially in Europe, and the peace movements in America and Europe.

The Brezhnev Moratorium

Dominating Soviet discussions of this issue has been President Brezhnev's speech at the 17th Congress of USSR Trade Unions announcing a unilateral Soviet moratorium on the deployment of medium-range SS-20 nuclear missiles in the European USSR. In return for this "freeze," Brezhnev called on the U.S. and NATO to forego deployment of new Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Europe.

Brezhnev's freeze offer was apparently a direct response to President Reagan's zero option plan put forth November 18, 1981 and rejected out of hand by the Soviets. Saying that the "Soviet leadership has once again shown an example of goodwill" (Radio Moscow, March 16), Soviet propagandists have trumpeted this "new initiative" as the best starting point for arms control talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. Soviet commentators have carefully avoided noting that the USSR continues to deploy SS-20s to the east of the Urals, whence they can easily reach targets in West Europe.

Spokesmen like Georgii Arbatov of the USA Institute (Manchester Guardian, March 22) have also taken pains to deny that Brezhnev threatened to place nuclear weapons in Cuba when he said in his speech that, if the U.S. and NATO governments went ahead with deployment of their new European missiles, the USSR would be compelled to take measures in reply which would put the other side, including the U.S. and its territory, in an analogous position.

Much attention in Soviet propaganda has been devoted to the negative American reaction to Brezhnev's proposals. "Washington fears the principle of equality and like security because it stands in the way of its arms drive," was the way commentator Igor Dmitriev put it on Radio Moscow's World Service in English

- 5 -

Soviet propagandists have tried to use the freeze proposal to bring pressure on the U.S. to begin strategic arms talks. Thus, Vladimir Bogachev has written (TASS English, March 18):

Reagan's statement that the production of nuclear arms should not simply be frozen, that the already existing huge levels should be lowered can evoke only perplexity. For it was Washington that rejected the SALT II treaty providing for a substantial reduction of strategic arms. It is the present U.S. administration that under various pretexts and referring to the need of "finalizing the position" of the United States is delaying the resumption of Soviet-American talks on the limitation or reduction of strategic arms. . . .

In Soviet eyes, the aim to obtain leverage may be working. "It should be noted," according to Bogachev, "that on encountering the sharp opposition of the world public opinion, Washington was forced to moderate its tone and make its assessments of the new Soviet initiatives less categorical." Virtually every Soviet commentary on arms control questions finds it necessary to refer to the antiwar and antinuclear movements in Europe and the U.S. as evidence of support for their own positions.

The Peace Movements and Western "Freeze" Initiatives

In fact, Moscow has tried to make much capital out of peace movements in both Europe and America. Most of its propaganda on arms control is addressed directly to those engaged in the movements.

Thus, wrote Vasilii Kharkov (TASS English, April 9):

In Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and other West European countries, mass manifestations against the Pentagon's nuclear madness, for talks, and not confrontation, with the Soviet Union, are characterized by a variety of forms used, the mass scale and coordination of action by different antiwar and pacifist organizations.

That many participants in the marches direct their negative sentiments toward Soviet arms as well is, of course, passed over in silence by Soviet analysts. They prefer to see all the demonstrations as a show of the "determination of the West European peoples to avoid being used as the Pentagon's nuclear hostages."

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Soviet chief of staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, has recently called for a crack-down on pacifism within the Soviet Union. In his booklet entitled Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland, published in late February, Marshal Ogarkov criticized some of the younger generation of Soviets for a "false sense of peace, complacency and pacifism" and urged Party propagandists to "struggle against such elements."

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- 6 -

A source of some surprise and pleasure for Soviet propagandists is the fact that the "current antiwar movement in the USA has a broader basis than in the years of the war in Vietnam," involving "not only the youth but also the 'average American,' moderate sections of the population, church circles, organizations of physicians, lawyers, businessmen, and finds support in political circles and the U.S. Congress" (Ivan Ablamov, TASS English, April 12).

Of particular interest to Soviet commentators has been the freeze proposal advanced by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield. Although this proposal has both "good and bad qualities," in the words of radio commentator Oleg Anichkin (Moscow Domestic, April 9), it is a good indication of the growing resistance to the arms race in the U.S. What no Soviet propagandist will do, however, is endorse such mutual freeze proposals, because that would also mean an end to Moscow's massive arms buildup.

"The war opponents in the West," claimed TASS's Ablamov, "clearly see that, while the Soviet Union advances numerous constructive initiatives, Washington rejects them outright without even getting around to studying them attentively."

"Strange Speech" on The Military Balance

Soviet propagandists were quick to pick up on President Reagan's March 31st news conference statement that the USSR had a margin of superiority in nuclear weapons. Valentin Zorin, a prominent television and radio analyst, called this "fresh proof that some really high-ranking United States officials don't feel bound to stick to the truth when they address their fellow countrymen." He accused Reagan of making this statement "obviously to try and keep in check the mounting public demand in his own country for freezing the existing levels of nuclear arms" (Moscow Radio English, April 10).

Vladimir Bogachev (TASS English, April 9) claimed that "[in] the past, when making similar statements, the President himself and members of his administration got away with it. This time, however, Ronald Reagan's statement has given rise to a stormy reaction in the country." According to Zorin and Bogachev, Senators Moynihan and Jackson have categorically rejected the President's charge, and even earlier statements by Alexander Haig and Caspar Weinberger refute Reagan.

"The President's closest staff members tried to come to Reagan's aid," averred Bogachev, "hinting that the President in his strange speech meant only individual types of Soviet armaments." But the American public will not be fooled, in the view of this Soviet: "broad masses of people in the United States [take the statement] as evidence of the administration's refusal to heed the Soviet Union's new peace proposals and as the administration's refusal to conduct constructive negotiations on limiting and reducing nuclear arms."

- 7 -

Haig "Falsifications" and the Foreign Affairs Article

Secretary of State Alexander Haig's speech on arms control at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies on April 6 evoked strong response from Soviet propagandists. Haig "resorted to the open falsification of commonly known facts to cover up the aggressive character" of U.S. policy, wrote TASS analyst Igor Orlov (April 7). This speech, in Orlov's report, reaffirmed a U.S. program of nuclear arms buildup "which in fact relies on the admissibility of nuclear war and includes the possibility of delivering the first nuclear strike."

According to Soviet commentators, the Haig speech was an attempt to deal a "pre-emptive strike" to a forthcoming article in the journal Foreign Affairs by four former top U.S. officials (George Kennan, McGeorge Bundy, Robert MacNamara, and Gerard Smith). This article argues for, among other things, U.S. renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons.

INF Talks at Geneva and MBFR at Vienna

Not surprisingly, Soviet propaganda has claimed all justice for the Soviet side's positions at Geneva and none for the U.S. stance. Thus, P. Viktorov wrote in Pravda (March 12):

Comparing the Soviet plan for nuclear disarmament in Europe with President R. Reagan's so-called "zero option," international commentators note that the USSR has displayed a desire to make the Geneva talks purposive and constructive and has taken a major step in the direction of solving one of today's most acute problems.

The U.S. approach, however, presupposes talks which would lead to a limitation of the other side's arms without affecting its own armaments. Washington wants only those armaments whose limitation or liquidation would benefit the United States and NATO to come under scrutiny.

At Vienna, the socialist countries have tabled "an important initiative," according to TASS (April 9), but the West has avoided discussion of this document. The reason: NATO and "above all the United States" want to push on with the arms race and establish "military superiority over the USSR and its allies."

It is precisely this course which is stalling the Geneva talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. It is precisely this course which is raising obstructions on the way to agreement in Vienna. . . . This course is shortsighted and unwise. . . . irresponsibility and fanning the nuclear and conventional arms race could end in tragedy.

(over)

- 8 -

U.S. "Madness"

The root cause for all problems in the arms control process are to be found in Washington's policies, according to Soviet commentators. These charges against the U.S. have become increasingly bitter in recent weeks. Typical of the Soviet attacks is an article in the journal Selskaia zhizn (March 13) entitled "Madness as a Policy." In this piece Nikolai Pastukhov wrote: "Real awareness of the terrible danger which is hanging over the planet through the fault of Washington's insane policy is giving rise to a growing protest movement among the broadest circles of the international public against the militarist forces' criminal course."

Pastukhov summed up the current situation as follows: "The threat to peace and universal security emanates from the present American administration, that champion of the U.S. military-industrial complex interests, which has elevated madness to the rank of its official policy."

FALKLANDS CRISIS AND LATIN AMERICA

While for most of this period Soviet propaganda has concentrated on charges of U.S. plots against Nicaragua, Cuba, and other Latin American nations, the Argentine seizure of the Falkland Islands has provided it with a major new theme.

The U.S. Desires a Foothold in the Falklands

At first rather neutral on U.S. involvement in the crisis, more recent commentary from the USSR now includes charges that the U.S. is "trying to exploit the dispute" for its own aims (Krasnaia zvezda, April 2). The U.S. goal, according to Radio Moscow (in Spanish, April 14), is to establish military bases on the Falklands and to control the South Atlantic (TASS, April 13).

Soviet propaganda has also begun to claim a definite pro-British slant to U.S. activity in the crisis (e.g., A. Maslennikov, Pravda, April 12). The USSR, meanwhile, has shown a tendency to support the Argentines in the dispute, largely by criticizing British "threats" smacking of colonialism (TASS English, April 9). Soviets' attempt at "evenhandedness" in the dispute is shown by their use of both the Argentine (Malvinas) and the British (Falklands) names for the islands in most stories.

Reagan's Caribbean Initiative

Overshadowed in April by the new crisis, President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) still continued to draw fire from Soviet propagandists. TASS English (April 9) charged:

The "economic program" which is being imposed on the Caribbean countries is nothing more than a cover-up for Washington's aggressive aspirations and sinister designs against the pro-

- 9 -

gressive countries of the region, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. It is also designed to assure the exploitation of manpower and natural resources of the region by American monopolies.

And just what are these "aggressive aspirations and sinister designs"? In order to solidify "its military and economic positions" in the region, the U.S. will pour huge amounts of money into the "bloody Salvadoran junta" and the "anti-people dictatorships of Honduras and Haiti." These funds, according to TASS English (April 11), "will be used for armed suppression of democratic forces inside these countries and for staging from their territories subversive operations against Nicaragua, Grenada, and other sovereign states."

"Gunboat Diplomacy" and Other "Desperate Attempts"

Apropos of NATO naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Mexico in March, Komsomolskaia pravda correspondent R. Gabdullin wrote that "in an attempt to trample on centers of the revolutionary movement in Latin America, Washington is again pursuing a 'gunboat diplomacy' which runs contrary to common sense" (March 16).

Repeating a charge leveled by Guatemalan revolutionaries, TASS English (March 26) stated: "The military coup in Guatemala is a desperate attempt of the Washington administration and the reactionary Guatemalan military to save the repressive pro-imperialist regime against which the whole people is waging struggle."

The U.S., in the Soviet view, is most anxious to sustain the current "repressive" regimes in Guatemala and Honduras in order to have bases for launching subversion against revolutionary Nicaragua. TASS correspondent Sergei Gorbunov has written (April 1) of U.S. plans to reconstruct air bases in Honduras to handle American combat planes, "thus preparing conditions for armed intervention against revolutionary Nicaragua."

TASS commentator Ruslan Kniazev alleged on March 26 that

behind the smokescreen of a vociferous slander campaign about the Nicaraguans' 'intervention' in the Salvadoran conflict . . . the United States is steadily building up its military muscle in Central America and the Caribbean and escalating preparations for extensive subversive activities against revolutionary Nicaragua.

The other main target of the U.S. in Latin America, say Soviet analysts, is Cuba. When a group of U.S.-based Cuban exiles called Alfa-66 was recently tried in Cuba, Literaturnaia gazeta correspondent Vladimir Vesenskii wrote at length about Washington's alleged "interest in Alfa," foreknowledge of Alfa-66's attempt to assassinate

(over)

- 10 -

ate members of the Cuban government, and, thus, collusion in international terrorism. Vesenskii concluded that Washington intended to "use gangs of this kind as the first echelon, as cover for the agents of the CIA and other American special services, who are allotted the main role in preparing assassinations and major acts of sabotage, such as a biological attack, for instance"

The elections in El Salvador in March also provided grist for Soviet propaganda mills. These were a "foul election farce," cried Novoe vremia (April 2), "staged by the Salvadoran ruling junta to a script prepared in the White House." The U.S. allegedly had much riding on the Salvadoran elections:

It was hoped in Washington that the very fact of elections held will help improve the reputation of this blood-stained regime which has made murder an instrument of political struggle. It was also hoped that elections will help end the growing international isolation of the Salvadoran regime and become an argument to persuade American congressmen . . . that there is nothing reprehensible in this support because it is support to a "duly elected government."

OTHER REGIONS, OTHER COUNTRIES

No Soviet catalog of American perfidy in the world could be complete without some mention of such additional areas as the Far East, Mideast, Africa, and Europe. In this period, Soviet accusations of U.S. interference, pressure, and other malefactions centered on Korea, Greece, Iran, and Zimbabwe.

"Aggressive Intrigues" in South Korea

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's trip through the Far East in March and April occasioned several Soviet attacks on U.S. policy in the Pacific region. A North Korean foreign ministry statement picked up by TASS English (April 7) "firmly condemns U.S. aggressive intrigues in South Korea as a brazen challenge to the peace-loving Korean people and as actions aimed at undermining peace in Asia and throughout the world."

Describing U.S.-Korean plans for continued mutual assistance and military aid, TASS English charged: "Thereby Washington fully revealed its plans of perpetuating American military-political control" of Korea and of using that nation as a "springboard of the United States to blackmail and pressure the independent states of the Far East and Southeast Asia" (March 30).

The United States was also condemned more generally for its "secret deals" with the People's Republic of China--threatening the USSR, Afghanistan, and world peace; its past "genocide" against the Vietnamese; and its pressure on Japan to increase its military activities and spending.

- 11 -

CIA Espionage in Greece

A strike of teachers employed at the U.S. cultural center in Athens led to discovery of some U.S. documents allegedly revealing the center as a hotbed of espionage. Documents of the International Communication Agency, "under whose cover CIA officials actively operate," showed that "the main purpose of the American 'Cultural Center' in Athens is 'penetration of military, parliamentary, diplomatic and administrative circles' of Greece." (TASS English, April 1).

The lesson to be learned in all this, according to Soviet commentators, is that "U.S. intelligence services might push the forces of the right into stepping up their activities, as happened in the past when the black colonels came to power in Greece with the assistance of the United States in April 1967."

U.S. Policy Against Zimbabwe

Conspirators planning to overthrow the government of the republic of Zimbabwe who were arrested by state security organs have been shown to be "closely linked with Western special services, specifically of the United States and Britain"--this according to TASS English (March 27).

In addition, charged TASS commentator Sergei Kulik, "the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund and transnational companies are especially active in carrying out anti-Zimbabwe measures" (April 7). In sum, said Kulik, "Zimbabwe has been added to the list of independent African countries against which the Reagan administration is pursuing a policy of an 'undeclared war'."

Conjoined with these charges concerning Zimbabwe have been other Soviet accusations of U.S. plots against Chad, U.S. backing for "new aggression planned by the racist Republic of South Africa against People's Angola," and a CIA coup plan in Ghana.

U.S. Plots in Iran

Iranian security forces have, according to Soviet reports, discovered an antiregime plot backed by the CIA. The plotters planned to "stir up unrest among various strata of Iranian society, kidnap state figures, plant bombs, and so forth."

Radio Moscow (Persian, March 23) commented on these events thus:

In September last year Alexander Haig explicitly said that everything will be done to return Iran to the ranks of Western society. Washington is substantiating these shameless remarks by the U.S. Secretary of State with its dirty and rude actions. The new plot of the counterrevolutionaries discovered in Iran, and which was directed by U.S. spy masters, is further confirmation of this.

(over)

- 12 -

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Prepared by: FGM/P Staff

== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 5

March 26, 1982

Summary

During February, Soviet international propaganda emphasized:

o U.S. arms control negotiating behavior. Soviet media contended that the U.S. lacks sincere intent to negotiate at Geneva on INF and is using the talks as a "smokescreen" for a massive U.S. military buildup. Conflict between the U.S. and its NATO allies on INF--as well as a myriad of other issues--was played up.

o Chemical weapons. The Soviets intensified their attacks on U.S. chemical weapons policy. Soviet propaganda alleged that the U.S. intends to store chemical weapons in Europe despite objections by NATO allies; is ready to use chemical munitions in a "limited war" in Europe; and has used and is providing chemical weapons for use in the Third World. The Soviets also accused the U.S. of refusing to take part in negotiations to ban chemical weapons, and of "concocting lies" about Soviet use of chemical warfare to divert attention from U.S. activities.

o Poland. Soviet propaganda stressed the familiar theme that Washington is trying to disrupt "normalization" in Poland through subversion and hostile propaganda. The "Let Poland Be Poland" telecast was repeatedly denounced, as were foreign radio broadcasts alleged to be sending "coded instructions" to counter-revolutionaries in Poland. The U.S. was condemned for "shedding crocodile tears" over Poland while enacting sanctions that hurt the Polish people. The Soviet media also criticized the U.S. for allegedly seeking to turn the Madrid CSCE meeting into an "arena of confrontation" over Poland.

o Latin America. To protect American imperialist interests, argued the Soviets, the U.S. resorts to subversion, military adventurism, and "assistance to bloody, repressive regimes." The U.S. was charged with trying to halt the revolutionary process in Nicaragua and Cuba by preparing terrorist groups of exiles for subversive actions and eventual invasions. Direct U.S. complicity in atrocities in El Salvador was also alleged. Soviet news commentators dismissed President Reagan's OAS speech as a "rehash of the Monroe Doctrine." They also claimed that Washington is exaggerating problems in Poland to divert attention from El Salvador.

o Middle East. Soviet media suggested that Egyptian President Mubarak, uncomfortable with close ties to the U.S., is seeking to distance himself from Washington. Soviet commentaries treated Mubarak favorably and expressed a cautious optimism regarding developments in Soviet-Egyptian relations. The U.S. and Israel were blamed, as is customary, for tensions in the Middle East.

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-1-

ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Soviet Line on Geneva Talks

Soviet media focused directly on the Geneva INF talks or tied most general discussions of international security and strategic matters to Geneva. Some attention was also paid to the Vienna MBFR talks. While no fundamentally new themes emerged, familiar ones were adapted for application to Geneva:

- o The U.S. went to Geneva reluctantly only under pressure of international (especially European) public opinion and is not making a serious negotiating effort.
- o The U.S. is using the Geneva talks to create the impression that it strives for peace, favors arms control and reduction, and tries to deal with the Soviet Union. To develop this image, U.S. tactics are to make clearly unreasonable proposals, counting on their rejection, then blame the Soviet side for obstructionism. At the same time the U.S. ignores reasonable Soviet proposals.
- o Using Geneva as a "smokescreen," the U.S. is carrying out an immense military buildup--increasing the defense budget, developing new types of weapons, and expanding its resources abroad.

According to the Soviets, U.S. "stalling" at Geneva fits into the overall strategy of Washington's drive for political-military superiority: "the U.S. opposes any concrete results which might hinder the siting of new U.S. missiles [in Europe] and spoil the Pentagon's plans for the United States to achieve military superiority" (TASS, Feb. 11). American "obstructionism" at Geneva was related to increases in the military budget, to interventions throughout the world aimed at shoring up or expanding U.S. power, to confrontation with the Soviet Union, and to the "doctrine of the acceptability of 'limited nuclear war'."

The Soviets maintained that the USSR, in contrast to the U.S., adheres to a "peace-loving" policy and consistently supports arms control and reduction. But, in the interests of security and progress, the USSR cannot and will not permit the U.S. to achieve the world domination it seeks. Thus if the U.S. is determined to escalate the arms race, Moscow has no choice but to keep pace.

Greater Media Attention to Geneva

Soviet media coverage of Geneva in December was sparse and avoided direct comment on U.S. negotiating behavior. Treatment of the subject increased in January, but a decision to "go public" on the issue of negotiating positions was clearly indicated only on February 9 with the release of an authoritative TASS commentary on the Soviet stance, repeated the following day in the central press. Subsequently, remarks on INF made by Leonid Brezhnev were widely

(over)

-2-

reported as indications of Moscow's offering of new "concrete" proposals.

Soviet media handling of Geneva was intended partly to counter the impact of President Reagan's February 4 announcement of the U.S. draft of an INF treaty. Western analysts suggested that Moscow felt it was necessary to generate pressure from public opinion to moderate the U.S. position at the negotiations. They also speculated that Moscow's decision was influenced by East-West tensions over the Polish situation and Soviet anxiousness to discredit the U.S. policy of linkage.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Soviet propaganda on chemical weapons increased and became more strident in February. In addition to a barrage of domestic and international press and radio items devoted to the subject, criticisms of U.S. chemical munitions policy frequently appeared in treatments of other subjects, such as American foreign policy in general, CSCE, and the U.N. To some extent, the intensification of Soviet propaganda appeared to be a response to Western coverage of Soviet complicity in lethal chemical weapons use in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. The Soviets also charged the U.S. with developing lethal biological weapons--a form of warfare which the U.S. has repudiated.

Techniques in Treating the Chemical Weapons Theme

Soviet propaganda strove for effect with dramatic descriptions of the chemical weapons allegedly being produced or planned for production by the U.S. Nothing was said about Soviet possession of lethal chemical and biological agents. Soviet reports criticized the U.S. for already having the "world's greatest arsenal of 'silent death'" yet preparing to spend "billions of dollars more" on chemical weaponry.

The Soviets also relied on a one-sided piling up of facts and figures--some accurate, some not, many attributed to Western sources--on chemical weapons: what types of munitions the U.S. has, how much of various types, budget allocations for binary chemical weapons, "case studies" of American use of chemical agents, and so forth. Soviet propaganda continued to deny charges leveled against the USSR regarding chemical and biological weapons use.

Chemical Weapons in Europe

The Soviets stressed that the U.S. is "proceeding with plans to turn Europe into a storehouse of binary chemical weapons" despite objections of the European NATO allies. Just as with "limited nuclear war," contended Soviet commentators, the U.S. envisions Europe as a potential theater for chemical war and has little regard for European fears of this: "The United States' new binary munitions are first-strike weapons meant for use on the European territory." (TASS, Feb. 9)

-3-

Parallels were drawn with other cases of the U.S. "forcing" Europe to accept certain weaponry, e.g., new American medium-range nuclear missiles and the ERW.

Chemical Weapons in Third World Trouble Spots

Soviet media alleged that in addition to the European theater, the U.S. plans to deploy chemical weapons in Asia and the Middle East. Soviet regional radio broadcasts emphasized U.S. intentions to bring chemical weapons to those regions. Propaganda for Middle Eastern audiences, for example, stressed that eventually chemical weapons are to be placed in Israel for use in "localized conflicts." (Moscow Radio's Hebrew as well as Arabic broadcasts warned of potential ruin of the area by chemical war.)

Sharply denying American charges that the USSR is responsible for chemical and biological weapon use in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, the Soviets countered with accusations of American use of such agents in those and other areas. According to the Soviet line, the U.S. is trying to justify and/or divert attention from its own chemical weapons policy by fabricating groundless charges against the Soviet Union--"irresponsible claims [which] were shown to be false following enquiries" (Radio Moscow in English, Feb. 3). Soviet commentators vehemently attacked and ridiculed Sterling Seagrave's book Yellow Rain and U.S. State Department evidence of Soviet complicity in chemical/biological weapon use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

Soviet media accused the U.S. of waging biological as well as chemical warfare against Cuba. They listed diseases supposedly caused by the U.S., ranging from swine fever in 1971 and a fungus affecting sugar cane in 1972 to dengue fever in 1981.

A particularly bizarre story spread by the Soviet media claimed that the U.S. is testing virus-carrying mosquitoes on innocent citizens in Lahore, Pakistan, planning to export the "killer mosquitoes" to Afghanistan and elsewhere.

International Controls on Chemical Warfare

Soviet commentators criticized the U.S. for "invariably refusing" to hold talks aimed at banning chemical arms. At Geneva, complained the Soviets, the U.S. has refused since last summer to proceed with negotiations on chemical weapons. The Soviet explanation of this was the "U.S. drive for military superiority" and rejection of any constraints on this drive. There was no mention of the U.S. and Western European position on the necessity for verification and compliance safeguards in any chemical weapons agreement.

Soviet propaganda accused the U.S. of violating the spirit of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and alluded to the U.S. abstention from a U.N. resolution noting the need to activate talks on chemical

(over)

-4-

weapons in the Disarmament Committee as indicative of the U.S. position. For their part, the Soviets professed willingness to take part in any negotiations aimed at reaching international agreements on chemical weapons.

POLAND

Propaganda on Poland continued in the same vein as in prior months. According to the Soviet line, Washington is still disturbed that the attempt to overthrow socialism in Poland was thwarted and the situation there is normalizing. The Soviets alleged that the U.S. continues to interfere in Polish internal affairs, trying to disrupt improving conditions there and to exacerbate international tensions. Some Soviet commentators charged that the U.S. is seeking to "break down the postwar system" established at Yalta by challenging the principle of "the inviolability of borders."

Soviet examples of the U.S. disruptive effort include:

o Economic sanctions. Washington's hypocrisy is evidenced by its imposition of sanctions that will make life more difficult for Poles at the very time U.S. leaders are professing "solidarity" with the Polish people. Soviet media characterized the sanctions as "inhumane" and also "naive" (historically proven to be a futile method of exerting pressure).

o Polish issue at Madrid. The U.S. and certain other delegations were accused of trying to use the Polish issue to stir up anti-detente feeling and to transform the CSCE Madrid meeting into an arena of East-West confrontation. Western intent, argued the Soviets, was to divert attention from the real problems at hand--such as ensuring military security--by raising a fuss over Poland, a subject which has no place at Madrid.

o Showing of "Let Poland Be Poland." By mid-month the propaganda blitz aimed at discrediting the program had somewhat abated, but references to it as a "provocation" which turned out to be "a total failure" persisted. Soviet media condemned efforts by the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to hold a "provocative screening" of the program at the Embassy. As an indication of extreme Soviet sensitivity on "Let Poland Be Poland," the Soviets denounced the singing group ABBA (hugely popular and until now officially approved in the USSR) because ABBA taped a segment for the program--even though the segment was never shown.

o Western radio broadcasts. Allegations that RFE is broadcasting coded instructions to counterrevolutionaries inside Poland were repeated. VOA and foreign radio in general were condemned for interfering in Polish internal affairs.

o CIA. Quoting heavily from official Polish sources, Soviet media charged that the CIA is linked with Polish subversive groups. The Soviets lost no time in working up stories of the

-5-

CIA in Poland and tying these in with the favorite Soviet theme of the CIA as the sinister, ruthless and ubiquitous U.S. "special service" involved in virtually everything evil in the world.

Another Soviet theme related to the so-called "U.S. anti-Polish campaign" was U.S. pressuring of reluctant European allies to follow American initiatives. The Soviets dwelt in particular on allegations of "desperate but fruitless" U.S. efforts to stop the Soviet-West European gas pipeline.

A particularly virulent article entitled "White Scorpions" appeared in Pravda on February 15. Essentially, the article blamed Polish problems on the influence of Western decadence (nihilistic attitudes, consumerism, etc.) which had grown dangerously in Poland over the past two decades. The "white scorpion" of American propaganda was attacked, as was a sweeping range of U.S. foreign and domestic policies.

LATIN AMERICA

Soviet propagandists argued that Washington's actions in Latin America are but one part of a worldwide U.S. policy of using "lies, threats and sanctions" to pressure and weaken revolutionary movements. Pravda on February 4, in a piece on Nicaragua, charged that "almost every day Washington cabinet members make announcements containing threats to take 'sanctions' or 'measures' against one or another state."

El Salvador

Soviet media relied almost exclusively on selective use of material from Western sources which they adapted to fit their own needs. Soviet propaganda stressed that the U.S. has entered what is essentially a civil war in El Salvador in order to protect U.S. imperialist interests in the area; the U.S. naturally sides with the oppressors of the common people. The Soviets charged the U.S. with direct complicity in the murders of innocent civilians by Salvadoran "cutthroat" squads on "punitive missions."

Soviet media repeated and added to connections drawn by Western journalists between El Salvador and Vietnam. One Soviet commentary on the attitude of the U.S. military toward El Salvador asserted that "the Pentagon generals have long been straining to take revenge for Vietnam" (Moscow domestic radio, Feb. 12). Other commentators noted that, as in Vietnam, U.S. involvement is escalating despite strong protest from U.S. citizens, and the U.S. role is growing gradually and "sneakily" under the "pretext of resisting foreign intervention." Drawing another analogy to Vietnam, the Soviets criticized El Salvador's upcoming elections

(over)

-6-

as a dubious exercise staged solely to legitimize the present government.

Cuba and Nicaragua

Soviet propagandists complained of a stepped-up U.S. campaign to reverse the process of revolutionary transformation in "progressive" Latin American states. They accused the U.S. of training "terrorist groups" of Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles for subversive actions and eventual invasions.

President Reagan was charged with making "an avalanche of insinuations" about Cuban participation in Caribbean drug and arms smuggling designed to create pretexts for aggressive acts against Cuba. Soviet media asserted that the U.S. has shown no proof of Cuban smuggling or "export of violent revolution."

The Soviet media also accused the U.S. of CIA-directed chemical and biological warfare against Cuba (see page 3) and in El Salvador.

President Reagan's OAS Speech

Labeling President Reagan's speech a "rehash of the Monroe Doctrine," Soviet propagandists described his Caribbean basin initiative as "a package of military-political and economic measures, directed at suppressing the mounting struggle of the Latin American peoples for freedom and independence [and] at consolidating pro-Washington regimes and military dictatorships which have given a free hand to American corporations in plundering their national wealth...." (TASS English, Feb. 24).

Miscellaneous Charges

Much of Soviet propaganda on Latin America--especially but not exclusively that intended for Latin American audiences--contained various details and elaborations on the major themes. Among these were:

- o Washington organized the Central American Democratic Community to further its plans for creation of a regional military bloc composed of reactionary regimes.
- o U.S. has plans to use Chilean military forces to intervene in Central America.
- o Expansion of the Peace Corps in Latin America means more CIA agents will be sent out under that cover.
- o Senior U.S. military officials have made "provocative visits" to Guatemala to emphasize USG concern over the situation there.
- o U.S. military exercises in Panama were staged to say "Do not forget who is the real master of the Panama Canal Zone" (Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Spanish, Feb. 15).

-7-

MIDDLE EAST

Soviets View U.S.-Egyptian Relations

A spate of media items dealt approvingly with Egyptian President Mubarak, pointing to Egyptian internal reforms, an evident inclination to seek better relations with other Arab states, and a decline in the amount of "anti-Soviet propaganda" in Egypt. Soviet commentators expressed a vague cautious optimism regarding prospects for improved Soviet-Egyptian relations.

Soviet media treated U.S.-Egyptian relations cautiously but at some length. They emphasized that President Mubarak is uncomfortable with a close relationship with the U.S. and is seeking to distance himself from Washington. As one Soviet commentator stated, "Mubarak's visits to the West European capitals are... viewed as a desire to attribute a more balanced character to Egypt's foreign policy and eliminate the far too strong tilt toward Washington. Already a word like 'desadatization' is being used." (Moscow Domestic Television, "International Panorama," Feb. 6). The U.S. was depicted as pressuring Egypt to stay in line on Camp David and to serve as a base for U.S. "aggressive military designs."

U.S. and Israel Blamed for Mideast Tension

Predictably, U.S. policy was denounced as the "real reason" for tension in the Mideast. The U.S. was taken to task for "black-mailing" the U.N. on the Golan Heights vote. Soviet media claimed that U.S. behavior on this issue is an indication that the "U.S. wants to maintain tension in the Middle East" and "essentially instigates Israel to new aggressive actions against Arab states" (TASS, Feb. 4).

The Soviets asserted that Secretary Weinberger's trip to the Middle East was a disappointment for Washington. They reported that he did not want to hear what he was told by Arab leaders--which was that Israel is the real threat in the region--and he was unhappy to find his interlocutors did not want to talk about strategic cooperation with the U.S. or about a "mythical Soviet threat."

Prepared by: PGM/R Staff

-8-

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-9-

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-10-

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-11-

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PROJECT TRUTH

Soviet Propaganda Alert

No. 4

February 17, 1982

Re: Project Truth

Summary

Soviet propaganda in January continued to accuse the U.S. of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, notably Poland, and of seeking military and geopolitical superiority.

- o Poland. Soviet media charged that the U.S. is interfering in Polish internal affairs by, among other things, provocative radio broadcasts (VOA and RFE), "inhumane" economic sanctions, "slandereous" declarations, and CIA plotting. The television program Let Poland Be Poland was derided and denounced. According to the Soviets, the U.S. goal is to undermine "normalization" and subvert socialism in Poland.

- o U.S. Strategic Policy. A glossy Soviet publication called Whence the Threat to Peace sought to counter the Pentagon's Soviet Military Power (which it imitated in appearance) by mustering "facts and figures" on U.S. military capabilities. The publication's theme is that the U.S., maintaining its tradition of an offensive strategic policy, is escalating the arms race and striving for military superiority and eventual world domination.

- o The Reagan Administration. Assessing President Reagan's first year, Soviet commentators dwelt on the gloomy state of U.S.-Soviet relations. They criticized the Administration for allegedly "reviving the Cold War" and conducting a campaign of "fabrications and slander" to discredit the USSR and socialism. The "myth of the Soviet threat," they contended, has been used to justify Western aggressiveness worldwide and escalation of U.S. "preparations for war." President Reagan's handling of domestic economic problems, especially unemployment and the budget, also came in for criticism.

Soviet propaganda on other issues involving U.S. policy in various parts of the world included the following:

- o "Wedge-driving" efforts to emphasize differences and conflicts between the U.S. and its West European allies, especially the FRG.

- o Allegations of CIA links with the Italian Red Brigade terrorists and complicity in the kidnapping of U.S. NATO General Dozier.

- o Other disinformation campaigns implicated the U.S. in the failed coup attempt in the Seychelles, and suggested that the U.S. is conspiring to overthrow the governments of Ghana and Nicaragua.

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-1-

POLAND

Poland was one of the most important subjects in Soviet propaganda during January. Dominating Soviet treatment of the Polish situation were themes of alleged U.S. interference in Poland and condemnations of U.S. policy toward the martial law regime. The amount of actual reportage on internal developments in Poland was limited and had a rather pessimistic tone.

Much effort was devoted to refuting Western statements on Poland and denouncing Western actions. Soviet commentators drew heavily on Polish media and government pronouncements to support the Soviet line. By this they evidently sought to impart a sense of authenticity to the Soviet version of what is going on in Poland, and to project the impression that the Poles and Soviets share the same viewpoint.

On Poland, as on other subjects, the Soviet media made extensive use of Western (usually noncommunist) media items to buttress their claims.

Continuing U.S. Interference Alleged

The general Soviet line on U.S. conduct vis-a-vis Poland was the following: The U.S. is disappointed over the increasing stabilization and normalization inside Poland. Strife and chaos were required by the U.S. scenario for counterrevolution and the overthrow of socialism there. Now, not yet resigned to failure, the U.S. is continuing to mount various futile, last-gasp attempts to disrupt Polish affairs. These include economic sanctions, subversive radio broadcasts, projects such as "A Day of Solidarity with Poland," etc.

Some of the other major Soviet themes elaborating this basic line were:

- o U.S. hypocrisy. The U.S. is hypocritical to condemn and enact sanctions against Poland on the pretext that the declaration of martial law entails human rights violations, while the U.S. maintains excellent relations with states that are truly oppressive and that violate human rights. (South Africa, Turkey, Chile, and El Salvador, among others, are commonly cited.) Some Soviet commentaries argue that the U.S. is unjustified in condemning martial law in Poland since martial law is recognized under American law as a legitimate measure to restore order under threatening circumstances, and it has been put into effect in parts of the U.S. on various occasions in recent decades. A further point made is that the U.S. is hypocritical to declare its desire to help the Poles while at the same time cutting off economic aid to them.

- o CIA involvement. The CIA and U.S. Government in general have been deeply involved in supporting and inciting "Solidar-

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-2-

ity extremists" and other groups bent on civil war and the overthrow of socialism in Poland. Subversive broadcasts by RFE and RL (the "CIA mouthpieces"), VOA and other stations also try to provoke counterrevolution--for example, by broadcasting "instructions" to Polish "extremists."

o Anti-Polish slander. The U.S. and NATO are running an "anti-Polish campaign," slandering Poland and giving a false and outrageous version of developments in Poland. The Soviet Union and Soviet-Polish friendship are also targets of this campaign. The January 11 NATO ministers' statement on Poland is one of the most offensive products of this campaign in the Soviet view.

o U.S. pressure on allies. The U.S. is pressuring other countries, particularly its West European allies, to go along with American policy but is encountering considerable resistance. Soviet media reported and criticized Western European statements condemning martial law (January 5 EC statement, January 11 NATO statement) but Soviet commentary implied that the Western Europeans are "long on words, but short on deeds." In other words, regardless of what they say (perhaps as an effort to appease the U.S.), they are unlikely to take any measures--such as trade sanctions--which would seriously harm their economies or endanger the prospects for European security.

Soviet Media React to U.S. Sanctions

The Soviets denounced U.S. economic sanctions against Poland as inhumane actions which will affect the Poles adversely but not influence the course of events in the directions desired by the U.S.

As to measures taken against the USSR, Soviet commentators claimed these would not hurt the Soviet Union in the slightest. They contended that history has shown such actions are doomed to failure--and furthermore, they tend to backfire and harm the state enacting economic sanctions more than its intended target. Gloating over West European failure to follow the U.S. lead on sanctions, Soviet propagandists stressed that Western European countries are far more dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc than is the U.S., that they understand the importance of vital East-West economic links, and that they are unlikely to take the severely self-damaging step of cutting off these ties.

Soviets Blast "A Day of Solidarity with Poland"

The Soviet line on "Let Poland Be Poland" was established immediately after the President's January 20 announcement of the program:

o The program constituted interference in internal Polish affairs. Such interference is contrary to international agreements such as the CSCE Final Act and the UN Charter.

-3-

- o The program was subversive in its intent, designed to incite the Polish people against the government. In the long run, it is part of a general plan to undermine socialism in Eastern Europe and to destroy the Warsaw Pact.

- o The program and other Solidarity Day activities underscore U.S. hypocrisy. No such "solidarity" has been shown for the victims of the massacre of Indonesian communists, the persecution of left-wing activists in Chile, or the subjects of repression in El Salvador and other countries. The hypocrisy is compounded by U.S. claims of wanting to help Poland while simultaneously cutting off food aid.

- o The U.S. is putting on the program not out of friendship for Poland, but because its imperialist and hegemonist plans for the country were frustrated. The program is only part of the large-scale anticommunist effort of the U.S.

- o The U.S. forced its West European allies to take part in the program. Many of these countries would prefer not to because of the damage it will do to peaceful coexistence, but the U.S. wants to regain its dominant position in the alliance.

- o The program was part of a massive U.S.-West European propaganda campaign. This campaign is unprecedented in scale and recalls 1950s Cold War activities.

- o Mr. Reagan supervised preparation of the program. USICA was responsible for producing it.

- o The program and U.S. propaganda plans are doomed to fail.

With minor variations on these basic themes, the Soviets attempted at once to diminish the impact of the program and to exploit it as an example of U.S. anticommunism. Predictably, initial reaction to the program was that it was a fiasco and had perhaps even damaged the U.S. position by showing how little support there was among the West European allies.

Adopting tones ranging from righteous indignation to sarcasm and heavy irony, Soviet media put out a barrage of articles and broadcasts. On the program itself, commentary tended to stress its "Hollywood" aspect and the low level of usage by even close U.S. allies. Some commentaries claimed to detect disagreement with the U.S. position in the statements of Messrs. Trudeau and Schmidt.

In what has become a propaganda pattern, the Soviets rushed out a program on Radio Moscow's English world service which was clearly a direct response to the planned U.S. show. Hosted by the well-known propagandist Vladimir Pozner and entitled "The Friends and Foes of Poland," the program was introduced as follows:

(over)

-4-

This is not a show. Hollywood stars past and present are not involved in it, nor does it offer you such entertainment as heads of state sharing a rostrum with traitors. This is a documentary. It offers you the views of ordinary people and furnishes documented and verifiable facts. Those views and those facts will help you decide who are the friends and who are the foes of Poland.

Somewhat less temperate were the remarks of TASS news analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

What is of interest is that the "independence" of states and "noninterference" in the internal affairs of other states are being persistently invoked in Washington by those who not so long ago tried to "bomb back to the stone age" the revolutionary Vietnam, who have unleashed and continue their undeclared war against the sovereign Afghanistan, who try--wherever it is possible, be that in Chile or in El Salvador--overtly or covertly to strangle any attempt by the peoples to decide their own future. Appeals "to pray for freedom" are launched by those who encourage and aid the most reactionary, dictatorial, and hated regimes, who are arming the Israeli aggressor which in the eyes of the whole world is occupying the native Arab territories and wants to drown in blood the struggle of the Palestinian people for its own national existence.

Human rights are being invoked by those who created in their own country a state system of institutionalized arbitrariness, who shoot to kill the "disobedient" in Miami, send the national guards and police armed to the teeth to "pacify" the fighters against racism, and handcuff the leaders of the flight controllers' trade union which was brave enough to try to protect its basic rights. Truly there is no limit to Washington's dissemblance.

Pessimistic Reportage on Life in Poland

Soviet media coverage of actual developments in Poland was sparse, particularly early in the month. Most stories had a distinctly pessimistic character, pervaded with cautions that the internal situation is still "difficult," Polish attitudes are "extremely complicated," economic problems will not be easily solved, and other "threats to normalization" (CIA plotting, antisocialist extremists) still remain. Such stories were presumably designed both to prepare the Soviet people for a protracted period of troubles in--and because of--Poland, and to justify martial law as a means of coping with such a serious situation.

-5-

The pessimistic tone of such Soviet features was somewhat tempered, if not offset, by optimistic notes. These were at least partly intended to reassure worried citizens of socialist bloc countries. Soviet commentators rarely failed to mention the constant progress in "normalization" of life in Poland under martial law. Uplifting stories about Polish servicemen steadfastly doing their duty--with many of them rushing to join the Party--and interviews with Polish workers relieved that "work rhythms" had returned to normal in their factory were intended to foster the impression that things are calm and, overall, are developing along positive lines (from the Soviet viewpoint).

Another common type of optimistic media feature focused on the "fraternal bonds" between Soviet Russia and socialist Poland. The 37th anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw by the Soviets was amply publicized. Polish gratitude for this was underscored, perhaps with the implication that Poles have lasting obligations to the Soviet Union which had better be honored. Some Soviet commentaries also seemed to suggest a parallel between Poland's rescue from fascism in 1945 and its more recent "rescue from counterrevolution." For Soviet audiences, it was no doubt reassuring to be told that Poles were now honoring Soviet war memorials rather than desecrating them.

Coverage of Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek's visit to Moscow also served to put Soviet-Polish relations in a positive light. The phrases chosen by the Soviets to characterize Czyrek's visit indicated that relations had considerably improved since the declaration of martial law.

PROPAGANDA PUBLICATION: Whence the Threat to Peace

Soviet propaganda booklets lauding the "peaceful nature" of socialist policy and condemning the "aggressive imperialist militarism" of the West are nothing new. The most recent pamphlet of this sort, however, titled Whence the Threat to Peace, gained unusually great attention. Published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in six languages and released in mid-January, the 78-page booklet was a reaffirmation of public Soviet strategic policy and, more specifically, the major Soviet rebuttal to the 1981 Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power.

Whence the Threat to Peace was accorded an exceptionally large promotion in the Soviet domestic and foreign-targeted mass media. It was previewed, excerpted, and discussed by news commentators, and a rare Soviet military press conference was held. Interestingly, however, the print run was reportedly not large, and there were no reports--as of late January--of efforts to distribute it widely.

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-6-

Themes

The booklet's fundamental thesis is that U.S. strategic policy has traditionally been offensive, and the Reagan Administration is carrying on that tradition with a vengeance. The ultimate goal of the U.S., contend the publication's authors, is world domination achieved through development of military superiority (first-strike capability) over the Soviet Union.

Whence the Threat to Peace attacks Soviet Military Power for allegedly presenting a distorted and exaggerated picture of Soviet military strength (for example, by excluding comparative data on the U.S. and NATO). According to the Soviets, the "myth of the Soviet threat" has been concocted in order to "frighten" the public, and justify and mobilize support for a Western arms race for superiority.

To summarize briefly some of the other central points of the Soviet argument:

- o The U.S. bears the blame for obstructing arms negotiations, hindering peace and international cooperation, pressuring other countries, and trying to destabilize sensitive situations. It is driven by a desire to destroy socialism, which is growing in strength and thus becoming increasingly frightening to the capitalist world.
- o By mounting its noisy campaign against socialism, the U.S. is also striving to distract attention from domestic difficulties (deep social and economic problems). Furthermore, an active arms industry, fed by international tensions and antisocialist feeling at home, means huge profits for Western capitalist-imperialist circles.
- o The USSR is and has always been dedicated to peace. Its military establishment is for the purpose of defense. Soviet military developments have been responses to Western actions; the U.S. always initiates every new phase of the arms race.
- o The U.S. must accept the realities of the world situation and stop its confrontational foreign policy and futile drive for military and geopolitical superiority.
- o There is currently a rough parity between Soviet bloc and Western forces in Europe. U.S. and NATO military power is more than adequate for defense needs. Thus the present balanced situation should be acceptable to both sides.
- o The USSR favors arms control and reductions, but they must be carried out fairly. Providing the West considers the legitimate defense needs of the Soviet Union, agreements can be reached.

-7-

Techniques

While "ideological" material is integrated into Whence the Threat to Peace, the authors rely mainly on a massive mustering of facts and figures (real and imaginary) to support their arguments. Adding to the persuasive appeal of this approach is the booklet's relatively sophisticated, smooth, "Western" style of presentation--which attempts to "mirror-image" that of its American-produced target, Soviet Military Power.

A favorite Soviet propaganda technique is liberal use of Western--especially reputable and noncommunist--sources to support the Soviet position on issues. Material is very carefully selected, of course, and often taken out of context or manipulated in a misleading fashion. This method is taken to an extreme in Whence the Threat to Peace, where a tremendous amount of data and analyses comes from Western newspapers, journals, and government documents. Most of the photographs are Western. The primary purpose is to establish credibility for the Soviet argument--the Americans' claims are "disproved" with their own data.

ASSESSMENTS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST YEAR

Soviet media commentators provided an unrelentingly negative appraisal of President Reagan's first year on the anniversary of the Administration. As is their habit, they focused primarily on foreign policy and especially U.S.-Soviet relations, with secondary attention to U.S. domestic economic and social problems. There was much ado about the revival of a "Cold War mentality" in Washington--charges that the Reagan Administration is "fanning the flames of anti-Soviet hysteria" and "seeing the 'hand of Moscow'" wherever a problem for the U.S. exists. Lack of "realism" on the part of U.S. leaders was bemoaned, and there was no expression of hope for improved relations in the near term.

Soviet critics of the Reagan Administration tended to adopt a mocking, ironic tone when discussing Washington's current views on the Soviet Union, as if seeking to underscore the sheer absurdity--from the Soviet perspective--of such views.

One of the favorite themes of Soviet propagandists was the alleged "moral posturing and hypocrisy" of the Reagan Administration. They cited as a prime example of this the "harsh treatment" of striking American air traffic controllers as opposed to the "pious" stance taken on Polish Solidarity.

Regarding the U.S. domestic scene, Soviet commentators focused on economic ills. The emphasis was on unemployment--the num-

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-8-

bers of unemployed, their suffering, and the alleged indifference and callousness of U.S. Government leaders, who have "failed to take steps to remedy the situation." The Soviets inevitably contrasted unemployment in the West with the "guaranteed full employment" of the socialist-bloc countries.

President Reagan's State of the Union message to Congress was also used as a peg for criticism of the Administration's domestic economic policy. Soviet commentators stressed that the President "had to admit that the economic situation is very bad...it was impossible not to admit this." Noting that Reagan had promised to reduce the enormous U.S. budget deficit, they declared that he had "failed to produce results" and was now warning the American people not to expect speedy improvement. Nonetheless, "President Reagan expressed his determination to continue the present course of reducing appropriations for social needs combined with colossal military spending" (Moscow World Service [English], 27 Jan. [FBIS, 27 Jan.]). Soviet journalists asserted that in seeking to balance the budget by cutting funds for social programs without controlling military spending, the Reagan Administration was moving to "take away from the U.S. working people much of what they had achieved during long years of hard and stubborn struggle" (Moscow Television, Jan. 30, [FBIS, Feb. 1]).

WESTERN EUROPE

Major issues directly concerning Western Europe, the U.S., and the USSR are covered in the preceding sections on Poland and Whence the Threat to Peace. Other Soviet propaganda themes on Western Europe included:

- o Continued "wedge-driving" between U.S. and Western Europe. The Soviet media continued to stress the differences between American and Western European geopolitical concerns, while at the same time emphasizing the unity of interests among all those sharing the European continent--including the Soviet Union. Among the Soviet allegations repeated again this month were U.S. indifference to European security concerns, failure to consult adequately with European allies before making decisions, and willingness to sacrifice Europe in a war if necessary for U.S. "victory."

- o Alleged CIA link with Red Brigades. Charges of CIA-Red Brigades complicity, already made during the 1978 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, were revived in connection with the kidnapping of U.S. NATO General Dozier. Referring to non-Soviet sources of information, the Soviet media reported that the Red Brigades, as other terrorist groups, are known to work with, and sometimes on instructions from, the CIA. The CIA would welcome a terrorist action such as the Dozier kidnapping, argued the Soviets, because it would hurt the image of the anti-NATO peace movement while creating sympathy for NATO at a time when opposition to it is strong and growing.

-9-

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Soviet propaganda output in January was routine as far as the Middle East, Latin America, southern Africa, and other regions are concerned. American policy in the Middle East came in for most attention.

Middle East

The U.S. was strongly criticized for vetoing the proposed U.N. declaration on sanctions against Israel. Trips by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger to the Middle East were characterized as U.S. "interference" in the internal affairs of sovereign nations and efforts to impose American imperialist will on that part of the world. U.S. support for "the Israeli aggressors" was blasted, and commentaries on this and related themes--for example, on the strength of "pro-Zionist" elements in influential U.S. circles--were designed to portray the U.S. as hostile to Arab interests in the Middle East and always on Israel's side.

In contrast to this picture of U.S. anti-Arab bias, the Soviet Union's sympathy and support for Arab peoples were emphasized. This, in addition to being explicitly stated, was conveyed in glowing reports on Arab delegations in Moscow, Soviet technical aid projects in Arab countries, friendly meetings of Arab and Soviet citizens, etc. Propaganda attacks against Israel, particularly in connection with the Golan annexation, also served to reinforce the image of the USSR as friend and ally of the Arab peoples.

Latin America

The harshest Soviet propaganda on Latin American issues was heard on Radio Peace and Progress (RPP) to Latin America. These broadcasts described alleged CIA operations in Nicaragua as "a conspiracy of large proportions...aimed at assassinating the Sandinist leaders and sabotaging the economy." A typical report concluded:

All this U.S. underground work in Nicaragua is part of the U.S. aggressive political strategy against this country. Washington is exerting direct pressure on the Nicaragua Government by telling it how the Nicaraguans should live and manage their internal affairs, whom they should or [should] not befriend. If they do not obey such dictates, Washington threatens an armed invasion, dragging along in its aggressive plans other states of the continent. [Present U.S. activity] is...the prelude of a collective intervention that is being prepared. (Moscow RPP in Spanish [to Latin America], Jan. 18 [FBIS Daily Report, Jan. 26])

(over)

-10-

Commentaries similar in substance but generally less inflammatory in tone than the RPP broadcasts appeared elsewhere in the Soviet mass media.

Africa

Toward the end of January, the Soviet media began a disinformation effort on U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ghana. A familiar pattern of operation became evident: Soviet media, vaguely citing Ghanaian media sources, ran a story that Washington was involved in planning a coup in Ghana because of U.S. displeasure over the change of leadership there. One Soviet report, for example, charged that, because a "secret agreement" Washington had with the previous Ghanaian government was terminated by the fall of that government, the U.S. decided to provide "planes and mercenaries for an invasion" (Izvestiia, Jan. 24). Citing Radio Accra as its information source, TASS reported that the U.S. hoped to destabilize Ghana "through economic boycott, slander, [and] ethnic strife." Once Soviet media gave worldwide circulation to such vaguely-sourced stories, they were picked up by communist and noncommunist news media outside the USSR. Frequency of repetition alone was relied upon to infuse them with a degree of credibility, at least for some audiences.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Several prominent and numerous minor Soviet media items dealt with the subject of chemical-biological warfare (CBW). Much of the material appeared to draw upon recent publicity in the Western mass media of the issues surrounding the development and proposed production of binary weapons. Soviet sensitivity to Western charges of Soviet use of CBW in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan was evident in outraged Soviet denials of such activity and the intense campaign of countercharges, which show little sign of abating.

The Soviets raised standard accusations against the U.S.:

- o The U.S. is stalling bilateral CW (chemical warfare) talks because it is "on the way to preparations for large-scale chemical war."

- o Ample evidence, some available from Western sources (articles in The Washington Post and Armed Forces Journal are cited), shows that the U.S. has appropriated huge sums for CW development. The Reagan Administration, especially Secretary Haig, advocates binary munitions production and has "pressured" the Congress into earmarking funds for it. (As in other situations, the Soviets used--selectively--Western-sourced figures and other "facts" to enhance the credibility of their claims.)

-11-

o The U.S. is trying to picture the Soviet Union as the aggressor in this area; it has used "slander and lies in order to justify its own dangerous course of increasing the arsenals of such weapons and to ascribe to others its own militarist plans."

A CASE STUDY: Continuing Soviet Campaign to Link the U.S. with Seychelles Coup Attempt

On November 25, 1981, an attempt to overthrow the government of the Seychelles failed. Michael Hoare, an individual with a long history of mercenary activity in Africa, led the group of armed men, most of whom returned in a hijacked airliner to South Africa from where they had mounted the attempt.

On December 1, President Rene of the Seychelles issued an official statement on the attempted coup, in which he noted that it was organized in South Africa but that the South African government disclaimed any responsibility. He accused two Seychellois exiles of involvement. No accusations were made against the U.S. or other Western governments, and the U.S. was implicitly thanked for its message of support to President Rene.

Notwithstanding their inability to produce any evidence of U.S. involvement in the event, the Soviets launched a campaign to lay the blame on the CIA. To outline briefly the key elements of their efforts to date:

o Immediately after the coup attempt failed, Moscow domestic radio reported unnamed African radio commentators as noting the "undoubted participation of Washington." The Soviets were unfazed when the official Seychelles account of the failed coup made no suggestion of U.S. involvement and clearly placed the blame elsewhere.

o During the first week of December, in TASS and in radio broadcasts to Africa, Moscow continued to blame the U.S. for conspiring with South Africa to "mastermind" and fund the attempted coup. TASS referred to nameless "news analysts" as the source of statements that CIA agents were involved.

o Subsequently, articles appeared in various African newspapers (Nairobi Nation, Lagos Daily Times, Ethiopian Herald, and others) speculating on U.S. involvement and repeating variations of the Soviet themes. In January, the Times of India picked up the story, stating that "it is widely believed [in southern Africa]" that the attempt "had the backing of several intelligence organizations of Western governments...."

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-12-

o A January 12 Izvestiia article on alleged CIA activity in Africa cited an article in the Paris journal Afrique-Asie as saying that the attempted coup was staged by the CIA in cooperation with the intelligence services of South Africa, Israel, and Morocco.

Typical characteristics of Soviet disinformation campaigns are evident in this case:

- o The first appearance of the theme is in Soviet domestic media.
- o False information is attributed to foreign sources (often vaguely identified) to give spurious authority to the fabrications. (Foreign sources cited by the Soviets in these situations may often be nonexistent.)
- o Repetition is relied upon to establish the charges and endow them with an aura of credibility (at least for some audiences). There is often no attempt to establish even the appearance of a factual basis for the charges.
- o The Soviets take advantage of the willingness of some non-communist media to accept undocumented accusations. Once these media carry the material, Moscow can replay it, treating it as if it were further confirmation of the original (Soviet) line.

Prepared by: PGM/R Staff

PROJECT TRUTH

Soviet Propaganda Alert

No. 3

January 11, 1982

Re: Project Truth

Summary

Soviet external propaganda in December continued to emphasize that the Soviet Union steadfastly maintains a humane, peaceful and defense-oriented foreign policy, while U.S. policy is bellicose, aggressive and inconsiderate of other nations.

In connection with specific international events and developments, Soviet propaganda efforts:

- o depicted the U.S. approach to negotiations on nuclear arms reduction in Europe as conniving and insincere (in contrast to the sincere and longstanding Soviet commitment to arms negotiations).

- o dwelled on issues of U.S. and NATO military policy in Europe, playing up alleged differences between the U.S. and some of its European allies on that subject. At the same time, the Soviets stressed their ties with Western Europe and their stake in common "European" concerns, implying unsubtly that the U.S. is an outside power stirring up trouble and seeking to further its own ends against the interests of all Europeans.

- o denounced Solidarity "extremists" and other elements in Poland for counterrevolutionary, antisocialist activities against the interests of the Polish people. Soviet media conveyed approval of the imposition of martial law. Since the crackdown, they have emphasized that conditions are generally calm and "returning to normal." Soviet propaganda harshly accused the U.S. of interfering in internal Polish affairs, charging, among other things, that the CIA was behind Solidarity.

- o attempted to weaken the impact of U.S. official statements and news media items critical of the Soviet Union by ridiculing them as "cynical fabrications" or "shopworn anti-Soviet cliches" designed to distract attention from the real evils perpetrated by the U.S. Media attacks were targeted on American officials and journalists associated with the alleged anti-Soviet propaganda campaign.

- o portrayed the U.S. as a threat to stability and progress in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, Indian Ocean region and Latin America.

End Summary

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.**

-1-

A. Arms Reduction Talks in Europe

Soviet media commentaries repeatedly chided the U.S. for behavior and statements by American leaders which allegedly revealed a cynical and unserious attitude toward arms limitation negotiations. Soviet propagandists claimed that the U.S. embarked on negotiations only under pressure (mainly from public opinion in Western Europe and the U.S. itself). While expressing their hope that the U.S. would negotiate in a "businesslike" and sincere fashion, Soviet commentators noted somberly that the U.S. had thus far not manifested its intentions to do so.

The U.S. was consistently portrayed as a reluctant and untrustworthy participant in arms negotiations, more interested in attaining a one-sided advantage than in working out fair and mutually acceptable solutions. Nonetheless, much of the Soviet reportage dealing directly with the newly begun Geneva arms talks was rather restrained in tone and played down the usual harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric. Soviet commentators rarely failed to inject a note of optimism alongside the usual cautions that reaching agreements at Geneva would not be easy. Soviet media appeared to be attempting to prepare the ground for negotiations without discouraging the development of popular opposition to U.S. arms policy in Europe.

Despite its relatively cautious treatment of the Geneva talks, Soviet propaganda throughout December did not ease efforts to depict the U.S. administration overall, and certain officials in particular (e.g., Secretaries Haig and Weinberger), as "warmongering" and "saber-rattling." Frequent media items on such topics as the U.S. military budget, NATO talks, and measures to enhance U.S. and NATO military preparedness were intended to contribute to the image of U.S. militarism.

Constant references were made to Leonid Brezhnev's recent Bonn visit--termed his "peace mission"--and to the Soviet position on arms in Europe which Brezhnev set forth, once again, during that visit. Continuing the line of previous months, Soviet propaganda characterized Soviet arms reduction proposals as ideal, but proclaimed Moscow's willingness to seek compromise and consider other "serious" approaches. Brezhnev's Bonn statements were described as indicating the most fruitful direction for negotiations to take.

President Reagan's "zero option" proposal, on the other hand, was criticized as a blatantly unreasonable suggestion disingenuously put forth for sheer propaganda value--a "phony proposal" designed to deflect criticism from the Reagan Administration. Soviet propaganda charged that the West's selective method of counting weapons in Europe presented a false picture

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-2-

of Soviet strength. In reality, the Soviets contended, there currently exists a rough parity in Europe. In the Soviet view, the U.S. proposal sought to reestablish Western military superiority in Europe and ignored legitimate Soviet defense concerns.

Alleged U.S. willingness to sacrifice Europe in a "limited nuclear war" was, as in previous months, another major point of Soviet propaganda. A December 9 article in Literaturnaia gazeta, for example, described Europe as America's "nuclear football field"--"no matter which goalpost the 'goals' are kicked through, the Americans remain on the other side of the ocean ready to sacrifice the Europeans." Numerous media features seeking to portray the U.S. as the real threat to European security drew on the Soviet propaganda pamphlet Threat to Europe released in November.

B. Poland

Soviet coverage of the Polish situation before the declaration of martial law consisted largely of fierce attacks on Solidarity--accused of "providing cover for counterrevolution"--and on other elements of Polish society characterized as anti-socialist. After the crackdown, Soviet media, in addition to continuing their denunciations of Solidarity and the "anti-socialist threat" to Poland, endorsed the measures taken and began to stress that conditions in Poland were beginning to "return to normal."

The Soviet media have reported selectively on developments in Poland, exercising particular care in the choice of material for domestic Soviet audiences. Relatively little concrete information on what is going on in Poland has been offered by Soviet media. Instead, they have sought to pound away on several ideas which they would like to have the world believe. These include:

- o The vast majority of Poles did not support the Solidarity "extremists" and are relieved that Party and military leaders have reasserted control to return the country to normal. Soviet reportage is laced with quotes attributed to Polish citizens which criticize Solidarity and express support for the measures taken by the Military Council. Although "isolated" hot spots have been noted in Soviet reportage on Poland, a heavy emphasis has been placed on depicting the situation as generally peaceful with constant improvements in popular morale and progress in the efforts to resolve Polish economic problems.

- o While the Polish armed forces are playing a significant role in saving Poland from counterrevolution and helping it "return to normal," it is the leadership of the Polish Party which is of key importance. (Some Soviet defensiveness on this issue was indicated in commentaries which took pains to underplay

-3-

the Polish Army's role and even managed to credit "the Party leadership" with the crackdown.)

- o The Polish situation is an internal Polish matter and should be resolved by the Poles. Western speculations that Moscow is orchestrating events there and may intervene militarily are "slandorous lies" and merely part of the general U.S.-inspired anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that sees the Kremlin behind everything from international terrorism to peace marches in Europe. However, while repeating that there should not be outside interference in internal Polish affairs, Soviet media have asserted the USSR's special position in regard to Poland, noting that a threat to Poland "directly affects the security interests" of all the Warsaw Treaty nations.

- o It is actually the U.S. and NATO that are interfering in domestic Polish affairs by holding meetings and issuing statements designed to support and incite counterrevolutionary activity, and to pressure the Polish government into taking actions--such as making concessions to Solidarity--deemed desirable by the West. According to the Soviets, Western "crude interference in the affairs of sovereign Poland" is taking other forms as well: economic blackmail; escalated "subversive propaganda" broadcasts into Poland by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe; and provocative media sensationalization and distortion of events in Poland.

Such allegations of Western (especially American) interference and provocation in Poland have been a daily staple of Soviet media since mid-December. President Reagan's announcements of sanctions to be taken against Poland and the USSR triggered intensified attacks on the President personally and on American policy vis-a-vis Poland. The sanctions were denounced and the the President accused of resorting to "lies" and "blackmail."

During the last week of December, Soviet propagandists sought to elaborate on their charges of "U.S. interference." They claimed to have "documentary proof" that the U.S.--and in particular the CIA--was deeply involved in trying to wrest Poland from the "socialist community" by supporting and inciting "coup-plotters." Soviet media also contended that the U.S. has been displeased with the course of "normalization" in Poland since the imposition of martial law, and is continuing efforts to destabilize the Polish situation and use it to exacerbate international tensions and provide a pretext for continued Western military buildup and antisocialist activity.

Other Soviet media themes which have become significant since U.S. sanctions against Poland and the USSR were announced are:

- o The U.S. is attempting to force its NATO allies to join in the American "campaign of pressure" against Poland and the USSR,

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-4-

but this is meeting with little success. U.S. "official circles" disregard European interest in and need for cooperation and detente in Europe.

- o Washington continues to "magnify" and "distort" events in Poland in a deliberate attempt to build tensions. This attempt, however, is doomed to failure.

- o The U.S. decision on economic sanctions is "extremely in-human"--withholding of food as a means of exerting political pressure is particularly reprehensible. However, these sanctions will have no real effect. (Western sources are extensively cited by Soviet commentators making this point.)

- o U.S. policy toward Poland since the imposition of martial law fits perfectly into the overall pattern of U.S. foreign policy--seeking to hinder detente, and discriminating against socialist countries on various pretexts while supporting truly repressive regimes simply because they are antisocialist.

To summarize, the overall effort of Soviet propaganda on Poland in the closing days of 1981 was to emphasize charges of continuing U.S. pressure against Poland and the socialist bloc while at the same time downplaying the actual international significance of Polish events. By taking this approach, Soviet propagandists hoped to: show a real need for martial law to repel outside threats to Poland; muster public opinion against the U.S.; divert attention from Soviet involvement in Poland; and demonstrate that declared Soviet foreign policy goals (detente, arms control, etc.) should and would not be jeopardized by developments in Poland.

C. Attacks on U.S. "Propaganda" Against the USSR

A longstanding common complaint in Soviet media has been that the U.S. is waging a campaign of slander and lies against the Soviet Union and socialism. In December there was an unrelenting flow of prominently featured media items on this theme, zeroing in on the Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power, the State Department's Soviet Active Measures report, USICA and VOA in general, "Project Truth," Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and network television news programming. Articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, Literaturnaia gazeta and other publications attacked "American anti-Soviet propaganda" for allegedly seeking to invent a mythical Soviet threat and to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria in order to divert American--and worldwide--anxieties over U.S. policy, in particular increased defense spending and deployment of new weapons.

Soviet media sought to discredit U.S. information efforts by, among other things, personal attacks on the integrity of the individuals and institutions involved. Protesting that "aggressive and provocative radio propaganda" from the West had

-5-

escalated, the Soviets reiterated familiar charges that RFE-RL is staffed with "traitors and renegades" who formerly served the Nazis, and that the CIA is overseeing U.S. international broadcasting operations. A long article in the Izvestiia weekly supplement Nedel'ia (December 10) described ICA Director Charles Wick in disdainful tones as a millionaire who made his money in "real estate, show business and brothels," and a "cold warrior" who wants to return to the Truman era.

D. U.S. Policy and the Third World

While not introducing any new themes, Soviet propaganda keyed its repetition of the standard ones to current international situations. Major emphasis was on the Middle East and Latin America. Specific themes included the following:

- o Libya. The Soviets charged the U.S. with trying "to implement a plot against an independent and sovereign Arab state" and, in addition, with "reanimating the propaganda falsehood of the 'support' by the Soviet Union...for international terrorism, which had failed [to convince people] on all counts." The Soviets contended that the U.S. had no support worldwide for its accusations against Libya.

- o Middle East. Soviet propaganda called it "ridiculous" to think that the U.S. did not know in advance about and approve Israeli plans to annex the Golan Heights. By its consistent support of Israeli aggression in the Middle East, claimed Soviet media, the U.S. shared responsibility for the latest Israeli actions.

- o Latin America. The Soviets gave heavy coverage to the Moscow visit of Nicaragua's foreign minister, making use of the occasion to condemn the U.S. for a "flagrant campaign of threats" against Nicaragua aimed at forcing that country to cooperate with alleged U.S. imperialist policy in Latin America. Soviet media also criticized U.S. plans to increase "provocative" broadcasts to Cuba.

- o Indian Ocean. Propaganda attacks focused on the presence of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (referred to as evidence of escalating imperialist military power), and alleged U.S. failure to join efforts to secure peace in the region.

- o Afghanistan. Complementing glowing accounts of beneficent Soviet activity in Afghanistan were condemnations of the Western media for "creating lies" about the Afghanistan situation. The U.S., China and Pakistan were accused of continuing to incite and support "bandit activity," thus blocking complete normalization of conditions in Afghanistan. Stories portrayed Soviet soldiers serving in Afghanistan as conscientious young citizens fulfilling their "internationalist duty" under trying conditions. Babrak Karmal's praise for Soviet assistance was also reported at length.

(over)

-6-

E. Human Rights

On the occasion of UN Human Rights Day (December 10), Soviet media self-righteously described the socialist states as the true defenders of the most important of all human rights--the right to live in a peaceful world--inasmuch as "socialism and peace are indivisible." Replaying familiar themes, Soviet commentaries contrasted the rights enjoyed by citizens of socialist countries--right to a job, to free universal education, free health care, etc.--with the lack of rights in Western capitalist societies, as evidenced, they noted, by high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, and expensive medical care.

Some of the Soviet propaganda on human rights may have been designed especially as a counterweight to Western media coverage of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner's hunger strike in defense of Liza Alexeeva's right to emigrate to join her husband (Bonner's son, Sakharov's stepson). But the Soviet media regularly feature such material and rarely let suitable opportunities such as Human Rights Day pass without comment. Soviet media treatment of the Sakharov hunger strike itself consisted, predictably, of extremely cryptic reporting of events themselves along with generalized articles criticizing Sakharov, Alexeeva and others involved. The hunger strike was characterized in some Soviet sources as a "provocation" intended to promote Western opposition to detente.

F. Brezhnev's Birthday

The Soviet news media were packed with material dedicated to Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of his 75th birthday, celebrated on December 19. Birthday-related items included congratulations and praise from numerous Soviet Party and government organizations; congratulatory messages from foreign communist parties and foreign government leaders; excerpts from Brezhnev's books; biographical features; speeches by Politburo members; reports on exhibits, plays, and other events devoted to Leonid Ilich; poems and songs; and much, much more--all highly laudatory.

Western observers noted several characteristics of the birthday adulation. Brezhnev was praised for his lifelong dedication to the cause of peace. At the same time, relatively great attention was focused on his military experience and ties to the military, perhaps underscoring the prestige and significance of that institution. Controversial international issues were totally avoided in the many official speeches; there was no mention of Poland. There were, however, references to serious Soviet economic problems and the need to solve them.

Prepared by: PGM/R Staff

PROJECT TRUTH

Soviet Propaganda Alert

No. 2

November 27, 1981

Re: Project Truth

Summary

Overall themes and techniques of Soviet propaganda remain virtually unchanged from those reported in the first number of this series. However, specific incidents have triggered major Soviet efforts to take advantage of transitory themes which fit into ongoing propaganda patterns.

The theme of war and peace has been the main focus of Soviet media. In addition, many American officials and government agencies have come under frequent attack in recent Soviet propaganda.

Recent Soviet efforts are designed:

- o to picture President Reagan's disarmament proposals as a propaganda ploy.
- o to convince Europeans that the U.S. would, in the event of war, abandon them to the Soviet Union if by doing so the United States itself could avoid nuclear attack.
- o to turn public opinion in Europe and elsewhere against the NATO plan to modernize its theater nuclear forces (TNF) and thus to achieve Soviet aims at minimum cost.
- o to undermine the credibility of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy, and especially its recent offensive against Soviet active measures.
- o to divert attention from Soviet wrongdoing in Afghanistan and Poland.

End Summary

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.**

-1-

I. THEMES

A. The President's Speech on Arms Reduction Talks

Initial Soviet media response to President Reagan's November 19 speech criticized the U.S. "zero option" as unrealistic and unfair, an attempt to regain U.S. military superiority in Europe. Soviet media characterized the Reagan proposal as a "propaganda ruse" intended simultaneously to soften opposition--particularly in Western Europe--to U.S. and NATO military plans for Europe, and to block the upcoming Geneva negotiations, while trying to cast blame for the deadlock on the Soviets.

A flood of Soviet media commentary on the Reagan speech seemed primarily designed to blunt its positive impact upon worldwide audiences by discrediting it as a serious arms control initiative. Perhaps out of concern that Reagan might be upstaging Brezhnev on the eve of the latter's trip to Bonn, Soviet media commentators reemphasized the seriousness and steadfastness of Brezhnev's peace policy, contrasting that to alleged U.S. "posturing" and suspiciously "sudden" interest in peace.

Soviet media commentary stressed the following points:

- o "Rough parity" between the military power of both sides now exists in Europe. Figures cited by President Reagan to show alleged Soviet superiority are "fantastic." (Soviet media provided a counter set of figures.)
- o Acceptance of the American proposal would mean a return to the imbalance which formerly prevailed. The present Soviet defense potential in Europe would be eliminated while U.S. forward-based systems and British and French submarine-based missiles and nuclear bombers would remain untouched. Thus for this and other reasons, the "zero option" does not take Soviet security needs into account.
- o By deliberately offering a proposal they themselves realize is unacceptable, U.S. leaders are trying to create the impression "among the uninformed" that they are seriously interested in arms reduction in Europe. Actually, this maneuver is yet another indication that the U.S. is approaching the Geneva talks with an unconstructive attitude: the U.S. side would like to see a breakdown of the talks "that could be used as an excuse for the continuation of the arms race."

The Soviet media quoted extensively from Western media analyses to support their arguments. They also continued to give prominent play to material treated as evidence of a "warmongering attitude"

(over)

-2-

on the part of the U.S., such as information on U.S. military appropriations and recent statements by U.S. officials on "limited nuclear war" and "nuclear warning shots."

B. War and Peace

The recent focus of Soviet propaganda has been, overwhelmingly, war and peace. Soviet media have painted the U.S. as the enemy of peace, the instigator of a new arms race, an opponent of arms limitations talks, and a proponent of nuclear war.

While alleging America's "trigger-happy" attitude toward war and nuclear weapons, Soviet propaganda emphasizes the "peaceloving" nature of Soviet policies. The centerpiece of this campaign has been the so-called interview Leonid Brezhnev granted to the West German journal Der Spiegel in November. In this lengthy exposition, the CPSU General Secretary denies that his country seeks military superiority over the U.S. and disclaims any Soviet belief in the "winnability" of a nuclear war. Brezhnev insists that the USSR desires serious arms negotiations and that the U.S. is obstructing such talks.

Soviet media have given much play to the antiwar movements in Western Europe and pictured them as exclusively anti-American instead of antinuclear (i.e., against both U.S. and Soviet arms). This propaganda tries to turn the concern of many Europeans over nuclear conflict into a Soviet weapon to obtain the unilateral cessation of NATO's TNF modernization program while permitting continued Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.

Because Soviet propagandists know that their own and other publics tend to discount official Soviet statements, they quote liberally from American and Western leaders--generally out of context or with distorted interpretation added--to bolster their points. Thus, statements by President Reagan on the possibility of a "limited nuclear war," by General Schweitzer on current Soviet designs, and by Secretary of State Haig on certain NATO contingency plans have all figured prominently in recent Soviet propaganda. (See also following section.)

In pushing the image of the U.S. as a warmonger and the greatest threat to world peace, the Soviet Union has made a number of claims and charges, such as:

- o the U.S. is plotting an invasion of Libya under the pretext of its Bright Star joint military exercises in the Mideast.
- o the U.S. plans to deploy neutron weapons in the People's Republic of China.
- o the U.S. plans to invade the Caribbean nation of Grenada.

-3-

- o the U.S. refuses to support the Soviet-backed U.N. treaty on weapons in space, an obvious sign of American intention to put "weapons of mass destruction" into space.
- o the U.S. is waging war against Cuba with chemical and bacteriological weapons and is training forces for an invasion of Cuba.
- o the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia presages a vast expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and indicates an American intention to use its military forces in areas where it claims (unjustifiably) a U.S. national interest.

Thus, for example, the Soviet military newspaper Red Star on October 18 claimed that "Washington regards the upcoming series of U.S. Armed Forces maneuvers . . . as a 'dress rehearsal' for an invasion of Libya and as a means of forcible pressure on other Arab countries." And a TASS broadcast on November 1 charged that

the United States is trying to secure for itself the long-awaited possibility to deploy its armed forces in the Middle East on a long-term basis, which fully meets the aspirations of U.S. imperialism to establish dominance over that strategically sensitive part of the world.

Soviet organs also continue to reiterate elements of the Soviet "peace offensive" first sketched at the 26th Party Congress in February-March 1981: e.g., the call for nuclear-free zones in Europe, and a new Mideast multinational peace conference to supplant the Camp David accords.

C. Vilification of U.S. Officials and Agencies

Soviet media have devoted much time and space to attacks on and citation of certain American officials. Among those most frequently and most sharply attacked in the past month have been: President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, ICA Director Charles Wick, ACDA head Eugene Rostow, former NSC staffer General Robert Schweitzer, and two U.S. diplomats. Most often attacked has been Secretary Weinberger, with Secretary Haig a close second.

Two apparent motives lie behind these attacks. First, many of these officials have been on the offensive against the Soviet Union in recent weeks. Second, as noted above, Soviet propagandists think that quoting and misquoting Western officials lends more authority to their work.

The President's comment that he could, in certain circumstances, envision a nuclear engagement confined to Europe alone, has drawn much fire from Soviet media. In keeping with public Soviet mili-

(over)

-4-

tary doctrine, Brezhnev (in Der Spiegel) and Defense Minister Ustinov (at the November 7 anniversary celebration)--as well as many other Soviet commentators--have insisted that the USSR does not agree with the concept of "limited nuclear war." They claim that any nuclear exchange between NATO and Warsaw Pact members would inevitably lead to a major nuclear conflagration.

Such efforts seem geared to fan anti-American and anti-NATO feelings in Western Europe. Thus, Soviets apparently hope to spread doubt and disaffection among the NATO allies.

Notable examples of personal attacks are:

- o After publication of the Department of Defense report Soviet Military Power, Secretary Weinberger became a lightning rod for Soviet abuse, including many personal attacks. In a Pravda piece entitled "In a Propagandistic Hysteria" (October 1), a Soviet commentator implied that the Defense Secretary's "anti-Sovietism" amounted to a kind of mental imbalance. Noting that "anti-Soviet hallucinations" had brought former Defense Secretary James Forrestal to a "bad end" (suicide), he expressed fear that the present Pentagon chief might succumb to "the same illness." At bottom, this and other articles portray Weinberger and the U.S. as seeking military superiority over the USSR.
- o Secretary of State Haig has been the object of Soviet assault for a variety of public statements, e.g., that the U.S. would like to see a more moderate, pro-U.S. regime in Iran, that NATO might consider use of a nuclear weapon as a "demonstration," and that the U.S. intends to ensure its leadership in the Middle East with an American military presence in the region. Most of these remarks have been interpreted by Soviet commentators as evidence of American desire to dominate various areas of the globe and to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations.
- o Statements of officials such as Bush, Rostow, and Lehman have all been used by Soviet propagandists to bolster their claims that the U.S. pursues a policy of singleminded self-interest, primarily by military means, to the detriment of other countries. Soviet media portray U.S. policy as seeking American dominance over its allies, neighbors, and others--especially less developed countries.
- o Particularly intense have been Soviet-inspired attacks against two American diplomats, Ambassador Barnes to India and Ambassador Ortiz to Peru. Non-Soviet media with close ties to the USSR originally accused both men of being CIA agents. In a classic pattern, the Soviet media then picked up and spread the stories. Such unfounded charges are designed to embarrass American public servants and to complicate bilateral relations with the nations involved. But they endanger the lives of U.S. diplomats because alleged CIA agents often become "fair game" for terrorists worldwide.

-5-

Some individuals and agencies in the U.S. engaged in international information and cultural exchange activities have been prime targets for Soviet media attacks.

The International Communication Agency (ICA) has been depicted by Soviet media as a powerful and "far-flung" propaganda apparatus leading U.S. "anti-Soviet and antisocialist" propaganda operations.

ICA is charged with having close ties to the CIA; some Soviet commentaries, such as a November 5 TASS item, characterize ICA as "nothing more than a branch of the CIA." The Voice of America (VOA) is the ICA component most often singled out for attack, and the recently inaugurated "Project Truth" has also drawn specific criticism. Soviet media have accused ICA/VOA of, among other things, spreading fabrications which glorify the West and "blacken" socialism, and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries (most importantly, Poland) with the purpose of encouraging instability and subversion.

The Central Intelligence Agency itself has also come under regular fire from Soviet media, both for its alleged foreign involvements and for current attempts to change its mandate. Charges of CIA "crimes" against Panama's Torrijos, Cuba, etc. are noted below. But Soviet propaganda has been especially attentive to the proposed changes in laws which would enable the CIA to operate at home against enemies of the U.S. The Soviets accuse the Reagan administration of trying to turn the CIA into a domestic spying operation which would endanger the civil liberties of all Americans, particularly those who do not agree with administration policies.

D. The U.S. as Moral Monster Abroad and at Home

Soviet propagandists' ongoing efforts to portray the United States in the worst possible light can be seen in their charges of "amoral" and "immoral" U.S. activities, such as:

- o The U.S. constantly interferes in the internal affairs of other nations: in Poland, where the U.S. allegedly fans the flames of antisocialism in the Solidarity union; in Spain, where the U.S. is supposedly pressuring that nation to join NATO; in El Salvador, where--it is claimed--a legitimate national liberation movement is being blocked with U.S. support; and in Afghanistan, where the U.S. (and China) are accused of fomenting and abetting resistance to the Soviet puppet regime.
- o The United States uses military, political, and economic means to exploit Third World nations for the benefit of its multinational companies, monopoly capital, and the military-industrial complex.

(over)

-6-

- o The U.S. uses its leverage unfairly against its own allies-- forcing the Japanese to increase their military spending, the Europeans to acquiesce to U.S.-inspired NATO plans that only threaten war, and Egypt to submit to an expansion of the American military presence in the Mideast.
- o The United States in general and the CIA in particular have engaged in heinous crimes against individuals and nations. The U.S. was behind the death of Panama's General Torrijos, was somehow involved in the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt, and is currently using outlawed chemical and biological weapons against Cuba.
- o The Reagan administration's domestic economic program squeezes the poor and weak while helping the rich and powerful. The American worker is either ignored or consciously overburdened so that those in the so-called ruling elite may increase their own wealth. Most harmed by current policies are minority groups.

II. TECHNIQUES

Diversion of Attention from Soviet Wrongs

One of the most widely practiced Soviet propaganda techniques, diversion, has been frequently used in the past month. The most recent example occurred when a Soviet nuclear-equipped submarine ran aground in Swedish territorial waters. The incident, with the submarine obviously on an intelligence-gathering mission, garnered the Soviets much hostile publicity and considerable adverse reaction among European publics. Yet within a few days of the sub's release, Soviet media were again hyping the Soviet plan for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. And shortly thereafter TASS, the official Soviet press agency, accused the Swedes, albeit indirectly, of spying on Soviet communications systems for NATO.

They continue to utilize the diversionary technique to distract attention from their own huge military buildup, Soviet wrongdoing in Afghanistan and the Third World, and Soviet use of chemical and biological warfare (CBW). For example, as the United States began to demonstrate with hard evidence that the USSR uses and supplies lethal agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union unleashed a massive attack on the U.S. for use of chemical weapons in Vietnam and of bacteriological warfare against Cuba (an allegation made by Fidel Castro).

As the Cancun summit was unfolding, the Soviet media tried to paper over the Soviet absence at the conference and the USSR's meager aid program to nonsocialist developing nations by vilifying the U.S. and the West as colonial exploiters of the Third World. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is almost ignored in

-7-

Soviet media, which blame instability there on Western interference. Continuing Soviet difficulties in subduing the indigenous Afghan resistance are blamed on the U.S. and China--supposedly the instigators and direct supporters of the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.

When the Pentagon released its report on Soviet Military Power, the immediate Soviet response was to step up attacks on U.S. military power and the planned Reagan administration enhancement of American military capabilities. By falsifying efforts, they have tried to show that one photograph of a Soviet computer is not what it purports to be and by this device to call into question the entire text. (See Kornilov item in Izvestiia for October 20.)

In short, Soviet propaganda not only indulges in coverups and omissions, it often is reduced to name-calling. The theory behind this technique seems to be that Soviet policies, behavior, and even intentions are always irreproachable.

Prepared by: PGM/R staff

PROJECT TRUTH

== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 1

October 15, 1981

Re: Project Truth

In addition to the efforts underway of a complementary nature, this is the first in a monthly series of reports on Soviet external propaganda. The reports will be based on evaluations of cable reporting, primary source material, and secondary sources such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) publications. Because this report is the first, it contains more general and introductory material than will be included in updates.

Presented in this report are:

- o An overview of Soviet propaganda principles and techniques.
- o A list of major political-military propaganda themes and societal comparisons drawn between the U.S. and the USSR. Selected regional and country propaganda themes are also provided.
- o A case study of a Soviet propaganda campaign currently in progress: the anti-neutron weapon (ERW) campaign.

While the focus is on Soviet external propaganda, most of the themes are echoed in the domestic media. Thus, Soviet citizens do not in general get different messages than do foreign audiences.

Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.

-1-

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA

A. Soviet External Propaganda*

Soviet external propaganda has two main purposes:

- o To represent the Soviet Union as dedicated to peace and detente, and
- o To show the Soviet Union as a just, fair, progressive society, worthy of admiration if not emulation.

For these purposes, Soviet propagandists follow several basic principles. The first of these is a systematic denigration of the U.S., its culture, political system, and belief structures. By showing that the U.S.--the acknowledged representative of all things Western--is a doomed, decadent, inherently evil society which opposes all progressive change, Soviet propagandists hope to persuade target audiences that it is not a fit model for their own countries.

The Soviet Union presents itself as the only alternative to the U.S. as a system of social organization. It portrays itself as the near-perfect society. Armed with an ideology that maintains that the Soviet form of society is the inevitable next step in human development, Soviet propagandists draw invidious comparisons between almost every aspect of American and Soviet life.

Another key feature of Soviet propaganda is the argument that while the U.S. and the West are doomed in historical terms, the U.S. is all the more dangerous because it will defend its way of life to the end, taking the rest of the world with it to destruction if need be.

By contrast, the Soviet Union arms only to defend itself and its allies. It does this reluctantly because its main goal is to perfect the social, cultural, and economic lives of its citizens; and armaments are a drain on that process.

From these basic principles flow the whole litany of Soviet propaganda and, for that matter, foreign policy:

- o Support for "national liberation" movements is justified in terms of putting them on the road to the higher plane of existence enjoyed by the Soviet Union.
- o The foreign and domestic policies of Western countries are criticized because they are dedicated to the preservation of the status quo and are opposed to progressive change.

* In the Soviet lexicon, the word "propaganda" does not carry the negative connotation that it does in the West.

-2-

- o Western military measures are portrayed as inherently aggressive because they are directed against the Soviet Union and the progressive principles for which it stands.
- o Anti-imperialism (anti-Americanism) is claimed to be good because it represents a movement against the ancien regime and toward historical progress. The methods used in the anti-imperialist struggle are sometimes harsh but are justified by the ends.
- o The Soviet Union is the natural ally of Third World countries and all others who have freed themselves from imperialism (i.e., Eastern Europe).

B. Soviet Propaganda Techniques

Soviet propagandists employ a vast array of techniques, crude and sophisticated. As well as simply being very good at what they do, Soviet propagandists are not restrained by truth, honesty, and morality; rather, they are guided by a new morality, defined by Lenin as that which serves the good of the Party. Their ideology rationalizes the use of falsehood and deception by promising that the end--the perfect society--justifies all means and that shrinking from the use of all available means constitutes betrayal of the cause.

Soviet propagandists use selective information, half-truths, distortions, and innuendo, as well as outright lies. Many Soviet propagandists (such as Radio Moscow's Vladimir Pozner) have an excellent understanding of the American psyche and take advantage of American feelings about fair play to justify their own actions or call those of the West into question.

A favorite Soviet propaganda technique is indirection: an item from a Western or other non-Soviet source is cited in support of the Soviet position on an issue, the item sometimes having been planted by the Soviets. Ironically, the Soviets tend to think sources from the bourgeois West will have the greatest credibility, even among their own population. An alternative form of indirection is the inaccurate citation of a foreign source or the portrayal of the source as broadly representative of the larger society when it is not (i.e., frequent citations from the U.S. Communist Party newspaper, Daily Worker).

Disinformation is another technique. It is impossible to tell how widespread the practice is because good disinformation is usually not detected. One form of disinformation is the "revelation" of false information (such as a forged U.S. document), preferably in a foreign source that cannot be directly associated with the Soviet Union. Another disinformation technique is to draw attention to past covert actions by U.S. intelligence agencies and then to imply that the attempted assassination of the Pope or the bombings in Iran are similar

-3-

types of activities. From here it is a short step to the suggestion that the U.S. could have been involved.

A most effective technique is imputing false motives to U.S. policy. The Soviets are quick to exploit any opening offered by a U.S. action by pointing out adverse consequences or offensive features to the countries affected. Thus, any U.S. action which can be interpreted to support Israel is portrayed as being anti-Arab in nature. U.S. attempts to achieve "balance" in situations such as the recent South African incursion into Angola are dismissed as hypocrisy.

Another technique is to debase the meaning of words. Soviet propaganda has succeeded in appropriating the word "socialist" as a synonym for the word "communist," and propagandists seldom refer to themselves or their East European allies as communist countries. In so doing, they acquire at least semantic legitimacy with groups and countries that consider themselves to be socialist but not communist. Perhaps the term most debased is "anti-Soviet": virtually every development in the world is seen as either pro- or anti-Soviet and whatever is not clearly "pro" is immediately labeled "anti." There is also the example of the application of "national liberation movement" to groups which seek the violent overthrow of governments unfriendly or neutral toward the Soviet Union.

Diversion is a technique used to blunt attacks on the USSR. When the USSR is criticized, Soviet propaganda responds with a barrage of countercharges, trying to turn the accusation made against the USSR against the accusers themselves. For example, Western charges of Soviet experimentation with biological warfare, arising in connection with the Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, were answered by a Soviet propaganda blitz on Western development of biological weapons. Soviet propagandists often concoct even the most absurd accusations in the belief that even these will help distract attention from the charges against the USSR.

This is not to say that everything that Soviet propagandists create is untrue or that Soviets necessarily disbelieve their own arguments even if they appear to be untrue in Western eyes. Because their ideology dictates the "correct" interpretation of most facts, Soviets may often read a vastly different meaning into a situation or action than would their Western counterparts. Over the years, Soviet ideologists have developed an array of philosophical rationalizations that make all Western actions appear to be threatening or malevolent regardless of their objective intent, while all Soviet actions are laudable, no matter how they might appear to the outside observer.

-4-

II. CURRENT SOVIET EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA THEMES

This list of current propaganda themes and variations is not exhaustive. Soviet propagandists adjust quickly to changing situations, developing variations on general and constant themes in the Soviet repertoire to suit the needs of the moment. Thus, a general theme (e.g.: "The U.S. is a threat to peace") can be refined to apply to an unlimited range of geographic and situational requirements.

The themes are organized according to their geographic concerns--global, regional, or country-specific--and within these categories according to whether they involve military-strategic matters or seek to contrast the Soviet Union with the United States.

A. Global Themes: Military-Strategic

The aggressiveness of the U.S. as contrasted with the peace-loving nature of the USSR is one of the dominant themes of Soviet propaganda. It encompasses many sub-themes, some of which are discussed below.

According to Soviet propaganda, the U.S. is escalating the arms race, provoking conflict, and trying to counter every aspect of Soviet influence in the world in its efforts to regain the military-strategic superiority it once possessed. Aggressive behavior by the U.S. stems largely from its inability and/or unwillingness to adjust to the new "correlation of forces" in the world (the decline of the Western capitalism and the rise of socialism). U.S. frustration at no longer being "number one" is expressed in violence, directed primarily at its chief rival, the Soviet Union.

The USSR, on the other hand, has always been and continues to be dedicated to the struggle for peace. Its military might is intended only to defend itself and other peoples who want and deserve help in defending themselves. In recent months, the so-called Brezhnev "peace offensive" has been cited repeatedly as testimony to the peace-loving nature of Soviet policy.

While Soviet propaganda always presents U.S. military-strategic aggressiveness as a real and dangerous threat, it also indicates that U.S. actions will ultimately prove futile. For as Marxism-Leninism teaches, the capitalist/imperialist world is doomed, despite its desperate efforts to survive, and socialism--with the USSR its leading representative--is the future. Nonetheless, the forces of socialism cannot wait passively for the collapse of the capitalist world; they must actively counter its "last gasps" of harmful activity.

-5-

Sub-Themes

1. The U.S. seeks military superiority over the Soviet Union. The U.S. has lost the military preeminence in the world it enjoyed after World War II when only it possessed nuclear weapons. The U.S. wishes to regain its former position in order to blackmail the Soviet Union and its allies, to force its will upon other countries, and to resist forces of change and progress, especially in the Third World.
2. The U.S. is not seriously interested in arms control negotiations. The U.S. strives to create an international atmosphere which is counterproductive to arms talks, it has failed to respond to any of the sincere Soviet initiatives in the sphere of arms control, and it has blocked ongoing efforts such as the MBFR talks. Although the American failure to ratify SALT II is no longer a major emphasis, it is still regularly referred to in the context of more general criticisms of U.S. arms control behavior.
3. The U.S. is introducing sinister new weapons such as the neutron weapon, the Pershing II, the MX, chemical and biological weapons. In its drive to regain superiority, the U.S. is developing and deploying new weapons systems which endanger the alleged parity that Soviet propagandists maintain now exists between the two countries. The U.S. is willing to use any weapon, including chemical and biological devices which most other countries have outlawed. The U.S. is also developing the space shuttle mainly for military use and is working on killer satellites, particle-beam weapons, and laser applications.
4. The U.S. is forcing its allies to accept its weapons and to increase their own arms expenditures. The U.S. blackmails its allies into accepting the placement of weapons (e.g. Pershing II's). Its allies resist because they recognize that the U.S. is trying to export a future war, that is, to ensure that it is not fought on U.S. soil. There is a growing split between the U.S. and its allies.
5. The U.S. seeks to forge an anti-Soviet alliance with such countries as China, Japan, Pakistan, and Turkey. The U.S. wants bases for its troops or the right to stockpile military supplies on the soil of other countries. The U.S. uses economic aid, military assistance, weapons sales, or simple blackmail to gain concessions.
6. The U.S. engages in psychological warfare against the Soviet Union. It spreads untruths about the USSR through its propaganda activities--especially radio: VOA, RFE, and RL--and foments anti-Soviet hysteria and war mentality. These activities are in violation of basic international agreements such as CSCE.

-6-

7. The U.S. wages economic warfare against the USSR. The U.S. is trying to provoke a costly new round of the arms race that will strain, exhaust and ultimately destroy the Soviet economy. It also uses economic weapons such as the grain embargo to force the Soviet Union to accede to its will. Soviet propagandists always strongly emphasize that the Soviet economy will never be ruined by a forced arms race. Although the Soviet leadership would much prefer to use Soviet resources for improving the people's living conditions, the USSR is certainly capable of keeping pace with U.S. military strength and is determined to do this, even if sacrifices are necessary in other sectors of the economy.

8. The U.S. grossly interferes in the internal affairs of other countries. The U.S. seeks to manipulate the domestic political process of other countries, including its allies. It attempts to guarantee that these countries' domestic and foreign policies will be subordinate or at least complementary to its own. The U.S. is willing to use all methods to this end, including propaganda, blackmail, bribery, and assassination. In the case of countries that seek to free themselves of U.S. or colonial domination, the U.S. assists repressive regimes in putting these movements down or sponsors counterrevolutionary activities which will restore the status quo.

9. The U.S. faces vast resistance to its aggressive plans. The world public opposes the aggressive plans of the U.S. and its allies. Large-scale resistance is seen in almost all countries. Pacifism and neutralism are growing, especially in those countries most threatened by U.S. plans. Even within the U.S., there is a major split between the Government and the people over defense policy.

10. The U.S. and allies are responsible for international terrorism. The U.S., Israel and some of the NATO allies are behind terrorist activity in the world. There is a tradition of terrorism associated with right-wing extremists in the West and the U.S. is a violent, unstable society which spawns terrorist activity.

11. The CIA is behind much of the unrest in the world. In its efforts to carry out its policies, the U.S. resorts to all available means. Along with military, economic, and psychological weapons, the U.S. employs the CIA to subvert other countries and to bring their policies in line with its own. It attempts to control other governments through its agents or to destabilize those countries it cannot control. The CIA has unlimited funds and will employ any means to achieve its ends.

-7-

12. The Soviet Union seeks only peace and detente. Soviet policy is peace-loving and defensive. The USSR has often sought to reach agreement with the U.S. and its allies to reduce tensions, disarm, and engage in peaceful economic and social intercourse. The Soviet Union respects the independence and sovereignty of other countries and does not interfere in their internal affairs. The world public recognizes and appreciates this policy, and regards the Soviet Union as the greatest force for peace on the planet.

13. The Soviet Union arms only to defend itself and its allies. The USSR is forced to respond to U.S. and Western threats by building its own forces. These forces are purely defensive, but can be used to defend the gains of socialism and national liberation movements such as in Afghanistan.

14. The U.S. cannot succeed in gaining military superiority. The Soviet people are willing to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to provide adequate defenses. In spite of the U.S.'s superior resources, it will never be allowed to regain military superiority.

B. Global Themes: U.S. and USSR As Competing Social Models

The propaganda themes listed in this section are meant by the Soviets to show that the U.S. is an unattractive, vicious, exploitative society which has outlived its time. The Soviet Union is portrayed as the society which has found the answers to the challenges of modern society. While the Soviet Union is acknowledged to have some problems, these are of a temporary nature and will fade as the society develops.

The Soviets are especially defensive about social and economic comparisons with the U.S. and other Western countries. They react immediately to charges from Western officials which call into question the quality of life in the Soviet Union or challenge the idea that the USSR constitutes a model for future society.

Sub-Themes

1. The U.S. slanders the Soviet Union. U.S. policy is pervasively anti-Soviet. "Bourgeois falsifiers" in the West carry on a relentless campaign of anti-Soviet slander. They slur the Soviet way of life, Soviet reality, nationality relations, foreign policy, economic system, etc. Western "secret services" and their "mouthpieces" and "voices" are in the forefront of this campaign of anti-Sovietism.

2. The neocolonialist U.S. and its allies are not friends of the Third World. The U.S. holds up the American system as a model for Third World countries but in fact it is not a fit model. Imitating it means continuing in a mode of colonial-

-8-

style oppression and injustice. The U.S. supports tyrannical regimes (e.g. Chile, South Africa) if they are pro-West and anti-Soviet, and it opposes national liberation movements. It has no genuine concern for the welfare of the Third World peoples; its main concern is access to resources. American exploitation of Third World takes many forms--economic, cultural, political. For example, U.S. corporations extract profit from the Third World while exploiting their resources; the CIA manipulates foreign regimes by "dirty tricks"; U.S. museums and private collectors steal Latin American artifacts.

3. The Soviet Union is the natural ally of Third World countries. Its dedication to the interests of the common people is manifested in its support of national liberation movements. The USSR generously extends opportunities to Third World students to study in the USSR. It unstintingly gives economic assistance for peaceful purposes and sends Soviet technicians and specialists of all kinds to Third World countries to work jointly with the indigenous population on construction and other projects.

4. The U.S. is an insecure, unstable, inhumane society in a permanent state of crisis. Its most striking features are:

- o High unemployment (especially among blacks).
- o Racial discrimination.
- o Abject poverty juxtaposed with excessive wealth concentrated in the topmost elite.
- o Widespread demoralization as well as material deprivation among the poor, the unemployed, and the otherwise disadvantaged.
- o High cost of education, medical care, etc. (access and quality depend upon ability to pay).
- o Rampant crime and antisocial behavior (decadence, drugs, and pornography).
- o Neglect of and lack of respect for the elderly.
- o Widespread worker dissatisfaction (as evidenced by strikes).
- o Political prisoners.
- o Lack of genuine democracy.

Note: While usually less prominent and extensive than propaganda on international issues, propaganda on U.S. internal affairs is nonetheless a staple feature of the Soviet media. Themes are

-9-

longstanding and change little over time, although treatment and tone vary. Commentary is usually tied to some news event or development in the U.S. which illustrates negative aspects of American society. Soviets do not need to make up stories or "disinformation" although they are not above it. All they must do is give one-sided coverage of issues, drawing from Western press articles and data that show American society in an unfavorable light.

By contrast, Soviet propagandists portray the USSR as having solved or nearly solved most of its problems. Because economic rights (jobs, wages, pensions) are considered to be basic human rights in the Soviet Union, the system is shown to be more humane and dedicated to the welfare of the masses. Social relations are based on equality, antisocial behavior is an aberration, and the people regard the system as fair and just.

5. The U.S. violates fundamental human rights while accusing others of doing so. The U.S. hypocritically attacks the Soviet Union for alleged human rights violations, while it is the U.S. that is violating fundamental human rights. The U.S. is interested in human rights only as an issue with which to attack the Soviet Union.

6. Soviets who fall prey to Western propaganda tend to be unsuccessful and miserable when they emigrate. Soviet emigres miss their homeland intolerably, regret their decision to emigrate, and are desperate to return to USSR. Their reasons for being disenchanted with life in the West tend to be both economic and "spiritual": difficulty of getting a job commensurate with one's education and experience; unsatisfactory living conditions; feeling out of place in a cold, uncaring, dog-eat-dog, every-man-for-himself capitalist society.

C. Regional and Country Themes

Many of the global themes previously described appear in Soviet propaganda directed at or concerning specific regions and countries. This section sets out the main lines of propaganda about a few countries and areas.

1. Poland. Soviet propaganda accuses outsiders--especially the West and particularly the U.S.--of interfering in internal Polish affairs, stirring up trouble through its radio propaganda (VOA and RFE), and supporting antisocialist elements. Various Polish organizations and individuals have been criticized, but favorite targets are Solidarity, the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR), and groups which allegedly seek to separate Poland from the socialist community or restore capitalism. FRG interference and revanchism is also a recurrent theme.

2. Afghanistan. Major emphasis is on the humanitarian, economic, and otherwise peaceful aid rendered by the Soviet Union

-10-

to Afghanistan. Outsiders, especially the U.S. together with the PRC and Pakistan, are charged with interfering in Afghan affairs and in the Persian Gulf, supporting and encouraging the "bandits" (insurgents) and generally provoking discord and chaos. The CIA is accused of being behind "bandit" activity.

3. Iran. The Iranian people are said to have overthrown the oppressive, U.S.-backed regime of the Shah. The U.S. is still trying to regain its previous dominance and is behind attempts to overthrow the revolutionary regime. The U.S. (through the CIA) is responsible for the rash of assassinations of Iranian leaders.

4. China. China is accused of taking an uncooperative and hostile stance toward the Soviet Union. It is depicted as conspiring with the U.S. on military and political adventures which threaten the USSR and its allies and endanger peace--for example, in Afghanistan. The point is made, however, that the USSR remains ready to have normal relations with the PRC.

5. Japan. Japan is ganging up with China and the U.S. against the Soviet Union. It is making outrageous claims on Soviet territory (the disputed Northern Territories).

6. Cuba. Cuba and the USSR are loyal allies. Cuba is the bastion of progressivism and freedom in Latin America. Latin Americans elsewhere seek to follow its example, but are often discouraged or prevented from this by the U.S. (through the CIA) together with its allies. Since Castro took power, the U.S. "special services" have been plotting and conniving against him. The U.S. constantly threatens and provokes Cuba.

7. El Salvador. The U.S. is propping up an oppressive, unpopular regime. It has promoted falsehoods about the situation there, bolstered with forged and falsified (by the CIA) documents. The U.S. has made false claims about Soviet clandestine involvement in El Salvador in order to distract attention from its own activities.

8. South Africa. South Africa is a racist renegade state which suppresses its national liberation movement with the support if not the assistance of the U.S. Its recent attack on Angola is evidence of its lawless, aggressive nature, and the UN veto is evidence of U.S. support.

9. Middle East. The main propaganda target is Israel, which is depicted as the prime military and political threat in the region. Zionism is condemned as a pernicious force and is equated with ~~imperialism~~-imperialism. Egypt is another favorite target of Soviet propaganda, with personal attacks often made on President Sadat. The U.S. is criticized for efforts to reach a "separate deal" with Israel and Egypt which is doomed to fail. The U.S. is also charged with general aggressiveness in this area. This is contrasted to the "peace, friendship and cooperation" offered by Soviet Middle East policy. Steadfast Soviet support for the PLO's cause is reiterated.

-11-

10. Western Europe. NATO countries are often lumped in with the U.S. in propaganda on military/strategic themes. On TNF, the U.S. and "some NATO leaders" are the villains, while the European people are generally described as peace-loving. All manifestations of opposition to neutron weapon and other weapons receive heavy play. Disagreements or conflicts between the U.S. and its European allies receive heavy and unbalanced attention from Soviet propagandists. A constant theme is that the U.S. exploits Europe in its (U.S.) anti-Soviet policies and uses heavy pressure in countering European resistance to U.S. domination. Another theme, used mostly in connection with the FRG is the "resurgent neo-Fascism, neo-Nazism" in the West.

III. A CASE STUDY: THE ANTI-NEUTRON WEAPON CAMPAIGN

This section describes a Soviet propaganda campaign on a specific issue to show how propaganda themes and techniques fit together in a concrete situation. The anti-neutron weapon campaign is a major effort, is current, and is typical of Soviet propaganda activity.

The Soviets have mounted an intensive worldwide propaganda offensive against the neutron weapon (ERW) in response to the recent U.S. announcement of plans to put ERW into production. The campaign began immediately after the U.S. announcement on August 6, and it has quickly grown into one of the biggest Soviet propaganda efforts in recent memory.

The Soviets' current themes and techniques are largely reminiscent of those used in their 1977-78 anti-neutron weapon campaign. Some themes, however, are given new or different emphasis, in line with present circumstances.

ERW in the Context of General Propaganda Themes

In addition to targeting the ERW issue directly, Soviet propaganda frequently treats it as one of many elements constituting the most important "general trends" in U.S. nuclear-strategic policy. ERW is almost always brought up in the context of discussions of these broader themes, several of which are listed below (see pp. 6-9 for general discussion of these themes):

- o The U.S. is initiating a costly new spiral of the arms race. The neutron weapon decision is an obvious component of this. The U.S. hopes to achieve military superiority over the USSR but this is a futile effort. Escalating the arms race can only lead to an ever more dangerous world situation and the peoples of both countries will suffer because the resources needed for butter will go for guns.
- o The U.S. is seeking to destabilize the world situation and to take advantage of that instability to intervene in other countries in order to further its own interests. The

-12-

neutron weapon is linked to other U.S. military programs and plans geared to this goal. The neutron weapon decision, for example, is tied to U.S. preparations for nuclear aggression in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area; the creation of the "Rapid Deployment Force," in combination with ERW and other things, assumes a "particularly sinister character."

Major Themes on ERW

Most of the Soviet propaganda on ERW interweaves a variety of general (e.g., "The U.S. is not serious about arms control negotiations") and specific themes. The specific themes include:

- o The neutron weapon is a new type of weapon, distinct from other weapons; its introduction will significantly disturb the present military parity between the USSR and the U.S.
- o By blurring the line between conventional and nuclear-strategic weaponry, the neutron weapon lowers the threshold for nuclear war and makes nuclear war more "thinkable."
- o The neutron weapon is a particularly "monstrous" and "barbaric" weapon. That it is designed expressly to destroy living things while leaving inanimate objects and property intact is a clear and horrifying reflection of capitalist/imperialist priorities.
- o The U.S. is making "nuclear hostages" of the Western Europeans. In the event of nuclear war, Europeans would become the first victims and many countries would cease to exist.
- o It is common knowledge that despite the present U.S. decision to store the weapons on American territory, the neutron weapon is intended primarily for use in Western Europe and deployment of the weapon on European soil can be expected before too long. The U.S. failed to consult with its allies on this decision--although it affects them directly and it continues to "trample callously" on their concerns. The U.S. thus seeks to impose its will on Western Europe regardless of strong opposition at a popular--and even to some extent official--level.
- o Worldwide opposition to U.S. introduction of the neutron weapon has been and continues to be fierce. Manifestation of anti-neutron weapon sentiment has been greatest in Europe, but is occurring elsewhere, too, including in the United States. Popular demonstrations have taken place, prominent figures have spoken out, letter-writing campaigns have been conducted, committees have been formed, and other activities against the neutron weapon have been undertaken.
- o The neutron weapon decision "complicates" and "puts off" the question of LRTNF talks, thus intensifying the overall problem of European security.

-13-

- o The U.S. argument that the neutron weapon is a defensive, anti-tank weapon, intended to offset Soviet tank strength in Europe, is nonsense. The weapon can be used offensively, for example, to clear the way for invading troops.
- o Although the USSR opposes the production of any new types of weapons, it will respond with a "proper counterbalance" to the neutron weapon if the U.S. does not reconsider its decision to produce the weapon. The USSR is prepared to acquire a neutron weapon or whatever is necessary to defend against the American threat.

Trends in Soviet ERW Propaganda

Slight shifts in emphases on several themes have been noted recently. Thus far, Soviet propagandists have been concentrating heavily on what the neutron weapon means for Europe. While anti-neutron weapon propaganda is not directed exclusively to a European audience, this is nonetheless the group on which it has a primary and immediate impact.

Now in mid-September it appears that the Soviets are increasingly stressing the possible opportunities for use of neutron weapons in the Third World--opportunities, they suggest, which the Pentagon is pondering. According to Soviet propagandists, the neutron weapon can be used wherever the U.S. perceives a "sphere of vital interest"--which, it is noted, appears to be anywhere and everywhere. The Persian Gulf is mentioned as one of the most likely locations for U.S. use of the neutron weapon.

Anti-ERW propaganda dealing with the European context has not been decreased, but perhaps an attempt is being made to broaden the appeal of the Soviet campaign and make everyone feel more threatened by ERW and thus inclined to protest against it.

There has also been a shift of emphasis away from the theme of "the neutron weapon as an offensive weapon for clearing the way for invading troops." Stress is increasingly being placed on the argument that radiation contamination hazard from the weapon is much longer lasting and more intense than U.S. officials contend. If the Soviets want to play up the latter theme (as they evidently do), they cannot simultaneously charge that the weapon could be used to quickly clear the way for troops to move into or through an area.

There is no indication of a perceptible reduction in the intensity or quantity of anti-ERW propaganda generated by the mass media of the USSR and Soviet bloc countries. Their rhetoric also continues to be harsh.

Techniques

The techniques used in the anti-ERW campaign are no different from those commonly used in any Soviet external propaganda activity (summarized in pp. 3-5 of this report). Different

-14-

themes are played up for different audiences, or one theme is treated in a sophisticated or simple manner. Thus a Radio Moscow English broadcast targetted to North America is likely to emphasize the cost of ERW and other weapons to the American public, commenting that it would be better for ordinary American citizens if arms expenditures rather than social programs were cut. Broadcasts to Western Europe, on the other hand, stress U.S. "victimization" of Western Europe and European opposition to ERW.

Various approaches used in the anti-neutron weapon campaign include the following:

- o TASS statements and official statements issued by top Soviet officials giving the Soviet position on ERW. As these constitute "news," they are generally reported widely in foreign media.
- o Statements issued by prominent Soviet figures in fields such as medicine, science, religion (e.g. the Patriarch of Moscow, the head of the USSR Academy of Sciences). These usually condemn ERW on "humanitarian" grounds.
- o Testimony by military experts (Soviet or non-Soviet) on the military characteristics of ERW. This material is often intended to refute American information on the subject. For example, an expert may discuss (in fairly technical terms) how the longterm ERW radiation hazard is much greater than U.S. specialists have disclosed.
- o Citation or reproduction of articles, speeches, reports, etc., appearing in non-Soviet, especially Western, mass media which support Soviet anti-ERW themes. References to Western sources to support Soviet positions is very common in Soviet external and internal propaganda. The Soviets may use foreign-originated material to suggest things they prefer not to state directly themselves or consider more credible to audiences if presented in non-Soviet sources. To give one example of Soviet use of foreign media items: Publicity was given to a secret ACDA study supposedly unearthed by Jack Anderson that "revealed attempts to reassure the U.S. leadership by emphasizing what would remain intact after the use of nuclear weapons." This, according to the Soviets, provided "further convincing evidence" that the U.S. is preparing for nuclear war.
- o Personal attacks on U.S. officials considered responsible for the ERW decision--Secretary Weinberger and Counselor Meese, for example. Their worldview in general and their motives for promoting particular policies are impugned.

Prepared by:
PGM/REU Staff
724-9265

M-9/17/81

Countering Soviet Mis-statements

**G. Countering
Soviet Mis-Statements**

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PAGE 01

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PGMA-01 PGMO-01 POC-04 POE-03 POF-03 POP-03 MGT-01
PGM-01 PL-01 EU-03 GC-02 PGMR-01 PRL-03 PGMP-04 ECA-08
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EO 12065 N/A

SUBJECT: CONTINUED SOVIET CHARGES REGARDING US CHEMICAL
WEAPONS BUILDUP/USE

REFERENCES: A1 COPENHAGEN 2432 - U (NOTAL)

- B1 NELSINKI 1349 - U (NOTAL)
- C1 MOSCOW 3508 - L (NOTAL)
- O1 LAHORE 0720 - C (NOTAL)
- E1 MOSCOW 4081 - U (NOTAL)
- F1 VIENNA 3901 - C (NOTAL)
- G1 USICA 7048 - U
- H1 USICA-01 55891 - U
- I1 USICA 08658 - U

1. USICA COPENHAGEN (REF A1) REPORTS SOVIET CHARGES REGARDING
US CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUILDUP WHICH SURFACED IN "AKTUEL"
(LOCAL SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PAPER), AND ASKS WHETHER SIMILAR
ARTICLES HAVE APPEARED ELSEWHERE. FOLLOWING IS BRIEF ACCOUNT

OF SOME TYPES OF SOVIET (OR SOVIET-INSPIRED) CBW ACCUSATIONS
WHICH HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY.

REFS A-F CONTAIN VARIETY OF SOVIET CHARGES REGARDING US
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUILDUP/USE. CHARGES SURFACED IN REFERENCED
COUNTRIES, AND ACCUSE US OF CBW ACTIVITIES IN NUMBER OF
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PAKISTAN AND CUBA. IN ADDITION, LARGE
NUMBERS OF OTHER SOVIET ACCUSATIONS (SIMILAR IN CONTENT)
ABOUT US CBW ACTIVITIES APPEAR IN RECENT FBIS REPORTS.
REFS G AND H PROVIDE FACTS ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC CHARGES AND
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR POSTS DEALING WITH CHARGES OF US CBW
ACTIVITIES.

2. REFS B, C AND D RELATE ABSURD CHARGES ("TASS,
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA," AND "JANG," AN UROU DAILY) CONCERNING
CBW RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND'S PAKISTAN MEDICAL
RESEARCH CENTER AT LAHORE. POSTS SHOULD CONSULT REF G FOR
DISCUSSION OF CHARGES, FACTS ABOUT RESEARCH CENTER AND POLICY
GUIDANCE.

3. USICA MOSCOW (REF C) RELATES RIDICULOUS "TASS" CHARGE
THAT US-MADE AMMUNITION "STUFFED WITH TOXINS" IS BEING USED
BY SALVADORAN JUNTA. ALLEGATIONS THAT US HAS BEEN INVOLVED
IN CBW ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICAN HAVE SURFACED FREQUENTLY
IN RECENT MONTHS. GUIDANCE AND FACTS ARE PROVIDED IN REFS G
AND H.

4. REFS A, E, AND F POINT UP SOVIET CHARGES OF US CBW
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. ON THIS SUBJECT, MAX KAMPELMAN'S (NEAO
OF US DELEGATION MAJOR CSCE REVIEW MEETING) FEBRUARY 16
SPEECH (CARRIED WORLDWIDE ON WIRELESS FILE 1/16 AND 17)
PROVIDES AUTHORITATIVE OVERVIEW OF CURRENT CBW DEVELOPMENTS.
GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF G, PARA 5 REMAINS CURRENT, WHICH IS
THAT: WHILE SPECIFIC CHARGES OF US CBW ACTIVITY MAY BE
RIDICULOUS, SOVIET EFFORT TO UNDERMINE WORLD CONFIDENCE IN US
COMMITMENT TO 1972 CONVENTION ON CBW IS SERIOUS AND APPEARS
TO REPRESENT PATTERN OF DISINFORMATION AGAINST U.S. POSTS
SHOULD BE ALERT TO RESPONSE AS APPROPRIATE.

5. USICA COPENHAGEN (REF A1) DISCUSSES ARTICLE APPEARING IN
"AKTUEL" (APRIL 2) HEADLINED "THE US REJECTS BAN ON CHEMICAL
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EO 12065 N/A

SUBJECT: PROJECT TRUTH: AS-SABAH AND MOTHER JONES
 REFERENCE: TUNIS 1693-U

1. AS-SABAH IS ROMANTICIZING MOTHER JONES WHEN IT SAYS THE MAGAZINE "HAS MADE AMERICA DIZZY" WITH ITS REPORTING AND "HAS MADE AN ADVENTURE OF THE PRESS." THE CALIFORNIA PUBLICATION IS A SELF-STYLED MUCK-RACKING JOURNAL OF THE ALTERNATIVE PRESS, PUBLISHED IN SAN FRANCISCO. ITS CIRCULATION BEYOND CALIFORNIA IS LIMITED TO A FEW URBAN CENTERS ON THE EAST COAST AND CHICAGO. IT IS ADDRESSED MAINLY TO A YOUNG, EDUCATED AUDIENCE WITH AN ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT POINT OF VIEW. IT IS HARD-HITTING AND WIDE-SWINGING.

2. AGENCY WOULD SUGGEST LOW-KEY RESPONSE. PAO MAY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT MOTHER JONES AS WELL AS COUNTLESS OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES PUBLISH WHAT THEY WANT AND TAKE STRONG POSITIONS ON ISSUES. ACCESS TO CHANNELS OF EXPRESSION ARE NOT LIMITED, AND A WIDE DISPARITY OF VIEWS CAN FIND A MARKET.

FURTHERMORE, IN THE TRADITION OF MUCKRACKING JOURNALISM IN THE U.S., THE PUBLICATION BRINGS TO THE ATTENTION OF ITS READERS SHORTCOMINGS AND/OR ISSUES THAT THEY FEEL REQUIRE ATTENTION. U.S. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THEM AND ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO THEIR CONCERNS. THUS A FREE SOCIETY MONITORS AND CORRECTS ITSELF.

3. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CHARGES IN REFTEL, POST COULD MENTION THAT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS IN 1981 FULLY ABSOLVED NASA OF ANY RESPONSIBILITY IN DEATH OF THE CHILD OVAINE ISIC SEXTON. THE CHILD AND OTHERS WERE PARTICIPATING IN A MEDICAL RPT MEDICAL PROGRAM DESIGNED TO USE RADIATION AS A MEDICAL APPROACH IN TREATMENT OF CERTAIN FATAL DISEASES. IT WAS NOT RPT NOT A PROGRAM RELATED TO SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIMENTS AS MOTHER JONES ALLEGES. NASA HOWEVER MADE USE OF THE AVAILABLE DATA FROM THIS MEDICAL PROGRAM IN ITS OWN RESEARCH. ALLEGATION THAT HUMANS WERE USED INSTEAD OF ANIMALS IS PURE FANTASY.

4. CHARGE THAT THE THIRD WCR.O IS THE U.S. DUMPING GROUND FOR ILLEGAL OR DANGEROUS MATERIALS IS OFTEN MADE AND REQUIRES DELICACY IN RESPONSE. ACCORDING TO U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE CONTROLLING FACTOR ON WHETHER OR NOT A SUBSTANCE MAY BE EXPORTED IS THE LAWS OF THE IMPORTING COUNTRY. IF A FOOD, DRUG, DEVICE, OR COSMETIC ACCORDS WITH THE SPECS OF A FOREIGN PURCHASER AND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH LAWS OF IMPORTING COUNTRY, EXPORT LICENSE MAY BE GIVEN. INFORMATION ON PRODUCTS IS READILY AVAILABLE BUT OFTEN NOT OBTAINED BY IMPORTER. U.S. RESPONSIBILITY IS TO MAKE FULL INFO. AVAILABLE ON ALL PRODUCTS, BUT CARELESS IMPORTERS OR UNSCRUPULOUS EXPORTERS CAN AND SOMETIMES DO RESULT IN SUBSTANCES SUCH AS THE DOLCOCH ENFIELD BEING EXPORTED EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE U.S. MARKET. POST MAY

WISH TO NOTE THAT GENEROUS PUBLIC ATTENTION IN U.S. MEDIA IS GIVEN TO WITHDRAWAL OF ANY PRODUCT AND THIS INFORMATION USUALLY IS WELL DISSEMINATED ABROAD.

5. LASTLY, RATHER THAN SHOWING THE "HORRIBLE SECRET ASPECTS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY" AS ARTICLE ALLEGES, MOTHER JONES ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATES THE SELF-CORRECTING NATURE OF THE U.S. SYSTEM. IT ISN'T PERFECT, AND NO ONE WOULD CLAIM IT IS; BUT WHEN SHORTCOMINGS OR PROBLEMS ARE BROUGHT TO PUBLIC ATTENTION, STEPS ARE USUALLY TAKEN TO CORRECT THEM. THE FCRO PINTO ISSUE IS AN EXAMPLE. BECAUSE OF MANY ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PINTO AND THE ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM GENERATED BY CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND THE MEDIA, THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE VEHICLE, IN FACT, WERE MADE.

6. THIS MESSAGE SENT LOW BECAUSE THE DISCUSSION IS OBVIOUSLY SOMEWHAT DELICATE AND OPEN TO SOME INTERPRETATION AND ARGUMENTATION. THEREFORE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT IF POST WISHES TO REBUT THE CHARGES IN AS-SABAH, IT DO SO WITH A VISIT TO THE PAPER AND DISCUSSION WITH THE EDITOR ON BACKGROUND RATHER THAN A LETTER TO THE EDITOR. THUS, THE EDITOR MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PUBLISH A USEFUL COMMENTARY ON THE MOTHER JONES PIECE WITHOUT INVOLVING THE EMBASSY IN PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE ISSUES.

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PAGE 01

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INFO TCO-01 OSO-02 HCTI-01 MTCH-05 PCME-02 PGHF-01 PFN-01
OIS-01 AIO-10 NSA-03 NSC-02 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 HEA-02
PGMA-01 PGMO-01 POC-04 POE-03 PDF-03 POP-03 MGT-01
PGM-01 PL-01 EU-03 CC-02 PGMR-01 PRL-03 PCMP-04 ECA-03
MGTP-04 PPM-03 PGMT-08 VOA-01 VBCA-01 VBCK-01 USUH-01
OOS-15 CIA-05 WN-02 OSO-01 SECD-02 JJ-02 SSO-01
/132 A4 2

ARTICLE MAINTAINED THAT "DOCUMENTS" WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO
BRITISH JOURNALISTS IN 1980 BY HCB, AND THAT PLAN HAD ALSO
BEEN MENTIONED BY "STERN" MAGAZINE IN 1969. POSTS SHOULD NOT
ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THIS TYPE STORY, SINCE IT WOULD ONLY CALL
ADDITIONAL ATTENTION TO, AND DIGNIFY, THE REPORT. 8.
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS ON SOVIET CBW USE AND SOVIET ALLEGATIONS
OF US CBW ACTIVITY WHICH POSTS MAY FIND INSTRUCTIVE ARE
LISTED IN USICA 08658 - U, CBW BASIC DOCUMENTS (REF 1).

WICK

BT

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OKAFTED BY PGMAC HTURPIN
APPROVED BY PCM CHALONE
PCM/G JTHURBER
PGM/C OMAINES
C JSHIRLEY
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TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
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RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY RABAT
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RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TURIN
RUDHRB/AMCONSUL ZAGREB
RUENVA/AMEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA
RUEHBB/AMCONSUL JONAHNEBURG
RUEHOU/AMCONSUL OURBAH
RUFNMR/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
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USICA

EO 12065 H/A

WEAPONS." ARTICLE CONTINUES WITH USUAL ACCUSATIONS THAT US
ALONE OPPOSES BAH ON CBW, IS CONTINUING LARGE-SCALE
PRODUCTION CBW MATERIALS, AND IS DEPLOYING THEM IN EUROPE.
FINALLY, ARTICLE ALLEGES THAT USSR HAS NEVER USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ANYWHERE, STRICTLY OBSERVES CENEVA PROTOCOL, ETC.
6. USICA MOSCOW (REF E) REPORTS ON "IZVESTIYA" ARTICLE
(MARCH 27) CHARGING THAT US IS DEPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
ITALY, AND ACCUSES US OF FABRICATING STORIES ABOUT SOVIET CBW
ACTIVITIES TO COVER UP OUR ALLEGED EFFORTS IN THIS AREA.
7. USICA VIENNA (REF F) DISCUSSES ARTICLE APPEARING IN
"VOLKSSTIME" (AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY) ON MARCH 27
CONTAINING PORTIONS (STAMPED TOP SECRET) OF WHAT IS PURPORTED
TO BE 1960'S US PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT OF CBW IN AUSTRIA.
PORTIONS OF SAME PLAN APPEARED IN "VOLKSSTIME" AND "PROFIL"
(INDEPENDENT NEWS WEEKLY) IN SEPTEMBER 1981. "PROFIL"

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PAGE 01

052209 HIA185
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ORIGIN OFFICE PGMS-01
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USICA 07048

USICA

EO 12958 N/A

SUBJECT: SOVIET DISINFORMATION: "KILLER MOSQUITOES"
1. ALLEGATION: ONE OF THE MORE IMAGINATIVE ALLEGATIONS TO COME FROM THE SOVIET DISINFORMATION MILL IN RECENT YEARS IS THE STORY OF THE "KILLER MOSQUITOES". A LEADING SOVIET CULTURAL MAGAZINE, THE WEEKLY LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, PUBLISHED STORY FEBRUARY 3 ALLEGING THAT CIA-FINANCED RESEARCH BEING CONDUCTED AT THE MALARIA RESEARCH CENTER IN LAHORE, PAKISTAN, WAS AIMED AT "BREEDING PARTICULARLY POISONOUS MOSQUITOES WHICH INFECT THEIR VICTIMS WITH DEADLY VIRUSES." THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO INFECT AFGHAN NOMADS WHEN THEY CROSS INTO PAKISTAN AND THROUGH THEM UNLEASH AN EPIDEMIC OF ENCEPHALITIS IN AFGHANISTAN. RADIO BROADCASTS HAVE BEEN HEARD ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA, AND THEY MAY BEGIN TO CRIP UP ELSEWHERE.
2. FACTS: THE PAKISTAN MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER AT LAHORE IS A UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND FACILITY WHICH, FOR 21 YEARS, HAS CONDUCTED RESEARCH ON MALARIA AND LED AN EFFORT TO HELP ERADICATE THE DISEASE. IT IS FUNDED PARTIALLY BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH AND RECEIVES SOME COUNTERPART FUNDS FROM AID TO COVER LOCAL COSTS. NO USG DOLLAR FUNDING

HAS BEEN GRANTED TO THE CENTER IN RECENT YEARS. OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST FOUR ATTEMPTS TO LINK THE RESEARCH CENTER WITH CIA AND LABEL ITS RESEARCH A FORM OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE.
3. GUIDANCE: THE CHARGE IS UTTERLY RIDICULOUS. THE RESEARCH CENTER IS AN ESTABLISHED AND RESPECTED INSTITUTION ENGAGED IN SERIOUS SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WORK DESIGNED TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IT IS NOT ENGAGED IN PLOTTING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHEMES. THE CHARGE DEMONSTRATES THE DEPTH TO WHICH SOVIET DISINFORMATION WILL SINK. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, IT APPEARS TO BE AN EFFORT TO DEFLECT PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET USE OF TOXINS IN AFGHANISTAN ITSELF AND THE SOVIET COMPLICITY (AND PROBABLE PARTICIPATION) IN THEIR USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (I.E., THE "YELLOW RAIN" ISSUE). IF THE KILLER MOSQUITO STORY APPEARS, PAOS SHOULD REBUT WITH RIDICULE, BEING SURE TO REFER TO THE SOVIET USE OF CCW IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN ANY RESPONSE.

4. FOR AR POSTS: SAME ARTICLE RETURNS TO THEME OF U.S. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST CUBA, DREDGING UP THE OLD CHARGES THAT U.S. WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT EPIDEMICS OF SWINE FEVER, TOBACCO ROT, AND DENGUE FEVER IN CUBA. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN LAST YEAR CALLED THESE CHARGES LUDICROUS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. POSTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO RIDICULE THEM IF THEY APPEAR, NOTING THAT MOST OF CUBA'S PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE RECENT EPIDEMICS, CAN BE TRACED TO AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM THAT DOESN'T WORK.

5. WHILE LUDICROUS IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO PIN SPECIFIC CHARGES ON U.S., THE SOVIET EFFORT TO UNDERMINE WORLD CONFIDENCE IN U.S. COMMITMENT TO 1972 CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IS SERIOUS AND POSTS SHOULD BE ALERT TO RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE.
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PAGE 01

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ORIGIN OFFICE PGHG-01
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 NEA-02 PGM-01 EU-03
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RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GEHOA
RUEHOU/AMCONSUL OURBAN
RUEHBG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
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UNCLAS USICA 53128

USICA

TO PAO FROM DIRECTOR WICK

EO 12065 N/A

SUBJECT: DISINFORMATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S.
REFERENCE: USICA 55891

1. EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF DISINFORMATION EFFORT THAT COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN ALMOST ANY COUNTRY-- AND WHICH WE ARE GOING TO COUNTER WITH FACTUAL RESPONSE--IS THE FOLLOWING FROM MADRID.
2. ON NOVEMBER 10-11 A FORGED LETTER DATED OCTOBER 23 ALLEGEDLY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING JUAN CARLOS I WAS PLACED IN THE MAIL BOXES OF THE DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) MEETING IN MADRID. THE LETTER DISCUSSED THE SPAIN-NATO ISSUE AND QUOTED THE PRESIDENT AS SAYING THAT SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO WITHOUT DELAY WAS "VITALLY IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES." THE FORGERY ALSO HELED OUT HOPE THAT "AMERICA MIGHT CONSIDER THE FINAL SOLUTION TO GIBRALTAR IN FAVOR OF SPAIN" IF THE KING WOULD "ACT WITH DISPATCH" TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO.
3. STORY WAS PICKED UP BY THE MADRID PRESS ON NOVEMBER 12-13 AND PLAYED AS A FALSIFICATION. SPANISH NEWS AGENCY EFE ALSO RAN THOROUGH REPORT CALLING FORGED LETTER A DISINFORMATION

CAMPAIGN.

4. ALTHOUGH ISSUE SEEMS SETTLED IN SPAIN, FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE IN EVENT STORY RUNS OR REAPPEARS IN YOUR COUNTRY.
5. "THE ALLEGED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN IS A CLUMSY AND TOTALLY PREPOSTEROUS FORGERY. IT BEARS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A HEAVY-HANDED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN WHOSE OBVIOUS PURPOSE IS TO PREVENT SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO." U.S. EMBASSY SPOKESMAN, MADRID. NOVEMBER 12.
6. "THE LETTER IS A BLATANT FORGERY. IT IS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF DISINFORMATION AND IS A CRUDE AND CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT U.S.-SPANISH RELATIONS. THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS AND RESPECTS THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND WE CONDEMN ANY ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN THAT PROCESS. THE DECISION TO ENTER NATO IS ONE FOR SPAIN ALONE TO MAKE." PREPARED FOR, BUT NOT USED BY, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, NOVEMBER 12.
7. "THE FORGERY AND ITS CRUDENESS IS, OF COURSE, OBVIOUS. IT REMINDS US AGAIN OF THE DIFFICULTY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE IN THE FACE OF ACTIVE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS BY THOSE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL DESTABILIZATION." AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPFMAN, CHIEF U.S. DELEGATE TO CSCE, IN LETTER TO DELEGATES, NOVEMBER 13.

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56-
OUTGOING
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PAGE 01

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EA SJUE
NEA OROBING-HOWRY

SUPPRESSED BUT AUDIBLE LAUGHTER. THE NEXT SESSION OF THE SUB-COMMISSION TAKES PLACE AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 12 IN GENEVA.
3. WE ALSO RECALL 1991 EEO TV "FALCRAHAM" PROGRAM WHICH CONTAINED A LENGTHY SEGMENT EXPOSING SOFINISKY'S QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES IN NEW ZEALAND. SEGMENT INCLUDED ACTUAL FILM FOOTAGE OF HIS LEAVING A HOTEL IN AUCKLAND WHERE HE HAD CLANDESTINELY MET WITH A TRADE UNIONIST. SWAEE
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TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BANJUL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USICA 30011

USICA

EO 12055 GDS 6/3/85 GOMALONE, ACT. ASSOC. DIR. PGM

SUBJECT: COUNTER TO SOVIET DISINFORMATION: VSEVOLOD N. SOFINISKY

REFERENCE: STATE 141044 - C

1. REFTEL DIRECTED ATTENTION TO COM'S AND PAD'S TO AGENCY RE STORY ON SOVIET AGENT, SOFINISKY. SUBSEQUENTLY, USMISSION GENEVA CALLED DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION TO ADDITIONAL SOFINISKY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE USED IN TREATING THIS ISSUE. WHILE ADDITIONAL RE STORY ON SOFINISKY SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME, WE REPEAT THE GENEVA CASE (GENEVA 05459-C) BELOW WITH SUGGESTION THAT PAD OR OTHER EMECFFS COULD UTILIZE THE INFO IN ANY DISCUSSIONS ON SOFINISKY WITH LOCAL MEDIA OR OFFICIALS.
2. REPEAT OF GENEVA 05459-C (ENTIRE TEXT):
WISH CALL DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION TO ADDITIONAL ECOSOC ACTIVITIES OF VSEVOLOD N. SOFINISKY WHICH COULD BE EXPANDED UPON IN REFTEL'S EFFORTS TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY TO THE SOVIET DISINFORMATION EFFORT AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS. SOFINISKY, IN ADDITION TO SERVING AS A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION'S SUBCOMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. THE SUBCOMMISSION CONSISTS OF 26 "INDEPENDENT EXPERTS" IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS WHO SERVE IN THEIR "INDIVIDUAL" CAPACITIES, NOT SUBJECT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS. IN THE CASE OF AMBASSADOR SOFINISKY, HIS ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY HIMSELF IN THIS LIGHT OFTEN DRAW

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 21

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ORIGIN OFFICE PG-C3
INFO TCD-B1 OSO-B3 JCS-B3 AF-B3 AR-B3 NEA-B2 PGM-B1 EU-B3
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EU CHRIS HENZE
AR DONALD BESOM
AF ROBERT BAKER
NEA JOHN HARROD
EA STANTON JUE

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RUDKRB/AMCONSUL ZAGREB
RUFHPS/US MISSION GECO
RUENVA/AMEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA
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UNCLAS USICA 53912

USICA

EO 12865 N/A

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: GUIDANCE FOR PACS
1. THE WHITE HOUSE ISSUED A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21, ON RECENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO DIVIDE EUROPEAN ALLIES FROM THE UNITED STATES OVER THE ISSUE OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. STATEMENT WAS CARRIED BY USINFO AND BY WF OCTOBER 21 IN ENGLISH AND LANGUAGE VERSIONS. IT IS AN IMPORTANT POLICY DECLARATION AND DESERVES WIDE DISSEMINATION BY POSTS.
2. THE SOVIET WHICH HAS SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT OUT OF CONTEXT A RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO A QUESTION AT A MEETING OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS OCTOBER 16. IN SO DOING, SOVIET CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV, IN PRAVDA OCTOBER 20, IMPLIED U.S. IS THREATENING LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE. THIS CONTENTION IS A SELF-SERVING DISTORTION OF U.S. POLICY AIMED AT FEEDING THE FEARS AND CONCERNS OF EUROPEANS ABOUT A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. THESE CONCERNS ARE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, TO WIT: "THE ESSENCE OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY IS THAT NO AGGRESSOR SHOULD BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE COULD REASONABLY BE LIMITED TO EUROPE." WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT EUROPEANS HAVE LEGITIMATE AND REAL INTERESTS HERE, PACS SHOULD NOTE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND THAT THE BREZHNEV STATEMENT IS AN EXAM-

PLE OF IT. U.S. CONTINUES TO REASSURE EUROPEANS THAT IT WILL NOT ACT IRRESPONSIBLY, THAT IT IS NOT LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, AND THAT ITS STRATEGY OF THE PAST TWENTY YEARS FOR DETERRING CONFLICT IN EUROPE HAS NOT CHANGED.
3. PACS SHOULD BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO BRING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS TO THE ATTENTION OF TARGET AUDIENCES AND BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES SUCH AS BACKGROUNDEERS AND/OR ADDITIONAL HIGH LEVEL COMMENTS ON THIS ISSUE.

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Soviet Distortions and Fabrications

H. Soviet Distortions
and Fabrications

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 28, 1982

Soviets Attack President Reagan's U.N. Disarmament Speech

SUMMARY - Soviet media attacks on President Reagan's speech to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament accused the President of resorting to "crudely worded anti-Soviet rhetoric" and charged that, in fact, it was the Soviet Union who led the movement for arms control. Of course, "contrary to known facts. . . he asserted that the USA allegedly 'exercised unilateral restraint'." The contents of the President's speech refute these charges completely, urging the Soviets to join in disarmament measures.

ALLEGATION - Radio Moscow's English Service (to Great Britain and Ireland) alleged on June 17 that "Addressing the special United Nations General Assembly session, President Reagan ignored the Soviet appeal for the nuclear powers to take a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear arms. He resorted to crudely worded anti-Soviet rhetoric and grossly distorted Soviet policy. His speech is seen as an attempt to direct the attention of the international community away from the fact that it is the United States that is pushing the arms race ahead."

ALLEGATION - TASS English charged (June 17) that "the President's speech came to rhetorical justification of the U.S. policy aimed at undermining

detente and at sharpening international tension. . . .Contrary to the generally known facts, he tried to portray the Soviet Union as the main culprit of the arms race, grossly distorted the Soviet Union's policy."

ALLEGATION - A June 18 TASS English commentary stated that "We have never been aggressors, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said on Thursday. A strange statement, to say the least. . . .The statement was made before people of whom many not only know the history of the USA from textbooks, theoretically, but also know it well practically, so to say, from their own bitter experience. And history refutes a hundred percent the assertions of the American President."

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RESPONSE - In his June 17 speech to the United Nations' Special Session on Disarmament, President Reagan made the following statements, which are the basis for responses to questions about U.S. Arms control policy.

-- "The record of history is clear: citizens of the United States resort to force reluctantly and only when they must. . . .To those who challenge the truth of those words let me point out that at the end of World War II, we were the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military supremacy was unquestioned. We had harnessed the atom and had the ability to unleash its destructive force anywhere in the world. In short, we could have achieved world domination, but that was contrary to the character of our

people."

- "Instead, we wrote a new chapter in the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravaged economies of the world, both East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. We took the initiative in creating such international institutions as this United Nations, where leaders of good will could come together to build bridges for peace and prosperity."
- "While we exercised unilateral restraint they [the Soviets] forged ahead and today possess nuclear and conventional forces far in excess of an adequate deterrent capability. . . Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals."

President Reagan's U.N. speech, the culmination of seven months of preparation, demonstrated genuine U.S. commitment to arms control, despite Soviet charges to the contrary. Reagan outlined to the Special Session an integrated approach to arms control, which covered all major categories of weapons of concern to the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Alliance. As the President pointed out (without undue rhetoric), this is in sharp contrast to Soviet arms control claims and actions. (The full text of the U.N. speech was carried by the Wireless File June 17, 1982.)

COMMENT - The extent of Soviet propaganda surrounding President Reagan's U.N.

speech, as with his speeches to the West German Bundestag and the British Parliament, reveals unusual Soviet sensitivities to several aspects of their own standing in the world community. The subjects of these speeches, U.S. efforts for peace and the Soviet response, attest to Soviet vulnerabilities.

^{KS}
Drafted by: PGM/G:KRTurpin

^{KS for}
Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

JUNE 24, 1982

Soviets Accuse U.S. of Interfering in Lebanon

SUMMARY - The Soviet media has continued its propaganda barrage against Israel and United States support of Israeli actions in Lebanon. The major theme of Soviet attacks in the last two weeks has been that the U.S., in full and total support of Israel, is planning to move U.S. troops into Lebanon in the guise of a peacekeeping force, interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs. These allegations are unfounded and groundless. Accounts have also appeared in the Middle Eastern press stating that American soldiers had been killed while fighting with the Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Examples of Soviet media charges follow, along with guidance provided by the State Department and a senior administration official.

ALLEGATION - On June 14, TASS English charged that "The United States is hatching plans for a military penetration into Lebanon. To judge by ABC reports it is planning to ensure a constant presence of American troops there by establishing a so-called 'new' multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon, consisting chiefly of army units from the USA. . . American military presence in Lebanon will mean a considerable expansion of the area of U.S. gendarme operations in the oil-rich region of the Middle East."

This allegation has appeared in a number of other TASS English items in the last two weeks.

COMMENT - It is a usual Soviet propaganda tactic to attribute to a U.S. media organ statements which cannot easily be checked for accuracy. This method is valuable because the Western press is known to be independent of their governments, and thus more credible than the Soviet media.

ALLEGATION - A June 15 Radio Moscow English broadcast (to North America) made the accusation that "Washington is planning to deploy in the area controlled by Israel in Lebanon the so-called multinational forces, the backbone of which is to be made up of American troops. This is the chief objective of special United States envoy Habib's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East."

ALLEGATION - June 14's Pravda alleged that "The Reagan administration, which has given every assistance to the preparation and implementation of the barbarous Israeli aggression, is now trying to pose as a 'peacemaker'. But in fact it is seeking flagrant interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. . . .In this connection one is struck by official statements that some kind of 'international forces' with U.S. participation should be sent into the huge area of Lebanese territory now occupied by the Israeli military."

ALLEGATION - An article in the June 14 edition of Izvestiya charged that "it is no coincidence that reports have appeared in the press that the United States is not adverse to deploying its contingents in Lebanon under cover

of the same figleaf of a 'multinational force' supposedly designed to serve the aims of maintaining 'peace' and 'order'. The United States has long viewed Lebanon as a strategic objective which can be used in the struggle against the national liberation processes occurring in the Arab East."

ALLEGATION - A June 18 TASS English item stated that "Secretary of State Haig has actually admitted today that the USA intends to send its troops into Lebanon in the guise of a so-called 'multi-national' force. According to Washington's and Tel Aviv's design the troops are to be deployed in southern Lebanon, which is now occupied by the Israeli aggressor. Haig said that President Reagan will be ready to send American troops for the fulfillment of what he described as 'peace-making' functions in Lebanon. This will actually result in the occupation of a part of sovereign Lebanon, this time by U.S. troops.

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RESPONSE - Soviet allegations that the U.S. is eager to intervene in the Lebanon crisis are groundless and inflammatory. Current State Department guidance stresses that the U.S. seeks "a rapid end to the tragic events in Lebanon," and is making a major effort to find a solution to the crisis, "both through the tireless efforts of Ambassador Habib on the spot and through our own efforts here and in other foreign capitals. The main elements of our approach, which we believe consistent with a realistic and durable implementation of

Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, are as follows:

- immediate humanitarian relief
- the earliest possible termination of hostilities
- a strengthening of the central government to permit the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity
- the creation of a buffer zone patrolled by a peacekeeping force to prevent further attacks on Israel across the Lebanese border
- the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including those of Israel and Syria, and the demilitarization of the Palestinians in Lebanon."

As for the charges that the U.S. is planning to send American troops to participate in a peacekeeping force, a senior administration figure said on June 21 that:

"We are remaining open-minded on the subject. We are not enthusiastic, in fact we are less than enthusiastic about the prospect, but then in the final analysis. . .the President will do what he considers best to get peace and stability in the region."

COMMENT - The Soviet media have been vocal in their propaganda on Israel and U.S. policy toward Israel's actions in Lebanon. These attacks, which are updates of their usual propaganda on U.S-Israeli relations can be expected to

continue throughout the crisis.

In what may be an offshoot of Soviet propaganda, press accounts have appeared in Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates repeating the charges that American soldiers and officers had been killed "taking part in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon."

WJ
Drafted By:PGM/G:KRTurpin

WJ for
Clearance:PGM/G:MSchneider

US INFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

JUNE 22, 1982

Soviets Attack President Reagan's Role at NATO Conference

The Soviet media has continued its attack on President Reagan's European trip. Below are examples of Soviet propaganda on the West German/NATO Conference leg of the trip.

ALLEGATION - On June 9 Literaturnaya Gazeta discussed President Reagan's speech at the Bonn NATO conference. According to article, at last year's NATO session, President Reagan "spoke only of firmness, confrontation and the need to achieve military superiority. His vocabulary now includes such words as 'peace' and 'talks'. . . . Having begun to talk about 'peace' and 'talks', Washington has nevertheless not only shown no restraint in the implementation of its military programs but, quite the reverse, has begun to step them up in every way."

ALLEGATION - On June 12, TASS English charged that "In the FRG, too, the U.S. President held forth on the theme of the 'crusade' against socialism. But there he did not limit himself to this: He showered slanderous attacks on the USSR and its peace-loving foreign policy trying to prove that the arms race is not only not contra-indicated to Europe but is almost needed by it."

"Pompous speeches about Washington's 'devotion to peace' sound really

blasphemous considering that they are being made at a time when the Israeli military, armed with American weapons, are engaging in a veritable genocide against the Arabs in sovereign Lebanon, while London, with the active participation of the United States, is pursuing a policy of escalating the bloodshed in the South Atlantic."

ALLEGATION - On June 13 Izvestiya charged that "From the first day it was evident that R. Reagan's trip to the FRG was primarily propagandist in nature. . . . The quest made a point of mentioning peace and disarmament in every speech. . . . However, it is not hard to perceive the real U.S. line behind the propaganda fog: Reagan came to the Rhine with a manifestly destructive program whose essence boiled down to intensifying the bloc's war preparations, particularly in the sphere of conventional armaments, undermining the detente process in Europe and curtailing East-West ties, including in the economic sphere, and tried to foist it on the other members of the alliance."

ALLEGATION - TASS English on June 14 quoted that day's Pravda as charging that "Speaking in Bonn before the deputies of the Bundestag and putting on a show to pass for a peace-maker, he [President Reagan] said that if he had believed in the possibility of achieving peace through mass demonstrations he would have personally led them. He wanted, apparently, to stress one point but what he really stressed was another -- contempt towards the feelings and sentiments of others. This happens when one's words are in disagreement with one's inner thinking. He who wants to unleash a nuclear war. . . cannot march among demonstrators demanding peace. They would chuck him out of their ranks as a hypocrite and a cheat."

ALLEGATION - On June 17, TASS English charged that "Rhetoric about readiness

to develop 'constructive relations' between East and West, about disarmament and even about the need to avert war changes but little. This rhetoric is a tribute to the demands of the peoples to check the madness of the arms race, an attempt to dampen the wave of anti-war protests and to dupe the population of their own countries."

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RESPONSE - In his June 9 Bundestag speech President Reagan made the following remarks, which are the basis for answers to Soviet charges about U.S. arms control policy.

The Search for Peace:

"I believe this partnership of the Atlantic Alliance nations is motivated primarily by the search for peace."

Strengthening Alliance Security:

Without a strengthened Atlantic security, the possibility of military coercion will be very great."

The Threat of Nuclear War:

In recent months. . .there has been renewed public concern about the threat of nuclear war and the arms buildup. . . . It is the United States that has proposed to ban land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles -- the missiles most threatening Europe. It is the United States that has proposed and will pursue deep cuts in strategic systems. It is the West that has long sought the detailed exchanges

of information on forces and effective verification procedures. And it is dictatorships, not democracies, that need militarism to control their own people and impose their system on others."

Western Commitment to Arms Control:

"We in the West. . . are deeply committed to continuing efforts to restrict the arms competition. Common sense demands that we persevere."


The Need for Unity:


"In each of these areas our policies are based on the conviction that a stable military balance at the lowest possible level will help further the cause of peace. The other side will respond in good faith to these initiatives only if it believes we are resolved to provide for our own defense. Unless convinced that we will unite and stay united behind these arms control initiatives and modernization programs, our adversaries will seek to divide us from one another and our peoples from their leaders."

President Reagan's speech was in no way an attempt to pressure our NATO allies, but rather a convincing statement in support of the concept of the dual approach of modernization of Western defenses and arms reduction efforts, approved by NATO. (The full text of the Bundestag speech was carried by the Wireless File June 10, 1982.)

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COMMENT - The extent of propaganda surrounding President Reagan's Bundestag speech, as with the address to the British Parliament, reveals unusual Soviet sensibilities to several aspects in their own standing in the world community. The subjects of both speeches, U.S. efforts for peace and the Soviet response, and democracy contrasted with communism, attest to Soviet vulnerabilities. Thus, the Soviets have mounted broad general attacks on the U.S., and our arms control policy, and alleged that the U.S. is pressuring its allies.


Drafted By: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 18, 1982

Soviets Attack President Reagan's Parliament Speech

Soviet media have assaulted President Reagan's June 8 speech to the British Parliament. Several examples of Soviet media attacks on the speech and the President's visit to England follow.

-- On May 31, TASS English attacked the alleged contents of the June 8 speech, citing the New York Times and The Guardian on the contents of the speech and adding the Soviets' interpretation of its contents. According to TASS' assessment the "'political aid' which the United States intends to render to developing countries envisages undisguised financing of some political parties, trade unions, newspapers and politicians there. In other words, it envisages outright bribery, though it is camouflaged by the demagogic slogan of assisting the development of democracy." TASS also states that the proposed assistance is "bound to finance infiltration of American agents in the socio-political life of those countries, creation of an atmosphere of political instability. This is a doctrine of political gangsterism which still discloses Washington's imperial ambition, its hegemonistic designs."

On June 2, TASS English carried a similar article on this subject.

-- TASS English reacting on June 8 to the President's speech, stated that "In

his speech he declared for the buildup of the armed might of the North Atlantic bloc and for conducting talks with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. The President also supported the British Conservative Government which is spreading the bloody conflict in the South Atlantic. Meanwhile, he did not advance any proposals for stopping Israel's aggression against Lebanon.

-- TASS English on June 9 attacked the President's speech, saying that in his "broadly publicized speech . . . the American President slandered the Soviet Union and called for a crusade against communism. . . .The American President is by no means concerned over racism and mass unemployment, the arms race, the suppression of human rights and freedoms in the West, including the USA. He takes under his defence fascist regimes and justifies the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and other Arab countries. . . .Ronald Reagan also justifies the British invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands."

-- On June 10 TASS English carried excerpts from Izvestiya's analysis of President Reagan's speech. "Perhaps in all its century-old history, the article runs, old Westminster 'has never heard such unbridled insults towards whole peoples. Mounting his hobby-horse, the U.S. President extolled the false virtues of the world of exploitation and capital and, without mincing words, he smeared the socio-economic system which for the first time ever opened to mankind the way to a world without humiliation, oppression and without wars.' The boss of the White House 'undertook all of a sudden to instruct peoples of socialist countries how they should

live and work in the future. If one is to listen to Reagan, the whole world should fall into line with the United States and even think as it does.'" "

-- Radio Havana's International Spanish Service charged on June 15 that

"During his appearance at the British Parliament, the U.S. President called for a crusade against communism and repeated the arguments he has used to step up the arms race and to heighten tension in various areas of the world."

"Conspiring against the dovish image Reagan tried to convey in Europe were the open support he gave to Great Britain in its conflict with Argentina while in London and his conniving silence when the Israeli troops unleashed their genocidal invasion of Lebanon. . . . Reagan's efforts to seem a messenger of peace to the Europeans were undermined by the stark reality that U.S. weapons and supplies, as well as U.S.-made planes, were used to murder thousands of innocent people in the Middle East, with Washington's complacency and blessing."

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President Reagan actually said in his June 8 speech to Parliament:

"The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy -- the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities -- which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means."

The President continued to state that:

"This is not cultural imperialism; it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity. Democracy already flourishes in countries with very different cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy.

In examining Soviet propaganda on the speech, it is impossible to miss the fact that the bulk of Soviet charges about President Reagan's speech do not deal with the content of the speech itself. Rather, the attacks center on charges about U.S. support of the British in the Falklands and Israel in Lebanon. As stated previously, the United States has counseled restraint on all parties involved in both these crises, and has worked unceasingly to see peace restored in both areas.

KRT
Drafted by: PGM/G:KRTurpin

KRT
Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

JUNE 17, 1982

Soviets Continue to Attack U.S. Policy on the Falkland Islands Crisis

Since the British landing on the Falkland Islands, the Soviet media has intensified its propaganda barrage against U.S. and British policy in the South Atlantic. While the primary Soviet propaganda theme remains the allegation that the U.S. is exploiting the crisis to gain a military base in area, several other themes have been introduced or expanded. Examples of these follow.

- Literaturnaya Gazeta's May 19 edition charges that "What has happened in the icy waters of the South Atlantic is not a clash as such between British colonialism and the Argentine Armed Forces. Imperialism, whose shock detachment is the NATO military bloc headed by the United States, is giving battle there against the entire so-called Third World, against all the developing countries. In effect they are being warned: Today Argentina, anyone may be next."
- On June 9, Radio Moscow's World English Service made the accusation that Britain and the United States are united by their intention to punish Argentina and at the same time teach the other developing nations a lesson."
- A June 10 broadcast of Moscow Radio Peace and Progress (Spanish to Latin

America) said that "The conflict in the South Atlantic has created problems of principles in relations between the West and the Third World. This conflict is not just a question of an Anglo-U.S. desire to forcibly snatch the Malvinas away from the Argentines in order to set up a military base there. It is also a question of punishing Argentina for its independent foreign policy, for its refusal to submit to the desire of the United States which seeks to bring this sovereign country under the yoke of its voracious objectives within its global strategy. With this example, the West intends to threaten other emerging countries, to demolish any liberation movement in Latin America and on the other continents as well."

The conflict in the Falkland Islands is of no benefit to the U.S., since it has imperiled our recently improved relationship with Argentina, and adversely affected our relations with other Latin American nations. Once it was clear that the U.S. effort at mediation between the two sides would not succeed, the U.S. Government felt compelled to support the British in order to demonstrate our position against the unlawful use of force. Secretary of State Haig stated that:

"We must take concrete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes." We are not trying to threaten other 'developing countries'. . . .The United States remains ready to assist the parties in finding the settlement."

While we have opposed Argentina's use of force in this crisis, we have been careful not to take a position on sovereignty over the islands. We believe that the issue should be resolved through peaceful negotiations. This is not

"punishing Argentina" or "threatening other emerging countries".

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-- TASS English on June 3 carried excerpts from that day's Izvestiya comparing the crisis in the Falklands with that in Lebanon. "One should recall another region and another country with which Washington maintains 'particular relations' -- Israel. When Israel annexes captured Arab lands, Washington, even rebuking Begin for the sake of appearances, acts above all as defender of Tel Aviv and its expansionist policy. But not as champion of international law and order. Why? One of the main causes is that Israel is 'a strategic ally' of American imperialism. Britain is also an ally. That is the gist of the matter. Exactly this self-interest which determines the American line on the Falkland conflict, and if the question is taken on a broader plane -- the U.S. attitude to non-aligned countries in general, be those Arab or Latin American countries."

The United States has counseled restraint on all parties involved in both these crises, and has worked unceasingly to see peace restored in both areas. In recent weeks, State Department officials have travelled to both areas in attempts to end the fighting. This can hardly be construed as unconditional support of Great Britain and Israel in the quest of "American imperialism".

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The following charges that the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires is "preparing a coup d'etat in Argentina" and that U.S. has approved British use of "nuclear

and biological weapons, and implosion bombs" are vicious and demonstrate that the Soviets are trying to poison U.S./Argentine relations.

-- Radio Moscow's Domestic Russian Service alleged on June 2 that an unnamed newspaper carried a report charging that "The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires in preparing a coup d'etat in Argentina. This was stated by the Argentine Communist Party Central Committee. We are experiencing a difficult time, the statement says, which our country's enemies would like to take advantage of. The U.S. Embassy in the Argentine capital is openly carrying out preparations for a coup with the objective of preventing a deepening of Argentina's anti-imperialist course."

-- On June 13, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress (Spanish to Latin America) charged that "It is even known from reports that the United States has approved the use of nuclear and biological weapons, and implosion bombs by the British strike force.

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The Soviet media is continuing its attacks on U.S. policy in the South Atlantic in an attempt not only to damage U.S. relations with Argentina but with all Latin America while trying to improve its own ties with the countries of the region. With the surrender of Argentine troops on the Islands and the massive demonstrations in Argentina, the Soviet propaganda may begin castigating the U.S. for its role (real or imagined) in the evolution of the government of both the Islands and Argentina itself.


Drafted By: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 15, 1982

Soviets Charge that U.S. Pressured Allies at Versailles

Soviet media commentary on the Versailles Economic Summit has accused the U.S. of pressuring our allies to follow hard line economic policies against the Soviet Union. Examples of Soviet propaganda which appeared during and after the summit follow.

- TASS English on June 4 charged that "Contrary to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act the United States is pressing for restrictions and undermining of the commercial and economic contacts of its partners with the socialist countries and for subordination of these relations to the global anti-Soviet strategy of the United States."
- On June 5 TASS English carried an Izvestiya account of the Versailles summit. According to TASS, Izvestiya said that "what is referred to as 'settling economic differences' in the parlance of U.S. diplomats means in the language of the remaining 'six' an 'attempt to impose on them the diktat of American monopolies', while 'to put an end to discord' inside NATO means in other languages the Pentagon's desire to make Western Europe march to its militaristic commands."

Izvestiya continues to state that "There is no doubt that the economic difficulties experienced by the Western world, specifically by Western

Europe, cannot be resolved or even alleviated if the burden of military spending continues to press heavily on the shoulders of NATO countries, if, instead of fruitful cooperation and trade between countries with different social systems, diverse embargoes, sanctions and other accessories of policy of diktat gain the upper hand."

-- On June 6, TASS English quoted that day's edition of Pravda. "The U.S. stand at the Versailles meeting shows that the 'leader' wants to be full master. This is indicated by U.S. attempts to make its partners limit the granting of export credits to socialist countries and by the proposal to reconsider altogether trade-and-economic contacts between West and East with a view to toughening them."

-- TASS English on June 7 leveled the accusation that "The Versailles summit meeting of the 'big seven' has borne out that the USA does not intend to stand on ceremony with its allies, in pursuing a policy which serves first and foremost the selfish aims of the United States, the monopolies of that country, which strive to find a way out of their economic troubles at the expense of the interests of other countries, in the first place of the European partners."

"American representatives subjected their partners at Versailles to the crudest pressure, wishing to force on them agreements that would undermine the natural and mutually beneficial East-West economic relations."

"The meeting is over, but there is every indication that Washington further intends to bring pressure on its allies to the detriment of their interests."

-- Radio Moscow World English Service broadcast a commentary on June 7 which said that "President Reagan and his advisors did all they could to make

the other countries accept the American approach to international affairs from positions of strength, and the American policy of diktat and sanction in world trade."

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American officials stressed in public statements before and during the summit that President Reagan was not proposing economic warfare against the Soviet Union. U.S. proposals would not interfere with trade as long as the Soviet Union was willing to pay cash for or finance imports at market rates of interest. Basically the U.S. had two goals in this area at Versailles:

- The administration wanted an already negotiated OECD agreement on tightening guidelines on subsidized credits from the governments of industrial nations ratified and put into effect. Part of this agreement would move the Soviet Union from one category to another for the purposes of the guidelines and would have the effect of increasing interest rates on export credits provided the USSR.
- The U.S. also wanted a further mechanism put in place among the seven summit nations to exercise some sort of restraint over the amounts of credit supplied to the European communist nations. The administration wanted a real commitment from the other summit participants to restrain government-subsidized and government-guaranteed credits to the Soviet Union, and some kind of effective followup to those commitments. .


The Summit leaders agreed at Versailles to "pursue a prudent. . .economic approach" to the USSR and Eastern Europe and "to limit their government export


credits to these countries." The leaders agreed "to handle cautiously financial relations with the USSR and other Eastern European countries, in such a way as to insure that they are conducted on a sound economic basis, including also the need for commercial prudence in limiting export credits." This agreement did not go as far as the U.S. wanted, but it did establish the principle that the Western economic approach to the East should be consistent with its political and security interests.

The U.S. did not "attempt to impose on them [the allies] the diktat of American monopolies." We did, of course, have positions on the issues to be discussed, as did all of the participants. These were discussed and debated freely. The fact that the U.S. plans were not totally agreed to certainly should lay to rest the idea that the U.S. can impose its own wishes on its allies.

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Soviet media "previews" of the summit attacked the U.S. along the same lines as those appearing later. The Soviet propagandists were ready with their accounts of the results of the summit before it took place and without worry about its actual course. These themes will almost certainly appear in future Soviet propaganda on U.S. economic policies.


Drafted By: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 11, 1982

Soviets Charge U.S. Is Responsible for Israeli Attack on Lebanon

Soviet media attacks on Israel and the U.S. have intensified following Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. The current Soviet media blitz repeats the Soviets' routine allegations that Israel is a puppet of the United States and that the U.S. is behind every move Israel makes. Several examples of these charges follow.

-- TASS English Service charged on June 6 that "The start of the aggression followed military consultations between Tel Aviv and Washington. . . .The invasion of Lebanon. . . confirms in all obviousness that deals similar to the Camp David one only encourage the Israeli aggressors to further use of force against Arab states and peoples and enable imperialist forces to gain a spring-board for direct interference in the affairs of local countries. The way of separate deals has nothing in common with the task of establishing a lasting and just peace in the Middle East and is threatening new aggravations of the conflict."

Secretary of State Haig in his May 26 speech on the Middle East discussed the Camp David peace process. "The Camp David process, which is based firmly on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, remains the only practical route toward a more comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and all of its

neighbors, including Jordan and Syria. No other plan provides for movement despite the conflicting interests and fears of the parties. No other plan embodies so well the necessity for progress despite the inherent imperfections of a transitional arrangement."

-- On June 7 TASS English repeated the accusation that "The new Israeli aggression was undoubtedly undertaken with consent and support from Washington which armed Israel to the teeth and is pushing it by its policy to carry out criminal anti-Arab actions. The attack on Lebanon is a direct consequence of the Camp David deal and American-Israeli 'strategic cooperation'."

State Department spokesman Alan Romberg said on June 4 and 8 that Israel did not notify the U.S. before moving into Lebanon. "This clearly was an Israeli decision. It was not a U.S. decision."

-- Another June 7 TASS English item accused the U.S. of "encouraging Israeli 'hawks' poisoned with chauvinist sentiments to pursue an increasingly adventurist and bellicose policy with regard to Arab countries," and of attempting "to assure a Middle East 'settlement' American-Israeli style, to perpetuate the occupation of the lands captured from the Arabs and to threaten directly not only the Middle East but also the adjacent regions." Secretary Haig's May 26 speech reaffirms the U.S.'s commitment to a peace settlement which will benefit all the Middle Eastern parties involved..

-- On June 7 Radio Moscow Peace and Progress broadcast in Hebrew that "The Americans, after all, view this region as a region which should include

props for the United States aimed against the national liberation movement of the Arabs and African agents. It is not secret to anyone that the United States is mainly gambling on tightening its military-strategic alliance with Israel. . . .One of the basic tasks. . .is to destroy -- while relying on the Israeli and U.S. military power -- the anti-Imperialist forces in the Middle East and turn the region into a base for war against the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the national liberation movement."

The U.S. has consistently volunteered its services to the parties involved to ensure peace in the Middle East. We are not interested in using the area to "war" on other nations. This allegation that we are turning the region into a "base for war" is typical of the Soviet Union's tactic of accusing the U.S. of acting as they do.

-- On June 8, TASS English continued its allegations saying that "As regards the Middle East, Israel remains the U.S. principal military ally, is the United States trump card there and a tool it is going to use to recarve the map of the Middle East as it sees fit. . . .It becomes clear, therefore, why at a time when the world has been swept by a storm of anger at Israel's fresh aggression against Lebanon, Washington is driving a feverish effort in a bid to whitewash the aggressor and justify his crimes before the world public."

Secretary Haig in his June 7 briefing said that the U.S. has "joined fervently in the United Nations Resolution yesterday to urge an immediate ceasefire. . . . The initial efforts of this government are to take every step possible to bring the bloodshed to a conclusion." Responding to a question, Secretary

Haig said that "Clearly we have sought that [Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon]. We didn't want them to go in the first place. We've been very clear about that for an extended period."


-- Several articles attributed to TASS items appeared in Moroccan newspapers on June 7 and 9. A piece charging U.S. collusion in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon appeared in a page one "Wire Service Round-up" of the Arabic language newspaper Al Alam on June 7. A similar item appeared June 9 in that paper's French language sister daily L'Opinion.

-- On June 8, the North Koreans added their attack. A Pyongyang KCNA English broadcast charged that "It is entirely due to the active patronage and instigation of the U.S. imperialists that the Israeli Zionists are now running wild at will to realize their expansionist ambition, defying publicly recognized international law and the unanimous denunciation of fair world opinion."

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The Soviet Union has been a major critic of Israel and its relationship with the U.S. for years. The Soviets have used the Arab-Israeli conflict to ingratiate themselves with the Arab states of the region and gain influence in this strategically important area at the expense of the United States. They will almost certainly continue their media attacks on the U.S. and its friends in the Middle East in pursuit of this goal.


Drafted By: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

EXPOSING SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 9, 1982

Soviets Continue to Accuse U.S. of Interfering in Poland

In recent weeks, the Soviet and Polish media have continued their attacks on U.S. policy toward Poland, accusing us of interfering in the domestic affairs of Poland. The accounts have continued to single out Radio Free Europe for particularly vituperative abuse, although they are also attacking other Western press organs. Several examples follow.

-- Literaturnaya Gazeta carried in its May 19 edition an attack on Radio Free Europe and its staff, which stated that "Last week Poles watched on television, a four-part documentary on the activity of Radio Free Europe and its ties with the CIA. They were able to see for themselves the worth of that demagoguery and what true criminal schemes the 'baboons', as the political degenerates and traitors to People's Poland who work for that station are contemptuously called, were instructed to implement. Poles also saw for themselves that the wave of political hooliganism that swept through their cities in early May was by no means a 'spontaneous display of the masses' anger'."

-- On May 20 TASS English Service made the accusation that Radio Free Europe, "the main mouthpiece and offspring of the cold war that is supervised by

the CIA, plays an important role in these sinister plans of Washington, which is trying to exploit the difficulties faced by Poland to weaken the socialist community and to whip up international tension. Maintaining continuous contacts with the Polish underground and using the services of mercenary henchmen from among renegades and traitors to the Polish people, this American subversive radio center operating from the territory of another country has drastically expanded its subversive anti-Polish propaganda during the past few months."

TASS is not content with attacking Radio Free Europe. The item continues to charge that "The Washington administration is increasingly involving in these unseemly activities the American press and its correspondents working in Poland with other radio centers." Michael Dobbs of the Washington Post is singled out in a long segment of the item.

Routine allegations were repeated that the Western media like the Soviets' is run by the U.S. Government (usually the CIA).

-- Novoye Vremya on May 21 continued the accusations that Radio Free Europe is interfering in the domestic affairs of Poland, with the connivance of the CIA and the Reagan administration. It alleged that ICA Director Wick requested \$15-20 million for "modernization" of Radio Free Europe's studios in Munich and \$200 million for improving the transmitters of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. This constitutes interference according to the article because the request for funds was justified by the argument that "it would cost less than a B-1 bomber, but could accomplish more than all B-1's."

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are funded and overseen by the Board for

International Broadcasting, not by USICA or the Central Intelligence Agency. USICA has requested appropriations for modernizing VOA transmitters because the current equipment is antiquated and non-standard. This modernization was planned long before the events in Poland. Radio Free Europe broadcasts news accounts of Eastern Europe into those countries where the media are government controlled, and does not incite violence, disseminate "subversive" propaganda, serve as a center for subversive elements in Poland, or slander Poland and the Soviet Union.

-- TASS English Service on May 22 charged that "As for the allegations of the Department of State that the United States has never encouraged Solidarity to perpetrate illegal actions, this claim, to put it mildly, is even farther from the truth than Washington is from Warsaw. . . .How else can we view the patently provocative and inciting statements of the official U.S. radio station Voice of America and the subversive radio centre Free Europe which takes its orders from the U.S. Government and which, broadcasting to Poland, conveys round-the-clock what actually amounts to instructions to the counterrevolutionary underground, slanders socialism and incites people to 'resist' the authorities.?"

The TASS item also discussed the Polish TV series which "supplies irrefutable proof of close contacts" between "counterrevolutionary organizations", including Solidarity, and the CIA and "its actual affiliate, Radio Free Europe".

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The United States' position remains that the Polish people should settle their

current difficulties through a process of negotiation and compromise, without outside interference. The accusation that the U.S. has intervened in Poland's affairs is baseless. The United States is not seeking to impose any political formula in Poland. It is simply trying to make clear that the way out of Poland's crisis is to end repression, release political prisoners, and establish a genuine internal dialogue.

This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union's efforts to turn back the reform process through its support of the imposition of martial law and the stationing of large numbers of Soviet troops in Poland. The Soviet Union seems uninterested in negotiation and compromise. Rather its interest is in imposing its own solution on Poland.

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Continued Soviet and Polish media attacks on the Western media can be expected as long as objective news is printed and broadcast on the situation in Poland. RFE will be the recipient of the harshest criticism because it is the one media organization which provides the Polish people with uncensored news of events in their own country.


Drafted by: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 4, 1982

Soviets Charge That U.S. CW Accusations are Slander

Recent revelations of evidence of lethal chemical and toxin weapons (CW) use by the Soviet Union and its proxies in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan have led to additional Soviet attacks on alleged U.S. CW activities. Several examples of Soviet and Soviet-sponsored media charges that the U.S. is 'slandering' the Soviet Union and Vietnam follow.

— Phnom Penh Domestic Radio Service on May 5 charged that the U.S.' "present campaign of vicious propaganda is aimed at misleading world public opinion in an attempt to cover up the savage and ugly crimes they have perpetrated and at diverting opinion from the fact that they are continuing to produce toxic chemical weapons in preparation for an assault against world peace.

. . . U.S. imperialism itself is the one who uses toxic chemical weapons against mankind while blaming our friends the Soviet Union and Vietnam."

The U.S. reported incidents of lethal chemical and toxin use which have been brought to our attention since the mid 1970's by refugees from Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. These reports have been corroborated by scientific analysis of samples of "yellow rain" and by medical examination of victims of chemical and toxin attacks.. There has been no fabrication of stories about Soviet use of lethal chemicals and toxins intended to cover up our own use, since the

U.S. has never used these lethal agents. If anything, the reverse is true, with the Soviets accusing us to divert attention from their own activities.

— On May 7 TASS English charged that "The slander campaign against Vietnam and the USSR that has been inspired by the U.S. administration looks sacrilegious against the background of the facts related to the consequences of the Pentagon's chemical warfare in Vietnam."

At no time during the Vietnam War did the U.S. use toxins or lethal chemical weapons. U.S. use of riot control or irritants against enemy combatants and the use of the defoliant Agent Orange during the Vietnam War is a matter of extensive public record. We have neither denied these activities nor endeavored to keep them from the public. Moreover, the U.S. never deliberately used the defoliant Agent Orange against people. The U.S. used more of the defoliant (for agricultural purposes) in the U.S. than in Vietnam; and discontinued its use both in Vietnam and the U.S. at the same time in 1970 when a Department of Agriculture report indicated that there could be possible long-term harmful effects from exposure to Agent Orange.

— Pravda's May 7 edition in effect charges the U.S. with disinformation activities in Thailand. "The Thai press must refrain from publishing articles which accuse Vietnam of receiving 'yellow rain' chemical weapons allegedly manufactured in the Soviet Union. The point is that in recent months the editorial offices of the Bangkok newspapers and magazines have been receiving a continuous flow of such fabricated reports from U.S. agencies."

The U.S. has provided the U.N., all member-states and the public through the

media with material including comprehensive reports of U.S. evidence of CW use in Southeast Asian and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its proxies. What the Thai or any other press does with these materials is up to the publications' editors.

The article continued with the charge that the U.S. was planting CW evidence in Indochina. "One of the goals. . . was to supply and circulate the countries of Indochina with 'yellow rain' chemicals, in order to create 'material evidence' of the use of toxins by the Soviet Union and Vietnam."

This accusation is patently ridiculous. The U.S. has no need to fabricate or plant any evidence of CW use. The evidence is voluminous. We have merely reported the eye witness accounts of refugees, the findings of medical examination of victims, and scientific analysis of a variety of samples, including blood samples from victims.

-- A lengthy May 15 Pravda article repeated the now familiar litany of Soviet charges about the U.S. CW activity. The article described the State Department's March 1982 CW report as "a whole collection of fabrications about the USSR" which was "based on ludicrous fantasies, the bribery of bogus eyewitnesses and other machinations, and. . . fabricated from the so-called 'testimony' that 'eyewitnesses'. . . gave to CIA agents, after appropriate treatment. It contains not a single fact, not a single piece of proof that can with any seriousness bear out the accusations that have been leveled. . ."

According to the article, "Washington decided to resort to a frankly underhand method and to take the path of creating 'proof', systematically

introducing its bogus eyewitnesses in Southeast Asia and planting 'material evidence'."

Similar charges about the State Department Report and the usual list of charges about U.S. CW development and deployment appeared in a May 18 Izvestiya article.

The Department of State's Report to the Congress "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan" is based on a massive amount of information, from a variety of sources, which has been carefully compiled and analyzed over the years. The paper is accompanied by annexes and tables that provide details of the medical evidence, sample analyses, and other supporting data. The report thus provides a compilation of all the U.S. evidence which can be made public without compromising sensitive intelligence sources and methods. It presents incontrovertible proof of lethal CW use.

— A May 26 Thai broadcast by Hanoi's International Service made the accusation that "the U.S. State Department's samples were all provided by the Pol Pot clique and no one knows where they were collected or under what conditions. . . .The United States has spent no small amount of money to fabricate evidence to substantiate its allegation. In the end, its efforts have exposed its attempt to deceive public opinion. . . .It is clear that the U.S. propaganda about the toxic chemicals issues was a dirty slander right from the beginning."

The variety of U.S. samples come from a number of different sources, from three different countries -- Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. So far, positive results showing tricothecene toxins have been reported in samples from both Laos and Kampuchea. In addition to the toxins ("yellow rain") there

is strong evidence that other lethal agents, including nerve gas and phosgene oxime, have been used.

With these charges the Soviet media continues to accuse the U.S. of doing what the Soviet Union is doing with the development and use of lethal chemicals and toxins. The problem for the Soviets is that their arguments break down under the sheer weight of fact. They can provide no evidence whatsoever of American use of lethal chemicals and the U.S. long ago admitted use of non-lethal riot control gas and Agent Orange in Vietnam. The Soviets will, of course, continue their slanders of the U.S. in the hope of diverting world attention from their own CW activities and their violations of the 1925 Geneva protocol and the 1972 Biological and toxin weapons convention.

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Drafted By: PGM/G:KJ:Turpin

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Clearance: PGM/G:MSchneider

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

June 2, 1982

Soviets Charge U.S. With Profiting from Iran-Iraq War

Soviet media coverage of the Iran-Iraq War has included frequent charges that the U.S. is profiting from that conflict and has a vested interest in seeing it continue. Several examples follow.

- On April 10 TASS English carried an account of a Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) article which asserted that "Washington's behind-the-scenes instigatory role in whipping up the Iranian-Iraqi military conflict is well-known." According to the article, "America needs the conflict also to split countries of the Near and Middle East and to divert their attention from Israel's aggressive policies."
- Izvestiya's May 14 edition charged that "The United States is seeking to draw considerable dividends from the conflict on the shores of the Persian Gulf. . . .The United States is trying to deepen the split among the Arabs and distract their attention from the consequences of the Camp David deal and from the struggle against the brazen Zionist aggressor; it is insinuating into the minds of the Arab peoples the idea of the 'Iranian threat' in the hope of accelerating the formation of a pro-Western alliance in the Near East on the basis of so-called 'strategic consensus'."

-- On May 25 Radio Moscow's Arabic Service alleged that the Iran-Iraq War is "exploited by the United States. . .for stirring up differences and feelings of enmity among the Arab countries so as to weaken them."

The broadcast continued to cite the Kuwait Times article which supposedly "pointed out that it is futile to expect the United States to play a positive role in halting the Iraq-Iran war. Being a major protector of Israel, the United States is happy to see that the two militarily strong Muslim countries weakening each other to such a degree."

Radio Moscow continues to charge that "It is common knowledge that the United States and Israel want the conflict to continue. . . .Imperialism and the reactionary circles in the Arab countries are trying to use the Iranian-Iraqi conflict so as to drive a wedge in relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the parties involved in the conflict on the other."

This Radio Moscow broadcast combines two Soviet propaganda techniques. First, it cites a non-Soviet media source, but without a complete citation so it is difficult to verify whether the quote was accurate. Secondly, the broadcast follows the citation with its own text, which to the casual reader appears to be that of the Kuwait Times rather than Radio Moscow.

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Current Department of State guidance on the Iran-Iraq War states that:

We have always maintained that the Iran-Iraq War poses a danger to the peace and security of all nations in the Gulf region. As

Secretary of State Haig said in his May 26 Chicago speech, "There is great risk that the conflict may spill over into neighboring states. . . , " and may "lead to unforeseen and far reaching changes in the regional balance of power offering the Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge its influence".

Clearly the interest of all will be served by an immediate ceasefire and a negotiated settlement based upon the territorial integrity and independence of both Iran and Iraq. In this context we have consistently welcomed constructive international efforts to bring an end to the war on the basis of each state's respect for the territorial integrity of its neighbors and each state's freedom from external coercion.


We have made our views on the war known to other countries and will continue to do so in the hope that hostilities can be brought to an end as soon as possible.

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With their propaganda on the Iran-Iraq role and U.S. policy towards it, the Soviet Union is pursuing its usual strategy of imputing to the U.S. the policies and actions they are pursuing themselves. As Secretary Haig points out, the U.S. is anxious to end, not continue, this conflict which has the potential of destabilizing the entire region. It is the Soviet Union which has an interest in the conflict, demonstrated by the fact that it fueled the conflict by supplying arms to both Iran and Iraq.

Post should expect that as long as this conflict lasts, the Soviet Union will almost certainly continue its propaganda barrage against the U.S.


Drafted By: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:JPTurber

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 27, 1982

Soviets Continue to Assail U.S. Policy in the South Atlantic

The Soviet media has continued its verbal assault on British and U.S. policy regarding the Falkland Islands. Their charges have centered on two major themes: that the U.S. was never really neutral, even during Secretary Haig's shuttle diplomacy in April; and that the United Kingdom and the U.S. were interested in the Falklands for imperialist reasons. Several examples follow:

Radio Moscow's Peace and Progress to Latin America (Spanish) on May 14 carried a commentary discussing a letter Fidel Castro sent to all heads of nonaligned countries "urging them to adopt measures to put an end to the Anglo-U.S. aggression against the Argentine people." The message states that the United States and Great Britain intend to impose punitive actions against

- 2 -

Argentina as a sure lesson of imperialist powers to all developing countries that hope for their sovereignty and territorial integrity...It is thus a criminal attack on the right of each people to be free and independent to decide their own future.

TASS English on May 17 alleged that Secretary Haig's 'shuttle diplomacy' was designed "to mislead the international public as to the Washington administration's real plans, and at the same time to stall until the British squadron drew near to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands."

TASS English on May 24 continued on the same themes. "Touching on the so-called mediation effort by the United States in the British-Argentine conflict, the news analyst stresses that it lasted for as long as it took Britain's admiralty to lead its task force to the archipelago...After that Washington cast off the guise of mediator...The conflict in the South Atlantic has once again demonstrated the sinister role of NATO which uses it not only as a test range of modern sea warfare but also as an additional pretext for intensifying the arms race."

- 3 -

Earlier USINFO's in this series (May 5 and May 14), which also discussed the Falkland Islands crisis and the U.S. role in it, answered many of these charges directly. However, it bears repeating that: the U.S. was scrupulously impartial in its mediation efforts prior to April 30; the U.S. announcement of support for the United Kingdom came only after the breakdown in negotiations and was not timed to coincide with the arrival of the British fleet in the South Atlantic; The United States did not precipitate the crisis in the Falklands; we are not trying to gain control of the Falkland Islands for military or any other purposes; the United Kingdom and the EEC members did not ask the U.S. for permission to act or for approval of their actions and were not pressured by U.S.; the U.S. began its mediation effort at the request of both Argentina and the United Kingdom.

In contrast, none of the Soviet attacks on U.S. and British Falkland Islands' policies mention the facts that: the Argentines first occupied the islands, which are outside their territorial waters, without warning; the people of the islands have expressed a preference to remain British subjects; while the Soviets vehemently

- 4 -

attacked our efforts at solving the crisis peacefully, they themselves have done nothing to help bring peace, contenting themselves with calumnies against the U.S. and the British.

These Soviet attacks will undoubtedly continue throughout the crisis and after, for as long as there is a chance that the Soviet Union's relations with Latin American countries will benefit from attacks on the U.S.

Drafted by:PGM/G:KRTurpin

Clearance: JPTurber, Jr.

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USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 24, 1982

Soviets Assail President Reagan's Speech at Eureka College

The Soviet media carried a number of distorted accounts of President Reagan's May 9 Eureka College speech shortly after it was given. Examples of their charges about the speech and U.S. Arms Control policy follow.

- Moscow Domestic Service on May 12 charged that "The only new thing about his speech was that it gathered together the various fabrications and insinuations against the Soviet Union which have been customary with the current U.S. leaders. Admittedly, on this occasion, the standard anti-Soviet attacks were mixed up in the President's speech with peacemaking phraseology. . . .He has never concealed the fact that he wants to foist an endless and very expensive arms race on the Soviet Union. Only someone who has lost all sense of reality would hope that the Soviet Union would succumb to blackmail and disarm unilaterally. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly continue its efforts to achieve a genuine reduction of strategic armaments based on the principles of equality and identical security of the sides."
- A May 14 Radio Moscow English Service commentary charged that, "Try as you will, you will find no sign in the President's Eureka speech of a serious desire to reduce strategic arms in a way suitable for both sides. . . .The

proposals he made suggest that Washington seeks not an agreement that would end the danger of a nuclear arms race, but military advantages for the United States. . . .The administration is apparently obsessed with the idea of gaining advantages for the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union's security. . . .What all this means is that President Reagan expects the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally."

Since taking office, the President has been seeking arms reduction agreements which would be verifiable, equitable and militarily significant. In his Eureka College speech, President Reagan proposed drastic reductions in the nuclear arms arsenals deployed by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He proposed that nuclear arms levels be reduced by one-third as soon as possible, that the ceilings for nuclear warheads be equal, and that no more than one-half the remaining forces be land-based. These are certainly quite new and specific proposals for ending the nuclear arms race, which would benefit both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, at the expense of neither country's security and for the benefit of all. There is no suggestion that the Soviet Union should disarm unilaterally.

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While a number of Soviet media items on the President's speech attacked its contents directly, a far greater number used one of the Soviets' favorite propaganda techniques -- assailing the President's speech through the criticisms of the speech by Democratic Party members of Congress, former members of Democratic administrations, and the Western media. Several examples follow.

-- On May 10, Moscow Domestic Radio Service broadcast alleged criticisms of the President's speech by former Secretary of State Muskie and Senator Nunn with the lead that "The latest speech of President Reagan. . .has evoked quite a skeptical reaction among leading circles of the opposition Democratic Party in the United States."

-- Moscow Domestic Service on May 12 carried a litany of Western press accounts which appear to be critical of the administration. For example, it alleges that NBC "stressed that Reagan certainly does not wish to set off on his planned meeting with his West European partners with the reputation of a warmonger."

Immediately after the NBC quotation, Radio Moscow continues with the charge that, "If Reagan's speech is stripped of its cosmetic rhetoric, which is a sop to world and U.S. public opinion, it shows him in his customary role of inspiring and organizing futile attempts by the U.S. reaction to undermine the positions of world socialism and to seek military superiority over the Soviet Union."

Here the Soviets quote directly from an innocuous Western media statement and follow it with a Soviet accusation. NBC was speculating about the reason for and tone of the President's speech, not condemning its content, yet the first impression is that it is NBC, rather than Radio Moscow who is attacking the President.


-- Numerous other Soviet media accounts appeared in the days after the speech, all of which attacked the President's speech through the use of U.S. domestic political and press disagreements with the President's policy.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental rights of citizens in democracies. The Soviet citations of public domestic criticisms of the President's policies merely point up this major strength of our country.

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Whenever the President, Vice-President or a cabinet member delivers a major foreign policy speech, the Soviet media react strongly and critically. They often use the technique described above of quoting Western sources in their accounts to give their attacks at least a veneer of credibility. They will almost certainly continue to use these techniques whenever there is a major foreign policy speech.


Drafted By: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:JPThurber

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 21, 1982

Soviet and Cuban Media Continue Assaults on Ocean Venture '82

The U.S. Navy's recently completed training exercises in the Caribbean, Ocean Venture 1982, were the target of a number of attacks by the Soviet and Cuban media. Several of the most recent examples of these charges follow. . . .

-- Pravda on May 5 charged that "Washington is continuing to worsen relations with the Western Hemisphere's first socialist country and is whipping up tension throughout the Caribbean. . . .While this whole armada is 'practicing' firings and landings, U.S. propaganda is inventing all kinds of pretexts to justify the latest outburst of militarist fever."

-- On May 10 Pravda accused the Pentagon of "indulging in saber rattling off the Cuban coast. . . .The maneuvers are an alarming symptom of the escalation of Washington's policy of threats against the island of freedom."

-- Havanna's Domestic Radio Service broadcast on May 13 accusations that the goal of Ocean Venture '82 is "to frighten countries in

the area that are hostile to U.S. imperialism and liberation movements struggling in the region to overthrow corrupt and bloodstained governments supported by Washington."


Ocean Venture '82 was a regularly scheduled yearly Atlantic command naval and amphibious exercise, which is traditionally held in the Spring in international waters in the same area as this year's exercise. The objective of Ocean Venture was to insure that U.S. Naval forces are in a high state of readiness to defend the sea lines of communication in the region and to demonstrate U.S. capability to project power into the region when necessary to support friendly nations or to oppose a potential threat. According to Admiral Robert McKenzie, the commander of the exercise, "That's what this exercise was meant for -- to improve our readiness and to let our friends know we are here to support them." Ocean Venture was a training exercise, not preparation for aggressive action against anybody or anything, and there is no need for "pretexts to justify" its activities.

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These media attacks continued the propaganda campaign which the Soviet and Soviet-influenced media launched just prior to the beginning of Ocean Venture '82 in late April. Similar attacks were leveled against Operation Team Spirit in South Korea and seem to be beginning on NATO's North Sea exercises "Bright Horizon". Posts

should expect similar propaganda campaigns whenever and wherever
U.S. military forces conduct routine training exercises.


Drafted by: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:JPTurber

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 19, 1982

Soviets Assail USICA and Director Wick

In the last several weeks, Soviet and Soviet-influenced media have intensified the vicious propaganda campaign against Director Wick and USICA. Several examples of these slanders follow.

-- Izvestiya on May 5 charged that recently the "bourgeois" press has given up its role in disseminating "anti-Soviet" propaganda, and that the U.S. Government and USICA in particular have taken over this task, which is "first and foremost 'psychological war' against the USSR and other socialist states". The Soviets charge that Project Truth, the name of this alleged "campaign of psychological war," has "not even been touched by the truth. It has other contents: unscrupulous deception and blatant lies."

-- On May 7, Pravda continued, in an article written by the paper's senior political observer Yuri Zhukov, Izvestiya's "psychological war" accusations, charging that USICA conducts "U.S. foreign policy propaganda worldwide" and that Washington does not intend to renounce "psychological war". The article places the U.S. in the league of Nazi Germany with its charge that the U.S. "borrowed from Goebbels," the "tactic of the 'big lie'," which is "being used increasingly actively by the present U.S. and

NATO leaders for subversive purposes, as was done during the 'cold war' years."

TASS English carried an item on the Pravda article on May 7, which repeated the article's main points.

USICA's goal, and that of Project Truth, is to tell the truth about the U.S. and about the U.S. Government's policies, in an attempt to lessen international tensions. We do not disseminate propaganda and are not conducting "a campaign of psychological war" against the Soviet Union and its allies. The attempt to link USICA's activities with Goebbels' 'big lie' is despicable.

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-- May 11's issue of the Polish Government daily Rzeczpospolita attacked Director Wick's May 3 speech in Chicago, linking it to the "unprecedented anti-Communist and anti-Polish propaganda campaign" allegedly being waged by the Reagan administration. "In the United States it is no secret that the psychological war being conducted against our country is intended to force the authorities to restore the pre-December 13 state. To the contrary, it has been forecast that it is the goal of the propaganda activities to interfere in Polish internal affairs. Moreover, one of the bosses of American propaganda, Charles Wick, went so far as to put forward serious threats."

The article charges that the Director, while "pretending to be 'a friend of Poland'. . .simultaneously is responsible for activities in [the] Spring unrest, disturbances, and street rows. [And] in various propaganda

activities, playing on nationalist feelings is linked with anti-Socialist phraseology followed by calls and instructions to organize a resistance movement, break the regulations of martial law, and set Poles in opposition to Poles, even as far as civil war."

As stated above, USICA's goal is to tell other countries about the U.S. and its policies. We do not disseminate propaganda, interfere in the affairs of other nations (including Poland), and certainly do not incite domestic violence abroad. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, involves itself in all these activities in many areas of the world.

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These Soviet scurrilous attacks on USICA and Director Wick come after a month-long period of reduced Soviet propaganda on the Agency. Several of the new attacks appear to be a result of the Director's April trip to Europe, which is mentioned in several of the above items. The Polish item, while ostensibly an account of Director Wick's Chicago speech, was probably published as part of the propaganda barrage over the expulsion of the two American diplomats. Both also fit well with the continuing Soviet (Soviet-inspired) propaganda campaign against Western media and journalists. The extent and vehemence of these continuing attacks against USICA may be an indication that current Agency efforts to point out Soviet propaganda and disinformation are discomfiting to the Soviet Union. It is unlikely the Soviet media would bring such attention to USICA unless our anti-disinformation efforts hurt the Soviets.


Drafted by:PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance:PGM/G:JPThurber

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 17, 1982

Soviets Attack Vice President Bush's Visit to East Asia

Vice President Bush's trip to East Asia in April and May has been the subject of numerous unfounded attacks by the Soviet media and by Soviet-sponsored media in the region. Examples of the type of propaganda appearing on the Vice President's trip appear below.

-- A Radio Moscow English commentary (to South and Southeast Asia) charged on April 27 that "Political analysts link Bush's current trip with the implementation of the United States administration's militaristic plans regarding the Pacific area. Washington is banking on its local allies in its effort to regain the role it played in the region and lost as a result of its defeat in the aggressive war in Vietnam."

The purpose of Vice President Bush's trip to East Asia was to demonstrate to our Asian allies that the United States remains a strong and reliable force in the region. Before leaving Washington, the Vice President told reporters that the U.S. has a full, legitimate, useful role to play in the Pacific. Another reason for the trip was for the Vice President to represent the U.S. at various commemorations in the region, and much of the trip was devoted to those ceremonial functions.

-- On April 27, the purportedly clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (VKPR) broadcast to South Korea about the Vice President's visit to Korea, that "the visit by U.S. Vice President Bush was, in a nutshell, a trip to inspect the preparations by the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and the Chon Tu-hwan ring for a war of northward invasion. It was a criminal trip to inspire the Chon Tu-hwan ring's policy of fascism, treachery and division. It was also an aggressive trip to fabricate the military alliance of South Korea, the United States and Japan. . . . Bush's visit to South Korea was a dangerous and criminal visit to hinder peace in the Korean Peninsula and its peaceful reunification and to accelerate war and division."

-- VKPR (April 27), Pyongyang Domestic Radio (April 29), and Nodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the North Korean Communist Party, (April 30) contained similar attacks on the Vice President's visit to South Korea, and a May 2 Pravda article repeated Nodong Sinmun's accusations about the trip.

In fact, Vice President Bush's prime reason for visiting South Korea was to participate in ceremonies marking the Centennial of the establishment of relations between Korea and the United States.

-- On April 28 TASS English attacked the Singapore leg of the Vice


President's trip, charging that the trip was an attempt to further extend American influence in the region. "Washington's real approach to ASEAN countries is based not on the principles of respect for their national interests, but on the striving to subjugate them to the United States military and political aims."

Since there are no pressing issues between the United States and Singapore, the Vice President's discussions with Singapore's leaders were wide-ranging, including international trade issues and security in the Asia-Pacific region. To accurately reflect American relations with ASEAN, the "not" in the above TASS quotation should be moved from the first to the second phrase of the sentence. To characterize Soviet intentions toward ASEAN, it would be necessary to replace 'Washington' and 'the United States' with 'Moscow' and 'the Soviet Union' in the quote.

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Since a large part of Vice-President Bush's trip to East Asia was occupied with ceremonial duties, Soviet and North Korean media were hard pressed to find material on which to base their normal output of scurrilous propaganda on the trip's activities. Most of the accounts of the trip quickly moved from attacking the trip itself to castigating U.S. policy in the area in general and relations with the countries visited in particular. These accusations followed the usual Soviet technique of accusing the U.S. of attempting to dominate an entire region, that is, of doing exactly what the Soviets themselves have been doing, unfortunately with some success, for years. Posts can expect the Soviet media to mount similar propaganda campaigns whenever and wherever senior American officials travel.


Drafted by: PGM/G:KRTurpin


Clearance: PGM/G:JPTurber

USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 14, 1982

Soviets Attack U.S. Policy and Intentions During the Falkland Islands Crisis

The April 30 announcement by Secretary Haig that the United States would support the United Kingdom in its conflict with Argentina has resulted in the continuance of the Soviet Union's spate of anti-U.S. propaganda regarding our role in the Falkland Islands crisis. The major charges leveled by the Soviet media are that Secretary Haig's effort to prevent the outbreak of hostilities was a sham, and that the U.S. donned the "mask" of mediator only to gain control of the islands for the U.S. Several examples follow.

- Moscow's World English Service charged on May 3 that British air raids "completely exposed the myth of America's role as a self-styled mediator in the conflict. In reality the much-publicized shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary of State Alexander Haig was nothing but a screen to cover up the Anglo-American compact against Argentina. Haig moreover was winning time to enable the British naval armada to reach the area of the Falklands."
- A May 4 Izvestiya article charged that the conflict in the Falklands was the responsibility of the U.S. as well as Britain. "The United States is by no means an 'honest broker' in the British-Argentine conflict. . . . The main thing is that this conflict is in fact a conflict between the United States and Argentina to the same if not larger extent as it is a

British-Argentine conflict."

- Radio Moscow's English to North America Service (May 6) accused the U.S. of "playing a double-crossing game. The 11-day-long mediation mission of the United States secretary of state was geared to enable Britain to take its fleet to the Falklands and make ready for landing troops there and starting hostilities."
- Pravda charged on May 9 that "there can hardly be any question of neutrality when from the very start of the crisis Washington has been trying to get its own hands on the subject of the conflict -- the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands." (Segments of this article and its accusations appeared in by TASS English on the day the article appeared in Pravda.)
- TASS English on May 10 contained accusations against the U.S. which appeared in Kommunist, the journal of the Soviet Communist Party. "It is not astonishing that in this case too they preferred to side actually with one of its NATO allies in demanding the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, disregarded the interests of a member-state of the Organization of American States, which they simply discounted as soon as it comes to the strategy of imperialism."
- TASS language services have repeated, throughout the crisis, the same litany of accusations and charges in programming dealing with the Falklands. In addition, similar propaganda has appeared in the media of other Communist or leftist governments.

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A response to Soviet attacks that the U.S. was not impartial in its mediation

attempts is contained in Secretary of State Haig's April 30 statement on the Falklands:

"We have made a determined effort to restore peace through implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 502. . . . From the outset, the United States has been guided by the basic principle of the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. . . . We took no position on the merits of either the British or Argentine claims to the Islands."

The announcement that the United States would support the United Kingdom in the crisis was made only when it became apparent that the Argentinians would not accept the compromise agreed to by the United Kingdom. The announcement was not timed to coincide with the arrival of the British fleet in the vicinity of the Falklands, despite Soviet charges to the contrary. Secretary Haig stated that:

"In light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes. . . . The United States remains ready to assist the parties in finding the settlement. . . . In the end, there will have to be a negotiated outcome acceptable to the interested parties."

Finally, in answer to Soviet charges that the conflict in the South Atlantic is a conflict between the U.S. and Argentina, it must be pointed out that, since we have recently developed a better relationship with Argentina, the

conflict in the South Atlantic, with its concomitant deterioration of that relationship, is of no benefit to the U.S. The accusation that the U.S. precipitated the crisis to gain control of the Falkland Islands is patent nonsense. The United States became involved in the crisis only after both Argentina and the United Kingdom requested our assistance in mediating the conflict.

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The Soviet media continues to use the Falkland Islands crisis to attempt, through its propaganda, to damage U.S. relations with Latin America while trying to improve its own ties with the countries of the region.

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USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 12, 1982

Soviets Charge U.S. Is Interfering in Poland

The expulsion of two American Embassy officers by Poland this week comes during continuing Soviet attacks on U.S. policy on Poland and on American diplomats and journalists covering Poland. Several examples of these attacks follow.

- On April 20, the Polish Army newspaper Zolnierz Wolnosci carried the text of a Warsaw speech given by the Soviet ambassador to Poland, accusing the U.S. and NATO of interfering in the internal affairs of Poland. The ambassador charged that "American imperialism and its NATO assistants, who have petted the Polish counterrevolution and pushed it toward the seizure of power, are continuing to brutally interfere in internal Polish affairs." Ambassador Aristov also characterized the Soviet Union's role in Poland, alleging that "Notwithstanding the slanderous bourgeois propaganda, the Soviet Union does not impose its will on anyone."
- Pravda's May 6 edition carried a TASS item which contained a number of accusations that the May 3-4 demonstrations were the result of foreign subversion. Among the charges were: 1) that the incidents took place according to a "unified scenario" and were directed by a "single hand"; 2) that external support, especially that of Radio Free Europe has now

gone beyond "scurrilous propaganda" and broadcasts not only instructions, but "entire scenarios"; and 3) that the "offensive" against Poland is motivated by the fears of Poland's enemies that tension is lessening and that the "shameful Falkland's conflict" has pushed Poland off the front pages of Western Europe.

It is the position of the United States that the Polish people should settle their current difficulties through a process of negotiation and compromise, without outside interference. The accusation that the U.S. has intervened in Poland's affairs is baseless. The United States and the West in general are not seeking to impose any political formula in Poland. The West is simply trying to make clear that the way out of Poland's crisis is an end to repression, the release of political prisoners, and the establishment of a genuine internal dialogue.

This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union's efforts to turn back the reform process through its support of the imposition of martial law and the stationing of large numbers of Soviet troops in Poland. The Soviet Union seems uninterested in negotiation and compromise, rather its interest is in imposing its own solution on Poland.

-- According to Reuters, a May 3 Zolnierz Wolnoscsci article charged that "intelligence agents were masquerading in Poland as Western journalists" and that "certain publications owned or inspired by the CIA are involved in espionage and subversive activities." The publications attacked by the article as "past or present instruments" of the CIA were The Christian

Science Monitor, Time-Life Incorporated, the Rome Daily American, and U.S. Armed Forces Radio in West Berlin. The article also included another of its regular attacks on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Reuters said that the article attempted to link U.S. intelligence circles to the current unrest in Poland by implying that Newsweek's correspondent in Gdansk had something to do with that city becoming the center of the 1980 strikes. On May 6, Pravda printed a TASS dispatch summarizing this article.

-- On May 3 Radio Moscow's Polish Service also attacked the Western media, saying that in Western accounts of events in Poland "events and facts are twisted and falsified beyond measure."

-- A Radio Moscow Polish Service commentary on May 4 charged that "In the text of anti-Polish psychological war unleashed over the waves by the NATO ideological subversion staffs, one of the main roles is played by Radio Free Europe. . . .Gross provocations and subversive moves are the most characteristic methods of Radio Free Europe. . . .In implementing the guidelines of its CIA bosses, Radio Free Europe is literally jumping out of its skin, striving to torpedo the process of normalization of life in Poland."

Allegations that the Western press is run by the CIA frequently appear in the Soviet media. All media in the Soviet Union are government owned and controlled. Their staffs routinely are saturated with intelligence agents, and the Soviets charge that our media operates the same way. In fact none of the media cited above is "owned or inspired by the CIA". Most are independent privately-owned organizations: one exists for the entertainment of U.S. troops in Germany, and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are funded and run by the

semi-governmental Board for International Broadcasting.

In the May 6 Pravda article cited above, the Soviets charge the United States and the West with exacerbating the situation in Poland to deflect international attention from our role in the Falkland Islands. The fact that Poland has reappeared on the front pages of Western newspapers does not please the Soviet Union and they have lashed out at the journals carrying the news with the usual accusations that they are tools of the CIA and carry inaccurate stories. This is in sharp contrast to their own use of Western sources when it suits Soviet interests. Of course, Soviet attacks on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are constant, since they broadcast objective news accounts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union into those countries where the media are government controlled.

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USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 10, 1982

Soviets Accuse U.S. Of Militarizing Outer Space

Recently the Soviet media has rehashed and expanded its charges about U.S. militarization of space. Examples of these accusations follow.

- Sovetskaya Rossiya on March 20 attacked American television networks (ABC and NBC) for claiming that the Soviet Union has a 'killer satellite' in orbit designed to destroy U.S. satellites, and that next year the Soviets will "'be putting laser weapons into space'." According to Sovetskaya Rossiya, "These fantasies are a far cry from reality. It is the United States, not the USSR, which is starting an arms race in space." While the Pentagon is primarily responsible for this "sordid propaganda ploy", according to the article, the Heritage Foundation and Joseph Coors are also involved.

The article continued by charging that the "flight program of the reusable shuttles is geared to militarist plans." Finally, the article accused the U.S. of "doing its utmost to block any measures being taken to prevent the militarization of space."

In fact, the Soviet Union is the primary villain in the militarization of space. As stated in October 1981 by Kenneth Adelman (U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations), the Soviets launched the propaganda campaign, not the U.S. Ambassador Adelman said (in a United Nations First Committee meeting) that the Soviet accusations about U.S. militarization of

space were untrue, and regreted that the Soviet Union continued its "rhetorical claims" that the U.S. was militarizing outer space, particularly since they were made by "the only country to engage in such practices." Soviet implications that the space shuttle is primarily a military vehicle are patently untrue. The bulk of the shuttles' flights will carry civilian payloads, including those of foreign nations. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger said in April 1981 on NBC's Today, "it has some military applications but these are really secondary to the civilian aspects. . ."

- Pravda on April 18 charged that "The delirious ideas of the 'Pentagon's Thinkers' outdo the most unrestrained play of science fiction writers' imagination. According to Pravda's correspondent, an article in the Naval War College Review, written by two Air Force officers said that, "the United States must start creating new units in its armed forces -- space troops. Their mission is to restore the era of American nuclear superiority of the fifties'."

This quotation, if accurate, is only the recommendation of two mid-level officers, and certainly not U.S. Government policy.

The Pravda article also alleged that Aviation Week and Space Technology writes that, in preparation for a "future space war", "The Pentagon. . . is now developing a 'new weapon' which will alter 'the balance of power' in the world. . . . According to the journal, it is a question of a multimillion dollar program to set up space stations circling the earth equipped with laser weapons."

The Soviet Union has been engaging in the development (admittedly) and possible deployment of space weapons, and so the Department of Defense is

studying the practicality of many types of systems to be used for defensive purposes. The use of space by the U.S. to support defense programs is fully consistent with our obligations to the 1967 U.N. Treaty.

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As usual, the Soviets accuse the U.S. of doing what they themselves are engaged in, and then self-righteously castigate us for falsely accusing them of these same activities.

Several of these articles employed a favorite, and frequently used, Soviet propaganda tactic; that is, using quotations from respected Western sources to bolster their position on any subject. One characteristic of this method (the Naval War College Review citation) is to infer that the views of individuals are in fact government policy. Another characteristic (Aviation Week and Space Technology) is to omit the full bibliographic citation of the piece quoted from, so that it is almost impossible to go to the original sources and check their actual content.

Soviet media attacks on the militarization of space can be expected any time there is activity in the U.S. space program. The examples discussed above almost certainly result of the third flight of the shuttle "Columbia" in March. Posts can expect to see more such charges with the next flight of the space shuttle.

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USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 7, 1982

Soviets Charge That U.S. Naval Exercises Are Prelude to Intervention

The U.S. Navy's current training exercises in the Caribbean, Ocean Venture 1982, have been the target of a number of recent attacks in the Soviet and Soviet-influenced media. Examples of these charges follow.

- Moscow Domestic Radio service (April 29) attacked Ocean Venture '82 as a demonstration that the U.S. is "continuing a course of escalating hostility toward Cuba, of intimidating the peoples of Nicaragua, Grenada, El Salvador, Guatemala and other Central American and Caribbean states with the threat of a possible invasion." The article continued to charge that the U.S. "under the cover of talk about a Soviet-Cuban threat . . . is whipping up a militarist psychosis in the region, seeking to create more favorable conditions to conduct military actions, including intervention against Central American States." Finally, the broadcast alleged that the U.S. was holding the maneuvers in order to somehow disrupt negotiations between Cuba and Nicaragua aimed at "normalizing the situation in Central America." Similar accusations were carried the same day by Havanna Domestic Radio and Radio Hanoi's English service.

- TASS English on May 4 charged that "U.S. militarists have committed a

fresh blatant provocation against socialist Cuba," and that "Washington's fresh attempt to intimidate Cuba with a demonstration of force has caused indignation among Cuban people."

- Hungary's Nepszabadsag (May 4) repeated Cuban accusations about Ocean Venture '82, charging that "the real goal of the present military exercise is to threaten the Cuban people as well as other progressive movements in the area."
- Pravda's May 5 edition accused the U.S. of using Ocean Venture '82 "to exacerbate relations with the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere, heightening tension throughout the Caribbean Basin."
- Izvestiya (May 5) charged that Ocean Venture '82's maneuvers ("among the largest the Pentagon has ever carried out in the Caribbean") "have an overall aggressive character," and that "their goal is to intimidate the countries of the Caribbean with military might."

Ocean Venture '82 is a regularly scheduled yearly Atlantic command naval and amphibious exercise, which is traditionally held in the Spring in international waters in same area as this year's exercise. The objective of Ocean Venture is to insure that U.S. Naval forces are in a high state of readiness to defend U.S. interests in the region. It is a training exercise, not preparation for aggressive action against anybody or anything, certainly not for invasion of either Cuba or Nicaragua.

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- Prior to the commencement of Ocean Venture '82 (but after its April 5 announcement), a number of accusations about U.S. intentions in Central America appeared in Pravda, TASS, Managua Domestic Radio, and Havanna Domestic Radio.

These attacks, charging that the U.S. was preparing to invade various leftist countries in the area, seem designed to prepare their Central American audiences for later accusations about Ocean Venture '82.

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It is obvious that Soviet and Soviet-influenced media have launched one of their usual propaganda campaigns aimed at maligning military exercises in which the U.S. participates. The current attack on Ocean Venture '82 in Central America is similar to that aimed at Operation Team Spirit in South Korea. Posts should expect to see similar propaganda campaigns whenever and wherever U.S. military forces conduct routine training exercises.

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USINFO

SOVIETS CHARGE THAT U.S. IS USING FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS

TO "STRENGTHEN" OUR POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA

May 5, 1982

As the intensity of the Falkland Islands crisis heightened, the Soviet media moved from moderately balanced reporting of the crisis to criticism of British actions in the region, and finally expanded their reporting to concentrate on attacking the role and motives of the U.S. during the crisis. Examples of Soviet charges against the U.S. follow.

- TASS English on April 5 charged that the British forcibly took the Falklands from Argentina in 1833. The article also alleged that the Daily Mail said that the U.S. "gave Britain the green light for a military action against Argentina." The charge that the U.S. gave Britain a "green light" was repeated on April 6 in Pravda and on April 15 by Radio Moscow's Spanish to Latin America service.

The United Kingdom is a sovereign nation and does not ask the U.S. for permission to act or for approval of its actions.

- TASS International Russian reported April 18 that "Although Washington is trying to present its Secretary of State in the role of 'peacemaker', in

actual fact his so-called 'efforts to settle the conflict' amount to attempts to foist on the Argentinian side the British variation of settling the conflict. At the same time he is trying to frighten Buenos Aires with the threat that otherwise Washington will openly side with Britain."

In fact, the U.S. offered its good offices to both parties, and Secretary Haig visited both London and Buenos Aires several times in an attempt to resolve the dispute peacefully. In addition, the United States "strongly supports" United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 (adopted April 3), which calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities, immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands, and an effort by both parties to seek a diplomatic solution to resolve their difficulties.

- Moscow Radio Peace and Progress (Spanish to Latin America) asserted (April 16) that the "final objective of Washington's mediation mission" is the plan to establish a U.S. military base on the islands in order to "have the Latin American Southern Cone and especially Argentina within its scope."
- TASS English April 20 charged that "the true purpose of the U.S. diplomatic efforts is to use those islands in the southern Atlantic for the advance deployment of the U.S. and NATO forces in the region."
- According the TASS (English, April 27), the reason the U.S. is so

interested in the crisis is the strategic importance of the islands, since the Falklands are "the major link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Panama Canal, . . . a region that becomes increasingly troublesome to the major NATO power, the United States."

Obviously these charges are fabrications. Secretary Haig's mediation efforts were prompted solely by the desire to avoid armed confrontation between two governments which are friendly to the United States. The charge that we are interested in establishing a military base on the Falklands is ridiculous.

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Soviet media attacks (prior to May 1) focused primarily on these major themes, which charge that our peace-keeping efforts are merely a cover for attempts to establish a military presence in the South Atlantic, and accuse the U.S. of giving the British "the green light" to attack the Argentinians. In fact, the Soviet media are accusing the United States of employing the Soviets' own strategy, which is to use the crisis to improve the Soviet Union's position in the area. By siding with the Argentines, the Soviets may hope to improve their image in, and relations with, rightist Latin American countries, and thus alleviate some of these countries' suspicion of the Soviets, now suspect as the supporter of leftist revolutionaries in the region.

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USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

May 3, 1982

Soviets and North Koreans Attack U.S. Policy Toward Korea and Japan

In recent weeks, Soviet and North Korean media have carried a number of vituperative attacks on U.S. relations with South Korea and Japan. These were sparked by Secretary Weinberger's trip to the Far East to lead the U.S. delegation to the 14th Annual U.S.-R.O.K. Security Consultative Meeting, (March 30 and 31) and by the joint military exercise "Team Spirit 1982," held in Korea February through April 1982. A few examples of these attacks are listed below.

- On March 31 the purportedly clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (actually based in North Korea) broadcast to South Korea the abominable charge that the U.S. "will not hesitate to annihilate our people by triggering a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula."
- On April 1 a Nodong Sinmun (official North Korean Communist Party newspaper) article attacked "Team Spirit 1982" as "not a mere exercise but an exercise for a war of aggression." The article continued to charge that the U.S. "imperialists" are scheming to maintain our "last Asian colony" and "using it as a base, expand its sphere of influence" in the

area. -

- Nodong Sinmun on April 8 charged that the "extremely provocative war exercise called 'Team Spirit 1982'" (which turned "South Korea into a war zone closely resembling a real war") and the concurrent attendance of Secretary Weinberger and other top U.S. military leaders ("those who plan and execute U.S. war policy") at the 14th Annual Security Consultative Meeting showed that the "U.S. imperialists" regarded the meetings as very important in implementing our "policy for invading Korea."
- Pravda in Russian on April 8 charged that the Meeting's Communique contained statements which "attest that Washington intends to perpetuate the occupation of South Korea, to turn it into its military-strategic bridgehead in the region and to prevent the country's unification."

These joint military exercises and the Consultative Meetings are regularly scheduled annual occurrences. Both are regularly the focus of concerted and coordinated Soviet and North Korean media attacks.

"Team Spirit 1982" was the latest in this series of joint (U.S.-R.O.K.) military exercises. The only extraordinary thing about these particular exercises was that the North Koreans were invited, but declined, to send observers to them.

The Communique of the Security Consultative Meeting reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to aid South Korea in its defense, while stressing that "it is essential for the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula to ease tension and create an atmosphere for national reconciliation through

dialogue between the South and the North of Korea. This is a long way from the "policy for invading Korea" as charged by the Soviets.

Prior to his attendance at the meetings in Seoul, Secretary Weinberger visited Japan. Soviet media used his visit to harp on their recurring allegations that the U.S. is exerting unrelenting pressure on the Japanese in a variety of spheres. A few examples follow.

- TASS English on April 5 alleged that Secretary Weinberger warned Japan that "it would not avoid U.S. retaliation if it did not assume a heavier burden of war preparation in the region." The item continued to charge that this was yet another example of "the pressure constantly exerted by Washington on Tokyo in the political, economic and military fields."

- Moscow Domestic Radio on April 9 charged that the U.S. uses its military presence in South Korea as "a forward post in continental Asia--a possible bridgehead." (Pravda used very similar language in its April 8 edition.) According to the program, this presence in Korea allows us to keep tension in the area at a very high level and gives us "a pretext for exerting pressure on Japan....to force the Japanese" to increase their military spending, an increase "persistently asked for" by Secretary Weinberger during his visit to Japan.

~~Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge, in his prepared statement for the~~

House Foreign Affairs Committee (March 1, 1982), said that the U.S. and Japan have moved toward what has been termed "a productive partnership" and that our relationship is "now approaching equilibrium" and that "the patron-client relationship of the post-war period has largely faded away."

In the same statement Assistant Secretary Holdridge said that:

"In the defense area, our objective is an equitable sharing of roles and missions, taking into account Japan's unique constitutional and political constraints. Within this framework, we are agreed that Japan should assume primary responsibility for its local defense,"

which will

"require increased outlays in the years ahead....We recognize that the ultimate decision will be made by Japan in its own national interest."

While these examples of Soviet and North Korean attacks on U.S. policy in Korea and Japan are quite localized (only one is in English), they are good examples of the types of propaganda assaults leveled against any kind of military exercises in which U.S. military forces participate, and of the vicious media attacks which accompany and follow foreign visits by senior U.S. officials.

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USINFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

APRIL 30, 1982

Soviet Media Attacks USICA Officers

Scurrilous personal attacks on USICA officers, including the Director, are showing up with increasing frequency in the Soviets' disinformation campaign. A close look at some recent Soviet statements shows how vicious this slander campaign has become.

- On April 19 an Izvestiya article attacked the Agency, the VOA and John Hughes. (TASS English carried excerpts of the unsigned article.) The article ostensibly discussed the Director's National Press Club address; however, it expanded its scope to assail Agency, and particularly VOA, operations. Among the article's charges are: that the Agency's FY83 budget is thirty percent higher than that of FY82 of which a sizable amount will go to "the heavy artillery of ICA--the Voice of America;" that the Agency's "new broom" (Director Wick) is attempting to "sweep out," conducting in the editorial offices of VOA, "a campaign to 'strengthen the cadres'," with the resulting vacancies being filled by "specialists, like the rabid anti-communist and master of disinformation J. Hughes;" that the Agency will not achieve its goal of changing the

exacerbate) international tensions. We do not disseminate propaganda, and no VOA or Agency staffer has been replaced for the reasons cited by the Soviets. USICA's FY 82 budget request was \$561.4 million and the request for FY83 is \$640 million, a 14 percent not 30 percent increase. James Conkling resigned his position as Director of the VOA for personal reasons, so that he could spend more time with his family in California. He was replaced by John Hughes, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and former editor of the Christian Science Monitor. As mentioned above USICA and VOA are concerned with providing foreign audiences with the truth, an activity which cannot possibly be construed as interference in the affairs of other countries.

- Izvestiya (March 26) accused Vienna IO Michael Bennett of "crude pressure" on the government and people of Austria. Bennett sent a letter (in English) to the editor of Neue Zeit (Graz Socialist Party Daily), in which he protested an article on U.S. policy regarding Poland. Bennett's letter was published by Neue Zeit, followed by an editorial comment expressing the belief that "foreign representatives should use the language of their host country," but making no comments on the letter's content. Izvestiya summarized and criticized Bennett's letter and printed the editorial note, in an attempt to depict it as a blatant example of a U.S. attempt to "pressure" the Austrians.

- Pravda (March 27) attacked Barcelona BPAO John Barton for a letter he wrote to the director of a local film society, protesting its sponsorship

attitude of Western Europeans by increasing the number of "worthless farces sent over the airways. The article concludes its assault on the Agency with this statement: "nevertheless, the 'new broom' continues to sweep in the direction of further exacerbation of tension, not its relaxation.

- On April 8, Moskovskaya Pravda (Moscow city newspaper) attacked Director Wick, USICA and Project Truth in a lengthy article, which presented a review of old calumnies against the Director and the Agency. The article charges: that the Reagan administration came to power determined to make U.S. propaganda "extremely aggressive;" that Director Wick's first task was to make USICA the "spearhead" of this effort; that VOA staffers not sufficiently aggressive were replaced by those capable of "intensifying malicious anti-Soviet propaganda;" and that Project Truth culminates the reorientation of the VOA and USICA, whose arsenal consists of "lies, slander, disinformation and political provocation."
- TASS international Russian Service (March 24) charged that the change in leadership at VOA "is a victory for ultra rightwing political circles" who have succeeded in their goal of securing the replacement of James Conkling ("a spineless liberal") for not carrying out the propaganda directives of the Reagan administration. The change means that the VOA will continue its alleged "course of sharply stepping up the psychological warfare," as well as, its interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

USICA's goal, and that of Project Truth, is to tell the truth about the U.S. and about the U.S. Government's policies, in an attempt to lessen (not

of a Soviet film festival. The article quotes from Barton's letter, which refers to Soviet human rights violations in Poland (and elsewhere) and from the response of the Mayor of Barcelona. The Mayor's response was a published tirade accusing the U.S. of human rights violations in a number of countries, including support of Franco in Spain. The response also attacked Barton for interference in the affairs of "countries and cities which are not part of America, at least formally."

Both Mr. Bennett and Mr. Barton did what any citizen of democratic countries (such as Austria and Spain) can do, which is to write a letter disagreeing with an action taken by a local institution. Writing letters certainly cannot be construed as "crude pressure" or interference in the affairs of other countries.

While the Soviets have in the past ridiculed USICA officers, the number of such charges against USICA have increased significantly recently. The virulence of the attacks seems to reflect increasing Soviet apprehension over the potential effectiveness of US public information activities.

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U. INFO

SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS

APRIL 28, 1982

Soviets Charge That the U.S. Is Using Chemical/Biological Warfare (CBW)

Soviet canards about U.S. chemical weapons buildup/use have proliferated recently. These accusations have surfaced in a number of countries and accuse the U.S. of CBW activities throughout the world. Listed below are some recent examples.

- TASS (March 23) charges that U.S.-made ammunition "stuffed with toxins" is being used by the Salvadoran junta.

This accusation is nonsense and should be treated as such.

- Literaturnaya Gazeta (March 24) continues and expands its scurrilous attack on the University of Maryland's Lahore Malaria Research Center. The article adds to previous accusations more references to the CIA including one to an alleged CIA memorandum on ways of maintaining CBW arsenals despite Presidential directives. USICA 7048-U completely refutes this accusation.

The Research Center, an established and respected institution, has for 21 years conducted serious scientific and medical research on malaria and has been a leader in efforts to eradicate the disease. The Center has no connection with the CIA and is not engaged in CBW activities.

L'Espresso's Rome correspondent, in a March 27 article, accuses the U.S. of preparing for chemical warfare in Europe, focusing on the deployment of American chemical warheads in Europe, particularly in Italy. The article also cites a January 16 report in the Turin paper La Stampa (center/left orientation) allegedly discussing increased CBW activity in the U.S.

The U.S., as a signatory of the 1972 Convention on CBW, has not deployed or ever used lethal CBW weapons anywhere in the world, whereas it is clear from evidence made public that the Soviet Union has made offensive use of these weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. This attack is obviously an attempt to divert attention from the Soviets' own CBW activities in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and from their extensive training of their own troops in the art of chemical warfare. The Soviet Union has a chemical warfare force of 60,000 troops which can use various types of chemical agents, and every Soviet division in Central Europe is equipped with elaborate anti-CBW equipment. The U.S. will resume chemical weapons production in the U.S., focusing on better and safer packaging of established weapons and on replacement of obsolescent chemical weapons stores. The U.S. has decided that it must begin this replacement production only because the Soviet Union refused to match our 1969 unilateral decision to stop such research, and to serve as a deterrent to Soviet use of their own CBW supplies, which have greatly increased since 1969.

Soviets Claim That U.S. Accusations of Soviet Use of CBW Are Lies

Soviet and other Communist Bloc accusations that the U.S. is lying when we present evidence of Soviet CBW use have greatly intensified recently. The

increased level of these attacks against the U.S. are clearly designed to deflect public concern over mounting evidence that the Soviets were involved in CBW in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Below is a recent example.

- The March 27 Izvestiya article mentioned above charges the U.S. of fabricating stories about Soviet CBW to cover up our own efforts in this area. However, as the article itself states, "The thief's custom of covering his guilt by crying 'stop, thief' can apply to others as well."

The U.S. has reported incidents of suspected CBW use which have been brought to our attention by refugees in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and those which have been verified by scientific analysis. There has been no fabrication of stories about Soviet CBW use to cover up our own, since, as mentioned above, the U.S. has not used CBW. If anything the situation is the reverse, with the Soviets accusing us to divert attention from their own CBW activities.

While most of the specific charges of U.S. CBW activity are patently ludicrous, they can nevertheless have a cumulative effect. They are part of a pattern of disinformation against the U.S., aimed at undermining world confidence in the U.S.' commitment to the 1972 Convention on CBW and at distracting attention from Soviet CBW activities. This effort is serious and posts should be alert to respond to all charges as appropriate. It is likely that this Soviet campaign will be sustained and vicious.

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Dateline America

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No. 13

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS

American Families Host Foreign Students
U.S. Dairy Exports Show Substantial Increase
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Americans Show Volunteer Spirit
U.S. Schools Focus on Microelectronics
Focus on the Individual
(U.S. Agency for International Development)

2. U.S. JOB-PLACEMENT PROGRAM A SUCCESS..... 300 words
By J. Frank Diggs, from U.S. News & World Report
3. OIL IMPORTS DROP AS U.S. CUTS ENERGY USE..... 300 words
By Robert Ortner and David C. Lund
(From U.S. Department of Commerce)
4. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY..... 500 words
By Ian M. Ross, from New Jersey Bell
5. LAND IS RETURNED TO INDIANS IN U.S..... 650 words
By Al Pessin (USICA)
(Photo 82-777)
6. NEW YORK: THE 'EMPIRE STATE'..... 350 words
(Photos 82-1233c, 77-1795, 78-3802)
7. CALIFORNIA'S LIFE-SAVING SKYWAY PATROLS..... 400 words
By Hal Klopper, from Helistop
(Photo 82-159)
8. USING NATURE TO FIGHT INSECTS..... 350 words
By Wayne Hyde (USICA)

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A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. **FEATURE BRIEFS**
 - Foreign-Born Americans: Trend Reversed
(U.S. Bureau of the Census)
 - U.S. Farmers Focus on Exports
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
 - More Working Mothers
(U.S. Department of Commerce)
 - U.S. Firm Funds Cancer Research
 - Bicentennial of U.S. Constitution
(U.S. Supreme Court)
 - Work Habits Seen Likely to Change
2. **IN OHIO-BASED FIRM, IT'S VOLUNTEERS BY THE HUNDREDS.....550 words**
(From NAB Clearinghouse Showcase)
(Photo 82-903)
3. **WASHINGTON: AMERICA'S 'EVERGREEN STATE'.....250 words**
(Photos 77-3202c, 72-4965c, 77-3171c)
4. **EXXON CELEBRATES 100 YEARS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION.....400 words**
By C.C. Garvin, Jr., from The Lamp
5. **GOODBYE BLACKBOARDS, HELLO COMPUTERS.....450 words**
By Donn Barrett (USICA)
(Photo 82-826)
6. **PREFAB HOUSING EXPANDS IN U.S.....300 words**
(From U.S. Department of Commerce)
7. **AMERICA'S LAKE TAHOE; HIGH COUNTRY WINTER.....600 words**
By Mark Miller, from Vista/USA
(Photo 81-2911c)

dateline america



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS

- New Early Warning Forecasting System
(U.S. Department of Commerce)
- U.S. Winning War on Childhood Diseases
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
- Space Shuttle Uses 'Off-the-Shelf' Films
- U.S. Firm Gives Land to Public
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
- Florida Reports Foreign Trade Record

2. LEADING ENERGY RESEARCH.....350 words
By Jim Bapis, from University of Utah Review

3. PRIVATE SUPPORT EYED FOR STATUE OF LIBERTY..... 250 words
(From U.S. Department of the Interior)
(Photo 67-2654)

4. FACTORY FARMING.....650 words
(From The Economist)

5. ALASKA: 'THE LAST FRONTIER'.....300 words
(Photos 75-2439, 81-2929c)

6. CALIFORNIA'S LIGHTHOUSE HOSTELS.....500 words
By Larry Wood, from Sea Frontiers
(Photo 81-3553)

7. FRANCHISING'S NEW DIRECTIONS.....250 words
(From U.S. Department of Commerce)

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A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS
 - American Giving Sets Record
 - U.S. Energy Achievements
(U.S. Department of Energy)
 - U.S. to Host World Theater Festival
 - New Honor for Bob Hope
 - U.S. Gains Farms
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
2. U.S. PROJECT ORBIS BATTLES EYE DISEASE OVERSEAS.....450 words
(Photo 82-1583c)
3. U.S. CITIES, BUSINESS JOIN TO PROVIDE SUMMER JOBS.....650 words
(From NAB Clearinghouse Showcase)
(Photo 82-821)
4. MAINE: THE STATE WHERE INDUSTRY AND WILDERNESS COEXIST.....300 words
(Photos 73-2099c, 75-1802c)
5. COMPUTERS PINPOINT BAD WEATHER.....300 words
By Laurent Belsie, from The Christian Science Monitor
6. GENE TRANSFER ADVANCE: A STEP CLOSER TO GENE THERAPY?.....350 words
(From U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
7. TEEN-AGE UNITED NATIONS.....550 words
By Jonathan Kern (USICA)
8. THE LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN CHOCOLATE KING..... 600 words
(From Grit)
(Photo 82-176)

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A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS

- Americans Are Living Longer
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
Gift to Boost Energy Research
Housing Assistance for Elderly and Handicapped Americans
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development)
Everyday Life in American Art
(The Smithsonian News Service)
(Photos 82-151, 82-152)
U.S. Workforce Up 30.6% Since 1970
- 2. PETER GRACE: 'ONE STEP AHEAD'..... 450 words
By Donn Barrett (USICA)
(Photos 82-1803, 82-1804)
- 3. 3-D IMAGES OF HUMAN ANATOMY..... 550 words
From University of Utah Review
(Photo 82-814)
- 4. LOUIS LYONS: AMERICAN JOURNALIST..... 250 words
By Van Seropian (USICA)
(Photo 82-227)
- 5. OVERSEAS MARKETS EYED FOR VERMONT MAPLE SUGAR..... 300 words
(Photo 82-902)
- 6. COACH: LEARN FIRST, THEN RUN..... 400 words
By Mickey Cioffi, from Grit
(Photo 82-156)
- 7. VOLUNTEERS MAINTAIN AMERICA'S FORESTS..... 220 words
From U.S. Department of Agriculture

dateline america



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS

The American Immigration Record
(U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service)
Mississippi City to Host International Ballet Competition
AID Official on Key to Growth
(U.S. Agency for International Development)
Practical Home Electronics
Progress in Cancer Control

2. THOSE DETERMINED ENTREPRENEURS.....900 words
By Judith B. Gardner, from U.S. News & World Report
(Photos 82-803, 82-804, 82-805)
3. GUIDELINES FOR GIVING.....800 words
By C.C. Garvin, Jr., from The Lamp
4. WASHINGTON'S TOUCH-AND-FEEL MUSEUM.....850 words
By Wesley Ann Godard (USICA)
(Photo 82-319)
5. NEW TOOTHLESS GEAR HELD ENERGY SAVER.....400 words
By Ripley Watson, from The Journal of Commerce
(Photos 82-1094, 82-1096)
6. U.S. SCIENTIST CREATES 'CLEANUP' MICROBE.....300 words
(Photo 82-147)

dateline america



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS

Deaf Attorney Argues Case Before U.S. Supreme Court
(with Photo 82-1160)

U.S. Progress Against Inflation

Weeds Forecast Crop Survival

(U.S. Department of Agriculture)

Levitating Trains

A Better Artificial Knee

The Story of the Mississippi

2. VIVA FOSTER GRANDPARENTS!.....1,100 words
By Nancy Reagan, from The Saturday Evening Post
(Photo 82-278)
3. DISNEY EXPOSITION GIVES \$800-MILLION PEEK AT TOMORROW..... 300 words
By Ron Scherer, from The Christian Science Monitor
(Photos 82-1192, 82-1194)
4. AMERICAN INDIAN ART TODAY..... 900 words
By Erica Benis (USICA)
(Photos 82-899, 82-900)
5. AMERICAN FARM WOMEN TAKE ON NEW ROLES..... 300 words
(From U.S. Department of Agriculture)
6. SKYLIGHTS BRIGHTEN AMERICA'S URBAN LANDSCAPE..... 900 words
(From Rohm and Haas Reporter)
(Photos 81-1542, 81-1543)
7. FILM DIRECTOR GIVEN TOP AWARD AT HOLLYWOOD GALA..... 400 words
By Ray Kabaker (USICA)
(Photo 82-153)

dateline america



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. **FEATURE BRIEFS**

- U.S. Is Critical Trading Partner
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
- Americans Cut Energy Use
(U.S. Department of Energy)
- U.S. Space Orbiters Get Better Protection
(U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
- The Talking Encyclopedia

- 2. CABLE TV NEWS AROUND THE CLOCK..... 400 words
(Photo 82-1098)
- 3. NEW LASER ADVANCES BRAIN SURGERY IN U.S..... 400 words
- 4. MASTER OF NEW ENGLAND AMERICANA.....1,000 words
By Susan E. Meyer, from Modern Maturity (Photos 82-1100
and 82-1101)
- 5. CHICKS VACCINATED THROUGH EGGSHELLS..... 550 words
(From U.S. Department of Agriculture) (Photos 82-1141 and 82-1142)
- 6. TEACHING STUDENTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS..... 650 words
(From Honeywell Information Systems) (Photo 82-189)

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A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency


No. 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS

Bell Laboratories: At the Cutting Edge (with photo 82-808c)
Talking Encyclopedia Aids Blind Youngsters
(U.S. Department of Education)
U.S. Key Food Producer
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Prisoner Rehabilitation Program

2. 21 NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN 1982 WORLD'S FAIR IN U.S..... 400 words
By Michael J. Bandler (USICA) (Photo 82-277)
3. WILLIAMSBURG'S REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE..... 1,000 words
By Peggy Stanton, from The Saturday Evening Post
(Photos 69-2006, 81-466, 81-467)
4. HONORING VOLUNTEERS..... 450 words
By Sandra Arnoult, from The Montgomery Journal
(Photos 82-184, 82-185)
5. U.S. SCIENTISTS SEEK CUT IN FOOD MARKETING COSTS..... 600 words
(From U.S. Department of Agriculture)
6. THE LEGACY OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY..... 750 words
By Alan Silverman (USICA) (Photo 52-7614)



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. **FEATURE BRIEFS**
Electric Autos in World's Fair City
Native American Center for the Living Arts
Country Vacations for City Youngsters
More Food Per Acre
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
2. **SPACE SHUTTLE LABORATORY ATTRACTS UNIVERSITY RESEARCH.....800 words**
By Kim McDonald, from The Chronicle of Higher Education (Photo: 82-605)
3. **I.M. PEI, AN ARCHITECTURAL REVOLUTIONARY.....500 words**
From Grit (Photos: 76-316, 78-1486)
4. **REDUCING HEART ATTACK DAMAGE.....400 words**
By Laszlo Dosa, USICA
5. **U.S. OFFICIAL TESTIFIES ON IMMIGRATION ISSUES.....250 words**
From U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
6. **SODA ASH GALORE!.....320 words**
From U.S. Department of Commerce (Photo: 82-320)
7. **CULTURE IS GOOD BUSINESS (picture story)**
By Sandy Greenberg, USICA (Photos: 81-1642c, 81-1645c, 81-1668c)



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS
World's Fair Display Highlights Technology
U.S. Farm Exports Go To 40 Countries
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Fish Farmers: Latest American Entrepreneurs
The Spirit of American Heroism (Photos: 82-279c, 82-280c)
2. SATELLITES REPAIRED IN SPACE..... 500 words
From U.S. Department of Commerce (Photos: 79-252, 81-2381c)
3. VOLUNTEERISM BOOSTS NIAGARA FALLS' SPIRIT..... 400 words
By Jim Merkel, from Grit (Photos: 82-89, 82-90)
4. OLDER ARTISTS CREATE AN 'AGELESS' BEAUTY..... 1,250 words
By Margery Byers, The Smithsonian Institution
(Photos: 82-202, 82-203, 82-802)
5. NEW TECHNOLOGY TESTED FOR DEEP-SEA RESEARCH..... 600 words
By Bob English, University of California News Office
6. RAGS TO RICHES..... 600 words
From Cincinnati Horizons



A news and feature service of the International Communication Agency

No. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. FEATURE BRIEFS
2. HELPING TO FEED THE WORLD..... 300 words
From U.S. Department of Agriculture (Photo 81-3885)
3. COLUMBIA'S TRIUMPH -- SPACE AGENCY GAINS NEW CONFIDENCE.....1,000 words
By Robert C. Cowen, from The Christian Science Monitor
4. AMERICA EMBRACES WINDPOWER..... 500 words
From U.S. Department of Commerce (Photo 78-1466)
5. BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN FINDS U.S. VISIT 'A REVELATION'.....1,100 words
By Khaba Mkhize, from Frontline Magazine
6. RELIGION IN AMERICA.....1,400 words
By Frank P.L. Somerville, from The Baltimore Sun
7. U.S. INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM IN 25TH YEAR.....1,350 words
From U.S. Department of Transportation (Photo 76-1716)
8. JAZZ: STAYIN' ALIVE.....1,500 words
By Michael Rozek, from American Way
9. PROJECT HOPE PROVIDES GLOBAL MEDICAL AID..... 950 words
By John Holway, USICA Staff Correspondent (Photo 68-577)
10. FARMING FOR THE FUTURE -- PGM/P "Mini" Picture Story #1447/DA
By Sandy Greenberg (4 color photographs)

Films and Videotapes

**M. Films and
Videotapes**

UPDATED 16 JUL 82
PGM/TD - EWALT
WANG FILE 0259d

MASTER TITLE FILE OF AGENCY VTR, FILM
PRODUCTION AND ACQUISITIONS (OCTOBER 1, 1981 THROUGH JULY 16, 1982)

USICA PRODUCTIONS INITIATED:

AMERICAN FOLK FESTIVAL PROMOS
AMERICAN POETS
BENEFITS OF DATA PROCESSING AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS (Other Agency)
CBI-II, THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
EMERSON CENTENNIAL
FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
GRADUATE STUDY IN THE U.S. (EDIT)
LET POLAND BE POLAND - U.S. NETWORK COVERAGE (Staff Use)
MSTISLAV ROSTROPOVICH
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF U.S.-KOREAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
POLAND 1981
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND ACTIVE MEASURES
THE FORMULATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIAN SECURITY
U.S. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICIES (FRANCOPHONE AFRICA)
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
U.S. PEACE INITIATIVES
U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA - PART II

USICA PRODUCTIONS COMPLETED:

AFGHANISTAN 1982: THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM CONTINUES
AFRICAN HERITAGE IN THE SMITHSONIAN
AMERICAN CINEMA: FILMS OF SOCIAL COMMENT - WITH E.G. MARSHALL
AMERICAN LABOR TODAY
CANCUN: A REPORT FROM THE SUMMIT
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
COLUMBIA - FLIGHT II
COLUMBIA FLIGHT III: PATHFINDER MISSION
COLUMBIA RETURNS TO SPACE
DISARMAMENT EXHIBITS: PART I - PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH
DISARMAMENT EXHIBITS: PART II - ERIC SEVAREID
DISARMAMENT EXHIBIT: PART III
DUMAS MALONE: A JOURNEY WITH MR. JEFFERSON
FOCUS: FOUR AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHERS
IMPACT: ECONOMIC REPORT - FOREIGN INVESTMENT, THE PRIVATE INITIATIVE
JUMP UP
LET POLAND BE POLAND
LET POLAND BE POLAND (Abbreviated version)
MORE THAN SURVIVAL
NEW TRENDS IN AFRO-AMERICAN MUSIC
PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EUROPE: JUNE 1982
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS ON FOREIGN POLICY - 18 NOV 81 (NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
EUROPE)

- 2 -

PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE VISITS WASHINGTON
PRESS CONFERENCE USA: DR. HOWARD PENNIMAN - APRIL 2, 1982
PRESS CONFERENCE USA: NICHOLAS VELIOTES
PROJECT TRUTH: USICA TELEVISION RESPONDS (Staff Use)
RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE
REAGAN WHITE HOUSE, THE
SOVIET MILITARY POWER
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS: A CONVERSATION WITH DR. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
THEATRICAL SERIES #38: ARTS AMERICA - JAKE GARDNER
THEATRICAL SERIES #39: ARTS AMERICA - PAT BIRCH
TOWARD THE CANCUN SUMMIT
U.S. LAW OF THE SEA POLICY - MARCH 1982
USICA - A YEAR OF NEW DIRECTIONS
VOYAGER II - RENDEZVOUS WITH SATURN
YELLOW RAIN

REQUESTED CURRENT EVENTS NEWSCLIPS INITIATED:

BALTIC DAY
COLOMBIAN TV CO-OP VTR TRANSFER
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS - SECY. OF STATE-DESIGNATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT MONGE'S OFFICIAL VISIT
PANEL DISCUSSION: "ARE WE LOSING THE THIRD WORLD" (Staff Use)
PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EUROPE, 3-11 JUN 82
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TV ADDRESS TO THE NATION - 29 APR 82
RETRIEVAL/PROCESSING OF FOOTAGE - PRESIDENT & MRS. REAGAN'S VISIT TO FRANCE
SLIDE KIT UPDATE - SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ
STATEMENT FOR JORDAN TV
SWEARING-IN CEREMONY FOR SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ
U.S. VISIT OF PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE OF GUINEA
USICA DIRECTOR AND USUN AMBASSADORS AT SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH
VISIT OF HONDURAN PRESIDENT SUAZO
WRAP-UP ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO EUROPE 3-11 JUN 82

CURRENT EVENTS NEWSCLIPS COMPLETED:

A CONVERSATION WITH DATO SERI DR. MAHATHIR MOHAMAD, PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA
A CONVERSATION WITH EDWARD SEAGA, PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA
A CONVERSATION WITH HERMAN NICKEL - U.S. AMB. TO SOUTH AFRICA
AN INTERVIEW WITH EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR ACDA FOR WELLINGTON
ATATURK CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION

- 3 -

BETWEEN CONTINENTS/BETWEEN SEAS - EXHIBIT OF THE PRECOLUMBIAN ART OF COSTA RICA
BROCK AND BALDRIGE TESTIMONY AT TRADE RECIPROCITY HEARINGS
CHARLES WICK VISITS WITH PRESIDENT AND MRS MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES
CLEVELAND ORCHESTRA PROMO - PHILIPPINES
CONVERSATION WITH JOSEPH LUNS, SECRETARY GENERAL NATO
DILLERY INTERVIEW FOR TURKISH TV
GREECE'S DEPUTY SECY. OF DEFENSE MEETS WITH DEPUTY SECY. OF STATE STOESSEL
HERITAGE OF ISLAM EXHIBIT - HOUSTAN TEXAS
HERITAGE OF ISLAM EXHIBIT - SPECIAL VERSION FOR JORDAN
ICA - FIRST YEAR REVIEW (Staff Use)
INAUGURATION OF THE INDIAN CULTURE CENTER AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN NEW YORK
CITY
INTERVIEW WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESSEL, JR. ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD POLAND - 30 DEC 81
KONGO ART IN AMERICA
LOY KRATHONG CELEBRATION
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM'S MICHAEL ROCKEFELLER WING OF AFRICAN ART
NATIONAL BALLET OF ZAIRE, THE
1981 SLIDE KIT UPDATE
ORIENTAL INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN POETRY
PEACE CORPS RECRUITMENT STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR LORET RUPPE (Staff Use)
PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA - SATELLITE FEED
PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA - VISIT TO THE U.S.
PRESIDENT REAGAN ADDRESSES THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MEETING IN
WASHINGTON - 29 SEP 81
PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
PRESIDENT REAGAN PROCLAIMS AFGHANISTAN DAY MARCH 21, 1982
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS ON CARIBBEAN BASIN POLICY
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (PRE-CANCUN
SUMMIT SPEECH - 15 OCT 81)
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO UN ON DISARMAMENT - 17 JUN 82
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EUREKA COLLEGE ADDRESS
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEMORIAL DAY ADDRESS - 31 MAY 82
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE - MAY 13, 1982
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE - 30 JUN 82
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE - MARCH 31, 1982
PRESIDENT'S NEW INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE INITIATIVE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURE TO PERU - AID ADMINISTRATOR MCPHERSON
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH EXCERPTS FOR BRAZILIAN ADVANCE TEAM
PROMINENT INDONESIAN RECEIVES HONORARY DEGREE IN OHIO
REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO BRITISH PARLIAMENT - 8 JUN 82
REPORT TO CONGRESS: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN
ROLAND MASSA - OPEN AND CLOSE STATEMENTS FOR COLUMBIAN TV
SECRETARY HAIG AND UNDERSECRETARY STOESSEL REPORT ON SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SECRETARY HAIG INTERVIEWED BY EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT
SECRETARY HAIG PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING VISIT OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK - 5 FEB 82
SECRETARY HAIG STATEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION - 30 NOV 81 (SATELLITE FEED)
SECRETARY HAIG'S ADDRESS ON PEACE AND DETERRENCE - 6 APR 82

- 4 -

SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON DEATH OF ANWAR SADAT

- 7 OCT 81

SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG INTERVIEW FOR BELGIUM TV

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA - FLIGHT IV (NASA SPACE REPORT)

SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #1: ASTRONAUT TRULY PROFILE

SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #2: ASTRONAUT ENGLE PROFILE

SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #3: REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM

SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #4: CREW TRAINING

SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #1 - PROFILE: ASTRONAUT JACK LOUSMA

SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #2 - PROFILE: ASTRONAUT CHARLES FULLERTON

SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #3 - ASTRONAUT TRAINING

SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #4 - PAYLOAD

SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #5 - FLIGHT OVERVIEW

STOCK FOOTAGE TO SANTIAGO FOR SPECIAL ON U.S.

SWEARING IN OF HARRY G. BARNES, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO INDIA

SWEARING-IN OF JOSEPH VERNER REED - AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

SWEARING-IN OF MR. JOHN HUGHES AS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR -PGM (Staff Use)

THE LANDING OF COLUMBIA - IV

UN DAY CELEBRATION - MEXICAN PHILHARMONIC AT THE KENNEDY CENTER - 31 OCT 81

UNITED STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT MISSION TO AFRICA

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH PROMO FOR LATIN AMERICA

VIDEO DIALOGUE: UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER FOR ZDF-TV

VISIT OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE U.S. - FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEEDS

VOA - 40TH ANNIVERSARY (Staff Use)

ZAMBIAN UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY DELEGATION VISITS WASHINGTON

FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN TV, INITIATED:

FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, D.O.S.

(Other Agency)

FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEEDS - VISIT OF BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO

FACILITATIVE SUPPORT FOR PEACE CORPS (Other Agency)

OFFICIAL VISIT OF TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMED MZALI

FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN TV, COMPLETED:

"ACTION" FACILITATIVE - RSVP PROGRITAM PROMOS (Other Agency)

AUSTRIAN TV - ESCORTED FACILITATIVE: SPACE SPIN-OFFS

BBC FACILITATIVE SATELLITE: INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR WICK - 21 JAN 82

FACILITATIVE RAI INTERVIEW WITH ASST. SECY OF STATE ELLIOT ABRAMS

HUNGARIAN FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEED - JANOS AVAR

OFFICIAL VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MZALI OF TUNISIA - FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEEDS

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S D-DAY MESSAGE FOR FR3 TV

REAGAN PRE-SUMMIT INTERVIEW FOR EUROPEAN TV NETWORKS - 1 JUN 82

SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG INTERVIEWED BY RAI-TV - 24 Mar 82

SWEDISH TV FACILITATIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY

VISIT OF KING HASSAN II - FACILITATIVE COVERAGES AND SATELLITE FEEDS

Transmitted 18-21 MAY 82

- 5 -

VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN - FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE/SATELLITE FEEDS -
1-9 NOV 81
YUGOSLAV FACILITATIVE: BORIS BERGANT OF TV LUBLJANA - REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR

CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTIONS WITH FOREIGN TV, COMPLETED:

AUSTRIA TV CO-OP: "FOOTPRINTS IN THE THIRD MILLENIUM"
FINLAND TV CO-OP: THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R.: ARMS RACE OR DETENTE?
HUNGARY TV CO-OP: "PANORAMA"

ACQUIRED FILMS AND VTRS OFFERED POSTS:

A DREAM COME TRUE
A PLACE IN THE SUN
ABC-BARBARA WALTER'S SPECIAL 20/20: RONALD REAGAN ON THE RANCH
ABC CLOSE-UP...RAIN OF TERROR
ABC'S VIEWPOINT - 28 APRIL 82: TELEVISION REPORTING OF FOREIGN NEWS
AFGHAN EXODUS
AMERICAN INTERESTS: JEANNE KIRKPATRICK - 13 APR 82
ANNIE HALL
AS THE EARTH QUAKES
BEN WATTENBERG: RONALD REAGAN - 25 DEC 81
BEN WATTENBERG: THE U.N. AND THE U.S.
BEN WATTENBERG AT LARGE: SRI LANKA
BEN WATTENBERG AT LARGE: THE DEFENSE STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES
BEN WATTENBERG AT LARGE: THE SITUATION IN POLAND - 2 NOV 81
BEST BOY
BLACK MUSIC IN AMERICA: FROM THEN TO NOW
BODY HUMAN: THE BIONIC BREAKTHROUGH
BORROWED FACES
BUFFALO SOLDIER
BUKOWSKI READS BUKOWSKI
CAMERA THREE: CARL RUGGLES, AMERICAN MYSTIC
CAMERA THREE: THE DIRECTOR IN EXILE
COAL MINER
COLUMBIA, A FOUNTAIN OF LIFE
COME CLOSER
CONVERSATION WITH RALPH LOWENSTEIN
COUNTRY CORNERS
DAY AFTER TRINITY, THE
DAYS OF HEAVEN
DEAF LIKE ME
DICK SMITH - ACADEMY AWARD WINNING MAKE-UP ARTIST
DIVE TO THE EDGE OF CREATION
FACE THE NATION: RICHARD ALLEN - 11 OCT 81
FACE THE NATION: SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG - 20 DEC 81
FACE THE NATION: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPER WINEBERGER - 4 OCT 81
FACES OF A UNION

- 6 -

FAREWELL ETAOIN SHRDLU
FESTIVAL OF HANDS - THE SILKEN TENT
FIELDS OF FUEL: THE ETHANOL DEBATE
FROM HOPEFUL GREENSTUFF WOVEN
FULL OF LIFE A-DANCIN'
GETTING OFF WELFARE
GOVERNMENT AS IT IS
GREAT DECISIONS: EL SALVADOR - 26 FEB 82
HEAVEN CAN WAIT
HERE COME THE PUPPETS
HERMAN MELVILLE: CONSIDER THE SEA
IN PERFORMANCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE - GENE KELLY
IN PERFORMANCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE - MERLE HAGGARD
IN PERFORMANCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE - NEW YORK CITY OPERA SINGERS
IN PERFORMANCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE - RUDOLF SERKIN AND IDA LEVIN
IN THE WOODS...A LIGHT
JULIA
KGB CONNECTIONS - AN INVESTIGATION INTO SOVIET OPERATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA
KINFOLKS: THE BLACK FAMILY IN NEW HAVEN CONN.
LANGUAGE OF THE DEAF
L.A. SUGGESTED BY THE ART OF EDWARD RUSCHA
LEGACY OF A SMALL PLANET
LOUIS ZUKOFSKY
LOVE OF LIFE
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: A VICTORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: AFGHANISTAN UPDATE - 16 OCT 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION IN POLAND - 10 MAR 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE - 24 SEP 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: DOES THE PRESIDENCY WORK?
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
USSR
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: FIRST USE ISSUE - 7 APR 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST - ALLY OR BROKER?
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: HEART DISEASE TREATMENT
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: HOW WILL SADAT ASSASSINATION AFFECT SALE OF AWACS TO
SAUDI ARABIA?
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: IS THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN GOING TO REPLACE THE CAMP DAVID
ACCORDS
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: OPERATION BRIGHT STAR - 9 NOV 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: PRESIDENT JOSE MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: RECESSION -
21 Oct 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CARIBBEAN BASIN PROPOSALS - 24 Feb 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: SECRETARY HAIG - 16 FEB 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: START NEGOTIATIONS - 24 JUN 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: THE DEFICIT DILEMMA - 17 DEC 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF FEEDING POLAND -
12 JAN 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST USSR
MAKING DANCES
MANHATTAN
MARK TWAIN: THE PRIVATE HISTORY OF A CAMPAIGN THAT FAILED

- 7 -

MEET THE PRESS ALAN GREENSPAN
MEET THE PRESS EUGENE ROSTOW - 20 JUN 82
MEET THE PRESS: GUILLERMO UNGO - 28 FEB 82
MEET THE PRESS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER - 22 NOV 81
MEET THE PRESS: SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG - 28 MAR 82
MIDNIGHT COWBOY
MIDWIFE
MILDRED PIERCE
MODERN TIMES
MY CHILDHOOD: JAMES BALDWIN
NAPOLEON DUARTE - 21 SEP 81
NBC WHITE PAPER: AMERICA WORKS WHEN AMERICA WORKS
NEW VISION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENTAL FILM
NEWS: WHAT IS IT?
NORMA RAE
NORTHWEST VISIONARIES
NOT JUST ANYWHERE
NOVA: ANATOMY OF A VOLCANO
NOVA: MESSAGE IN THE ROCKS
NOVA: TERMITES AND TELESCOPES
NOVA: THE ASTEROID AND THE DINOSAUR
NOVA: THE GENE ENGINEERS
NOVA: THE SCIENCE OF MURDER
NIGHTLINE - SOVIET USE OF PSYCHIATRY - 27 JAN 82
NORMAN AND THE KILLER
ODYSSEY: THE CHACO LEGEND
OUR TOWN
PORTRAIT OF A COAST
PUBLIC POLICY FORUM: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY - WHAT ARE OUR VITAL INTERESTS?
PUEBLO OF LAGUNA
PUERTO RICO
PUTTING UP THE PICKLES!
QUILTS IN WOMEN'S LIVES
ROCKY
SATURDAY NIGHT FEVER
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS SEARIES
SILENT MOVIE
SIXTY MINUTES: LOOKING AT SIXTY MINUTES
SIXTY MINUTES: SOVIET EMIGRE POET - JOSEPH BRODSKY
SLEEPER
SPECIAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT DUARTE
STALAG 17
SUGAR RAY LEONARD/HEARNS CHAMPIONSHIP BOUT
SUMMER SOUNDS OF NEW YORK CITY
SUPREME COURT
THE BAD NEW BEARS
THE CHICAGO SYMPHONY
THE FLIGHT OF THE GOSSAMER CONDOR
THE GODFATHER, PART I
THE GODFATHER, PART II
THE GREATEST ADVENTURE: THE STORY OF MAN'S VOYAGE TO THE MOON (Q5528) (T/6)

- 8 -

THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
THE LEGEND OF SLEEPY HOLLOW
THE LIVING PLANET
THE LOOK OF AMERICA, 1750-1800
THE NIGHT OF THE HUNTER
THE SCARLET LETTER
THE SHOOTIST
THE VANISHING MOMMY
THE WRITER IN AMERICA: MURIEL RUKEYSER
THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER 20 JUN 82
TO HAVE A VOICE
TRIBUTE TO JOHN CAGE, A
WHEN NIGHT COMES TO KANDAHAR
WHITE HERON, THE
WIND POWER
WOMEN IN BUSINESS
XIV WORLD GAMES FOR THE DEAF
YANKEE DOODLE DANDY

Wireless File

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File:

- "Peace in Lebanon?" (7/7/82)
- "Soviet Peace Movements" (7/12/81);
and
- "The Shultz Hearings" (7/14/82)

(xx105,x,

•WF-105 (7/12/82)

•
(VOA EDITORIAL) SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENTS (500)

•
(A VOA EDITORIAL REFLECTING U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON
NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEACE
MOVEMENTS SUPPORTING THEM IN BOTH COUNTRIES)

•
THE SOVIET COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER PRAVDA SAYS THAT MILLIONS
OF SOVIET CITIZENS ALL OVER THE USSR HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING
THEIR UNSWERVING DESIRE FOR PEACE. THEY HAVE BEEN MEETING
AT THEIR FACTORIES AND WORKPLACES, PRAVDA SAYS, DONATING
SOME OF THEIR WAGES TO AN OFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE FUND. AND,
IT ADDS, THIS AMOUNTS TO AN ANGRY, MASSIVE PROTEST AGAINST
THE ARMS RACE, WHICH PRAVDA SAYS IS ALL THE FAULT OF NATO
AND U.S. MILITARISTS.

EVEN SO, THERE ARE A FEW JARRING, CONTRADICTIONARY NOTES TO
THIS PICTURE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET PRESS. TASS, FOR
INSTANCE, QUOTES DEFENSE MINISTER DMITRIY USTINOV AS STATING
THAT SOVIET DEFENSES MUST BE KEPT AT "THE PROPER LEVEL."

PAGE 02 -- VOA

IS THIS PROPER LEVEL A PART OF THE ARMS RACE? USTINOV INDICATES THAT IT IS. "THE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT OF OUR ARMED FORCES," HE SAYS "IS BEING STEADILY PERFECTED. THE LEVEL OF COMBAT EFFICIENCY IS RISING."

WHAT IS MORE, DISPATCHES FROM WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS IN MOSCOW REVEAL THAT NOT EVERY SOVIET PEACE MARCHER IS WELCOMED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES. ONE SMALL CITIZENS GROUP -- WHICH CALLS ITSELF THE "GROUP FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR" -- IS REPORTED IN TROUBLE.

TWO MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN UNDER HOUSE ARREST BY THE KGB, THE STATE SECURITY POLICE, FOR LENGTHY PERIODS. OTHERS HAVE BEEN TOLD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY ON SHORT NOTICE; ANOTHER HAS BEEN WARNED HE COULD LOSE HIS JOB AND BE PROSECUTED FOR TREASON.

A MONTH AGO WHEN A PARIS-BASED GROUP OF PEACE CAMPAIGNERS SAILED INTO LENINGRAD IN A NETHERLANDS SHIP, THERE WERE MEETINGS, THEN CLASHES WITH THE OFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE.

PAGE 03 -- VOA

THE TROUBLE CAME WHEN THE WESTERNERS RELEASED BALLOONS WITH SIGNS SAYING "USSR, STOP NUCLEAR TESTING NOW." SOVIET TUGS TOWED THE PEACE VESSEL OUT INTO INTERNATIONAL WATERS -- AWAY FROM ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONTAMINATING THE SOVIET PUBLIC.

MOSCOW'S PEACE COMMITTEES ARE READY TO SUPPORT CRITICISM OF WESTERN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AND WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS -- BUT NOT OF THOSE OF THE KREMLIN.

THIS PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR CONTRASTS WITH THE FREE PUBLIC DEBATE WHICH IS PART OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES.

A MONTH AGO, DURING HIS EUROPEAN TOUR, PRESIDENT REAGAN INVITED SOVIET LEADERS TO CONSIDER HOW COMPETITION IN IDEAS AND VALUES CAN BE CONDUCTED IN A PEACEFUL AND RECIPROCAL BASIS. IT IS REAGAN'S FIRM CONVICTION THAT DEMOCRATIC DISCUSSION, COMPLEMENTED BY A GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM, WILL STRENGTHEN THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND A WORLD AT PEACE.

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PAGE 04 -- VOA

PPO/ES/SG 11:14 7/12/82 RTG (JU-11:40)

item

(xx304,x,

*WF-304 (7/7/82)

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(VOA EDITORIAL) PEACE IN LEBANON? - (500)

*

THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IN LEBANON CAN BE EXPRESSED SIMPLY
AND DIRECTLY: THE FIGHTING MUST STOP.

WHAT WAS TRUE WHEN THE WAR BEGAN REMAINS TRUE. PEACE IN
LEBANON REQUIRES THREE CONDITIONS. THE LEBANESE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT MUST BE STRENGTHENED TO THE POINT WHERE IT CAN
TRULY CONTROL ALL OF LEBANON'S TERRITORY. ISRAEL MUST BE
ASSURED, ONCE AND FOR ALL, THAT IT WILL NO LONGER BE SUBJECT
TO ATTACKS FROM ACROSS ITS NORTHERN BORDER WITH LEBANON.
AND, THIRD, ALL FOREIGN ELEMENTS MUST REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM
LEBANON.

WITHOUT THESE THREE CRUCIAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION,
LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE UNWILLING SITE OF MILITARY
STRUGGLES IMPOSED ON IT BY OUTSIDE CONTENDING FORCES.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, INCLUDING THE TIRELESS EFFORTS BY
U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY PHILIP HABIB ON THE SCENE, HAS BEEN, AND
WILL CONTINUE TO BE, DEDICATED TO HELPING BRING ABOUT A

PAGE 02 -- VOA

LASTING SETTLEMENT.

BUT THE SITUATION REMAINS EXTRAORDINARILY TENSE AND DELICATE. KEY, AND INTERRELATED, QUESTIONS PERSIST. WILL THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S LEADERSHIP, BESIEGED IN WEST BEIRUT BY ISRAELI FORCES, DECIDE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON? AND WILL ISRAEL RESTRAIN ITSELF FROM A DIRECT ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT?

FORTUNATELY, THERE ARE OPTIONS WHICH PRESENT AT LEAST SOME MEASURE OF HOPE THAT FURTHER HEAVY BLOODSHED CAN BE PREVENTED. ONE IDEA, LINKED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, IS A TEMPORARY MULTINATIONAL FORCE WHOSE MISSION WOULD BE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IN THEIR SUPERVISION OF SUCH A PLO PULLOUT.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID THAT, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING AMERICAN TROOPS TO SUCH A FORCE -- IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ASKS FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE. OBVIOUSLY, ALL PARTIES CONCERNED IN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH SUCH A FORCE.

IN THE MEANTIME, NO MATTER HOW AGONIZING AND FRUSTRATING

PAGE 03 -- VOA

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE MAY BE, IT MUST CONTINUE.

ON THAT SCORE, THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

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PPO/VOA/SG/DJM 10:43 7/7/82 RTG GP

item

(xx308,x,

*WF-308 (7/14/82)

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(VOA EDITORIAL) THE SHULTZ HEARING (500)

★

(A VOA EDITORIAL ON THE SENATE CONFIRMATION HEARING OF
SECRETARY OF STATE-DESIGNATE GEORGE SHULTZ, WHICH REFLECTS
THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT)

★

A CABINET MEMBER IS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, AND
SO GEORGE SHULTZ -- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CHOICE TO REPLACE
ALEXANDER HAIG AS SECRETARY OF STATE -- WENT TO CAPITOL HILL
THIS WEEK FOR THE NECESSARY HEARINGS.

AS SHULTZ APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE, THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT ABOUT HIS SPEEDY
CONFIRMATION AND MOVE INTO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. GEORGE
SHULTZ IS NO STRANGER TO WASHINGTON, HAVING SERVED IN
CABINET POSTS IN THE PAST. HIS PERFORMANCE AS A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL IS HIGHLY REGARDED IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD.

STILL, THERE WAS NOTHING RITUALISTIC ABOUT THE QUESTIONS

PAGE 02 -- SHULTZ

PUT TO THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINEE BY SENATORS FROM BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES. AT ISSUE WAS THE STATUS OF REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY FOLLOWING THE SUDDEN HAIG RESIGNATION TWO AND A HALF WEEKS AGO, AND WHETHER SHULTZ WAS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT POLICY. HIS ANSWERS, AT A TIME OF PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, WERE REASSURING.

THE GOAL IN LEBANON, ACCORDING TO SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATE SHULTZ, REMAINS THE SAME: A CHANCE FOR THE LEBANESE TO GOVERN THEMSELVES FREE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE. THERE IS A NECESSITY FOR AN URGENT RESOLUTION OF THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE UNITED STATES MUST BUILD RELATIONSHIPS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. AMERICAN POLICY, SAID SHULTZ, MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAELIS AND ARABS ALIKE.

SHULTZ SAID THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. AND WHILE ADMITTING HIS GENERAL DISLIKE OF THE USE OF TRADE SANCTIONS

PAGE 03 -- SHULTZ

AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL, SHULTZ SAID HE FULLY SUPPORTS AMERICAN ECONOMIC MOVES AGAINST MOSCOW BROUGHT ON BY THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN POLAND.

THERE WERE QUESTIONS ON ASIA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND OTHER REGIONS -- ALL OF THEM HANDLED WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF A MAN WHO HAS APPEARED AT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS BEFORE, AND WHO SEEMS AT EASE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES HIS PROPOSED CABINET POSITION WOULD BRING.

ACCORDING TO GEORGE SHULTZ, THE PAST 18 MONTHS HAVE SEEN THE EVOLUTION AND EMERGENCE OF A VERY CLEAR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. HIS JOB AS SECRETARY OF STATE, SAYS SHULTZ, WILL BE TO BRING CONTINUITY TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES BY HELPING THE PRESIDENT FORMULATE AND EXECUTE HIS FOREIGN POLICIES.

GEORGE SHULTZ, IT SEEMS, IS READY TO PICK UP THE BATON (TAKE CHARGE) AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITHOUT MISSING A BEAT (WITH EASE).

*

PPO/VOA/SG AW-1:45 (YB-2:22)

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O. Special
Publications

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English - 12,600 copies in 80 countries
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POLAND

A Season of Light, and of Darkness

Poland 1981...

MO z narodem / ZY PRZ

Wszystkie ulice Warszawy mają być czyste

PRACOWNIKÓW
ZADANIE ROBOTNIKÓW
I ROLNIKÓW
STRON 1522 01 100000


...A dawning of freedom,
when the horizon opened
to reveal a sudden landscape
of national concord and
individual hope...



...then a night of fear
and arrest, and the return
to a familiar oppression.

Warsaw police equipped with helmets and special riot shields advance
against demonstrators following the declaration of martial law

Below, the ever-present Solidarity slogan.



Faith and struggle: Alike, workers before a reproduction of the Black Madonna at Czestochowa, the most cherished religious shrine in Poland. Below, Poles reach out for leaders from workers inside the Gdansk shipyard. At right, Solidarity headquarters on the day martial law was imposed.



The world witnesses a struggle for liberation that is as old as Poland itself

Solidarność. Solidarity. A sturdy workers' word that traditionally has signified the unity of working men and women throughout the world. Today, Solidarity has a new meaning: Poland's quest for individual freedom.

Poland is a nation that has been forged in generations of struggle for freedom and self-determination. But if history taught Poles to cherish freedom, geography exposed them to repeated invasions by Germans from the west and Russians from the east

In the 18th century they suffered three successive partitions that eliminated Poland from the map of Europe until 1918.

Poles were sustained through these decades of strife by their religious faith. Throughout Poland's history, the Roman Catholic Church has served as a protector of its culture, tradition, even language. And the Church continued to be a defender of human rights and Polish identity in the postwar era. Today, 75 to 80

percent of Poland's 36 million people are practicing Catholics.

Patriotism, religious faith, a tradition of resistance to oppression, these are values that have united Poles for centuries. Today, they are the values embodied in Solidarity.

Solidarity is, first and foremost, a labor movement. It arose from the accumulated grievances of workers exploited by a state that ruled in the name of the working class. Its demands—the right to strike, better

wages and working conditions—were the demands of any free labor union throughout the world.

Because Solidarity reflected the aspirations of the Polish people for self-determination, the Communist Party perceived it as a threat to the continuation of single-party rule. In short, it was a genuine working-class movement that threatened Communist leadership—the self-appointed, self-perpetuating representatives of the working class. In the end, the Polish

regime, pressured by the Soviet Union, refused to accept limitations on its power or a tolerance of pluralism.

Instead, the regime resorted to force, playing the role of Poland's historic foreign oppressors by instituting martial law, banning Solidarity and imprisoning its leaders. And once again, it was the Church which spoke for the Polish people. "Our suffering," said Poland's bishops, "is that of the entire nation, terrorized by military force."

SOLIDARITY: A response to decades of political and economic failure

Although Solidarity seemed to rise to prominence with incredible swiftness, its roots can be traced back to the devastation of World War II, to Soviet occupation, and to the imposition of a Communist government controlled by Moscow. It emerged because Poland was oppressed by a regime unable to provide either bread or freedom.

1956. Polish workers protested

food shortages and high prices in Posen and other cities. The regime violently suppressed the demonstrations, and in the fall, Wladyslaw Gomulka took power during the "Polish October," a period of relaxed political and cultural controls.

1968. The freedoms of the "Polish October" were only a memory, re-



Leon Wlodek Pasko, marked by banners and flags, speaks to a gathering of Polish workers.

placed with more familiar political repression and economic failure: hotel lectures and students called for political reforms, including an end to censorship. They failed to win support from the workers, however, and the regime suppressed efforts at liberalization, forcing many scholars, artists and other intellectuals to emigrate.

1970. With Poland's economy faltering, the government instituted frantic price increases, triggering strikes and factory shutdowns in cities along the Baltic coast. As strikes continued, demonstrators began attacking Communist Party headquarters. In one of the darkest moments of postwar Polish history, the regime ordered soldiers to fire on workers, dozens, perhaps hundreds died—the government never gave a full accounting.

But Poles never forgot the


events of 1970, and 10 years later, workers in Gdansk commemorated those who died in 1970 by erecting three towers with intertwined anchors resembling crosses.

1976. Edward Giersek had replaced Gomulka in 1970, but economic mismanagement continued. Giersek neither decentralized the

economy nor controlled Poland's growing national debt. He succeeded only in building large, ill-conceived export industries, impoverishing agriculture, and importing a flood of consumer goods that, in many cases, enriched just the privileged few. Once again sudden price increases sparked protests. The subsequent repression



Poles erect towers in Gdansk, under the Solidarity banner.



Flora gathered at the Gdansk shipyard gates for the dedication of the towers commemorating those who died in the 1970 protests.

Epic days of confrontation and triumph

Two events set the stage for the dramatic emergence of Solidarity: one unprecedented, the other familiar. The unprecedented occurrence was the 1979 visit of Pope John Paul II to his homeland, a moment of immense national pride for the Polish people.

The other event was a 1980 decree raising meat prices. Polish workers rose in protest, but instead of marching in the streets, they remained in the factories and conducted peaceful sit-in demonstrations. The strikes spread, and shipyard workers in Gdansk were

joined by striking miners in Silesia.

An electrician named Lech Walesa climbed over a fence to join the Gdansk strikers, and soon found himself negotiating with the government as the representative for more than one-half million workers. With patience, determination, and a refusal to be intimidated, Walesa and his negotiating team won virtually all their demands. Among the most significant: the right to an independent union, the right to strike, a relaxation of censorship and more freedom for the Church.

The historic Gdansk agreements of August 1980 signaled an extraordinary, long-awaited flowering of freedom in Poland. Solidarity gained rights taken for granted elsewhere: It published its own newspaper; the

state television network carried Sunday church services for the first time; new passport regulations enabled Poles to travel more freely; writers, scholars, artists and filmmakers began exploring a world whose boundaries had suddenly broadened.

Solidarity grew to a membership of 10 million. Together, union members and their families comprised a majority of Poland's population.

Farmers organized and won approval for a rural counterpart to Solidarity. At the same time, some 900,000 Poles quit the Communist Party, and dozens of corrupt officials were forced from positions of authority.

Poland was a nation where freedom was no longer an abstraction, but a daily reality in the lives of millions.



Above, crowd gathers to read letters offering best wishes to Solidarity. At right, Poles assemble at the gates of the Gdansk shipyard to show support for striking workers massed inside the yard. Negotiations conducted there led to the historic Gdansk Accords that recognized Solidarity as an independent union.



Gdansk shipyard workers (top) eye passing members of Poland's security forces. Above, workers carry an emblem on their shoulders following negotiations that produced the Gdansk Accords.



For a discredited, beleaguered regime, the only goal is survival

Publicly, the Polish government endorsed a dialogue with the representatives of Solidarity and the Church. But in practice they proved unwilling to implement their promises of reform, and unable to reconcile themselves to sharing power with groups they could not dominate.

In fact, the Communist Party was so demoralized and unstable that it could barely manage its own internal affairs. Party leader Stanislaw Kania, who had replaced Edward Gierk in September 1980, was in turn superseded in October 1981 by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who already held the offices of Premier and Defense Minister.

For their part, the Soviets engaged in continual, undisguised intervention in Polish affairs. They leveled a steady barrage of false or wildly overblown charges at Solidarity, repeatedly demanded suppression of the Solidarity movement, and conducted intimidating military exercises that underscored the threat of invasion.

With the party in disarray, the economy in shambles and the Soviets demanding action, Jaruzelski resorted to his last bastion of support, the military and security forces. On December 13, 1981, the martial law regime plunged Poland into a new round of fear and repression.




Woman carries candle in a Warsaw church procession for the Black Massacre 70 date December 13, 1981, the first day of martial law. Riot squads confront demonstrators at the Warsaw Academy of Sciences, where police arrested 300 students and professors, and took them to detention camps.

The final appeal of the regime was neither to patriotism nor Marxism, but to force

The attacks were swift, efficient and harsh. As many as 5,000 Solidarity members, including Walesa, were detained and thrown into internment camps. Many suffered through the winter months with little protection from the bitter cold. Authorities cut domestic and international telephone and telex services, imposed curfews, restricted all travel and tightened press censorship.

The government tried to minimize the resistance and violence that accompanied martial law, but both were widespread. Workers occupied factories throughout Poland; police and militia responded by smashing through gates and subduing protesters with force.

In Gdansk, riot police used tear gas and truncheons to halt demonstrations by as many as 40,000 persons. In the first days of martial law, the toll in Gdansk alone was one dead and 600 wounded.



Member of the Polish militia with helmet and riot shield prepares to advance against martial-law demonstrators.


At the height of the protests in Gdansk, security forces fire riot-control grenades at protesters.



Warsaw and Katowice: repression and resistance

In Warsaw, riot police, supported by armored vehicles and trucks with water cannons, suppressed street demonstrations, even firing tear gas into churches to flush out protesters. At Warsaw University, the Academy of Science and the Huta Warszawa steel mill, the pattern was the same: an assault by security forces to disperse strikers, followed by the arrest of Solidarity leaders.

The bloodiest confrontation occurred in the mining town of Katowice, a Solidarity stronghold. When police and militia attempted to occupy the Wujek mine there, the miners fought them off with axes, clubs and pneumatic drills. Special para-military police units rushed to the scene and opened fire, killing seven, two more died in the following weeks. Injured miners and medical personnel also were beaten by police, according to numerous eyewitness accounts.



In Katowice, flowers, candles, and miners' hand has seen it as a memorial to those who died resisting the assault by police and security forces.



At left, one of the many internment camps where Solidarity members and other protesters are still imprisoned months after the imposition of martial law, without having any formal charges brought against them. Below, food line stretches along a Warsaw street.



For families such as the one shown below, martial law has added political oppression to the unrelenting burdens imposed by the regime's economic failures. Many churches (center) have become repositories for shipments of food and other goods sent from the West by relatives and foreign relief agencies. Bottom, soldiers on a city street are a daily reminder of martial law.



for a dialogue between the government and Solidarity, and many workers follow the suggestions of the anti-regime Social Resistance Circle (KOS): "Work like a snail. Behave in a passive way... Break all the idiotic rules made by the military council."

Solidarity has gone underground, trying to operate much as it did before August 1980. Couriers deliver messages, and thousands help print and distribute leaflets and other publications rallying support for Solidarity and reporting incidents of repression. Some are single typewritten sheets, but several, such as *News of the Day* in Warsaw, appear regularly enough to be called newspapers. State holidays and commemora-

tions of historic dates serve to illuminate the hostility of the Polish people toward the regime. May Day 1982 produced a large, pro-Solidarity march in Warsaw; two days later, on the anniversary of Poland's first liberal constitution in 1791, angry demonstrations broke out in a number of cities, resulting in more than 1,000 arrests.

Solidarity members have even succeeded in making clandestine radio broadcasts calling for continued resistance to martial law and reporting on conditions in the internment camps. Radio Solidarity's theme music: a popular song of anti-Nazi resistance fighters during World War II.

The response of the Jaruzelski government follows a familiar pattern:

It floats tentative plans for restoration of a "reformed" Solidarity while handing out harsh sentences to anyone caught distributing anti-government publications. It talks of reconciliation, but announces a compulsory-labor provision for all males aged 18 to 45 that is reminiscent of the Stalinist era.

The martial-law regime continues to offer promises of economic reform, but it has only succeeded in providing scarcity at higher prices. In March 1982, the regime announced the greatest price increases in postwar Polish history; the cost of basic foods such as sausage, potatoes and bread doubled or even tripled. Despite such measures, shortages, food lines and rationing remain a way of life.

Life under martial law: dissidence and privation

Despite the estimated 2,000 dissidents and Solidarity members still imprisoned, Poles continue to demonstrate their opposition to the martial law regime in hundreds of daily individual acts. Church leaders speak out

For some Poles, the only recourse is exile

In pain and disillusion, thousands of people, as in the Czarist past, have left Poland for the uncertainties and wrenching adjustments to life apart from their homeland. Many were outside the country when martial law was declared and decided not to return. Since martial law, Poland's borders have been sealed, and few have been able to leave the country. Many Polish refugees hold temporary visas and are housed in Austrian transit camps; hundreds have applied for permanent residence abroad.

In Washington, the Polish ambassador to the United States, Romuald Spasowski, resigned and asked for political asylum. "I cannot be silent," he stated. "I shall not have any association... with the authorities responsible for this brutality and inhumanity." The ambassador to Japan, Zdzislaw Ruraz, sought asylum as well. "Poland today is not my Poland. The Polish people are being punished for the crimes committed by the Polish government." And writer Czeslaw Milosz, winner of the 1980 Nobel Prize for Literature, stated, "Last summer, after 30 years of exile, I returned to Poland. But after what happened in December, I am again a poet in exile."



Polish refugees in the Traiskirchen transit camp in Austria. Their grim choice are uncertain futures in foreign lands, or a return to the bleak repression of Poland under martial law.



New arrival at Traiskirchen: Many Poles seek political asylum in Austria or West Germany; some have obtained visas for other West European countries, Australia, Canada or the United States.





Enter new and old: Former Polish ambassador to the United States, Romuald Spasowski (top); Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz.

The world is watching

Tokyo. London. New York. Paris. Washington. Madrid. Stockholm. Chicago. Sydney. Bonn. Brussels. Lisbon. Rome.

In cities such as these throughout Europe and other parts of the world, thousands of ordinary citizens—many of them union members themselves—have rallied to show their own solidarity with the 10 million members of Poland's Solidarity Union, and with the thousands who have been imprisoned under martial law. Such rallies, many of which were sponsored by member unions of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, serve as a massive indictment of a regime, claiming to represent workers, that has repressed an authentic workers' movement—and then turned to the Soviet Union for support. These worldwide demonstrations also insure that neither silence nor censorship will allow the repression of the Polish people to go unchallenged.



Below, rallies for Solidarity in Tokyo and London...


...In New York City...

...In Paris and in Washington, D.C.



"The age-old lesson of history is that the human spirit will not live in chains. In Poland today, the flame of freedom may seem to burn less brightly, but it has not been extinguished, nor can it be."

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, United Kingdom



"On the 13th of December last year, we once again witnessed the failure of the Communist system to accept a process of national renewal and reform."

Prime Minister Kari Willoch, Norway



"Solidarity symbolizes the struggle of real workers in a so-called workers' state for fundamental human and economic rights... the right to assemble, the right to strike, and the right to freedom of expression."

President Ronald Reagan, United States



"The Polish people have often, through ages, suffered from despotism, but never has the soul surrendered. Their hope for freedom will give them strength to endure and survive."

Prime Minister Gunnar Thoroddsen, Iceland




"The repression in Poland concerns us all. The Poles must be allowed to build their own way of life without interference or coercion."

Prime Minister John Malcolm Fraser, Australia



"Now and always the Portuguese people will stand beside the Polish people and all those whose freedom has been destroyed."

Prime Minister Pinto Balsemão, Portugal



"Men of goodwill throughout the world deplore the present situation in Poland and... search for an avenue which leads to genuine stability and prosperity in Poland."

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, Japan



"The days go by and the basic conditions of freedom of which the labor movement has been deprived are not being restored to that great nation."

Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, Italy




"In the name of all Canadians, I fervently call upon the government of Poland to bring an end to martial law and to open the way to national renewal and reconciliation."

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canada



"We had hoped that the Polish people would be able to progress on the path of renewal and reform, which had started in the summer of 1980, without foreign interference."

Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu, Turkey



"I would like to add my voice to those leaders of other countries to ask the military authorities... to abolish the state of martial law which currently suppresses the most profound aspirations of the Polish people."

Prime Minister Pierre Werner, Luxembourg



"I am convinced that all democratic nations must show an attitude of unity and firmness in the face of the Polish crisis and the Soviet responsibilities related to it."

Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Spain



"The Polish people... need to know that the political and moral pressure of international public opinion will not cease until they have regained the use of the labor union rights wrested by the workers and farmers these past few years."

President François Mitterrand, France



"Poland recalls to us the value, and also the fragility, of what we have to represent and defend."

Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, Belgium




"The suppression of freedom in Poland is a grave moral challenge to all those in the world who stand for humanity and freedom."

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Federal Republic of Germany

A world appeal for an end to martial law

In an unprecedented satellite television broadcast entitled "Let Poland Be Poland," fifteen European and other leaders expressed their support for the people of Poland and called for the lifting of martial law. The broadcast was seen, in whole or in part, by more than 180 million people in 43 countries.



Warsaw in May, 1982. Police disperse crowd with water cannon; above, mass protest demonstration

...Poland 1982

The marches and protests of May again vividly demonstrated the failure of the martial law regime to win the support of the Polish people, despite Rich gestures as the release of 1,400 political prisoners and a temporary suspension of nighttime curfews. During the annual May Day parade in Warsaw,

more than 20,000 Poles defied the regime by conducting their own march with Solidarity banners and chants of "End martial law" and "Free Lech Walesa."

May Day was peaceful, but violence broke out later when police used tear gas, clubs and water cannons mounted on trucks to break up a gathering in the Old Town section of Warsaw. Small groups of demonstrators fought sporadically with police throughout

the night. Violent confrontations also occurred in Gdansk, Szczecin, Krakow, Lublin and other cities.

The regime tried to blame the May disturbances on Western intervention, a charge leveled without even an attempt at substantiation. But the wellspring of discontent runs much deeper than the regime acknowledges. The Polish people, as the May demonstrations revealed, have forgotten neither Solidarity nor what it represents.

ENDURING THE DARKNESS OF MARTIAL LAW

The present Government of the people in Poland rests on the alliance of workers and working peasants. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the workers, who are the leading class of society... These are the words of the preamble to the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic.

Poland today is a country oppressed by a regime responsible for an economic fiasco, divided internally, fearful of its citizens, and accountable only to the Soviet Union. Its lone success has been the forcible repression of Poland's first postwar mass workers' movement.

The Soviet Union attempts to rationalize its constant meddling in Polish affairs by endlessly stressing Poland's "fraternal ties" to Moscow. As part of this effort, Polish and Soviet authorities have tried to exploit four myths about recent events.

First, that Solidarity, through its "excesses," was responsible for its own downfall. The facts are otherwise. The claim that strikes by Solidarity created Poland's economic turmoil ignores the simple truth that much of the labor unrest arose as a result of the economic chaos caused by decades of government ineptitude and corruption.

Lech Walesa and other Solidarity leaders worked continuously to halt strikes and encourage a return to work following the August 1980 accord. Strikes affected only a small proportion of workers after March 1981, and the government's own statistics showed a steady increase in overall production. By contrast, the Januzelski regime never accepted Solidarity as a legitimate union, and it heightened tensions when it attempted to repudiate the heart of the Gdansk agreement by introducing a law to forbid strikes.

A second myth is that the Soviet Union did not intervene in Poland. Any impartial review of the record reveals a continuous Soviet campaign of threatening military maneuvers, verbal intimidation, and fabricated accusations directed at Solidarity. Western observers agree that secret preparations for martial law began as early as March 1981; the martial law decree itself was printed in the Soviet Union in September, and the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, Viktor Kulikov, and other senior Soviet military officers, were in Warsaw when martial law was declared. As one Soviet speaker admitted

publicly: Martial law had been "brilliantly conspired."

A third myth is that Poland's rulers acted out of patriotism, to pre-empt a Soviet invasion. This particular example of double-think requires one to laud the Januzelski regime's high-mindedness in doing the Soviets dirty work for them in returning the Polish people to the oppression that they had struggled so valiantly to escape.

Fourth, the myth that events in Poland are purely an internal matter. This assertion ignores an inconvenient fact: Poland and the Soviet Union are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which obligates all parties to respect each nation's right to develop its own political and economic system without interference. The establishment of martial law, the imprisonment of thousands, and the deprivation of freedoms for all is the clearest possible example of a deliberate and conscious violation of the Helsinki Final Act.

Poland is a challenge to the principles of civilized international conduct, and to the political will of independent nations everywhere. In meeting this challenge, the United States has joined with the nations of the Atlantic Community, and many others around the world, to demand the lifting of martial law, the release of all political prisoners, and the reestablishment of dialogue and reconciliation among all sectors of Polish society, including Solidarity and the Church. In short, the Polish people must be allowed to determine their own future, free from fear and outside coercion. To underline its condemnation of martial law and Soviet interference in Poland, the United States, along with other nations, has imposed a series of economic sanctions—including trade and credit restrictions—on both countries.

If the Polish regime undertakes a program of genuine reconciliation, the United States, together with Western Europe and other nations, stands ready to aid Poland in eliminating agricultural shortages and reducing its foreign debt. And the American people, as in the past, will continue to provide food and humanitarian aid directly to the people through private agencies. But the United States will not supply credits or other forms of assistance that serve only to prop up a regime imposed on the Polish people against their will.


The restoration of an independent, strong Poland is a matter which concerns not only the Poles but all of us... For the workers of all the rest of Europe need the independence of Poland just as much as the Polish workers themselves. Friedrich Engels wrote those words in the introduction to the Polish edition of The Communist Manifesto. Those outside Poland can cite such passages, acknowledging the heavy irony of a nation that oppresses its workers in the name of a workers' state. But Poles cannot afford the luxury of irony. They live the tragedy of Communist failure every day.

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Front cover: Liaison/Bulka
Inside front cover: 1. Liaison/Bulka
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International
Communication Agency
United States of America



Images of Poland yesterday and today

These posters are the work of a Polish artist, Jan Sawka, who left Poland in 1976 in search of greater artistic freedom. In the fall of 1981, Solidarity called and asked him to create a poster celebrating its union movement.

He did, but the poster was confiscated and destroyed when he sent it to Poland. So Sawka reproduced the poster (top), and then executed another (above) — his vision of Poland under martial law.

- USICA special publication
English - 37,100 copies in 110 countries
French - 7,800 copies in 49 countries
Spanish - 8,100 copies in 21 countries
Arabic - 4,100 copies in 24 countries

AFGHANISTAN

The Struggle to Regain Freedom



"We would like to hope that everybody will understand the fruitlessness of attempts to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs and to dictate to its people how they should live and what government they should have..."

Leonid Brezhnev,
October 1980


The would-be conquerors have come for centuries to this rugged, haunting land. Alexander the Great, Tamerlane, Babur, Genghis Khan... later, the soldiers of Czarist Russia and Great Britain. All failed. Now another power has come to Afghanistan. Since launching its invasion in December 1979, the Soviet Union has installed its own government, occupied the major cities, and attempted to suppress a resistance movement that encompasses elements from every regional, ethnic and social group in the country.



But it has neither conquered the nation nor vanquished the spirit of its citizens. As one freedom fighter declared:

"The foreigners never learn. They still keep trying to conquer us. This time, it is the Russians, and they will soon learn the lesson we teach anyone who tries to own us."

In these photographs we see the face of Afghanistan today, the face of a people struggling to regain freedom.



OCCUPATION

By invading and occupying its smaller neighbor, the Soviet Union has transformed an internal conflict into an example of international aggression. Soviet troops—and the remnants of the

Afghan army which they still control—have killed and imprisoned thousands, and so far have forced almost three million persons into exile in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. They have reduced villages to rubble with helicopter gunships, destroyed food supplies, seeded roads and trails with antipersonnel mines designed to kill and maim indiscriminately, and, according to reliable refugee and other eyewitness accounts, employed chemical warfare against civilian populations.

Beyond the international political debate concerning Soviet actions, beyond the implications for regional and global stability, there lies the human tragedy of a nation whose people are forced to choose between subjugation, resistance or exile.

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personal carrier in the

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"The trouble is the uncertainty. Kabul looks calm, but you never know where or when it will blow up."


Indian traveler

In the '70s Afghanistan was a country in political turmoil. Forces led by Mohammad Daoud, former Prime Minister and cousin to the nation's constitutional monarch, King Zahir, took power in a bloodless coup in 1973. Daoud had committed himself to a radical political and social program; but once in office, he grew increasingly conservative, purging leaders of the Parcham faction of the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which had helped engineer the coup that brought him to power.

In 1978 another faction of the PDPA, the Khalq, led by the party's founder, Nur Mohammad Taraki, staged a coup in which Daoud was killed. The Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty signed that year was the signal for an influx of Soviet military and civilian administrators and advisors. Taraki himself was executed a year later following a clash with supporters of a rival Marxist leader, Hafizullah Amin.

While these Marxist factions contested for power in Kabul, anti-communist dissidence flared in the cities and military resistance mounted in the countryside. Faced with a deteriorating political and military situation, the Soviet Union launched an invasion by land and air in December 1979. Amin was killed and replaced with Babrak Karmal, a member of the Parcham faction who had been in exile under Moscow's protection.

In a propaganda exercise that deceived no one, the Soviets attempted to claim that they had been invited into Afghanistan by the very government they overthrew. They then congratulated Karmal upon his "election" as President, and broadcast a speech he already had recorded before being flown into Kabul from the Soviet Union. Moscow added to the deception by sending the speech over transmitters claiming to be Radio Kabul but located inside the Soviet Union.



Signs of the Soviet presence: food vendor (above) stands in front of poster advertising the Soviet airline, Aeroflot; at right, group of Soviet bureaucrats congregate in Kabul street.



Signs of unrest (above); the February 1980 strike by shopkeepers in Kabul, protesting the Soviet presence, triggered subsequent demonstrations throughout the city. Violent anti-Soviet protests broke out in cities throughout Afghanistan, and resistance forces have had partial control of cities such as Jalalabad and Herat for weeks at a time.



A

After approximately two years and a commitment of more than 85,000 troops, after a major expenditure of resources and political prestige, Moscow has achieved little more than a tenuous military grip over Afghanistan's larger cities.

In its fundamental political objective—to establish a client state recognized as legitimate internally and internationally—the Soviet Union has failed.

According to observers, feuds and even armed conflict continue between the ruling Parcham and rival Khalq factions of the party; the Afghan army has suffered massive desertions; Soviet civilians and soldiers walk the streets at their peril; the economy has been damaged severely; and food production and distribution have been badly disrupted.

Despite efforts by the Soviets and their Afghan collaborators, the regime of Babrak Karmal has been unable to attract supporters from any significant segment of Afghan society; the regime's political base today is narrower than when the Soviets installed it in 1979. The Karmal faction remains a minority within a Communist Party that is itself a tiny minority as well. Without the protection of Soviet forces, it would not last a day.

Apart from a few states aligned with the Soviet Union, almost the entire international community has censured the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The United Nations General Assembly, for example, has called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops by votes of 104 to 18 in January 1980 and 111 to 22 in November 1980; similar resolutions have been passed by the UN Human Rights Commission, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the European Economic Community and, perhaps most significantly, by the Islamic Conference. (In the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union twice has vetoed resolutions deploring armed intervention in Afghanistan.)

The Soviets have continued to reject all reasonable proposals for the withdrawal of their troops and the restoration of Afghanistan as a genuinely nonaligned nation free from outside interference. Instead, they have offered a succession of diplomatic initiatives that are designed to accomplish what two years of occupation have not: internal control of the country and international recognition of the legitimacy of the regime.

Soviet troop-carrying helicopter (above) lifts off from Kabul airport, because roads are cut so badly by the resistance that the reinforcements to Soviet and Afghan army outposts move largely by air. Below, Soviet vehicles, with support troops, are jammed near the airport.




Beyond the cliffs, the
disappearance of the
above, taller than
a woman's head is a
figure, not seen
the ground, the
covered and, with
in a place of 1980

"The toll of the Soviet occupation
is apparent everywhere—
but nowhere more so than on the
faces of the children. They
rarely laugh or play games."

Western journalist

Right, a rare, jewelry and bright colors distinguish this child as a member of one of Afghanistan's
nomadic tribes. Many of whom have been forced into refugee camps by the fighting




agricultural production in areas of nationalist resistance. In addition to indiscriminate bombings, the Western press also has reported numerous instances of mass killings and torture, as well as the alleged use of lethal chemicals and other poisonous substances that are illegal under international law.

By day the Soviet presence in Kabul is most visible at the airport, where entrenched anti-aircraft weapons, rockets and tanks guard rows of MiG fighters, air force transports, helicopter gunships, armored personnel carriers and thousands of Soviet troops. At nightfall, journalists and other observers report, tanks and armored vehicles move through the city and take up positions on main thoroughfares and street corners. Yet even this military presence doesn't insure peace or halt resistance, and the sound of gunfire and streak of tracer bullets regularly punctuate the night.

When city-wide, anti-Soviet strikes and demonstrations erupted in 1980, according to eyewitness accounts reported in the Western press, the Soviets and Soviet-directed Afghan troops suppressed them with armored vehicles and helicopters, gunning down hundreds of massed demonstrators who were trapped in narrow streets. Violent demonstrations also have occurred in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and other towns. In response to such widespread opposition, the regime has imprisoned tens of thousands of Afghans, many of them in Kabul's Pul-i-Charki prison.

Faced with hostility in the cities and guerrilla opposition in the countryside, the Soviets have made little effort to protect civilian populations from the conflict. The destruction of food supplies, some experts have asserted, for example, appears to be part of a deliberate policy to destroy



Sharp contrast between the new regime and traditional Afghanistan, villed by the Kabul (above) beneath banners of the factional People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; aerial view (left) of Pul-i-Charki prison, which houses thousands of political prisoners and, according to Western reports, has been the scene of numerous executions without trial; opposite page, one of the country's many mosques, symbol of Afghanistan's enduring Islamic faith.



"The government is totally unnerved. Its only objective is to survive."

Asian diplomat in Kabul


"The Karmal government would not survive 24 hours without the Soviets there."

Traveler in Afghanistan

The Afghan army, which has lost as many as 50,000 troops through defections and desertions, has required massive Soviet support to maintain its facade as a fighting force. On the right, the Afghan army on parade in the 1980's; below, Afghan soldiers today outside an office building in Kandahar.



The ubiquitous Soviets: from top, airborne troops patrol a road on the outskirts of Kabul shortly after the invasion; auto with curtains drawn carrying high-ranking officials is followed by a Soviet security agent; soldiers guard facilities of Radio Kabul.





The true dimensions of the Soviet occupation can be measured in its toll upon individual lives. It is the village that has been razed by repeated rocket and bomb attacks, the family forced to flee into exile, the child whose foot has been mangled by an antipersonnel mine. It can be measured in the accumulation of thousands of individual stories of suffering, exile, imprisonment, injury and death. These are some of their faces, and a small sampling of their stories.

VICTIMS



Soviet planes attacked this village on March 26, 1981. The toll: 13 dead.

"The Soviets see nothing wrong in killing civilians. When you ask them about it, they say, 'This is a revolution, and in a class struggle you eliminate the enemy.'"

Third-world diplomat in Kabul



Opposite page, villagers vainly searching for unexploded anti-personnel mines. Below, the remains of pieces of shrapnel. Below, the remains of farm lands as well as destroyed buildings. Above, this child stepped on a small plastic-covered mine which the Soviets, according to eyewitnesses, had dropped by the roadside. Hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing throughout the country. Many are disguised as boys, girls or other objects which attract children. Villagers (far left) display another type of Soviet anti-personnel mine. At left, Afghans endure with prayer and patience





"The government
can do little against
us on the ground...
The helicopters are
the only Russian
weapons that can
hurt us badly."

Freedom fighter

Soviet Mi-24 helicopter gunship
ignited a rocket at an Afghan
village. Gunships, carrying 200 fire
guns and four bombs containing 200
rockets each, have wrought enormous
damage throughout the country, and
Afghans have few heavy weapons
with which to fight them effectively.
Below, small boys with Soviet rockets
to a pile of containers for Soviet mines.
Afghan youths grow up skilled in the
use of rifles and hand weapons.



Left, rocket pod from a downed Soviet Mi-24 gunship. Resistance forces often remove the explosives from such Soviet ordnance and reuse them in their own attacks. Below, a village doctor, here operating a makeshift hospital inside Afghanistan, are able to treat only a small number of the casualties among Afghan civilians and resistance fighters.




Villages near Herat (above) begin clearing away rubble following Soviet attack. At right, another group of villagers surrenders to the Russians after an attack by eight MiG jets and four helicopter gunships.



"The Russians are trying to annihilate us... There is not a single day when they do not bomb villages full of civilians. But they do not control the countryside. Despite their overwhelming firepower, they cannot win."

Resistance leader

Freedom fighter



The majority of deaths and disabilities are the result of infections. The most frequent diseases reported, "Some-thing is bothering my engine" infections are the leading cause of death and disability in children. The first 6 years of life are often considered to be the most critical period of a child's life, and the most important time to protect them from infections.

A nation of mass murderers, directed by a mad genius, is back, it said from a Kuno Prognosis, a magazine devoted to the study of mass murderers. It said that more than 1,000 people were murdered each blood day in April 1972.

"Over there Russian planes destroyed everything with their bombs. Our homes. Our fields. We came here to seek shelter with our women and children. We came with nothing. Just the clothes we are wearing. Now we must live like nomads."

Afghan refugee



While women and children remain in the refugee camps, mujahidin such as those return to their devastated villages and continue the resistance against Soviet attacks.



Crossing a river using a hand-held cable (top), trekking through a mountain pass with their belongings on the backs of mules (above), two groups of refugees escape the fighting for the sanctuary of camps in Pakistan.


"With no end of the conflict in sight, it is difficult to determine how long these influxes will continue. Whenever reports of heavy fighting come through, we get new streams of refugees."

International voluntary refugee worker

Below, one of the war's many casualties receives treatment in a refugee hospital in Pakistan.



At right, refugee camp in Pakistan with tents supplied by the United Nations and other international relief organizations; below, refugees in Pakistan. In some areas, refugees are housed in tents. In others, they live in makeshift dwellings. In some areas, refugees are housed in tents. In others, they live in makeshift dwellings. In some areas, refugees are housed in tents. In others, they live in makeshift dwellings.



Most arrive destitute. After long treks over mountainous terrain, they are weary, hungry, their feet often bloodied and unshod. Many have witnessed homes bombed, crops destroyed, family members killed or wounded.

Tens of thousands of homeless Afghans cross over into Pakistan each month. The largest and fastest-growing refugee group in the world, their numbers swelled to more than two million just 19 months after Soviet troops invaded and occupied their homeland. Together with those in Iran, they total nearly three million, or approximately 20 percent of Afghanistan's pre-invasion population.

More than 70 percent of the refugees are

women or children under the age of 12. Many of the rest are old men.

Most of the refugees inhabit sprawling tent villages located near the Afghan border. In certain regions, authorities have supplied refugees with the necessary materials to build themselves traditional dwellings, the flat-topped mud huts seen throughout Afghanistan.

The Afghan refugees must rely on the Government of Pakistan and international assistance for the essentials of food, clothing, shelter and medicine. They also must depend on outside help to finance the primary schools, vocational training and other programs in the refugee villages.

Estimates are that the Government of Pakistan itself bears about half the direct cost of the total Afghan relief effort. Pakistan also absorbs all the indirect costs for land and water resources caused by the growing concentration of refugees.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees oversees the international Afghan relief program, which is administered by the Pakistanis. The World Food Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, and the World Health Organization are among the contributors to this effort.

But no relief program can answer the ever-riding question: when will the Afghan refugees be able to return home?

"Why should our homeland be like this?
Why should we be homeless vagrants?
Aren't we human beings?
Don't we have the right to freedom?"

Afghan refugee

Refugee children in Pakistan.

"Words cannot stop bullets—but bullets cannot stop words."
This Afghan proverb easily could be the battle cry for millions of Afghans resisting Soviet occupation. Through strikes, demonstrations and guerrilla warfare, the Afghans are sending a signal to the Soviet Union, and to the rest of the world that they will not submit. One Western journalist, returning from a trip to the strategic Panjshir Valley, a stronghold of the resistance, has described the conflict as "one of the most popularly supported anti-communist revolts of this century."

RESISTANCE



Freedom fighters at prayer (above); their most powerful bond is their faith.
Left, after a three-day battle in the Hassan Keel Valley, mujahidin forces destroyed this Soviet-Afghan convoy and captured more than 700 AK-47 rifles.

"Nobody incited us to fight
against the enemy. We ourselves started
fighting for the glory of Islam. We are believers
in God, and these people wanted
us to leave our faith. Tell me, how can I
renounce my religion?"

Tribal leader



Resistance to the Soviet invaders is not limited to the freedom fighters. In one form or another it has been embraced by Afghans living throughout the world as well as within the country. Citizens demonstrate their defiance by distributing, during curfew hours, hand-written or mimeographed "night letters"; closing down shops; boycotting classes; and offering aid to tired and hungry mujahidin. Seven Afghan wrestlers hiked across the mountains for three days to Pakistan rather than participate in the Moscow Olympic Games, and more than 200 employees of the Afghan airline Ariana, many of them pilots, fled to Western countries to avoid flying Soviet military personnel and materiel into Afghanistan's war zones.

The Afghan army has virtually disintegrated because of defections. Since the Soviet invasion, their numbers have dwindled, in the estimates of journalists and government experts, by 50,000 or more; many of the former army men have joined the mujahidin, often providing much needed arms and expertise to the freedom fighters.

The Muslim mujahidin are bearing the brunt of the fighting. What the freedom fighters lack in sophisticated weaponry and modern military training, they make up in courage, commitment and religious faith. The mujahidin have learned to make the best use of their limited resources, including the rugged terrain. The craggy mountains provide excellent places from which to attack, and give the mujahidin effective shelter from helicopter and rocket fire.

A West European doctor helping to treat the Afghans witnessed a tactic of the freedom fighters which has been documented frequently by other eyewitness accounts: "They dig deep trenches across narrow mountain dirt roads and cover them. The lead tank falls in, blocking the road. The mujahidin run to the other tanks and smear mud over the slits so the crews are blinded. Then they destroy the tanks with gasoline."

Engaged in a battle many analysts initially said they could not win, the freedom fighters have refused to acknowledge defeat. Although their spirits are high, so are casualties. Lack of prompt medical attention sentences many of the wounded to die. And when food is scarce, the mujahidin sometimes must subsist on little more than black tea and a flat bread called nan. Yet their degree of success has been remarkable. One Western journalist, after a month inside Afghanistan, wrote: "It is no exaggeration to say that the Afghan resistance commands almost the entire countryside."

Right, Soviet helicopter gunship climbs after bombing attack on a village in Paktia Province. Afghan fighters dig deep trenches across narrow mountain dirt roads and cover them. The lead tank falls in, blocking the road. The mujahidin run to the other tanks and smear mud over the slits so the crews are blinded. Then they destroy the tanks with gasoline.


Above, resistance forces stop a Soviet T-54 tank. In the foreground, the mujahidin have developed sophisticated techniques for intercepting and destroying tanks and other armored vehicles.



"Of course it is difficult. But we can get food on donkeys along mountain tracks.... The worst shortage is of medical supplies and doctors. Many of the wounded have died because we have no medicine to stop their bleeding."

Freedom fighter

Freedom fighters (right) care for a wounded soldier far from doctors and with few medical supplies.




Top, mujahidin camp in Afghanistan. In the background are captured Afghan army tanks. Resistance forces are self-sufficient and independent. Cooks (above left) prepare the flat wheat bread that is a staple of the Afghan diet. Resistance members assemble a homemade land mine (center), and a blacksmith fashions a part for a rifle.





At first glance, the air war would seem to favor Soviet forces. Helicopters, such as the one at top left, with attached rocket launchers, carry enormous firepower, outgunning the guerrillas' Mi-24s. In the top right, a Soviet Mi-24 helicopter is seen in flight. Below, a Soviet Mi-24 helicopter is seen in flight. In the bottom left, a Soviet Mi-24 helicopter is seen in flight. In the bottom right, a Soviet Mi-24 helicopter is seen in flight.



T

he Soviets have followed their strategic error of occupying Afghanistan with a series of tactical miscalculations. Their military campaigns consist largely of unwieldy forays by tanks and armored vehicles, preceded by air strikes from MIG fighters and helicopter gunships. Such assaults tend to be enormously destructive, but in the long term they accomplish little: as soon as the Soviet and mujahidin return to their bases, the mujahidin reoccupy the area. As one Western military analyst has observed: the Soviets do not "win any territory, and they continue to expose their troops to Afghan mines, booby traps and sniping." As a result, they find themselves fighting an essentially defensive struggle from inside armored vehicles, aircraft or occupied cities, able only to conduct punitive raids that do little to change the military status quo.

The Soviets also have been unable to pit one ethnic or regional group against another successfully; quite the opposite, the common effort against the Soviet invader has proven to be a greater unifying force than any other factor in recent Afghan history. At the same time, the

decentralized, even disunited, character of the resistance has prevented the Soviets from mounting a single decisive military blow, or even responding quickly to successive attacks in scattered parts of the country.

While the resistance forces have few antiaircraft and other advanced weapons, they have grown stronger and more sophisticated in the last year. They have become adept at springing ambushes, setting mines, avoiding armored and air attacks, and reducing their own casualties. And even in areas which the Soviets control by day, the nights, in classic guerrilla style, belong to the mujahidin.

The regime's Afghan army, in the estimation of journalists who have observed the war, remains ineffectual in offensive operations, prone to desertions and politically unreliable. Soviet troops, also according to experts, suffer from low morale and frustration, and from a casualty rate estimated at between 8,000 to 12,000 killed and wounded.

The war is a tragedy as well for the young Soviet soldier fighting an enemy he rarely sees, in a conflict he does not understand.



Mujahidin Gunner (left), wearing a captured Soviet tank's helmet, holds a flag in one hand and a Soviet RPG-7 anti-tank weapon in the other. Above, mujahidin gather in a circle and listen intently as a gunner, kneeling, demonstrates how to aim and fire the RPG-7. The man standing beside him is holding a model of a Soviet helicopter.



Reared in a warrior culture and perfectly adapted to their mountainous terrain, the mujahidin have proven to be a formidable foe. At top, two soldiers descend a steep hillside; right, surrender of a crewman from a captured armored personnel carrier.



Resistance unit on the march (above) stops for a water break. Mujahidin in the field carry little equipment except for their weapons and ammunition, subsisting for long periods on water, sugared tea and bread.



Above, wreckage of a tank in a riverbed.




"The Afghans have always been the best resistance fighters in the world."

Pakistani government official

"They are a superpower and we are among the poorest of peoples... But the Russians have never before fought a people who were fighting for their faith."

Freedom fighter

Much of the Soviet military equipment introduced into Afghanistan, such as heavy tanks and large rocket launchers (bottom), have been destroyed by and virtually useless against the guerrilla tactics of the Afghans, but the crucial difference may not be hardware, but the extraordinary determination of the freedom fighters as they train their sons, whether with toy guns and sticks (below left) or AK-47s (below right), in the event that they must continue the fight against Soviet occupation.



nations, in Southeast Asia for example, and then acquiesce in a blatant act of aggression and imperialism by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The people of Afghanistan are demonstrating an extraordinary measure of courage and fortitude in the face of great adversity. Individuals, groups and nations around the world can show support by insisting upon the full withdrawal of Soviet troops.



Sporadic outbursts of criticism against Soviet actions in Afghanistan, followed by calls for accommodation, or by the silence of indifference, can only prolong the conflict. The international community must avoid a double standard which allows it to condemn the actions of the United States or other Western

condemning the indiscriminate destruction of villages and bombing of civilian populations, providing aid to the more than two million Afghan refugees, and calling for the reestablishment of Afghanistan as a nonaligned, independent nation.

The people of Afghanistan are defending a culture, a religion, a history, a homeland. Their struggle continues, their spirit remains unvanquished.

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International Communication Agency
United States of America



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- USICA acquired 12,000 copies and distributed to all overseas posts
- Significant segments ran on the Wireless File in English, Arabic, French & Spanish

SOVIET MILITARY POWER

"The more constructive East-West relationship which the Allies seek requires tangible signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon the disturbing buildup of its military strength, to desist from resorting to force and intimidation and to cease creating or exploiting situations of crisis and instability in the Third World."

*From the Communique of the
NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting
May 1981*

CONTENTS

I SOVIET MILITARY POWER	5
II MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION.....	9
III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES.....	15
IV SOVIET THEATER FORCES	25
V SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES.....	53
VI QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY	71
VII SOVIET GLOBAL POWER PROJECTION	83
VIII THE CHALLENGE.....	95



The illustrations of new Soviet weapons systems introducing each chapter are derived from various U.S. sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.

PREFACE

The Soviet Armed Forces today number more than 4.8 million men. For the past quarter century, we have witnessed the continuing growth of Soviet military power at a pace that shows no signs of slackening in the future.

All elements of the Soviet Armed Forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces of the Army, the Air Forces, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces—continue to modernize with an unending flow of new weapons systems, tanks, missiles, ships, artillery and aircraft. The Soviet defense budget continues to grow to fund this force buildup, to fund the projection of Soviet power far from Soviet shores and to fund Soviet use of proxy forces to support revolutionary factions and conflict in an increasing threat to international stability.

To comprehend the threat to Western strategic interests posed by the growth and power projection of the Soviet Armed Forces it is useful to consider in detail the composition, organization and doctrine of these forces, their ideological underpinning, and their steady acquisition of new, increasingly capable conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons systems. It is equally important to examine the USSR's industrial base, military resource allocations, and continuing quest for military/technological superiority which contribute to the effectiveness of its armed forces and proxy forces, and which support the Soviets' position as a world leader in arms exports.

The facts are stark:

- The Soviet Ground Forces have grown to more than 180 divisions—motorized rifle divisions, tank divisions and airborne divisions—stationed in Eastern Europe, in the USSR, in Mongolia, and in combat in Afghanistan. Soviet Ground Forces have achieved the capacity for extended intensive combat in the Central Region of Europe.
- The Soviets have fielded 50,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery pieces. The Soviet divisions are being equipped with the newer, faster, better armored T-64 and T-72 tanks. Some artillery units, organic to each division, include new, heavy mobile artillery, multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled, armored 122-mm and 152-mm guns.
- More than 5,200 helicopters are available to the Soviet Armed Forces, including increasing numbers of Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships used in direct support of ground forces on the battlefield.
- More than 3,500 Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical bombers and fighter aircraft are located in Eastern Europe alone. In each of the last eight years, the Soviets have produced more than 1,000 fighter aircraft.
- Against Western Europe, China and Japan, the Soviets are adding constantly to deliverable nuclear warheads, with the number of launchers growing, with some 250 mobile, SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile launchers in the field, and with three nuclear warheads on each SS-20 missile.

- The Soviets continue to give high priority to the modernization of their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force and their Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) force stressing increased accuracy and greater warhead throwweight. The Soviet intercontinental strategic arsenal includes 7,000 nuclear warheads, with 1,398 ICBM launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and 156 long-range bombers. This does not include some 150 nuclear-capable BACKFIRE bombers.

- The Soviets have eight classes of submarines and eight classes of major surface warships, including nuclear-powered cruisers and new aircraft carriers, presently under construction. This growing naval force emerging from large, modern shipyards is designed to support sustained operations in remote areas in order to project Soviet power around the world.

- The Soviet Air Defense Forces man 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers at 1,000 fixed missile sites across the Soviet Union.


- The growth of the Soviet Armed Forces is made possible by the USSR's military production base which continues to grow at the expense of all other components of the Soviet economy. There are 135 major military industrial plants now operating in the Soviet Union with over 40 million square meters in floor space, a 34 percent increase since 1970. In 1980, these plants produced more than 150 different types of weapons systems for Soviet forces and for export to client states and developing countries.

- Today, the Soviets have more than 85,000 men fighting in Afghanistan. Soviet naval forces are deployed in the major oceans of the world. The USSR is gaining increased access to military facilities and is supporting proxy conflicts in Africa, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia and the Western hemisphere.

There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, modernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious.

A clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities, their strengths and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of effective U.S. and Allied Armed Forces.

The greatest defense forces in the world are those of free people in free nations well informed as to the challenge they face, firmly united in their resolve to provide fully for the common defense, thereby deterring aggression and safeguarding the security of the world's democracies.



Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

I SOVIET MILITARY POW



CR

This document, which is a distillation of briefings provided to the NATO Ministers of Defense, describes the totality of the Soviet military buildup in some detail. Free people can better determine the challenges they face and the decisions required if armed with adequate factual knowledge of the threat. For this reason, the Secretary of Defense has had this document prepared and published.

Soviet Military Power presents a factual portrayal of the Soviet Armed Forces, a review intended to be as informative as possible on an issue of the utmost importance to the United States and its Allies.

The chart "Soviet Military Forces," on pages six and seven of Chapter I, depicts the size, composition and deployment of the USSR's Strategic Nuclear Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces and Naval Forces.

Chapter II, Military Resource Allocation, examines the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military industrial base, the world's largest in facilities and physical size.

Chapter III, Organization of Soviet Armed Forces, describes the USSR's strategic command structure, command and control, logistic support and combat doctrine.


Chapter IV reviews those Soviet Armed Forces designated for theater operations, nuclear and conventional land, sea and air forces— forces geared to fast-paced offensive operations, forces arrayed against the nations of Western Europe.

Chapter V describes the increasing capabilities of the Soviet Strategic Forces, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles of the ICBM forces, and the continuing modernization of the submarine launched ballistic missile forces.


Chapter VI reports on the Research and Development effort behind the USSR's drive for modern military technology.

Chapter VII reviews the application of Soviet military power today, and Chapter VIII summarizes the challenge posed by the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Tupolev BACKFIRE, swing-wing, turbofan powered bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs or air-to-surface missiles entered service in the mid-1970s. Thirty new BACKFIRES are being built each year in the continuing expansion and modernization of Soviet military power.




MILITARY FORCES




I SOVIET MILITARY POWER

II MILITARY RESOURCE



ALLOCATION



In 1980, the first of the Soviets' TYPHOON-Class 25,000-ton strategic ballistic missile submarines was launched from a newly completed construction hall at the Severodvinsk Shipyard on the White Sea. Earlier in the year the same shipyard launched the first of the extremely large OSCAR-Class guided missile nuclear submarines, a submarine capable of firing 24 long-range, antiship cruise missiles while remaining submerged.

In 1980, some 2,400 kilometers southeast of Severodvinsk, the mammoth Nizhniy Tagil Railroad Car and Tank Plant, an industrial facility covering 827,000 square meters of floor-space, manufactured 2,500 T-72 tanks.

To support the continuing growth and modernization of the armed forces, the Soviet Union over the past quarter century has increased military expenditures in real terms, devoting an average of 12-to-14 percent of its Gross National Product each year to the Soviet military. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military investment exceeded comparable US spending by 70 percent in 1979. The defense sector is the first priority of Soviet industrial production.


The Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military industrial base is by far the world's largest in number of facilities and physical size. The Soviet Union alone produces more weapons systems in greater quantities than any other country.

The Soviet military industry has grown steadily and consistently over the past 20-to-25 years. Its physical growth and the commitment of large quantities of financial and human resources is its most dynamic aspect, but its

The TYPHOON 25,000-ton strategic ballistic missile submarine was launched from the Severodvinsk Naval Shipyard in 1980. Severodvinsk, one of five Soviet yards building submarines, has produced seven different classes in the last decade.

cyclical production is its most important. Production plants remain at work. As old weapons programs are phased out, new ones are begun, leaving no down times or long periods of layoffs and inactivity. The cyclical process, the continuing facility growth and the high rates of production keep the arms industry in a high state of readiness to meet any contingency and any demand for new weapons. The military production industry includes 135 major final assembly plants involved in producing weapons as end products. Over 3,500 individual factories and related installations provide support to these final assembly plants.

Major Soviet Manufacturing Areas



- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Strategic and Defensive Missiles
Missile Engines and Motors
Major Surface Combatants | 8. Tactical Aircraft
Missile Engines and Motors |
| 2. Strategic Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Major Surface Combatants | 9. Tactical Aircraft |
| 3. Armored Vehicles
Tanks | 10. Strategic Aircraft |
| 4. Tactical Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Strategic and Defensive Missiles
Missile Engines and Motors | 11. Aircraft Engines
Strategic Missiles
Defensive Missiles
Armored Vehicles
Artillery, SP Guns and
Multiple Rocket Launchers |
| 5. Major Surface Combatants
Submarines
Tanks
Aircraft Engines
Missile Engines and Motors
Defensive Missiles | 12. Tactical Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Missile Engines and Motors
Armored Vehicles
Tanks
Artillery, SP Guns and
Multiple Rocket Launchers |
| 6. Submarines
Tactical Aircraft
Armored Vehicles | 13. Strategic Missiles
Tactical Aircraft |
| 7. Major Surface Combatants
Strategic and Tactical Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Strategic Missiles
Missile Engines and Motors
Armored Vehicles
Artillery, SP Guns and
Multiple Rocket Launchers | 14. Major Surface Combatants
Submarines
Strategic Missiles
Tactical Aircraft |

Construction at the Severodvinsk Naval Shipyard illustrates the growth of Soviet facilities over time. Over the past decade seven classes of submarines have been produced, and during this time, floor space has increased by several hundred thousand square meters, or approximately three-quarters again the yard's size ten years earlier. The new large construction hall used to assemble the TYPHOON and OSCAR submarines accounted for about 25 percent of this increase. Moreover, Severodvinsk is only one of five Soviet yards producing submarines.

In the aerospace industry, even though there has been significant construction in recent years including a number of new large final assembly buildings at established plants, the Soviets have revealed that they are constructing a wholly new, large aircraft plant at Ulyanovsk. This plant, when completed, will be well-suited for the fabrication and assembly of large aircraft—transports or bombers—underscoring the Soviets' continuing drive to improve further their industrial base. Qualitative improvements in production technology, which typically accompany new and more sophisticated aircraft, have paralleled the physical growth of the industry.

The Army's sector of Soviet military industry is traditionally large to support the growing Ground Forces. Army industrial floorspace has expanded by over ten percent in the late 1970s. All segments of the Army's industrial base have been expanded despite their already massive size. For instance, a major Soviet tank producer which was already nearly five times as large as the US manufacturers, has again been expanded.

The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact need all of these facilities for the large number of major weapons and support systems currently in production—more than 150 in all.

The following tables show estimates of production by weapon systems type over the past



**Production of Ground Forces Materiel
USSR and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact**

	1976		1977		1978		1979		1980	
	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP
Tanks	2500	800	2500	800	2500	800	3000	800	3000	750
T-55	500	800	500	800	500	800	500	800	—	750
T-64	500	—	500	—	500	—	500	—	500	—
T-72	1500	—	1500	—	1500	—	2000	—	2500	—
T-80	—	—	—	—	—	—	Trial Output	—	Trial Output	—
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles	4500	1800	4500	1900	5500	1700	5500	1600	5500	1200
Towed Field Artillery	900	50	1300	50	1500	100	1500	100	1300	100
Self-Propelled Field Artillery	900	—	950	—	650	—	250	50	150	50
Multiple Rocket Launchers	500	250	550	200	550	150	450	150	300	150
Self-Propelled AA Artillery	500	100	500	100	100	50	100	50	100	50
Towed-AA Artillery	500	300	250	250	100	200	—	200	—	150
Infantry Weapons	250,000	140,000	350,000	120,000	450,000	200,000	450,000	115,000	400,000	100,000

five years. A five year period was selected to demonstrate the Soviet ability to sustain high rates of production.

a new system, or increased orders for helicopters.

**Aircraft Production
USSR**

Aircraft Type	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Bombers	25	30	30	30	30
Fighters/ Fighter-Bombers	1,200	1,200	1,300	1,300	1,300
Transports	450	400	400	400	350
Trainers	50	50	50	25	225
ASW	5	10	10	10	10
Helicopters	1,400	900	600	700	750
Utility	125	100	100	100	100
Total	3,255	2,690	2,490	2,565	2,765

The most important aspect of aircraft production is the sustained high rates of fighter aircraft production. Helicopter production shows a decline at midpoint, but then a gradual build-up probably indicating a phase-out/phase-in of

**Missile Production
USSR**

Missile Type	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
ICBMs	300	300	200	200	200
IRBMs	50	100	100	100	100
SRBMs	100	200	250	300	300
SLCMs	600	600	600	700	700
SLBMs	150	175	225	175	175
ASMs	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
SAMs	40,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000

Missile production shows the wide range of missiles in production. Every class of missiles, from Surface-to-Air to ICBMs, is produced in significant quantities.

Naval ship construction demonstrates the USSR's capability to sustain high rates throughout. Moreover, the number of auxiliary ships produced in Eastern Europe has freed Soviet building ways for other projects.

Naval Ship Construction USSR

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Submarines	10	13	12	12	11
Major Combatants	12	12	12	11	11
Minor Combatants	58	56	52	48	52
Auxillaries	4	6	4	7	5

Ground Forces Materiel Production USSR

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Tanks	2,500	2,500	2,500	3,000	3,000
T-55	500	500	500	500	—
T-64	500	500	500	500	500
T-72	1,500	1,500	1,500	2,000	2,500
T-80				Trial Output	Trial Output
Other Armored Vehicles	4,500	4,500	5,500	5,500	5,500
Self-Propelled Field Artillery	900	950	650	250	150

Soviet Army materiel production shows a jump in the output of tanks and other armored vehicles in 1979 and 1980. The production of self-propelled artillery, however, exhibits a steady decline since 1977. This probably represents the phasing out of production of an old weapon and the introduction of a new one. Such transition is fairly common in Soviet production practices. The evolutionary introduction of new systems continues. Overall, Soviet Ground Forces materiel production has increased over the past five years.

An even greater increase is evident when Soviet Ground Forces materiel production is combined with that of the Warsaw Pact allies.

These weapons systems are produced to equip Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and for export. In recent years, in addition to being the world's largest producer, the USSR has become the world's largest exporter of major items of military equipment to the Third World.

To provide nuclear weapons for their Armed Forces, the Soviets have an adequate number of plutonium and uranium production facilities to ensure a sufficient quantity of necessary material for those forces, and to ensure the provision of material for other high priority needs as well.


What impact does this massive dedication of resources to military products have on the USSR? The Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact have, over the past decade, faced deteriorating economies while at the same time sustaining high levels of military equipment production for an across-the-board force modernization. The Soviets' own economy is in difficulty and facing competing priorities for scarce resources as it begins the 11th Five Year Plan. The problems include food shortages, low labor productivity, transportation disruptions and energy constraints which have all combined to bring industrial growth to a post-1945 low. Externally, the high costs of supporting other communist regimes, also in difficulty, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Poland have created an additional burden. These difficulties have grown at the end of a decade during which Moscow's policy has been to stress guns over butter. Throughout the 1970s the Soviets have consistently allocated from 12-to-14 percent of Gross National Product to military programs in spite of a marked downward trend in the rate of economic growth. If this trend continues, the percentage allocated to the military will increase. There are no signs of a deemphasis of military programs.

The economic burden of defense spending, as viewed in the West, is viewed differently in the Soviet Union. To the Soviets, defense spending is a necessity and a priority above all else. Productivity might continue to decline and the Soviets might have to face a negative growth rate, but the system of fostering massive military industrial production will continue.

III ORGANIZATION OF S



SOVIET ARMED FORCES



Marshal of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief Kulikov has written that the traumatic experience of World War II has taught the Soviets the necessity of having a fully operational strategic command structure in being prior to the onset of hostilities. To this end, the Soviets have created a wartime management structure which provides a unified system of command capable of exerting centralized direction, but designed to permit decentralization of functions to lower levels as necessary.

Immediate control of the Soviet land, sea and air forces is exercised by the Minister of Defense. Within the Soviet Government, the Minister of Defense is a member of the Council of Ministers, appointed by and technically answerable to the Supreme Soviet or to its Presidium. In practice he is responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Politburo. The current Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov, is a member of the Politburo, as was his predecessor. The Defense Council, a subset of the Politburo chaired by the General Secretary of the CPSU, in effect functions as the controlling authority. In 1976, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was awarded the highest military rank, that of Marshal of the Soviet Union, possibly indicating that ultimate operational—as well as policymaking—control of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces was being vested in the Defense Council.

The combined arms army, the basic Soviet field army, includes four motorized rifle divisions, a tank division, an artillery brigade, missile units, frontal air support, and intelligence, chemical, engineer and signal units. There are more than 180 divisions in the Soviet Armed Forces today.

The key point to understand about the Soviet military control structure is that the reins of the instruments of state policy and power—not just the purely military—are in the hands of a tested political leadership supported by very experienced and long-established staffs. President Brezhnev and his key colleagues have been at the center of power for decades. Ustinov has guided the Soviet armaments industry since the early 1940s and has proven to be an able and decisive leader. These men, aided by such others as KGB Chief Andropov, Premier Tikhonov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, the ageless ideologue Suslov, Chief of General Staff Ogarkov, Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov and lesser but equally experienced subchiefs of the military and industry, know how the Soviet military machine runs and what they want to achieve. They are able to marshal all available Soviet resources toward their strategic objective. They exercise absolute control of all instruments of Soviet power.

At the apex of the Soviet wartime strategic command structure is the State Defense Committee or GKO. The Defense Committee serves to unify the highest military and civilian leadership to insure centralized political direction of the entire war effort. This committee appears to consist of the permanent members of the peacetime Defense Council. Just as in World War II, the Defense Committee and its subordinate managerial entities would play a critical role in wartime economic mobilization and in overseeing sustained wartime production. Beneath the Defense Committee and its component elements is the vast ministerial structure of the Soviet government.


Under the guidance of the Defense Committee, a Supreme High Command (VGK) would serve as the highest organization of strategic military leadership. The Supreme High Command apparently includes the CPSU General

Secretary, the Minister of Defense, the first Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and the Commanders in Chief of each of the five services. The contribution of the General Staff, serving as an executive agent for the VGK, would be to insure the development and execution of a unified military strategy for the operational commands.

In order to simplify the planning for war, the Soviets have divided the world into 13 Theaters of Military Operations, or TVDs. The Theater of Military Operations is a geographical concept used to denote an area within which their armed forces would function in wartime. There appear to be possibly five continental TVDs, four maritime or naval TVDs, and four intercontinental TVDs.


Recognizing that the Soviet Supreme High Command would find it difficult to exercise the direction of multi-theater operations without an intermediate command echelon, the Soviets have apparently established intermediate-level high commands. This Soviet conceptual frame-

Soviet Military Districts and Groups of Forces



1. Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
2. Central Group of Forces
3. Northern Group of Forces
4. Southern Group of Forces
5. Baltic
6. Leningrad
7. Ural
8. Siberian
9. Transbaikal
10. Far East

11. Carpathian
12. Belorussian
13. Moscow
14. Odessa
15. Kiev
16. Volga
17. North Caucasus
18. Transcaucasus
19. Central Asia
20. Turkestan



work for intermediate-level strategic leadership is intended to accommodate centralized strategic planning with decentralized battle management.

The Theaters of Military Operations not only include the terrain upon which the *Fronts* would conduct their operations, but include those Military Districts that would support such operations. Thus, while forces may depart a Military District as battlefield operations progress, the Military District structure would be retained to serve as a principal wartime administrative entity.

The Soviets have carefully thought out and continue to develop the details of the system of strategic leadership. The system required for war fighting and war survival is now in place. Central to this system is the establishment of the means to ensure the survival of state control. The Soviets have, for years, been building an infrastructure of facilities and procedures which is geared to the survival of the means of control for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during even the worst of conflict situations—a nuclear war. Alternative locations have been established for virtually the entire structure of the Soviet leadership—political, military, security and industrial—from the highest to the lowest levels. Many of these are bunkered facilities and certain levels of leadership are provided with mobile equipment as well.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Utilizing the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense as its agent, the Soviet Defense Committee controls its military commands. To achieve this goal the Soviets have developed extensive and modern command, control and communications (C³) systems. Soviet doctrine emphasizes centralized control, survivability, redundancy and flexibility within the system.

Survivability is achieved through dispersal,

redundancy, hardness, concealment and mobility. Survivability is also enhanced by airborne command posts, which can be deployed to different locations to serve as alternate communications hubs in the event of war, hedging against the destruction of groundbase facilities.

Redundancy includes multiple command centers to assure continuity of the control of armed forces, and a wide variety of communications means and modes. Redundancy of Soviet C³ facilities is also achieved through the establishment of main and alternate command posts.

In the Soviet Union, the strategic command and control system maintains contact with widespread civil and military authorities. The system includes extensive networks of cable and open-wire lines, radio-relay links, radio-communications stations, and communications satellites. Modern Soviet telecommunications engineering concepts stress the flexibility, survivability and reliability of the system to meet national military command and control requirements for continuous telecommunications operations. The major national telecommunications complex is known as the unified communications system. In the event of war, the entire system could be readily converted into a nationwide military communications network.

Automation of Soviet command and control is evolving. The Soviet Air Defense Forces and the Moscow antiballistic missile system employ automation most extensively. The major strength of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact automation program is that systems are being developed specifically for military requirements rather than adapting other systems to military use.

Soviet satellites provide communications support to military, diplomatic, intelligence, and civilian organizations. The predominant communications satellite used in support of military command and control has been the MOLNIYA

I system. Since the mid-1960s, when the first MOLNIYA I was launched, the Soviet Union has continued to improve its communications satellite program. The Soviet Union has launched the improved MOLNIYA II and MOLNIYA III systems which can be used for military command and control. The MOLNIYA I and II military ground sites are deployed at major headquarters throughout the Soviet Union, and stations are beginning to be deployed in Eastern Europe.

The Soviets are maintaining vigorous research and development programs to upgrade their C³ systems emphasizing the use of cable as the primary means of communication when practicable, and increasing use of satellite and point-to-point systems operating in a number of frequency ranges.

The Soviets can be expected to increase their use of automated systems which will increase their data handling capabilities as well as increase reaction times. As in the past, Soviet command and control systems will continue to employ redundancy, hardness and mobility to enhance survivability.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

The Deputy Defense Minister who is Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces (NTVS) has management responsibility for the overall system of rear service support to the armed forces.

The Deputy Minister and his staff are located at Ministry of Defense Headquarters in Moscow. The first deputy to the NTVS serves as Chief of the Main Staff of the Rear, which plays a key role in the logistic establishment. From the Ministry headquarters, the Staff administers the fuel, food, clothing, military trade and technical supply organizations, the military medical and veterinary organizations, and other directorates and departments. This cen-

tralized system also includes a large number of Rear Services brigades, regiments and battalions as well as installations, bases, depots, arsenals, repair plants and other support assets for all armed forces components. All aspects of the movement of military supplies received from the national economy are managed by the Rear Services staff. In this management capacity, the Rear Services staff coordinates the activities of the deputy commanders for Rear Services of each of the branches as well as at the Military District, groups of forces and tactical levels.

Soviet wartime logistic planning is carried on at three general levels: strategic, operational and tactical. The NTVS is the principal controller of the numerous and diverse logistic organizations and assets comprising what Soviet planners call the "central Rear Services." There is a Rear Services counterpart at each subordinate echelon down to regiment. This officer, who is designated a deputy commander as well as the Chief of the Rear, is directly subordinate to his unit or formation commander, and in addition carries out the policies and guidelines of Rear Service representatives at higher levels.

The entire Rear Services establishment is designed to support military operations of all the Armed Forces with consumable supplies, weapon system stocks, maintenance assets, transportation resources, local security and a variety of logistic services deemed integral to the successful conduct of combat operations. In wartime, central logistic units, resources and command/control entities, in addition to serving as a USSR-based resource pool, may be moved into Theaters of Military Operations directly to support operational formations and organize the use of theater resources. Military command post complexes are present at all tactical and operational echelons.

The Soviets, and their Warsaw Pact military allies, conceived a system for automating Pact

Rear Service command and control in the early 1960s. Variations of this system have been field tested over the last decade. The system is designed principally to enable the Chief of the Rear at operational/strategic levels rapidly to evaluate his resources and assets in light of an envisioned operation; to formulate a Rear Service plan which optimally supports the commander's concept of operations; and to respond to the support requirements generated by rapidly changing battlefield situations.

Today, in the European Theater, for example, the Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces already have in place vast stocks of all the logistic supplies—from fuel, to ammunition, to weapon systems stocks—required for sustained combat.

COMBINED ARMS WARFARE

At the heart of Soviet combat doctrine is the concept of combined arms operations. To the Soviets, combined arms operations are more than the joint use of weapon systems and forces. The concept involves the bringing to bear of all systems and forces as needed in a unified and effective manner.

The Soviet Union's concept of combined arms operations, particularly at *Front* or theater levels, is much broader and more structured organizationally than the Western combined arms concept envisioning the joint and cooperative employment of ground, air and, if applicable, naval forces to achieve an objective. The operational definitions as provided by the Soviets in their combat doctrine permit a fuller understanding of the combined arms warfare concept.


- The Combined Arms Battle is a battle fought by a combined arms formation or unit together with attached formations or units of other service branches and aviation; and in maritime sectors, with

naval forces as well. The use of nuclear weapons and the participation of the various service branches or forces, in conjunction with the great mobility of the troops, impart an especially decisive and maneuver-oriented character to combined arms battle.


- The Combined Arms Commander is the sole commander of a combined arms formation, unit, or subunit. He organizes the combined arms combat of the forces subordinated to him, and leads them in battle. He makes the decision to engage the enemy, assigns combat missions to subunits, coordinates the actions of his own combined armed troops with those of neighboring troops, and directs his staff, and the commanders of the service branches and Services.

- The Combined Arms Staff is the staff of a major field force or of a formation or unit which includes formations, units or subunits of various service branches. The combined arms staff ensures coordination between the staffs of the subordinated and cooperating troops, and those of the service branches, special troops, services and rear. The combined arms staff takes all measures necessary to ensure the comprehensive preparation of the troops for their combat missions, and to ensure constant command and control of the troops during the course of battle (or operation).

At the *Front* level the Soviets are organized to control and employ coordinated ground, air, missile, air defense and, if appropriate, naval formations. The combined military power of all weapon systems is applied in a fully integrated plan. To insure the control of activities, the *Front* has a combined arms commander who is responsible for carrying out missions approved



Combined Arms Warfare, at the heart of Soviet combat doctrine, brings units from the different services, such as the tank, infantry, self-propelled artillery and missile units shown here, under one Combined Arms Commander.



by the General Staff Plan. It is his responsibility to oversee and coordinate the operations of his subordinate units and the commanders of the other services subordinated under his command. If the *Front* is operating near or in a maritime sector, naval forces will be under his command. As stated in the definition, he must also coordinate his activities with neighboring troops, most probably another *Front*.

The *Front* is the largest field formation in wartime. It is a tactical and administrative unit with size and composition subject to considerable variation depending upon the situation. A *Front* could be composed of three-to-five combined arms armies, one or two tank armies, plus aviation, air assault, diversionary, artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance and rear service units.

A combined arms army might include three or four motorized rifle divisions and a tank division, plus artillery, missile, air defense,

engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance and rear service units.

The role of the tank army, a heavily armored force of tanks and motorized rifle troops, is to rupture and penetrate enemy defenses and to exploit breakthroughs deep into the enemy's rear areas. This army is a tactical and administrative unit capable of independent operations, although its normal employment, like that of the combined arms army, is as a component of a *Front*. The size of the army and its force composition are dependent upon the mission, the situation and the area of operations. There are three different types of maneuver divisions in the field forces: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. The motorized rifle and tank divisions are the major combat and maneuver elements of the ground combat forces. Divisions are organized on a triangular basis. The motorized rifle division has three motorized rifle regiments, one tank regiment, one artillery



Armored Command Vehicle




Mi-24/HIND A Assault Helicopter

regiment, one air defense regiment and other support elements. The tank division forms around three tank regiments, one motorized rifle regiment, one artillery regiment, one air defense regiment and other support elements. Three airborne rifle regiments are the nucleus of the airborne division.

As few as one *Front* and as many as five may exist in a Theater of Military Operations (TVD). A High Command of Forces in a TVD is commanded by at least a three star general who is directly responsible to the Soviet General Staff. The commander is supported by a combined arms staff with the responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the activities of the various strategic formations. At the theater level the commander insures that the plans of the General Staff for his forces in the theater are carried out.

The General Staff controls the operations of the five services, while individual service chiefs are responsible for the training and support of troops, the development of tactics and the acquisition of weapons systems for their respective services. The services function under the General Staff to assure the mutual supportiveness of their training, tactics, and weapons acquisitions. In a wartime situation, the same system would apply, but the General Staff would operate as the executive agent of the national leadership and would adopt plans for control of the forces. The Soviets have organizationally structured their forces to form a unified command structure under the General Staff. This provides the Soviets with the command structure to apply the totality of their military power in warfare so that the whole of the operation is greater than the sum of its parts.

IV SOVIET THEATER FO



RCS



Over the past 15 years the Soviets have steadily expanded and upgraded their military forces designated for theater operations with particular attention directed toward the European theater. During this period, the Soviet objective for this modernization has been the conversion of the Red Army from a balanced offensive-defensive force to one geared to fast-paced offensive operations. A key aim appears to have been the provision in peacetime of a standing Army at the leading edge of the potential battlefield such that it could begin operations with minimal mobilization and, thereby, with little warning.

The forces are highly mobile, and they are organized and supplied for a rapid initial push from a peacetime posture. At the outset of a war, the Soviets plan to move quickly slicing through NATO forces in the Central Region and driving to the English Channel, while concurrently securing the northern and southern flanks. During the initial operations, necessary additional forces would be mobilized and moved to the battlefield. All of this the Soviets aim to accomplish before the full weight of NATO reinforcements could be brought to bear. The Soviets have given priority attention to all elements of their Armed Forces with a role to play in the sweep across Europe. Modernization and upgrading is underway in each of the following elements of Soviet Theater Forces:

- Long Range Missile and Air Forces
- Ground Forces
- Frontal Aviation
- Military Transport Aviation
- Special Purpose Forces
- Navy

Soviet theater nuclear forces are being deployed in increasing numbers against Western Europe and Asia. Some 250 SS-20 mobile, MIRVed nuclear warhead, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles have been deployed. Three warheads per missile greatly increase Soviet firepower; mobility increases survivability.

LONG-RANGE THEATER MISSILES

Since the advent of the nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, the Soviets have dedicated significant numbers of nuclear, land-based missiles to theater warfare missions. No theater has been neglected, but the European theater has always commanded the greatest attention. The first medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs—1,000-to-3,000 kilometers) were fielded in the late 1950s, followed by improved MRBMs and new intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs—3,000-to-5,000 kilometers) in the early 1960s.

Soviet MRBM/IRBM Characteristics

	Warhead	Range	Propellant	Mobility
MRBM				
SS-4 SANDAL	1	2,000	Liquid	Fixed
IRBM				
SS-5 SKEAN	1	4,100	Liquid	Fixed
SS-20	3	5,000	Solid	Mobile

More than 700 fixed launchers for these systems—the SS-3 and SS-4 MRBMs and the SS-5 IRBM—were operational at peak deployment in the mid-1960s. All but approximately 100 were directed at targets in or related to the European theater. The remainder were directed against the Middle East, South Asia and the Western Pacific littoral. China was not then a target. In the late 1960s, the Soviets began to draw down these, by then, obsolescent missiles, replacing them with ICBMs and adding coverage of the new enemy—China.

This situation remained unchanged until 1977 when the SS-20 IRBM first reached operational status. Previously, the theater-dedicated strategic nuclear missiles were based at fixed, vulnerable sites, and each missile carried only one warhead—although provisions for force reconstitution and refire were made. The SS-20 eliminated most of these weaknesses. Its launchers are highly mobile, and each SS-20 is fitted with three, very accurate and independently targetable (MIRVed) warheads. Moreover,



As the number of SS-20 missile launch sites in the Western USSR continues to grow, the Soviets intensify their tactical nuclear strike capability specifically targeted against Western Europe—SS-20 range and coverage extend beyond the shaded area.

Soviet Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles



each SS-20 unit is equipped with refire missiles—one per launcher—and each refire missile is fitted with three warheads. Thus the firepower of the theater strategic nuclear missile forces is being greatly multiplied, even though the Soviets are withdrawing older SS-4s and SS-5s from the forces as the SS-20s are deployed.


As of July 1981, some 250 SS-20 launcher/missile sets equipped with a total of 750 nuclear warheads had been deployed. Of these, 175 with 525 warheads are deployed opposite the NATO countries. There is no sign that the deployment is slackening. Since January 1981, the

pace of SS-20 base construction has increased, particularly opposite the NATO nations. At bases known to be under construction, another 65 launchers with some 195 warheads will be deployed. Perhaps as many as 100-to-150 additional launchers—300-to-450 warheads—could be fielded before the deployment program reaches its conclusion. While this modern nuclear force will continue to exhibit the full coverage of theater targets around the Soviet Union's periphery, it will be concentrated primarily against the European theater.

THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES

The Ground Forces, with a strength of 1,825,000, constitute the largest of the five major components of the Soviet Armed Forces. Traditionally, Imperial Russian and Soviet armies have been characterized by great numbers. Today, the Ground Forces are highly modernized and well equipped, possessing great firepower and mobility. Manpower and materiel combine to make the present Soviet Ground Forces the most powerful land army in the world.

Soviet leaders view an upgrading of the Soviet Ground Forces, in concert with an expanded Navy and improved strategic air transport capabilities, as adding a desirable flexibility to the exercise of Soviet military power on a global basis. The addition of some 30 divisions since about 1967 also reflects the Soviet view that war without resort to nuclear weapons, or at least without resort to strategic nuclear exchange, may be possible. To achieve these aims Soviet doctrine calls for clear-cut superiority at the outset of a conflict. Increased availability of helicopters, armored vehicles, amphibious vehicles, self-propelled artillery weapons and surface-launched guided missiles has provided the Ground Forces with unprecedented flexibility, mobility and firepower.



Characteristics of Primary US & Soviet Theater Missiles

Strength and Disposition: The Soviet Ground Forces currently contain more than 180 divisions at various stages of combat readiness. Of this total, 71 percent are motorized rifle divisions, 25 percent are tank divisions and four percent are airborne divisions.

These divisions are disposed as follows:


- 79 percent of the total are stationed inside the Soviet Union.
- 16 percent are stationed in Eastern Europe (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary).
- 3 percent are stationed in Mongolia.
- 2 percent are engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan.

There are four basic deployment groupings: against NATO, against China, against the Middle East, and a strategic reserve. The largest, best-equipped and most combat ready of these is the Ground Forces group deployed against NATO.


Modernization Program: The following graphs show the changes in manpower by type of division and the changes in the number of deployed tanks and artillery since 1966. Increases in personnel to 11,000 men in a tank division and almost 13,000 men in a motorized rifle division have resulted in an increase in the number of tanks and mobile combat vehicles per division.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have engaged in a program of modernizing and upgrading ground forces to ensure a capability for carrying out offensive doctrine. Comprehensive in scope, this program has involved large-scale improvements in mobility, fire power, shock action, command and control, obstacle crossing capability, air defense, electronic warfare and logistical support. New and advanced equipment has been introduced. Highlights of this program, which has resulted in formidable and increasingly capable ground forces that now

**Soviet Manpower
by Type of Division
1966-1980**



**Soviet Tanks
and Artillery
1966-1980**



face NATO Europe and other areas contiguous to the USSR, include:

- Deployment of T-64 tanks in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG); fielding of T-72 tanks into Soviet units in the Western Military Districts; introduction of small numbers of T-72s in most non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies; and continued development of a new tank, designated the T-80.
- Expansion of both division and non-division artillery units and some replacement of older, towed guns by self-propelled 122- and 152-mm weapons.
- Upgrading tactical capabilities by deployment of nuclear-capable heavy artillery brigades equipped with 203-mm howitzers and 240-mm mortars, and the introduction of the more accurate, longer-range and more mobile SS-21 and SS-X-23 tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) in ground forces as replacements for older FROGs and SCUDs.
- Replacement of the 900 kilometer SS-12/SCALEBOARD tactical missile with the more accurate SS-22.
- Replacement of older air defense gun


systems by a new family of surface-to-air missiles, some of which could have capabilities against enemy tactical ballistic missiles.

- Introduction of advanced radio systems and communications satellite equipment, airborne command posts and the gradual development of automated systems to enhance command, control and communications.


- Introduction of infantry combat vehicles into Soviet motorized rifle units, and the use of airborne assault vehicles and newly identified variants in airborne units.

- Introduction of Air Assault Brigades at the *Front* level.

Each of these deployments increases the Ground Forces' capability to launch a rapid thrust through Europe, the central theme of Soviet military thought.



122mm Self-Propelled Howitzer



152mm Self-Propelled Howitzer



T-64A Main Battle Tank



T-72 Main Battle Tank

The evolution of Soviet tanks illustrates the extent of Soviet Ground Forces modernization. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Soviets fielded the first and most sophisticated of their modern family of main battle tanks, the T-64A incorporating a number of unique and innovative features including:

- A 125-mm smoothbore gun and an automatic loader which allows reduction in crew size from four to three.





- Unconventional frontal armor and the inclusion of movable armored plates along the side of the hull.

- A compact, turbocharged diesel engine with a high horsepower-to-ton ratio.

The T-64A began deployment to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany in 1976, and, since 1980, has been deployed to the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary.

The T-72, a high production tank complementary to the T-64A, entered operation in the

Main Battle Tanks

	T-54/55	T-62	T-64	T-72
				
WEIGHT (TONS)	36	37	35	41
SPEED (KM/HR)	50	50	50	60
MAIN ARMAMENT	100mm TANK GUN	115mm SMOOTHBORE	125mm SMOOTHBORE	125mm SMOOTHBORE
MUZZLE VELOCITY (MPS)	1,400	1,600	1,750	1,750

mid 1970s. This tank incorporates many of the features of the T-64A such as the 125-mm smoothbore gun and automatic loader and unconventional armor in the form of layered or laminate armor in the upper hull.

The direct fire range for the 125-mm gun is 2,000 meters firing the kinetic energy round. This means that at all ranges out to 2,000 meters, the gunner merely places a crosshair on the target and fires. In the 125-mm gun the automatic loader allows a rate of fire up to eight rounds per minute. For mobility, the 41 metric ton T-72 is powered by a 780 horsepower diesel which allows a top road speed of 60 kilometers per hour, and a cross country trail speed of up to 45 kilometers per hour.

While the T-64A and T-72 are formidable systems, the Soviets are nearing production of an even newer tank, the T-80.

Simultaneously with modernization activities, Soviet ground divisions also are undergoing a personnel and equipment expansion program. Major aspects involve the addition of an artillery battalion to the tank regiments of tank and motorized rifle divisions; expansion of the motorized rifle company to a battalion within tank regiments of tank divisions; and the addition of medium tanks to the reconnaissance battalions of both types of divisions. The expansion

program has included the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS


The Soviets have deployed large numbers of tactical nuclear delivery systems, and we believe they have stockpiled reloads for these systems. The Soviets rely on dual-capable systems for most of their shorter-range theater nuclear delivery capability and have adapted some of their 203-mm and 240-mm artillery pieces deployed in the USSR to fire nuclear projectiles. Towed 203-mm and 240-mm weapons are being re-



FROG Tactical Nuclear Surface-to-Surface Missile

placed with self-propelled models. Their medium-range launchers are capable of firing nuclear, conventional, or chemical munitions, and consist of the FROG (and its SS-21 replacement), the SCUD B (and its SS-X-23 replacement), and the SS-12/SCALEBOARD (and its SS-22 replacement). An increase in the number of nuclear-capable systems combined with modernization of these systems give the Warsaw Pact improved nuclear options. A *Front* normally has tactical rockets, such as the free-rocket-over-ground (FROG), and operational tactical missiles (SCUDs) to complement nuclear-capable artillery, aviation and other longer-range missiles.

Long-Range Theater Nuclear Weapons



The follow-on to the FROG, the SS-21, has improved accuracy and range. Initial operational capability for the SS-21 was attained in 1976; however, only a few have been deployed.

Until recently, the West relied extensively upon the qualitative superiority of its forces to offset the numerical superiority of the USSR and its allies. That margin of quality is rapidly diminishing in the face of a massive Soviet effort to modernize its forces and those of its Warsaw Pact allies. Modern tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, rocket launchers, antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface

missiles, and other weapons now being fielded in large quantities are the direct result of an intensive, multi-year Soviet investment program. This program is expected to continue in spite of predicted Soviet economic problems. The Soviet advantage in tanks, presently about three to one in the European theater alone, will grow throughout the decade.

THEATER BOMBERS

BADGER, BLINDER and BACKFIRE aircraft assigned to both Soviet Long Range Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation could be used to carry out missions covering all of NATO Europe. While the BEAR and BISON bombers also could perform theater roles, they are reserved primarily for intercontinental strike missions. The most notable feature of the theater bomber force is its age: fully three quarters of the aircraft are over ten years old, and only the BACKFIRE remains in production.

These medium bombers have a primary land attack role, intended for either a nuclear or a conventional war scenario. In their nuclear use, the bombers would complement strikes by the Soviets' medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The primary objective in either case would be to free the Strategic Rocket Forces to concentrate on highest priority, time-urgent NATO targets.

FRONTAL AVIATION

The Soviet Air Force is separated into three distinct air arms to include: Long Range Aviation, Frontal or Tactical Aviation and Military Transport Aviation.

Frontal Aviation is the largest component of the Soviet Air Force and is organized into Tactical Air Armies consisting generally of fighter, fighter-bombers, transports, helicopters and reconnaissance units as well as miscellaneous support units. Tactical Air Armies are located

in 12 Soviet Military Districts and with the Groups of Soviet Forces in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These tactical air armies account for some 4,800 fixed wing combat aircraft, 250 transports and 3,500 helicopters.

Since the early 1970s, the introduction of modern aircraft such as the FENCER, FITTER C&D, FOXBAT and FLOGGER has steadily improved the offensive capabilities of Frontal Aviation, turning the Soviets' Tactical Air Forces from a force basically defensively-oriented to one now with significantly enhanced offensive capabilities for theater warfare. These aircraft carry loads of bombs, rockets and guided munitions, 2,000-to-8,000 kilograms in weight, to radii between 350 and 1,500 kilometers. The counterair fighters carry improved air-to-air missiles to ranges in excess of 900 kilometers. These aircraft also incorporate upgraded avionics. The entire counterair and about 75 percent of the ground attack force are

comprised of aircraft introduced in the past decade.

Frontal Aviation possesses five basic aircraft in support of ground force operations.

FLOGGER

Currently 1,400 FLOGGER B/D/G/J are operational in Frontal Aviation.

FLOGGER B/G — all-weather counterair fighter

FLOGGER D/J — all-weather ground attack aircraft

FLOGGER E — export version of FLOGGER B


FLOGGER F — export version of FLOGGER D

FLOGGER H — export version of FLOGGER D

Flogger

FLOGGER B/G FLOGGER D/J

Max Payload (kg)	6xAAMs	3,500
Combat Radius (km)	900-1,200	550-800
Service Ceiling (m)	18,000	16,000



MIG-23/FLOGGER B All-Weather Counterair Fighter

FISHBED

Some 1,300 FISHBED can be found in Soviet units, although the FLOGGER is replacing the FISHBED as the standard combat fighter in the Soviet Air Force.

FISHBED E — short-range, clear-air fighter
FISHBED D through N — (except H and M — all-weather counterair fighters
FISHBED H — reconnaissance platform

Fishbed

	FISHBED E	FISHBED L/N
Max Payload (kg)	2xAAMs	4xAAMs
Combat Radius (km)	350-650	550-900
Service Ceiling (m)	17,000	18,000



MIg-21/FISHBED N All-Weather Interceptor

FITTER


There are four ground attack and one reconnaissance variants of the FITTER operationally deployed with Warsaw Pact Forces, with only FITTER A and C in the national air arms thus far.

FITTER A — swept wing clear-air ground attack aircraft (200 operational with Soviet units)

FITTER C/D/H — swing-wing all-weather ground attack aircraft (650 operational in Soviet units)

Fitter

	FITTER A	FITTER C/D/H
Max Payload (kg)	2,000	3,500-4,000
Combat Radius (km)	250-350	550-900
Service Ceiling (m)	15,000	18,000



Su-17/FITTER C Swing-Wing Ground Support Fighter

FOXBAT

Two variants of the FOXBAT are deployed in operational service with Soviet frontal aviation; both are reconnaissance platforms.

Foxbat B/D

Max Payload:	Reconnaissance package only
Combat Radius (km)	1,100
Service Ceiling (m)	27,000



MIg-25/FOXBAT High Altitude Supersonic Interceptor

FENCER

The FENCER, operational since 1974, was the first modern Soviet aircraft designed specifically for a ground attack role and the first to carry a weapons system officer. There are 400 FENCERs operational.

Fencer

Max Payload (kg)	8,000
Combat Radius (km)	1,800
Service Ceiling (m)	17,500



Su-24/FENCER Ground Support Aircraft

Replacing the old Yak-28/BREWER tactical bomber with the FENCER gives Frontal Aviation the ability to strike targets throughout most of NATO Europe from home bases in the USSR. The addition of this aircraft along with the latest ground attack variants of FLOGGER and FITTER greatly increases the tonnage which can be delivered over a far greater range.

To complement the growing inventory of modern aircraft, the Soviets are developing new types of armament which should greatly increase the effectiveness of sorties against hardened ground targets.

HELICOPTERS

The majority of the Soviet helicopter forces are assigned to Frontal Aviation units to be employed near the forward edge of a battle area.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet helicopter design and production was limited to medium and heavy lift aircraft intended for use as transports only. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets began to experiment with the use of the helicopter in the assault and attack roles. The Soviets installed 128x57 mm rockets on the Mi-8/HIP C to be employed as an assault helicopter. Later, the Mi-8/HIP E was identified. It remains the world's most heavily armed helicopter. The HIP E helicopter has 192x57-mm rockets, four AT-2/SWATTER Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGM), and a 12.7-mm nose gun. The Mi-8/HIP F is an export version of the HIP E with the major change that six AT-3/SAGGER ATGMs replace the four SWATTERs.

While the Mi-8/HIP was undergoing modification to improve its assault capabilities, the

Frontal Aviation Ground Attack Aircraft

METERS	Su-24 FENCER A	MiG-23 FLOGGER B/G	MiG-27 FLOGGER D/J	Su-17 FITTER D/H	MiG-25 FOXBAT B/D	MiG-21 FISHBED L
22						
11						
0						
SPEED (KTS)	540	1,350	540	540	1,625	1,205
RADIUS (KM)	1,800	1,300	1,200	700	900	900
ARMAMENT	2,500 KG Bombs	6 AAMs	3,000 KG Bombs	3,000 KG Bombs	—	4 AAMs
WINGSPAN (M)	10.2 (swept)	8.1 (swept)	8.1 (swept)	9.9 (swept)	13.4	7.2



Mi-24/HIND E with Tube-Launched Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

Soviets were developing the Mi-24/HIND, an attack helicopter and the first Soviet helicopter to be produced that has an integral weapon system and retractable landing gear. The HIND A is armed with 128x57-mm rockets, four AT-2/SWATTER ATGMs, and a 12.7-mm machine gun in the nose. The helicopter also has a small cargo bay that is used to transport up to eight troops. The Mi-24/HIND D is a streamlined variant of HIND A with the pilot seated above and behind the co-pilot/gunner. The 12.7 mm nose gun has been replaced with a turreted Gatling-type gun, but other armament remains unchanged from the HIND A. The latest version



Mi-24/HIND D with Turreted Gatling Gun


of the HIND E is similar to the HIND D except that it has the tube-launched AT-6/SPIRAL.

TRANSPORT AVIATION

Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) is charged with the primary responsibility for providing airlift services for the Soviet Airborne Troops and air assault brigades.

VTA also operates an air logistics system to supply other deployed Soviet and allied armed forces and to support other Soviet political and economic interests.

Over 600 medium and long-range cargo transports are currently assigned to VTA airlift units. Il-76/CANDID long-range jet transports, which are replacing CUBs, now number over






Il-76/ CANDID Long Range Jet Transport

130. Over 50 An-22/COCK long-range turboprop transports are in the VTA inventory. The COCK and CANDID units are based in the western USSR, as are most of the remaining CUB units, although some VTA CUB units are stationed along the southern and far eastern periphery of the Soviet Union. This concentration in the western USSR places the main VTA assets near the airborne divisions they would support, as well as positioning the force opposite NATO. Nevertheless, VTA is capable of quickly concentrating its aircraft to support an operation anywhere along the Soviet periphery, as demonstrated in the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The CUB continues to be the mainstay of VTA. It is a four-engine turboprop which can carry up to 90-to-100 troops or cargo up to a maximum payload of 20 metric tons. It first entered VTA in the late 1950s.

In the mid-1970s, CANDID transports were introduced to meet VTA's increasing worldwide airlift requirements. The CANDID is comparable to the U.S. C-141, and can airlift up to 140 troops or 40 metric tons of cargo. Its main asset, however, is its greatly improved radius/range over that of the CUB it is replacing. A CANDID can thus theoretically lift twice the payload weight to five times the radius/range of the CUB.

During times of military emergency, VTA



An-22/COCK Long Range Turboprop Transport

can call upon the considerable reserve offered by Soviet civil aviation, Aeroflot. The civil fleet is equipped with about 200 CUBs and CAN-DIDs, about 1,100 medium- and long-range passenger transports and several thousand short-range transports and helicopters.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The Soviets continue to improve their capability to conduct Electronic Warfare (EW) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Technical advancements in both Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and Electronic Warfare Support Measures are noted in all Soviet forces. The air forces have numerous aircraft devoted to EW as escort and standoff jammer platforms. Additionally, since 1979, there has been increased emphasis on Soviet offensive, penetrating air forces equipped with ECM and accompanied by dedicated EW aircraft. The USSR has made a major investment in Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM), as well as lethal and nonlethal countermeasures. Ground forces continue to introduce new jammers, as well as a new series of improved SIGINT vehicles. Strategic fixed jammers are located throughout the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have developed their EW capabilities into an integrated system called Radio-electronic Combat, combining all forms of intelligence, direction finding, intensive jamming, deception and suppressive fires from ground, air and seabased platforms to attack enemy organization and systems through their electronic means of control. Its purpose is to limit, delay or nullify the enemy's use of his command and control systems while protecting Soviet systems by ECCM. An estimated goal of the system is to destroy or disrupt a significant proportion of the enemy's command, control and weapon system communications, either by jamming or by destructive fire.

The Soviet ECCM objective is the satisfactory operation of USSR electronic equipment in the face of enemy disruption. Thus, physical protection of the equipment is included as well as other practices beyond the scope of western ECCM. Modern ECCM features have been designed into the newer air defense equipment. The greatest emphasis, however, has been on individual and organizational techniques that can be applied in the field.

To cite one example, the Soviets use anti-radar camouflage to conceal military equipment against detection by ground, airborne and shipborne radars. Depending on the radar visibility of the objects to be camouflaged, anti-radar camouflaging is achieved by the creation of false targets or by blending into the terrain background those objects that might serve for orientation. Equipment may be concealed behind local features or by making use of the camouflaging properties of the ground relief.

In addition to natural cover, timber, brush wood, metallic nets and angle reflectors are used by Soviet forces for radar camouflage. Mockups of military equipment can also be used as antiradar reflectors.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

The armed forces of the Soviet Union in particular and the Warsaw Pact forces in general are better equipped, structured and trained than any other military force in the world to conduct offensive and defensive chemical warfare operations. Their capabilities are steadily improving.

The Soviets have deployed a variety of modern agents and multiple delivery systems, and have the tactical doctrine for large-scale employment of chemical weapons. A significant portion of all Soviet delivery systems—including missile and rocket systems, aerial bombs and artillery—are chemical-weapon capable. War-

saw Pact forces are well-trained, organized and equipped for offensive CW operations.

In Soviet military doctrine, toxic chemicals are associated primarily with theater warfare. The basic principle is to achieve surprise by using massive quantities of chemical agents against unprotected troops or against equipment or on terrain to deny its use.

A large chemical warfare organization is organic to the Soviet service structure. Throughout the Warsaw Pact each combat unit down to regimental level has a sizable contingent for chemical defense. Chemical specialists are also assigned at the company level. All Warsaw Pact combat and combat support forces are well equipped and realistically trained to insure their survivability and to increase their operational effectiveness in toxic environments.

SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

In the context of Special Purpose Forces, Soviet unconventional warfare is defined as a variety of military and paramilitary operations including partisan warfare, subversion, and sabotage, conducted during periods of peace and war, and including other operations of a covert or clandestine nature.

The Soviets have used unconventional forces and methods in the past:

- Bolsheviks employed partisan guerrilla units against the Czarists and other opponents during the Russian Civil War of 1917 to 1920.
- Soviet partisan forces were extensively used against the Germans during World War II.
- Special purpose troops were used to crush resistance to Soviet domination over Eastern Europe.
- Soviet special purpose forces were used in the Soviet invasion of Czech-

oslovakia in 1968 to arrest Czech leadership and secure key objectives in Prague.

- Soviet special purpose forces played an important role in the invasion of Afghanistan and the elimination of President Amin.

Soviet unconventional warfare activities are managed at the highest level of government authority. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff can be assumed to plan and execute Soviet unconventional warfare operations. These activities are protected by stringent security measures.

The Soviet leadership has a variety of elite forces for conducting unconventional warfare missions: special units of the KGB, GRU, Airborne and Ground and Naval Forces. The KGB special purpose units have a sabotage mission, and are thought to be targeted primarily against the civilian sector. Their tasks would be to create general panic among the civilian population, to disrupt civil government and public utilities, and to damage or destroy key production facilities.

The regular Soviet Armed Forces maintain elite airborne units, special sabotage/reconnaissance units and special long-range reconnaissance units for missions. The most powerful and numerous are the airborne troops under the direct control of the General Staff in Moscow. Some of these airborne units are designated as "special purpose" troops and are intended to operate in small groups against key political, military, command and control, transportation and industrial targets in the enemy rear area.

Soviet unconventional warfare units receive very intensive training. Small groups of men are trained as teams. Each team has an officer in charge who speaks the language of the target country fluently; a senior sergeant serves as sec-

ond in command. Other members of the group are trained as radio operators, weapons and demolition experts. In addition to the normal military training, the following special skills are emphasized:

- tactics of infiltrating and exfiltrating the target area
- night operational linkups
- sabotage methods using explosives, incendiaries, acids and abrasives
- parachute training
- clandestine communications
- hand to hand combat and silent killing techniques
- language/customs of target country
- survival behind enemy lines
- identifying and locating targets.

To make training as realistic as possible, the Soviet training centers are equipped with realistic models of key targets such as enemy facilities and weapon systems.

Soviet writings point out the effectiveness of UW units and record the accomplishments in World War II:

"During the war the partisans killed, wounded or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of German troops, collaborators and officials of the occupation administration. They derailed more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The partisan war affected the morale of the German Army, keeping the German troops in a constant state of fear."


Use of unconventional warfare is a basic element of Soviet doctrine, and Soviet capabilities in this respect constitute a formidable threat.

THE SOVIET NAVY


Over the last two decades the Soviet Navy has been transformed from a basically coastal defense force into an ocean-going force designed

Major Surface Ships


KIEV




KIROV




MOSKVA



UDALOY



SOVREMENNY



to extend the military capability of the USSR well out to sea and to perform the functions of tactical, theater and strategic naval power in waters distant from the Soviet Union. The Soviets have a larger array of general purpose submarines, surface warships and combat naval aircraft than any other nation. The submarines, about 70 of which carry antiship cruise

missiles, constitute the most serious threat to US and Allied naval forces and the worldwide sea lines of communication upon which we and our Allies depend. In the mid-1960s the Soviets had 260 major surface warships and amphibious ships. Today they have 362.

In the European theater, Soviet naval forces would have a variety of key missions. These would include securing vital areas of the sea and strategic passages such as the waters north of the Greenland/Iceland/United Kingdom Gap, the Gap itself, the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of

Finland, the passages on either side of Denmark, the Bosphorus and Dardenelles and the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, the Soviet Navy would seek to interdict the sea lanes to Europe, and would mount operations on the high seas against NATO carrier task forces, other surface warships and submarines.

The largest Soviet surface warship is the KIEV-Class aircraft carrier. At present, two KIEVs are deployed and two more are under construction. The KIEVs are armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, antisubmarine and over-

Soviet Navy Order of Battle

Submarines - Nuclear Powered

*SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (YANKEE, DELTA classes)	62
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (HOTEL class)	7
*SSGN	Cruise Missile Submarines	50
*SSN	Torpedo-Attack Submarines	60

Submarines - Diesel-electric Powered

SSB	Ballistic Missile Submarines	18
SSG	Cruise Missile Submarines	20
*SS	Torpedo-Attack Submarines	160

Aircraft Carriers and Aviation Cruisers

CVHG	VSTOL Carriers (KIEV class)	2
CHG	Aviation Cruisers (MOSKVA class)	2

Cruisers

*CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear) (KIROV class)	1
*CG	Guided Missile Cruisers (SAM/SSM)	26
CL	Light Cruisers (SVERDLOV class)	9

Destroyers

*DDG	Guided Missile Destroyers (SAM/SSM)	38
DD	Destroyers	30

Frigates (Escorts)

*FFG	Guided Missile Frigates (KRIVAK class)	28
*FF/FLL	Frigates /small frigates	140

Small Combatants

*Missile Craft	145
*Patrol /ASW/ Torpedo Craft	395
*Minesweepers	395

Amphibious Ships

*LPD	Amphibious Assault Transport Dock (IVAN ROGOV class)	1
LST	Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships (ALLIGATOR, ROPUCHA classes)	25
LSM	Medium Landing Ships (POLNOCNY/MP-4 classes)	60

Auxiliary Ships

*Mobile Logistics Ships	150
*Other Auxiliaries	605

* Indicates additional units under construction in these categories.

the-horizon target acquisition helicopters, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-submarine rockets and missiles, believed to be nuclear-capable, and the FORGER vertical- and short-takeoff and landing (VSTOL) jet aircraft.

The principal surface warships which the Soviets are building today have greater range, firepower and electronics capabilities than in the past. The modern ships of the Soviet Navy are among the fastest and most heavily armed in the world.

Present surface warship building programs include about 12 hulls under construction in four new classes of large warships, including a 23,000-ton nuclear-powered cruiser as well as the continued construction of KIEV-Class carriers and destroyer and frigate classes. The Soviet Navy has led the world in the use of cruise missiles in naval warfare. Since the installation of the SS-N-1 cruise missile on the KILDIN and KRUPNYY classes of destroyers in the late 1950s, the Soviets have extensively developed and deployed this type of weapon.


Today the Soviet Navy has some 20 cruisers, carriers, and destroyers, about 70 submarines and 300 land-based aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS


The widely publicized KIEV-Class aircraft carriers are the largest warships ever completed by the Soviet Union.

With the commissioning of KIEV in 1976, the Soviets, for the first time, have seabased, fixed-wing aircraft in operation. The second KIEV-Class ship, MINSK, is now in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, a third carrier is fitting out, and a fourth is under construction. A logical advance on the KIEV design could be a nuclear-powered carrier of about 60,000 tons with catapults and an air wing of some 60 aircraft. Such a ship could join the fleet late in this decade.

The KIEVs have an unusual design. They have a full load displacement of about 37,000 tons, are 270 meters long, have an angled flight deck some 185 meters long and an island super-




KIEV, Lead Ship of the KIEV-Class Guided Missile VSTOL Aircraft Carriers



In this view from astern, the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser KIROV reveals a superstructure massed with radars and electronic sensors, a stern door for ASW sonar, helicopter deck bordered by Gatling guns and 100mm dual purpose gun mounts.

structure to starboard in the tradition of Western carriers. However, the forward part of these ships is similar to Soviet missile cruisers, with antiship, antisubmarine and antiaircraft missile launchers. They also have a profusion of more traditional weapons, electronic warfare systems, and a number of advanced communications devices.

The lack of aircraft arresting wires and catapults on the flight deck limits the ships to helicopters and VSTOL aircraft. A mix of about 20 Ka-25/HORMONE helicopters and 15 Yak-36/FORGER VSTOL aircraft is a nominal air group, although this mix could be changed to meet varied mission requirements.



Yak-36/FORGERs on KIEV-Class Carrier

Although the primary mission of the KIEV Class is stated by the Soviets as antisubmarine warfare, the ships also have powerful antiship capability in their cruise missile battery. They have eight large launching tubes with reloads for SS-N-12 missiles, which are an improvement over the older SS-N-3 antiship missiles. The HORMONE B helicopter, capable of providing over-the-horizon targeting information for the SS-N-12/SANDBOX missiles which have a maximum range of some 550 kilometers, has been seen aboard the KIEV Class.

KIEV is a second generation class of Soviet "aviation ship," following the helicopter carrier missile cruisers MOSKVA and LENINGRAD, which were completed in 1967 and 1968, respectively. These earlier ships also were of innovative design, being essentially missile cruisers forward with a clear flight deck aft for the operation of up to 18 HORMONE antisubmarine helicopters. The latter ships are rated as "antisubmarine cruisers" by the Soviet Navy and have been used primarily in that role as well as serving as flagships.

SURFACE COMBATANTS

In May 1980 the Soviets began sea trials of their first nuclear-powered surface combatant, the guided missile cruiser KIROV. This is a ship of 23,000 tons, larger than any surface combatant other than an aircraft carrier built since World War II. Its primary armament is heavy, new generation, highly sophisticated surface-to-air and long-range antiship cruise missiles. The Soviets have also fitted her with ASW missiles, two 100-mm dual purpose guns, short-range surface-to-air missiles, Gatling guns for close-in defense, and Ka-25/HORMONE ASW helicopters.

KIROV is designed to provide improved fleet air defense against attack from Western aircraft carriers or from long-range cruise missiles. Conversely, the KIROV's new long-range, antiship cruise missiles will significantly enhance Soviet abilities to strike opposing surface action groups. KIROV marks an important developmental step in the technical evolution of Soviet sea power. A second unit is well along in construction.

In July 1980, the Soviets began sea trials of their second new class of major surface combatant in 1980, the 7,000-to-8,000-ton, steam-powered, guided missile destroyer (DDG) SOVREMENNY. While KIROV is clearly a multipurpose ship, SOVREMENNY appears



UDALOY, Guided Missile Destroyer

primarily designed for antisurface warfare with four 30-mm Gatling guns, surface-to-surface antiship cruise missiles, and new, medium range, surface-to-air missile systems. The SOVREMENNY has a secondary ASW mission and can carry HORMONE variant helicopters in its telescoping hangar. This new DDG is the first gun ship constructed by the Soviets since the late 50s and is their first major combatant since 1970 to deploy without significant ASW capability. It is now in series production with additional units expected through the mid-1980s. Ships of the SOVREMENNY Class can be expected to support amphibious assault forces, provide naval gunfire, and oppose Western air, surface and submarine forces in all ocean areas.


In November 1980, the Soviets began sea trials of still another new class of mission-specific guided missile destroyer, the UDALOY. This unit is designed primarily for antisub-

marine warfare, displaces about 8,000-to-9,000 tons, is armed with eight ASW missiles, two 100-mm guns, four Gatling guns for close-in defense and two hangars for ASW helicopters. The UDALOY appears to be a follow-on class to previous Soviet large antisubmarine ship programs and probably will be employed as the main ASW platform within an integrated Soviet task force. All available evidence suggests that the UDALOY program will be a large-scale effort with a number of units to be deployed through the 1980s.

Finally in 1980, a fourth major surface combatant program was identified in the Soviet Union. This new class of large, conventionally powered, multipurpose guided missile cruiser is being constructed in the Black Sea and has been temporarily designated "BLACK-COM-1." This new cruiser has supplanted KARA-class cruiser construction and will probably carry long-range cruise missiles. The new ship displaces approximately 11,000-to-13,000 tons and is further evidence of the Soviet trend toward larger, more technically sophisticated combatants. Although BLACK-COM-1 is conventionally powered, it is expected to function like KIROV as a multipurpose command ship capable of providing a Soviet battle group with enhanced air defense and surface strike capabilities. Series production of this new class is already underway.



KIROV, Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser



SOVREMENYY, Guided Missile Destroyer

SUBMARINES


The Soviet Navy currently operates some 377 submarines, including 180 nuclear-powered submarines compared to some 115 in the U.S. Navy.

Attack Submarines: The Soviet Navy operates about 220 attack submarines. Most are diesel-electric powered and many are of recent construction. About 60 of the torpedo attack submarines are nuclear powered, being of the NOVEMBER, ECHO, VICTOR, and ALFA

Classes. The last is believed to be the fastest submarine in service today in any Navy. An improved VICTOR Class is now in production and the small, ALFA Class, which combines deep-diving capabilities with its high speed, may well be in series production. The Soviet Navy continues to build diesel-powered submarines, the FOXTROT Class, for overseas sales, i.e., India, Libya and Cuba, and the new TANGO Class for use by the Soviet Navy. The prime weapons of these attack submarines are antisubmarine



VICTOR I-Class Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine



ECHO-Class Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine

and antiship torpedoes; however, mines also can be carried. The newer submarines have rocket-delivered ASW weapons as well.

Cruise Missile Submarines: Even while ambitious surface combatant construction programs were underway, the Soviets continued to turn out submarines at virtually the same pace they have maintained through the 1970s. One new class introduced in 1980, the OSCAR, is an extremely large SSGN capable of launching up to 24 long-range, antiship cruise missiles while remaining submerged. The missile fired by the OSCAR is probably a submarine variant of the same new antiship cruise missile first deployed aboard KIROV. This missile has an estimated range of over 450 kilometers. The Soviets began their submarine cruise missile programs in the 1950s converting existing submarines to fire the

long-range SS-N-3 missile. Then, newer submarines designed to carry the SS-N-3 joined the Soviet fleet, the diesel-powered JULIETT Class and the nuclear-powered ECHO I and II Classes.

After producing about 50 submarines of the JULIETT and ECHO Classes, the Soviets completed the first CHARLIE I Class SSGN in 1968 with the improved CHARLIE II following several years later. These nuclear-powered submarines can fire eight antiship cruise missiles while remaining submerged at a range of up to 100 kilometers from the intended target. Soviet cruise missile submarines also carry ASW and antiship torpedoes.

The Soviet Navy's cruise missile submarines and their missile-armed bombers form the greatest threat to Allied naval surface forces

operating on the high seas. This is especially so when within range of Soviet air bases where the Soviets can launch coordinated attacks using not only reconnaissance aircraft to provide target data for submarine-launched missiles, but also their extensive force of naval and air force missile-equipped bombers.

NAVAL AVIATION

Soviet Naval Aviation is subordinate to the Soviet Navy, with regiments being assigned to each of the four fleets under an aviation officer reporting directly to the fleet commander. Soviet Naval Aviation consists of some 1,440 aircraft, most of which are based ashore except for helicopters assigned to various cruisers and the helicopters and VSTOL aircraft that fly from the KIEV-Class aircraft carriers.

Soviet Naval Aviation has four basic missions: reconnaissance and surveillance, antiship strike, antisubmarine and aviation support.

Naval aircraft are employed in long-range reconnaissance and ocean surveillance, with some aircraft equipped to provide midcourse target data for antiship missiles launched "over the horizon" from surface ships, submarines, and other aircraft. Reconnaissance aircraft now in use include about 50 of the larger Tu-95/BEAR D turbo-prop planes; about 100 twin-jet Tu-16/BADGER aircraft, and Tu-22/BLINDER jet aircraft that have a supersonic dash speed. Additionally, the Il-38/MAY maritime patrol aircraft are used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

The prime strike force of Soviet Naval Aviation consists of over 300 twin-jet BADGER and BLINDER aircraft which are fitted to carry one or two of several types of antiship cruise missiles with "standoff" ranges varying from 90 to over 300 kilometers. Some missiles have variable flight paths and various homing techniques to

Soviet Navy Aircraft

Strike/Bombers 390

BACKFIRE
BADGER
BLINDER

Fighter/Fighter Bombers 70

FITTER
FORGER

Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare
Aircraft 180

BADGER
BEAR D
BLINDER

Antisubmarine Aircraft 400

BEAR F	HOUND
HAZE A	MAIL
HORMONE A	MAY

Tanker 70

BADGER

Transport/Training Aircraft 330

help penetrate ship defenses. All these missiles are assessed to carry either a nuclear or a high explosive warhead of about 1,000 to 2,000 pounds (450 to 900 kilograms).

Soviet Naval Aviation also flies the twin-jet BACKFIRE, a supersonic aircraft with variable-sweep wings. This plane carries stand-off missiles and is slowly replacing the BADGER in strike squadrons. The Navy is receiving this aircraft at about the same rate as the Soviet Long Range Aviation strategic bombing force and



Su-17/FITTER Fighter-Bomber

the inventory has climbed to more than 70 aircraft. The BACKFIRE greatly increases the capability and extends the range at which strike aircraft can attack Western surface forces such as aircraft carrier or amphibious battle groups.

The introduction of aircraft carriers and FORGER aircraft gives Soviet Naval Aviation another dimension of antiship strike. The FORGER can be fitted with short-range air-to-surface missiles, rockets, or bombs for use against ship or shore targets.

The FITTER fighter-bomber has been introduced into Soviet Naval Aviation over the last several years. These aircraft are assigned to the Baltic Fleet primarily to provide antiship strike and support to amphibious operations in the Baltic.

In addition to naval aircraft armed with antiship missiles, certain BEAR and BADGER bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation can be

used for attacks against ships, and these aircraft regularly participate in naval exercises. Most of these strike aircraft can be refueled in-flight by naval BADGERS fitted as tankers as well as by Long Range Aviation tankers.

For antisubmarine warfare the Soviet Navy has a force of about 400 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters configured for submarine detection and attack. This force currently includes BEAR F aircraft, MAY turbo-prop aircraft and MAIL twin-engine flying boat aircraft. Only the BEAR F appears to be still in production. These aircraft operate from Soviet land bases to search out seaward areas for foreign submarines.

An increasing number of antisubmarine helicopters are being flown by the Soviet Navy. The HORMONE A, a twin turboshaft helicopter, is flown from the newer Soviet cruisers, as well as from the helicopter carriers MOSKVA and LENINGRAD and the KIEV-Class aircraft

carriers. Additionally, an ASW version of the Mi-14/HAZE helicopter flies from land bases.

Soviet Naval Aviation also operates some 125 transport and utility aircraft of various types. Although basic and advanced training are provided by the Soviet Air Forces, maritime operational training is accomplished within the Navy. Soviet Naval Aviation retains a number of transports to provide a logistics capability better to meet the Navy's priority needs.

AMPHIBIOUS FORCES


Another area of continuing development in the Soviet Navy has been the amphibious assault forces. In April 1980, the recently constructed IVAN ROGOV, the Soviets' newest amphibious warfare ship, deployed to the Indian Ocean. At about 13,000 tons, the IVAN ROGOV is nearly three times the size of previous Soviet amphibious ships and is designed to operate both helicopters and high-speed air-cushioned landing craft. The ROGOV can embark about 550 naval infantry troops and significantly enhances Soviet amphibious warfare projection to distant areas, especially the Third World.

Amphibious lift for the naval infantry is provided primarily by IVAN ROGOV-Class LPDs, ALLIGATOR-Class and ROPUCHA-Class LSTs, and POLNOCNY-Class LSMs. The Soviet amphibious forces exercise regularly in their respective fleet areas and regularly deploy to the Mediterranean, off West Africa and the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy has about 25 LSTs and some 60 LSMs, plus numerous lesser landing craft and air-cushion vehicles for amphibious operations.


The Soviet Navy is now the world's largest operator of military air-cushion vehicles for which development continues. There are three classes currently in use: the GUS, LEBED and large AIST Class.

Although small by comparison to the U.S. Marine Corps, the Soviet Naval Infantry is the second largest marine force in the world. The potential power of even a few hundred Soviet marines afloat during a crisis provides the Soviet Union with a valuable political-military instrument.


The Soviets have in hand, or are developing, the elements necessary to provide a formidable



IVAN ROGOV, Lead Ship of a New Amphibious Assault Class



The 13,000-ton amphibious assault transport dock IVAN ROGOV entered service in 1978, the largest amphibious ship in the Soviet Navy. IVAN ROGOV has two helicopter decks and helicopter hangers, and a floodable welldeck, behind the large stern gate, which can carry three air-cushion landing craft. Judging by IVAN ROGOV's characteristics, the amphibious ship can carry a Soviet Naval Infantry Battalion—550 men—30 armored personnel carriers and ten tanks, enhancing the USSR's capability to project naval and military power at great distances from the Soviet homeland.




MINSK, Second of the KIEV-Class VSTOL Aircraft Carriers

projection into distant waters. These include the improvement in assault lift capability, the expansion of a large administrative lift ability designed into certain ships of the Merchant Marine, the retention of a substantial gunfire support strength in cruisers and destroyers, development of sea-based tactical air power, and an improving underway replenishment capability. The Soviet Navy's ability to project tactical power ashore at some distance from the Soviet littoral may be part of Admiral Gorshkov's grand plan of achieving a "balanced fleet."

Soviet naval policy and programs for the 1980s can be expected to be directed toward broadening the range of military and political options available to the leadership across the entire spectrum of conflict—from competition

in peacetime to hostilities in the event of a nuclear war. Having achieved rough parity in general war capabilities, the Soviets can be expected to increase their emphasis on making general purpose naval forces more capable in distant waters, of performing a variety of missions and of challenging the West's traditional dominance of the open oceans. We believe that Soviet naval policies also intend gradually to achieve greatly improved capabilities for sustained, long-range naval operations, even against substantial opposition.

V SOVIET STRATEGIC



FORCES



Over the past 20 years, the Soviet Union has devoted substantial resources to the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces. Fewer resources have been allocated to bomber forces, although new weapons systems—primarily the BACK-FIRE bomber—have been deployed.

Under Brezhnev, the Soviet missile forces have moved from a position of clear inferiority in the early-to-middle 1960s to one in which they are generally recognized as equal or superior in certain measures to those of the West. In 1964, the Soviets had only a few operational SLBMs, many of which had to be launched from surfaced submarines. While the USSR had more ICBMs than SLBMs, the number was significantly fewer than US ICBMs. Moreover, the majority of Soviet ICBMs were inaccurate systems housed in launchers that were clustered together and unhardened, making them vulnerable to attack. The USSR then embarked on high-priority development and deployment programs first focused on increasing single-silo ICBM deployment to a level greater than that of the United States. A similar buildup of SLBM launchers on modern, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) was underway by the late 1960s. These massive 1960s ICBM and SLBM deployment programs, largely centered on the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs and the SS-N-6/YANKEE SLBM/SSBN weapons systems, provided the foundation from which subsequent strategic nuclear modernization programs were to grow.

Since the mid-1970s the Soviet Union has completely upgraded its strategic Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force with the introduction of the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, equipped with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles—missiles with improved reliability, range, payload accuracy and survivability.

The 1970s modernizations, which only now are reaching a conclusion, were largely technological in nature. More than half of the 1,398 Soviet ICBM launchers have been rebuilt to house the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs in vastly more survivable, hardened silos. These ICBMs, all of which are MIRVed, are in the forefront of ICBM technology. Certain versions of the SS-18 and SS-19 are among the most accurate ICBMs operational anywhere. Together, these systems have the capability to destroy a large percentage of the more than 1,000 US ICBM launchers, using only part of their total numbers.

The Soviet SLBM/SSBN modernizations began in the early 1970s with the introduction of the long-range SS-N-8 SLBM deployed on DELTA-Class SSBNs. By the late 1970s, the Soviets were producing the MIRVed SS-N-18 and deploying it in a modified version of the DELTA-Class submarines. In 1979, a new SLBM, the MIRVed SS-NX-20, was first tested. This SLBM will probably reach operational status by the mid-1980s, deployed in the new TYPHOON-Class SSBN submarine.

These technological advances in ICBM and SLBM weapons systems have been accompanied by major improvements in communications systems and in the organization of the forces as well.

Soviet intercontinental bomber forces retain most of the BEAR and BISON bombers and refueling tankers which were initially produced in the 1950s and 1960s. Improvements to their avionics and weapons systems have been made, however. Since the early 1970s, the USSR has also deployed over 70 BACKFIRE bombers to operational LRA units and is producing about 30 more of these supersonic bombers each year. While BACKFIRE appears to have been given primarily theater and maritime missions, it has a strategic capability and cannot be ignored as


a potential intercontinental bomber threat.

Current force levels of Soviet intercontinental strategic nuclear forces include 1,398 ICBM launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and 156 long-range bombers, excluding BACKFIRE. These delivery systems are loaded with some 7,000 nuclear warheads. Deployment programs now underway indicate that the number of warheads will increase over the next few years.

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCE

The Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), the largest missile force in the world, controls all Soviet military units in the Soviet Union equipped with ICBMs, IRBMs and MRBMs. The mission of the SRF is to destroy an enemy's means of nuclear attack, military-industrial production facilities, civil and military command and control capabilities and logistics and transport facilities. The SRF's secondary mission is to support tactical joint forces and naval fleets.

Soviet strategic operational employment plans, based on Soviet writings, point to seizing the initiative through preemptive attack. Such an attack would effectively reduce the impact of a retaliatory strike, limiting damage to the USSR. While this is the preferred Soviet scenario, the Soviets also have the capability to launch on tactical warning if necessary. Regardless of how a war started, the Soviets view the nuclear forces and command and control of an enemy as their first priority targeting objectives. This would include such targets as ICBM launch silos, launch control facilities, support and maintenance facilities, strategic bomber bases, submarine berths and loading facilities and nuclear storage and production facilities. Priority two targets would be those that would negate the ability to project military power abroad. Such targets would include depots, transportation centers, military stockpiles, conventional force bases and training centers. Other targets



the SS-17 is believed to be about 10,000 kilometers. Although much more accurate than its predecessor, the SS-11, the SS-17 is not as accurate as the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs.

The SS-17 employs a cold-launch technique which delays main engine ignition until the missile has exited its hardened silo. This technique minimizes launch damage to the silo and is consistent with the notion of building in the capability to reload and refire missiles during a protracted nuclear conflict.

SS-18: The SS-18, the largest of the current Soviet ICBMs, is similar in dimensions to the SS-9, which it replaced, and is about twice the size of the proposed US MX missile. Like the SS-17, the SS-18 also uses a cold-launch technique. Both single and MIRVed versions of the SS-18 have been tested. The MIRVed versions carry eight or ten reentry vehicles. Each warhead of the ten RV variants has a better than 50 percent chance of destroying a MINUTEMAN silo. When used in pairs against a single target, the warheads are even more destructive. The single RV versions of the SS-18, with their large destructive power and accuracy, are capable of destroying any known

fixed target with high probability.

SS-19: The SS-19 ICBM became operational in 1974. It uses a hot-launch technique with engine ignition occurring while the missile is in its silo. The SS-19 is estimated to have three-to-four times the payload carrying capacity of the SS-11, and the missile is much larger in volume, comparable in size to the proposed US MX. There are both single and multiple RV versions of the SS-19. The MIRVed version, which makes up most of the SS-19 force, is believed capable of delivering six RVs to a range of about 9,000 kilometers.

ICBM RELOAD CAPABILITY

The Soviets could have contingency plans for reloading and refiring missiles from ICBM launchers which already have fired an initial round. The cold-launch technique employed by the SS-17 and SS-18 lends itself to such a capability in a protracted nuclear conflict. Additionally the Soviets may be able to reconstitute a portion of their hot-launched missile force—SS-11, SS-13 and SS-19—as well. The Soviets probably cannot refurbish and reload silo launchers in a period less than several days—thereby avoiding violation of the SALT II Agreement which precludes a rapid reload capability for ICBM launchers.


ICBM PRODUCTION

Four major Soviet design bureaus specialize in strategic missiles development. These bureaus are supported by activities at main assembly plants, at hundreds of component production plants, at test ranges, and at launch complexes. The Soviet missile development program shows no signs of slackening. We expect improvements leading to new missiles and to the modification of existing missile systems. These improvements are expected to continue the trend towards greater capabilities against such hard-

ened military structures as ICBM silos. As the accuracy of future Soviet missiles increases, it will be feasible for the Soviets to reduce the size of individual RVs and thereby to increase the number of MIRVs carried on each missile, assuming no external constraint such as that imposed by arms limitations. It is anticipated that the Soviets will develop solid-propellant ICBMs to supplement or replace some of the current liquid propellant systems. The SS-16, a small ICBM about the same size as the MINUTEMAN, is a solid-propellant ICBM which was developed by the Soviets in the early 1970s for mobile deployment. The system was never deployed. Future solid-propellant ICBM development and deployment could give the Soviets additional flexibility in handling and in basing their missile forces. Future missiles are expected to include upgraded versions of the present systems as well as new missiles.

SLBM FORCE


The Soviets continue to expand and modernize their SLBM force, now consisting of some 62 submarines carrying 950 modern SLBMs with a total of almost 2,000 nuclear warhead reentry vehicles. In the past seven years, the USSR has produced 30 SSBNs, and the new 20-tube, very




Length of TYPHOON Compared to Height of Washington Monument

large TYPHOON SSBN was launched in 1980. This new SSBN/SLBM system will be operational in the mid 1980s and is expected to include the SS-NX-20 missile. The SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 on DELTA-Class SSBNs permit the Soviets to hit targets in the United States from their home ports, and it is possible that the Soviets will develop follow-on SLBMs for these as well as the SS-N-6 on the YANKEE SSBNs.

The Soviet effort leading to this current capability began with the conversion of existing diesel-powered submarines in the mid-1950s to fire



YANKEE-Class SSBN




short-range ballistic missiles. In the early 1960s, the GOLF-Class diesel and HOTEL-Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines were completed.

By the end of 1974, the Soviet Navy had 34 YANKEE-Class SSBNs in service, each carrying 16 nuclear-tipped missiles. During 1973, following the signing of SALT I, the first of the larger DELTA-Class submarines was completed. The early DELTAs displace some 11,000 tons submerged and have an overall length of about 140

meters. The modern deployed strategic Soviet SLBM/SSBN force includes the SS-N-18/DELTA III weapon system.

SS-N-6/YANKEE I: The SS-N-6/YANKEE I weapon system is composed of the liquid-propellant SS-N-6 missile and the 16-missile tube YANKEE I-Class SSBN submarine. The SS-N-6/YANKEE I weapon system became operational in 1968. There are different versions of the SS-N-6 SLBM. One version carries a single RV and has a maximum operational range



DELTA I-Class SSBN


of about 2,400 to 3,000 kilometers. Another version carries two RVs and was the first Soviet SLBM to carry multiple RVs. This SS-N-6 has a maximum operational range of about 3,000 kilometers.

SS-N-8/DELTA I and II: The SS-N-8/DELTA weapon system includes the long-range, two-stage, liquid-propellant SS-N-8 SLBM and the 12-missile tube DELTA I and 16-missile tube DELTA II-Class SSBN submarines. The SS-N-8 was a significant change from previous Soviet SLBMs, even though liquid-propulsion technology was employed, because this was the first two-stage SLBM. The


SS-N-8 has a maximum operational range of about 9,000 kilometers and carries one RV.

SS-N-18/DELTA III: The SS-N-18/DELTA III weapon system is composed of the SS-N-18 two-stage, liquid-propellant SLBM and the 16-missile tube DELTA III-Class SSBN.


The SS-N-18 is the first Soviet SLBM to demonstrate a MIRV capability. Its maximum operational booster range is about 6,500 to 8,000 kilometers depending on the payload configuration. Greater range is possible if the SS-N-18 post-boost vehicle, or small third stage, is used to push the payload further along its trajectory, in addition to maneuvering to place reentry



DELTA II-Class SSBN



DELTA III-Class SSBN




vehicles in line with intended targets. A single RV version is also operational.

With the advances achieved in other Soviet strategic missile programs, it is assumed the missile for the new TYPHOON will be more capable than the SS-N-18 carried on the DELTA III, possibly having greater range, better accuracy, higher payload and more warheads. Today the DELTA III submarines can cover most US targets from the relative security

of their home waters. The TYPHOON at 25,000 tons submerged displacement, twice the size of the DELTA III, will certainly have no less capability.

LONG RANGE AVIATION

Long Range Aviation is comprised of more than 800 strike and support aircraft. Three-quarters of these are intermediate-range Tu-16/BADGER and Tu-22/BLINDER; the long-



M-TYPE/BISON Long Range Bomber



The Tupolev BACKFIRE Swing-Wing Bomber

range force includes more than 150 Tu-95/BEAR and M-Type/BISON, as well as some 70 Tupolev BACKFIRES.

The primary mission of LRA is to perform intercontinental and peripheral nuclear or conventional strike operations. The force also performs long-range reconnaissance, anti-naval strikes, and electronic warfare missions. Soviet long-range bombers complement the land and sea-based strategic missile forces, and in the event of intercontinental nuclear war they probably would be employed in follow-on nuclear strikes after initial missile strikes. The manned bombers provide the Soviets a degree of flexibility and diversity in their strategic attack forces not available with ballistic missiles.

The Tu-95/BEAR is a four-engine, swept wing, turboprop-powered bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs or air-to-surface missiles. First seen in the mid 1950s, about 100


BEARs are still in service with LRA. Able to carry a payload in excess of 25,000 pounds (12,000 kilograms) to a range greater than 11,300 kilometers, it is both the largest and longest range Soviet bomber. The range and flexibility of some models can be further increased with mid-air refueling. Six variants of the BEAR have been produced, three for the strike mission, two for reconnaissance and one for antisubmarine warfare. Two of the strike versions are configured to carry the 650 kilometer AS-3/KANGAROO air-to-surface missile.

The M-4/BISON is a four-engine, swept wing, turbojet-powered bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs. First seen in the mid 1950's, about 75 are still in service with LRA. About 45 of these are still configured as bombers while about 30 have been modified as air refueling tankers. They could be returned to

bomber configurations with little effort. This long-range, heavy bomber is able to carry a payload in excess of 12,000 pounds (5,500 kilograms) to a range of about 8,000 kilometers. The range and flexibility of some models can

also be increased with mid-air refueling.

The *Tupolev BACKFIRE* is the latest addition to the LRA forces. The BACKFIRE is a twin-engine, swing-wing, turbofan-powered bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs or




air-to-surface missiles. Placed in service in the mid 1970s, over 70 are deployed with Long Range Aviation with a like number assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation. This aircraft is still in production at the rate of about two and one-

half aircraft per month, 30 a year.

The BACKFIRE is a versatile, multipurpose aircraft capable of performing nuclear strike, conventional attack, antiship and reconnaissance missions. Its range and payload capabilities are comparable to those of BISON—more than 12,000 pounds (5,500 kilograms) payload and a range in excess of 8,900 kilometers with a bomb load. Its versatility makes it an excellent strike aircraft for peripheral and possibly for intercontinental missions. The BACKFIRE can be equipped with probes to permit inflight refueling which would increase its range and flexibility.

Intermediate Range Bombers: The 600 intermediate range Tu-16/BADGER and Tu-22/BLINDER aircraft represent a significant capability for use in theater strike operations. The Tu-16/BADGER is by far the most numerous aircraft in the force. Ten variants of this twin-jet, subsonic aircraft have been produced. These variants have expanded the mission of the BADGER beyond standard bombing to include electronic countermeasures, air-to-surface missile delivery, reconnaissance, and refueling. The BADGER G can carry two AS-5/KELT to a range greater than 3,200 kilometers while the BADGER A with a 8,360 pounds (3,800 kilograms) bomb load has a range of over 4,800 kilometers. The swept-wing, supersonic Tu-22/BLINDER is powered by two afterburning turbojet engines. The missile-carrier variant can deliver an AS-4 to a range of about 4,000 kilometers. The BLINDER has also been produced in free-fall bomber, reconnaissance and trainer versions.

Air-to-Air Refueling: The Soviets have an air-to-air refueling capability for Long Range Aviation. While they have not yet developed an



Tu-95/BEAR A, the Largest, Long Range Soviet Bomber

aircraft specifically for refueling, some 30 modified BISON aircraft serve as tankers. The Soviets evidently are developing a tanker version of the Il-76/CANDID transport aircraft. If so, the system is not yet deployed in sizable numbers.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES

Since the end of World War II, the Soviets have built and maintained the world's largest strategic defense force. Soviet efforts include each of the primary areas of defense concern: air defense, ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite defense, antisubmarine warfare and civil defense. When combined with the strong counterforce orientation of Soviet strategic offensive forces, these defense efforts point to a strategic concept of layered, in-depth defense of the homeland. This concept starts with preemptive attacks, if possible, against Western nuclear offensive forces and their command and control. It then proceeds to active defense against weapons enroute to targets and to the preparation of passive defenses to protect the Soviet governmental infrastructure and society against the effect of weapons penetrating the defenses.


The technical problems associated with defense against air and missile attack are im-

mense. Although Soviet defenses characteristically have fallen short of being able to handle fully the tasks they face, the USSR has persevered and is today entering a period of weapons system deployment aimed at measurably improving capabilities, primarily in air defense.

AIR DEFENSE

Manned Interceptors: Soviet air defenses combine the interceptor aircraft with early warning networks and surface-to-air missiles. There are more than 5,000 early warning and height-finding air defense radars throughout the USSR. Throughout the past decade, the USSR has continued to modernize its air defense forces which currently consist of some 2,500 aircraft, including the MiG-23/FLOGGER, MiG-25/FOXBAT, Su-9/FISHPOT, Su-15/FLAGON, Tu-128/FIDDLER and Yak-28/FIREBAR.

The number of older FISHPOT, FIDDLER and FIREBAR aircraft is decreasing as more modern interceptors are introduced to the inventory. FLAGON and the FLOGGER swing-wing interceptor aircraft are the workhorses of today's air defense interceptor force, comprising two thirds of the total inventory. The FLAGON, first deployed in the late 1960s, has been improved during the 1970s through additional armament and modernized avionics. The





MiG-25/FOXBAT Interceptor

FLOGGER is the most widely deployed interceptor.

The Mach 3 FOXBAT, designed to counter a high-altitude threat, can operate at 25,000 meters. A cutback in its production in 1977-1978 suggests that Soviet policy shifted to meet requirements for a low rather than a high-level threat. A number of new interceptor aircraft types could enter the air defense force over the next decade. Soviet research and development most likely will emphasize the development of look-down/shoot-down systems designed to be able to operate above their intended targets, identify and track them against the cluttered background of the earth and fire missiles capable of functioning in the same environment.

AWACS: To increase the effectiveness of their force, the Soviets are developing an increasingly effective Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to detect low-altitude penetrators. An earlier attempt, the Tu-126/MOSS, carrying a large rotodome radar on its back, does not appear to have met the need.

Organization: APVO's interceptor regiments are subordinate to ten air defense districts, each with its specific geographic areas of responsibility. The high concentration of interceptor regi-

ments west of the Ural Mountains, and in the south, reflects the degree of Soviet concern over its perceived major threats—NATO and the People's Republic of China.

Soviet air defense systems are unsurpassed and are deployed in great variety and quantities. The Soviet air defense umbrella is integrated and overlapping and includes both tactical—associated with the Ground Forces—and strategic components. If not occupied with Ground Forces requirements, the tactical air defenses could be available to supplement the strategic forces.

Tactical Surface-to-Air Missiles: The first truly mobile tactical SAM, the SA-4/GANEF, was introduced around 1967. The SA-9/GASKIN infrared homing missile, mounted on a scout car, was deployed in 1968 and the shoulder-fired SA-7/GRAIL was introduced in 1968.

During the last ten years, the Soviets continued to improve the mobility, firepower and target-handling capability of their Ground Forces' air defense umbrella.

In the early and mid-1970s, they introduced the SA-6/GAINFUL and SA-8/GECKO at maneuver division level. The GECKO has a range of over ten kilometers and is unique


among Soviet tactical air defense systems in that all the components needed to conduct a target engagement are on a single vehicle. The GAINFUL has a range of about 30 kilometers. These new SAMs can keep pace with rapidly advancing maneuver forces.

In the late 1970s, the Soviets fielded the short-range SA-13 on a tracked vehicle. The SA-13 has been deployed along with the ZSU-23-4 in the antiaircraft battery of motorized rifle and tank regiments. The SA-13 is probably a replacement for the SA-9.


The trend of improving air defense coverage is expected to continue through the modification of existing systems and the introduction of

new systems to supplement or replace them. This will be accomplished by improved technology. The diverse capabilities of Soviet air defense systems will be enhanced by improved command and control procedures to avoid destroying friendly aircraft while rendering the airspace over the ground forces virtually impenetrable to enemy aircraft. Other trends have been to increase the size of the engagement envelope, improve mobility, increase firepower, and increase target handling capability.

Strategic SAMs: The Soviet strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) force is composed of some 10,000 launchers deployed at over 1,000 fixed sites within the borders of the USSR. These



SA-2/GUIDELINE Missiles on Transporters



launchers can actually accommodate over 12,000 missiles because many of the launchers have multiple launch rails. In addition, other Warsaw Pact countries have over 1,000 launchers deployed in Eastern Europe. Four different SAM systems have been employed at these sites, and a new system—the SA-10—is now becoming operational. The four older systems are the SA-1/GUILD, SA-2/GUIDELINE, SA-3/GOA, and the SA-5/GAMMON, deployed in the USSR only. These systems are under the control of PVO Strany, the Air Defense of the Homeland, a separate service of the Soviet Armed Forces charged with protecting the Soviet Union from attack from the air.


The SA-2, initially operational in 1959, has been the backbone of Soviet SAM defenses. It is deployed throughout the Soviet Union and is used by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and other communist and Third World nations as well. The SA-3 is now deployed throughout the USSR and Warsaw Pact at over 400 sites. It provides low-altitude coverage and point defense to selected strategic areas. Over half the sites use newer four-rail launchers, rather than the two-rail launchers, thus doubling the numbers of missiles in the ready-launch position.

The SA-5 was first deployed in 1963, and

deployment continues today with over 100 complexes operational throughout the Soviet Union. The SA-5 is a long-range interceptor designed to counter the threat of high-performance aircraft.

The SA-10 system is the latest Soviet strategic SAM system and is designed for increased low-altitude capability. With radars which are more advanced than previous systems, the SA-10 was designed to counter low-altitude manned aircraft, although it may have some capability against cruise missiles.

In all, the Soviets maintain a vast network of SAM sites which are constantly being upgraded. This network, which acts in concert with the



ABM-1B/GALOSH Antiballistic Missile in Transporter/Launcher Canister

large numbers of interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and is enhanced by a virtual 100 percent high-altitude coverage of early warning radars, presents a formidable barrier to any would-be attacker from the air.

ABM DEFENSE

The Soviets maintain the world's only deployed antiballistic missile (ABM) defense. The system includes peripherally located HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars and four operational ABM launch complexes near Moscow. The Moscow defenses currently include the ABM-1B/GALOSH interceptor missiles, battle management radars and missile engagement radars.

The Soviets have continued to improve their BMEW capability by constructing large phased-array radars to supplement the old HEN HOUSE network and to close existing gaps in coverage.

They also continue to engage in an active and costly ABM research and development effort, which they are permitted to do under the ABM Treaty of 1972. Their main concentration appears to be on improving the performance of their large phased-array detection and tracking radars and developing a rapidly deployable ABM system. When development of this system is completed, its main elements could be deployed in the Moscow area to replace or supplement the existing system. Such deployment would further upgrade Moscow's defenses, and could provide operational experience for broader deployment. Improving the Moscow defenses is allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty as long as the 100 interceptor launcher limit is not exceeded. Deployment in additional locations is prohibited by the Treaty.




ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE

The Soviets' defensive posture extends into space as well with the only antisatellite (ASAT) system known to be operational. The demonstrated Soviet nonnuclear low-altitude orbital ASAT interceptor poses a known, if presently limited, threat to some US satellites. It is anticipated the Soviets will continue work in this area with a goal of negating satellites in high orbit, as well as developing more effective kill mechanisms, perhaps using a laser or some other type of directed energy weapons.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Soviet civil defense is a nationwide program under military control. The chief of Soviet civil defense is a deputy minister of defense and general of the army. Full-time civil defense staffs



exist at each echelon of the Soviet administrative structure: national republic, *oblast*, city, and urban and rural *rayon*. Civil defense staffs also exist at significant industrial and other installations. In peacetime, more than 115,000 people work full-time in the program. In wartime, the number could be upwards of 16 million. The program costs more than the equivalent of \$2 billion annually.


Protection of their leadership has been a primary objective of the Soviets. Given a war-crisis warning of only a few hours, the survival and effective functioning of the 110,000 government and other officials necessary to lead the Soviet Union may be possible. This protection has been achieved through the construction of deep, hard urban shelters and countless relocation sites. Leadership protection, from the na-

tional to *rayon* level, is intended to assure the maintenance of control throughout the society.

A civil defense problem of vital concern to the Soviets is their continuing inability to provide physical protection for their industrial installations. Although there have been numerous references in Soviet civil defense literature to the desirability of dispersal of key industries for protection purposes, little has been done to achieve this goal.

The Soviet leadership considers the protection of these resources through their civil defense program to be an indispensable element of their strategy. They continue a longstanding commitment to heavy investment in their civil defense program.

VI QUEST FOR TECHNO



LOGICAL SUPERIORITY

The Soviets have often stated their goal of superiority in science and technology. The present, growing Soviet military capability reflects the achievements of a technological base that has grown steadily since the late 1950s, despite the fact that the Soviets have nothing comparable to the commercial technology base in the Western World.

The recent increase in the level of deployed Soviet military technology is significant, because the West has customarily relied on its now eroding technological superiority to offset the Soviet Union's historical quantitative advantage in deployed weapons. Even the United States' lead in basic military technology is presently being challenged.

During the 1970s, the Soviets have dramatically reduced the US lead in virtually every important basic technology. The United States is losing its lead in key technologies, including electro-optical sensors, guidance and navigation, hydro-acoustics, optics and propulsion. In many areas where the United States continues to lead the Soviets, their technology has achieved a level of adequacy with respect to present military requirements.

Over the past ten years, the Soviet Union is estimated to have taken the lead in the development of directed energy weapons such as high-power lasers and possibly radio frequency devices. The USSR is also thought to have enlarged its lead in electrical power sources for such directed energy weapons, as well as its more customary lead in chemical explosives.

The T-80 tank, now in experimental production, is the third, new class of tanks with markedly improved firepower, armor and mobility produced by the USSR in recent years, a weapons system underscoring the across-the-board Soviet quest for quantitative and qualitative weapons superiority.


At present the United States still leads the Soviets by two-to-seven years in microelectronics, computers and jet engines critical to the development of advanced weapon systems.


In the past, to offset the superior quality of Western weapons, the Soviets have deployed larger quantities of military equipment. Furthermore, they have typically fielded one-and-one-half-to-two generations of equipment while the West fielded a single generation. And, they have often modified each of these generations two or three times, upgrading their technology with each modification. This combination of a high rate of deployment and an almost continuous program of modifying fielded equipment substantially reduces the average age of deployed technology. The West's technological lead is thus doubly eroded by the much younger age, as well as by the very large number, of fielded Soviet equipment.

The Soviets' weapons development effort, paced by a weapons acquisition process in which key national decision-makers directly participate, represents a systematic correction of deficiencies in the USSR's existing military capabilities and the methodical addition of new weapons capabilities.

The momentum of the Soviet research and development program is likely to continue. Scores of major Soviet systems are now in various stages of test and evaluation. Many of these systems are quite significant, for example, the T-80 tank, the TYPHOON ballistic missile submarine, the OSCAR cruise missile submarine, a new interceptor and associated look-down/shoot-down missile and a variety of precision-guided munitions.

Pacing each of the Soviet weapon system developments is a very large research effort in the sciences and technologies. Over the past ten years, the high-priority military research and development sector received large infusions of





capital investment leading to significant growth in those research, design and test facilities critical to Soviet weapons development.

A concurrent increase in the size of the Soviet R&D manpower force has also been noted. In 1980 the USSR was believed to have had nearly 900,000 full-time equivalent scientists and engineers engaged in research and development. This is the world's largest aggregation of scientists and engineers and is compared to about 600,000 for the United States. While the number of scientists and engineers specifically engaged in Soviet military R&D is unknown, it is clearly a large percentage of their total effort.

Soviet Research and Development Centers



In 1980 the Soviets graduated about 300,000 engineers and 150,000 natural scientists (including life sciences and medicine) out of a total of over 800,000 graduates. The trend in Soviet higher education graduates has been one of steady increase, although the rate of increase has declined in recent years. By 1990 the total number of graduates in the USSR is expected to be at least 950,000 per year.

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Estimated to be Over 40 Knots.***

MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES

Certain critical military technologies including electronics, propulsion, materials and life sciences are receiving highest priority in the USSR today.

Electronics and Computers: Although the United States remains the world leader in the field of microelectronics and computers, Soviet progress in the past 15 years has been impressive.

Advanced miniaturized electronics or microelectronics are vital and necessary elements of modern computers. Since modern electronic computers are the "heart" and "brain" of mili-

tary weapons, and industrial, economic, management and other complexes or systems, Soviet achievements in microelectronics greatly benefit the military.

In 1965, Soviet development and production of microelectronics and computers was about 10-to-12 years behind US capability. Today, the average relative position or "gap" is three-to-five years with a few outstanding developments following US technology by only two years and some problem areas lagging by as much as seven years. Important Soviet decisions to acquire US and Western technology and copy, or "reverse engineer," microelectronics and computers by



Soviet RYAD Computers

any means available have played a fundamentally important role in their success. The Soviet RYAD series of computers are based on existing US computer equipment. Similarly, Soviet microcomputers and microprocessors are clearly based on US minicomputer and microprocessing equipment already on the market. The Soviets have also copied many different types of US integrated circuits including computer logic and memory chips from practically all the major US microcircuit manufacturing facilities. Without the transfusion of US technology and equipment, the Soviet Union's capabilities would almost certainly have remained at the 10-

to-12 year gap of the 1965 era.

Directed Energy Weapons: The Soviets have devoted substantial resources to high technology developments applicable to directed energy weapons. Their knowledge of radio frequency weapons, as demonstrated in Soviet open literature, and the fact that they are developing very high peak-power microwave generators, gives rise to suspicions of possible weapon intent in this area as well. The Soviets have been interested in particle beam weapons (PBW) concepts since the early 1950s. There is considerable work within the USSR in areas of technology relevant to such weapons.



Artist's Concept of Soviet Surface-to-Air Laser Weapons

The Soviet high energy laser program is three-to-five times the US level of effort and is tailored to the development of specific laser weapon systems. In contrast, the United States largely confines its laser programs to exploratory work. The Soviet laser-beam weapons program began in about the mid-1960s. Since then the Soviets have been actively pursuing the development of all the high energy laser types considered most promising for future weapons applications. They have worked on the gas dynamic laser, the electric discharge laser and the chemical laser. Available information suggests that the Soviet laser weapon effort is by far the world's largest. Their development of moderate power weapons capable of short-range ground-based applications, such as tactical air defense and anti-personnel weapons, may well be far enough along for such systems to be fielded by the mid-1980s. In the latter half of this decade, it is possible that the Soviets could demonstrate laser weapons in a wide variety of ground, ship and aerospace applications.

Pulse Power and Technology: Pulsive power and energy conversion have been recognized as key technologies in the development of directed energy weapons. Possible applications include tactical airborne electric discharge lasers, tank and helicopter-mounted laser weapons, strategic or defensive antiballistic missile and antisatellite weapons and beam weapons for both short and long-range antiship missile defense. A principal pacing factor in the development of directed energy weapons is the availability of a suitable supply of energy. Pulse power technology may be the pacing factor in a weapons program even after the feasibility of beam propagation and adequate lethality is demonstrated. Because the requirements of beam weapons are unique and, in many cases, exceed current state-of-the-art, they have driven the

major research and development efforts in the USSR.

Propulsion: The Soviet Union customarily provides the propulsion units for all its aircraft, ships and land vehicles. The Soviets have conducted research and experimentation on new types of propulsion concepts for generations and have often produced innovative designs. For example, the SA-6/GAINFUL missile unveiled in 1967 used the world's first integral rocket ramjet. The Soviet recognition of the advantages in gas turbines for naval propulsion resulted in an impressive shift to this form of propulsion in the past 20 years. In addition to their low weight and volume, the advantages of gas turbines include operational flexibility, reduced manning levels, and ease of maintenance.

Until recently, the Soviet Navy's KARA-Class guided missile cruiser, operational since the early 1970s, was the world's largest gas turbine-powered warship. The USSR still leads the world in the widespread use of naval gas-turbine propulsion. It has applied this mode of propulsion to over 200 major and minor combatants.

Propellants: Soviet scientists are investigating all aspects of propellant chemistry and performance characteristics at several academic institutions throughout the USSR. The Soviets design their artillery and other propellant charges to obtain maximum performance, although they tend to use low energy propellant formulations in most of their large-caliber ammunition to maximize safety and storage life.

Explosives: The USSR is active in all facets of explosives research and development. The Soviets can now synthesize every known explosive compound with a military application, including research for fuel-air explosives. They can load their newest weapons with warheads containing TNT (trinitrotoluene), RDX (cyclo-

trimethylene trinitramine) or HMX (cyclotetramethylene tetranitramine). Western fuel-air explosive munitions are capable of clearing paths through minefields to permit the passage of armored vehicles. Such explosives can also do extreme damage to unarmored targets such as radar vans and aircraft.

MANUFACTURING

The success or failure of all weapons is heavily dependent on the quality and quantity of the materials used in their construction. The USSR has the largest raw materials base in the world and claims deposits of nearly all minerals needed by a modern economy. Since the 1950s, materials used in Soviet weapon systems have steadily improved.

Through considerable efforts and a combination of foreign and indigenous technology, the Soviets have built an imposing industrial base. While frequently less efficient in their use of capital, raw materials and manpower, the Soviets have nonetheless assembled the plant and equipment necessary to build annually thousands of tanks, trucks and aircraft and dozens of naval vessels.

Welding has assumed a high position among the fabrication techniques used by the Soviets because it permits complex shapes to be formed from a limited variety of mill products (e.g., sheet, plate, tube and rods). To augment their strong position in this area, the Soviets graduate several thousand welding engineers annually. The Soviets have been important innovators of welding methods, e.g., friction welding, submerged-arc welding, glue welding and certain aspects of pulse-arc welding. They have been creative in their development of methods for welding dissimilar and difficult-to-weld materials. Their construction in the late 1950s of what continues to be the world's largest forging and extrusion presses at 75,000 tons and 20,000

tons, respectively, was a bold move that enables the Soviets to fabricate aircraft structural components in sizes and with efficiencies that are unsurpassed.

By the late-1960s, the Soviets had perfected two new methods for refining steel and other alloys—electroslag remelting and plasma-arc melting—advancements in the methods to improve the properties of alloy materials.

The vast amount of technical data published by the industrialized Free World on materials technology has permitted, and has probably encouraged, the USSR to emulate and adopt Western developments. The differences in the materials used in Soviet and US weapon systems are thought to be approaching the point where the differences are no longer militarily meaningful.

Metallic Materials: Soviet achievements in metallurgy cover the complete spectrum of research and development emphasizing alloy development and materials processing.

The Soviet Union produces a full range of structural steels from the plain carbon and high-strength low-alloy steels to the stainless and maraging steels. The Soviets also are producing a unique high-manganese steel for cryogenic applications due to their abundant supply of manganese-bearing ores.

While high energy costs have reduced Western use of magnesium alloys, the Soviet Union's production of magnesium alloys was increasing in the 1970s. The weight advantages of their magnesium-lithium alloys may cause this material to be useful in aerospace systems.

Since the 1940s, the major industrialized nations have committed great amounts of R&D manpower and resources to improving the performance of the superalloys. The term "superalloy" refers to alloys that possess good strength and oxidation resistance in the temperature range of 650°C-2000°C. These alloys are of

critical importance in the high temperature sections of gas turbine engines. The Soviet super-alloys are thought to be as capable as Western alloys with respect to temperature capability but may possess shorter service lives.

The USSR is the world's largest producer of titanium alloys. The Soviets' titanium alloys are being extensively applied to enhance the performance of aircraft, missile, and naval ship systems using modern welding techniques.

Composite Materials: Since the mid 1960s, the Soviets have been constructing small naval vessels from glass-fiber-reinforced plastics. The glass-fiber-reinforced plastics also have been introduced into aircraft, missile and ground weapons applications. Based on Western successes in the late 1960s on high-performance carbon and boron-fiber reinforced materials, the Soviets launched a parallel effort in the mid 1970s. Their program is progressing along similar lines to that taken by the US and other Western countries by first incorporating such materials into aircraft secondary structures and control surfaces. The large Soviet commitment of physical and manpower resources to the development of a variety of high-modulus fiber-reinforced metal, organic and inorganic matrix composites should enable them to gain ground quickly in this field.

Organic Materials: By the early 1960s, the Soviets realized the importance of organic materials—resins, elastomers, adhesives, synthetic fibers—to a modern economy and military preparedness. Since that time, the USSR's chemical industry has been expanding at a formidable rate. Much of the technical knowledge has been directed at achieving high temperature capabilities.

LIFE SCIENCES

The Soviet Union has extensive R&D programs in the life sciences, the medical, biologi-

cal, and behavioral sciences, and, in some areas, their capabilities equal or exceed those of the United States.

In general, the Soviet Union's life science research program centers on those areas that permit them to establish or maintain a military advantage, and those areas that will contribute to the solution of critical economic, industrial and political problems. While their early efforts in manned space flight, for example, were devised to gain maximum political benefit, their current efforts seem to be related to the establishment of a military presence in space. Man-related problems and life support systems capability are the chief limiting factors in Soviet manned space flight.

The Soviets also conduct extensive research in other areas that contribute to the establishment of a military advantage. Underwater physiology, submarine habitability, human factors engineering and aviation physiology are examples of this type of research. The research goals in these areas are related to improving the performance of the biological component of their weapon systems.

The Soviet Union also conducts biomedical research in many other areas that affect their military capability. There is continuing Soviet interest in the recognition of emotional and physiological stress by voice analysis. Battlefield troops, pilots, submarine personnel and other isolated individuals could be monitored by voice analysis. The only constraints would be the quality of voice transmission and the analytic techniques.

Other areas of biological science research in the Soviet Union are directly applicable to developing weapon systems. Research in behavioral modification, biological warfare and genetic engineering all have the potential to result in the development of new and extremely effective weapons.

Behavior Modification: The Soviets are currently engaged in a number of research efforts directed at modifying the brain, its activity and ultimately the behavior of individuals and large groups of people. Significant work in this area—including psychosurgery, microelectrode implantation, electromagnetic radiation, drugs and physical methods for altering behavior—has been conducted. The Soviets have political and military goals for conducting behavior modification research.

Biological Warfare: Since the summer of 1979, information has been obtained from a variety of sources that presents strong circumstantial evidence of an inadvertent release of anthrax bacteria from a highly secured military installation in Sverdlovsk, in the USSR. The available information and our technical analysis point strongly to biological R&D activities that exceed those one would normally expect for biological warfare protection purposes. Furthermore, we cannot discount the probability that the Soviets have continued to pursue other microbiological agents for possible development and standardization as weapons of biological warfare.

Genetic Engineering: The Soviet Union is currently conducting extensive work in genetic engineering, which is the ability to selectively modify the composition of the genetic blueprint (DNA) in order to engineer biological organisms to meet specific design criteria. Although there is no work with genetic engineering being done in the Soviet Union that is known to be directly related to biological warfare, there is interest in this area. Soviet scientists are researching genetic regulatory mechanisms, recombinant gene vectors, recombinant gene stability, and basic aspects of viral and bacterial genetics, all of which have potential value for development of biological warfare agents. Similar research is, however, being pursued on a broader

scale in the United States and may serve as an impetus for increased Soviet interest. Of greatest potential benefit to the military is the development of vaccines using recombinant technology for troop immunization.

SPACE PROGRAM

The Soviets have a vigorous and constantly expanding military space program. In the past ten years they have been launching spacecraft at over 75 per year, at the rate of four-to-five times that of the United States. The annual payload weight placed into orbit by the Soviets is even more impressive—660,000 pounds—ten times that of the United States. Some, but by no means all, of this differential can be accounted for by long-life US satellites using miniaturized high technology components. Such an activity rate is expensive to underwrite, yet the Soviets are willing to expend resources on space hardware at an approximate eight percent per year growth rate in constant dollars.

We estimate that 70 percent of Soviet space systems serve a purely military role, another 15 percent serve dual military/civil roles, and the remaining 15 percent are purely civil. The Soviet military satellites perform a wide variety of reconnaissance and collection missions. Military R&D experiments are performed onboard Soviet manned space stations, and the Soviets continue to develop and test an ASAT antisatellite co-orbital interceptor.

The Soviets appear to be interested in and possibly developing an improved ASAT. A very large space booster similar in performance to the Apollo program's Saturn V is under development and will have the capability to launch very heavy payloads into orbit, including even larger and more capable laser weapons. This booster is estimated to have six-to-seven times the launch weight capability of the Space Shuttle.

Soviet space research and development, test,

production, and launch facilities are all undergoing a continuing buildup. The new booster will be capable of putting very large permanently manned space stations into orbit. The Soviet goal of having continuously manned space stations may support both defensive and offensive weapons in space with man in the space station for target selection, repairs and adjustments and positive command and control. The Soviet's predominantly military space program is expected to continue to produce steady gains in reliability, sophistication and operational capability.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

In addition to being the source of much of the Soviet Union's electronic and computer technology and advanced manufacturing capability, the industrialized Free World, during the past decade, has supplied the Soviet industrial sector with billions of dollars worth of efficient machine tools, transfer lines, chemical plants, precision instrumentation and associated technologies. These goods and technologies have unquestionably played a major role in the modernization and expansion of Soviet industry. Although much of the technology embodied in the Western equipment is known and understood by Soviet technicians, the purchase of such equipment via long-term low interest loans has enabled the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries to achieve an industrial expansion at a substantially faster rate than would have been possible with indigenous resources.

In addition to the acquisition of Western industrial plants and equipment, the decade of the 1970s has also witnessed greatly expanded contact between the Free World and Soviet scientists and engineers. The scope and depth of their interest in the advanced and emerging technologies is exemplified by the exchange agreements that the Soviet Union has nego-

tiated with the United States since 1972.

Bilateral S&T Exchanges: In 1972 the Soviets signed the first four of 11 agreements with the United States dealing with cooperation in the fields of science and technology. These 11, now combined into ten agreements, have encompassed as many as 250 different working groups and subgroups for the exchange of scientists, scientific and technical information and documentation, and joint research, development, testing and exchange of research results and experience.

Another mechanism of technology transfer under seven of the ten agreements is contained in a provision, "Article IV," stating that both parties encourage and facilitate the establishment and development of direct contacts and cooperation between agencies, organizations, and firms of both countries. The majority of the "Article IV" agreements are with the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology. This is the unit charged with the responsibility of coordinating technology acquisitions from the West.

Student Exchanges: Student exchanges usually occur under the aegis of a cultural agreement. The student exchanges with the Soviet Union and the East European communist countries are administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). The average Soviet student in such exchanges is 33-to-35 years of age, possesses a Candidate degree, roughly equivalent to a Ph.D., and has about eight years of practical experience, almost all of which apply to the study and conduct of research in the hard sciences or engineering. Further, the students want to concentrate in the emerging technological areas, with many of these areas having immediate military application.

In the senior scholar program, each side sends a number of scholars for a total of 50 man

months per year. As with the student exchange program, the Soviets tend to send scientists, while the United States sends persons specializing in the arts, literature, and history. Until a few years ago, most Soviets in this program conducted very basic scientific research. Now, nearly all of them propose to study in the emerging scientific fields, with most of these fields having direct and immediate military application.

Inter-Academy Exchange: The exchange between the US and Soviet Academies of Science makes available another mechanism of technology transfer. The provisions of this agreement permit the exchange of 12 scientists per year (one month each) for the purpose of survey and familiarization visits, and as many as 18 scientists for periods of three to 12 months each for a maximum of 88 man months per year.

Conferences/Symposia: The problem of technology transfer at conferences is one of additional concern. US companies use such gatherings to advertise the results of their work to industry, government, and the academic community in the hopes of securing additional contracts. The academic community uses conferences and symposia for the presentation of major papers. The government frequently uses this media to advertise its requirements and to provide status reports. For whatever reasons, this media makes available a wealth of scientific and technological data that is probably not surpassed by any other nation.

Unclassified Reports: All research reports and studies conducted by, or for, the US government are placed in one or more repositories. In defense, most reports and studies are sent to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), where they are accessioned and the classified documents stored. Such classified documents are readily available to other government agencies and personnel who have

the requisite clearances and need-to-know. They are also available to government contractors who have established a valid need through their contracting officer and possess the necessary facilities and cleared personnel. Unclassified reports received by DTIC are forwarded to the National Technical Information Services (NTIS) operated by the Department of Commerce. These reports are available to anyone for a very nominal fee.

The communist countries are some of NTIS' best customers. Until their subscription was terminated in February 1980, the Soviets purchased each of the estimated 80,000 documents entering NTIS each year. The remaining Warsaw Pact countries and individuals acting on behalf of the Soviets still purchase from the NTIS.

Professional/Open Literature: For many years professional and open literature has been exploited for technology transfer information. There is believed to be a great imbalance in the value of such literature in favor of the communist countries.

The Soviets are seeking Western technology and equipment by any and all means in their quest for technological superiority. In the past, Soviet weapon designers appeared to be somewhat constrained in the effectiveness of the products they could develop by a limited technological base for specialized components. Technology transfer affords them the opportunity to rectify such deficiencies. The vast amount of information gained from the United States saves the Soviets a considerable amount of time and money by pointing out the fruitful avenues of research and development.

VII SOVIET GLOBAL P




POWER PROJECTION




As self-designated leader of the communist world and as a superpower with global ambitions, the USSR and its expansionist efforts abroad are targeted at spreading and solidifying USSR political, economic and military influence and drawing nations into its orbit. The Soviets view the projection of power in much more comprehensive terms than commonly understood in the West. Their programs seek to integrate all instruments at their disposal in pursuit of their goals. In the past decade, Moscow's increasing boldness can be linked directly to the growing capabilities and utility of its military forces, applied in a pragmatic, coordinated and flexible manner with other military, political, economic and subversive measures to influence world events. The USSR's enhanced confidence in its capabilities to project power through a variety of military and non-military means has widened Soviet options and has been a key factor underlying its increased activities in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. In the military realm alone, involvement abroad has progressed steadily from the limited use of military assistance in the 1950s, to the occasional use of its armed forces in defensive roles in the early 1970s, to the extensive use of proxies in advisory positions and combat operations over the last five years, to the direct application of large-scale Soviet military force in Afghanistan since December 1979.

Violence and coercion have played a central role in the establishment and maintenance of

The CANDID jet transport, which can carry 140 troops or 40 tons of cargo, entered service in the mid-1970s to help meet the USSR's worldwide military airlift requirements. Because of their mobility, the USSR's seven airborne divisions are particularly well-suited for the rapid introduction of Soviet combat forces.

SOVIET GLOBAL

OWER PROJECTION



the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. The Soviet need for and use of force as a tool of domestic control, combined with the historic Russian policy of security through territorial aggrandizement, have given it the impetus to attempt to transform conflicts, tensions and resentments into concrete political gains. While the Soviets no longer wholly subscribe to Lenin's dictum that the advance of socialism "...is impossible without a violent revolution...and the destruction of the apparatus of state power..." they do believe that military force is the major propellant of change in international affairs. They see growing Soviet military strength as providing a favorable backdrop for the conduct of their dual-track foreign policy: the maintenance of traditional diplomatic and economic ties on the one hand, while promoting subversion and revolution in the same states on the other.

Trends in the Soviet military force buildup over the past 15 years have resulted in a number of improvements allowing for the increased use of military power to support foreign policy goals. Primary among these have been the development of an effective Navy with global capability and the expansion of strategic airlift capability. Soviet military leaders have long recognized the political significance of these improvements, and in the early 1970s began making authoritative statements about the utility of Soviet Armed Forces beyond the borders of the USSR.

Soviet adventurism has been buttressed by the USSR's belief that the correlation of forces has shifted in Moscow's favor. Soviet leaders continue to refute any inconsistency between detente with the West and their growing support of revolutionary activism and insurgencies in the Third World. They believe that comprehensive aid to progressive forces is a moral requirement rather than interference by an exter-

nal power. Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution specifically commits the Soviet Union to support wars of "national liberation."

To the Soviets, power projection does not involve the episodic military reaction to regional or world crises. Rather, it is a continuously applied means of foreign policy activity. Besides military forces, the Soviets project power and influence through the employment of a mixture of less visible, integrated elements including the KGB, diplomats and traditional state-to-state activities, military advisers and aid, treaties and legal ties, support for terrorists and pro-Soviet guerrilla groups, economic aid, cultural, media, and educational diplomacy, and the use of what the Soviets call active measures such as propaganda, blackmail and forgery. The coordinated use of these tools allows Moscow to develop an "infrastructure of influence" in a target country and to react rapidly to changing situations by applying the appropriate instruments, allowing the penetration of areas that may be beyond the immediate reach of Soviet military forces.

In their projection of power the Soviets include the pursuit of specific military objectives, for example, the acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad to support the military operations of Soviet and friendly forces and to expedite the air- and sea-lift of military equipment to Third World clients and insurgent forces. Overseas facilities ease the logistic problems of operating naval forces and aircraft at great distances from the Soviet homeland.

A broader, basic Soviet objective is the termination of Western and Chinese influence in the developing countries, and the concomitant expansion of the USSR's own political, military, and economic power and influence. The Soviets seek to gain strategic footholds in a number of client states and to promote the accession to

power of radical, anti-Western regimes. In this process and in order to demonstrate that they retain their leadership of the world communist movement, the Soviets portray themselves as the ideological vanguard of the world's "national-liberation" movements.

The Soviets are also seeking to develop a viable oil and strategic minerals denial strategy, either through physical disruption, market manipulation, or domination of producing or neighboring states. Soviet statements clearly reflect the USSR's understanding of the extent to which the United States and Western Europe currently depend on imports of vital strategic materials from the developing regions. By undermining Western ties with the oil and raw materials producers and exacerbating differences in the Western Alliance over policies toward these regions, the Soviets seek to erode both the economic health and political cohesion of the West.

The planning and control of foreign policy is the exclusive domain of the central organs of the Communist Party—the Politburo and the Central Committee. The orchestration of all foreign operations, including the broad range of subversive activities, is the responsibility of the Central Committee's International Department. The International Department's most important task is to advise on and implement the export of revolution. It maintains contact with scores of communist and radical parties and groups, allocating funds, providing training, and devising takeover strategies. The International Department plans, coordinates and oversees the work of various Soviet party, state and military organs involved in official activities abroad, as well as the KGB, front organizations, friendship societies, insurgent groups, and other elements engaged in illegal, subversive, and clandestine operations. Possession of a highly centralized, interlocking, authoritarian

decision-making and decision-implementing apparatus facilitates the USSR's coordination of various tools and tactics toward basic goals and creates a synergistic effect difficult for Western democracies to match.

INSTRUMENTS OF EXPANSION

Arms Sales: Since their origin in 1955 with a \$250 million arms agreement with Egypt, the Soviet Union's military sales have grown into a multi-billion dollar annual program. These sales form the basis for Soviet penetration of a number of Third World countries, providing Moscow access to nations and regions where it previously had little or no influence. In the last 25 years, the Soviets have granted over \$50 billion in military assistance to 54 noncommunist nations, with 85 percent going to nine nations in the Middle East and along the Indian Ocean littoral. This is supplemented by \$4.3 billion in arms sales by Warsaw Pact allies.

The Soviet Union's willingness to provide arms to almost any customer at low prices has been an important inducement to newly independent former colonies eager to improve their military capabilities. The favorable financial terms, eight-to-ten-year deferred payments at two percent interest, coupled with free training and maintenance services as well as fast delivery schedules, prove to be important enticements in gaining early contracts.

The Soviets have been adept at exploiting anticolonial nationalistic sentiments to the detriment of Western nations. The Arab-Israeli conflict, Indo-Pakistani tensions, as well as "liberation" movements in sub-Saharan Africa and Central America have all been utilized by the USSR to gain access and a subsequent political role in regional affairs. Major Soviet resupply efforts following the 1967 and 1973 Mideast wars contributed to the rapid growth in Soviet arms sales.

Provision of more complex equipment at higher prices resulted in a nearly threefold increase in Soviet arms sales in the period 1974-1980 in contrast to the previous 20 years. Four major Arab client states accounted for over 70 percent of the \$37 billion in arms aid during this period. Sales to India and Ethiopia accounted for another 15 percent. Recent exports include such advanced systems as the MiG-25 and MiG-23 fighters, the SA-6 and SA-9 missiles, the Mi-24/HIND attack helicopter, and the T-72 tank. Occasionally, these weapon systems have been exported to important clients before they have been provided to Warsaw Pact allies.

Military Advisers: The dispatch of Soviet advisers is a natural—and often required—complement to the provision of arms and equipment. In 1980, approximately 20,000 Soviet military personnel were stationed in 28 countries, where they play a central role in organizing training and penetrating client-armed forces. Heavy concentrations of advisers are found in those countries with large amounts of Soviet arms: Algeria, Libya, Angola, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syria and South Yemen. Important missions are often headed by one or more Soviet flag or general officers.

Since 1955, some 52,000 military personnel from the less-developed countries have been trained in the USSR and East Europe. Soviet advisers are able to cultivate pro-Soviet sentiments, influence local military policies and pinpoint promising candidates for further training and indoctrination in the USSR. The importance the Soviets attach to the missions and roles of military advisers is underscored by the fact that a Main Directorate of the General Staff centrally controls their operations.

Economic Aid: Selective economic aid often follows arms sales in Soviet efforts to increase its influence in the Third World. However, total

Soviet economic aid is well below arms aid, amounting to only \$18 billion to 67 countries in the last 25 years. The USSR has achieved a number of important benefits from its small economic assistance program, at a very small cost to the Soviet economy. By concentrating on a number of highly visible showcase projects such as the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Bokaro Steel Mill in India and the Tigris-Euphrates Dam in Syria, the Soviets have gained maximum political benefits.

The economic aid program has also resulted in an expansion in Soviet trade with the nations of the Third World. In 1955 total Soviet trade with Third World nations was \$260 million. By 1978 that figure had increased to \$13.4 billion, or roughly 15 percent of the Soviet total. An added advantage of this trade was that much of it was conducted in hard currency, which earned the Soviets funds with which they could purchase needed Western technology. Additional hard currency earnings from the nearly 33,000 Soviet economic advisers worldwide have grown to over \$100 million. Projects such as a gas pipeline in Afghanistan and an alumina plant in Turkey exported needed raw materials back into the Soviet economy, another benefit of the aid program.

The economic aid program has also enabled the Soviets to provide training for Third World nationals in the Soviet Union. These trainees have returned to their native countries and now make up a considerable portion of the total number of professional and skilled workers in these nations. Roughly 31,000 students, mostly from African and Middle Eastern nations, were being trained in the Soviet Union in 1979. The Soviets view their economic aid program as an important tool for expanding Soviet influence in the Third World.

Proxies: The use of proxy forces has significantly augmented Soviet power projection

capabilities. The Soviets have drawn on the political, military, and economic dependence of such allies as Cuba and East Germany in order to promote anti-Western causes and extend the USSR's own influence. The dispatch of proxy military forces and advisers to contentious areas minimizes the USSR's risks and deflects charges of imperialism while also giving support to progressive forces in a regional conflict.

Since the large-scale introduction of Cuban troops into the Angolan civil war in 1975, Cuban units and military advisers have grown in numbers in sub-Saharan Africa and have also appeared in the Middle East. There are currently approximately 35,000 Cuban military personnel in nearly 20 countries—about 20 percent of Cuba's regular forces. In addition to Angola and Ethiopia, substantial numbers of Cubans are in Mozambique and South Yemen. Soviet-blessed or inspired Cuban activities in the Caribbean and Central America are on the upswing. Cuban roles abroad include military, economic, and intelligence and security operations.

Fidel Castro has declared that it is Cuba's duty to help liberate the Third World from colonial, imperialist bonds, but Havana's capability to send military personnel overseas would be considerably reduced without massive Soviet support and sponsorship. Castro's repeated assertion of a natural alliance between the less-developed, nonaligned nations and the Soviet camp is a classic case of a proxy espousing the Soviet Union's propaganda.

Among the East Europeans, the East Germans are the most active proxies, specializing in the training of police and security cadres and intelligence operatives, the penetration of local governments, and the development of communist parties and front organizations. To a lesser extent, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Bul-

garian involvement has been noted in Africa and the Middle East.

The Soviets have also gained international advantages through other nations whose interests and aims often converge with the USSR's. Vietnam's military activities in Southeast Asia and its posture as a counterweight to China, periodic South Yemeni instigation of instability on the Arabian Peninsula, the involvement of North Korean pilots in a number of overseas countries with sensitive political situations and Libya's support for a variety of radical and terrorist causes all serve as examples.

Treaties: As a major component of its efforts to consolidate its ties with less-developed nations, the USSR has signed 12 treaties of friendship and cooperation since 1971, of which ten are still in force. While such pacts do not reflect the true nature of the Soviet support, it is no coincidence that the signatories have been the recipients of substantial Soviet military and economic assistance. The signing of these treaties occurred at different stages of Soviet relations with the countries in question. With Angola and Ethiopia, treaties were signed after the principal objectives of military operations were basically achieved and the Soviet presence was entrenched. Moscow signed pacts with New Delhi and Hanoi shortly before they launched invasions of Pakistan and Kampuchea, respectively. The ruling regimes in the Congo, Syria and Afghanistan signed partly because they needed a tangible sign of Soviet backing against domestic opponents.

The treaties vary slightly, containing similar calls for mutual cooperation, respect for sovereignty, and consultation on issues of common interest. While none are mutual defense pacts like those between the USSR and Eastern Europe, they all contain a general provision calling for military cooperation in the face of "threats" to peace and security. The USSR used

that article in the treaty with Afghanistan as a legal pretext for its military intervention. A similar article in the Vietnam treaty provided the rationale for Moscow to support and supply its client during and after Vietnam's February 1979 war with China.

Subversion: Overt foreign programs are paralleled by covert action. The principal instrument for these activities is the KGB, although other Party and state organs are brought into play. The foreign operations of the KGB, which has a unique charter as the Party's action arm for the projection of Soviet power, are of two complementary types: destabilization and penetration. The destabilization of target countries is accomplished by the use of such techniques as economic disruption, labor strikes, sabotage, assassination, clandestine aid and—in conjunction with the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff—the training of local groups for terrorism, guerrilla and “national liberation” struggles. The Soviet intelligence and security apparatus has available a number of special purpose forces for sensitive peacetime and wartime missions abroad. The Soviets have a tradition, dating from the Civil War period following the 1917 Revolution, of employing unconventional forces and methods. Special purpose units were used in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to arrest the Czechoslovak leadership and secure key objectives in Prague, and they played an important role in the invasion of Afghanistan and the elimination of President Amin. Soviet unconventional warfare operations are supported by agent networks in the target country. The KGB and GRU recruit local nationals and place their own agents in vital areas of a nation's social and political structure, such as the military, ruling and opposition parties, the press, labor, key industries, local intelligence services and student groups. Local communist

parties, Soviet friendship societies, front organizations and leftist trade unions are often heavily funded by the Soviets and assist the USSR in consolidating its influence. Some of these operatives actively engage in subversion, while others are “sleepers,” prepared to act only in the event of war. Both types are trained to operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors and saboteurs.

KGB subversive operations abroad are facilitated by allied Warsaw Pact and Cuban intelligence and security services. These services, which were either created by the KGB and its predecessors or are guided by Soviet advisers, often capitalize on diplomatic access or other overt types of presence denied to the USSR, and serve as useful “middlemen” for the execution of Soviet strategy.

KGB activities are aided by the official Soviet presence in the target country—embassies, consulates, journalists, trade organizations and military and civilian advisers. These entities not only pursue their normal overt functions, but also provide useful cover mechanisms for Soviet intelligence personnel. A large percentage of Soviets with diplomatic accreditation are KGB or GRU intelligence officers, and KGB operatives are present in every visiting political, economic, and cultural delegation.

Propaganda and disinformation are essential tools serving Soviet international objectives. The Soviet Union's application of overt propaganda and covert action techniques has been vividly demonstrated by its continuing attempts to prevent the deployment of US neutron warheads and to impede the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear forces.

Forces for Power Projection: The Soviets of late have been more aggressive in their use of military forces to project their power and influence. These activities have ranged from sizable Soviet and Cuban presence, including on-site

participation by the current Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, in Ethiopia during the war with Somalia, to the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in 1979.

In 1974 the late Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko wrote:

"The historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely to their defending our motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively and purposely opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear. The party and the Soviet government rely on the country's economic and defense might in fulfilling these tasks....


The development of the external functions of the socialist armies is a natural process. It will continue."

Grechko's statement is an echo of a similar theme expressed in 1969 by Marshal Sokolovskiy in *Soviet Military Strategy*.

"We consider it our duty to support the sacred struggle of oppressed peoples and their just wars of liberation against imperialism. This duty the Soviet Union discharges consistently and steadily by helping the peoples in their struggle with imperialism not only ideologically and politically but materially as well. The USSR will render, when it is necessary, military support as well to people subject to imperialist aggression."

Airborne and Special Purpose Units: Because of their mobility, the Soviet Union's seven airborne divisions are particularly well-suited for the rapid introduction of combat forces into a foreign country. The Soviets threatened such

action in the Middle East wars of 1967 and 1973, and in 1979 airborne units were the spearhead elements of the move into Afghanistan. Airborne divisions remain at a high state of readiness. While lightly equipped and not suitable for operations against a well armed adversary, the combat elements of an airborne division, delivered rapidly to a distant region by Military Transport Aviation and Aeroflot aircraft could overwhelm the indigenous forces of a number of less developed countries, at least in the initial stages of an assault.



MIG-23/FLOGGERS in Cuba

The speed with which Moscow can deploy an airborne force depends on a number of factors: the distance to be flown, the level and type of expected opposition, the granting of overflight and staging/refueling rights, and the availability of logistic support. While Soviet long distance airlift capabilities continue to lag behind those of the United States, the Soviets could move, under optimum conditions, major elements of an airborne division to a country such as Syria in three-to-five days. Utilizing its substantial geographic advantages, however, the USSR could attack vital regions such as Iran and the Persian Gulf with massive ground and air forces staging directly from the Soviet homeland and secured contiguous areas. The only constraint



Libyan Tu-22/BLINDER Supersonic Bomber

to the overt application of Soviet military forces in a number of less-developed nations—assuming the lack of success of more indirect means of penetration and takeover—is the USSR's assessment of the Western response.


The Soviet Navy: The Soviet Navy has proven to be the most effective force thus far in projecting power beyond the USSR's borders. Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov has written:

"The Soviet Navy is an instrument of a peace-loving policy and the friendship of peoples, a policy of suppressing the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, deterring military ventures and resolutely


counteracting threats to the security of the peoples on the part of imperialist powers.

"With the appearance of the Soviet Navy on the ocean expanses, the Soviet Union has been given new, wider potentialities for using the fleet in peacetime to support the country's state interests. And these potentialities are being successfully realized."

Since 1966 there has been a dramatic increase in Soviet port visits focused on the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the coast of West Africa. Since 1967, the Soviets have established a number of forward naval deployments which provide the nucleus for augmentation during periods of tension. The Mediterranean and, most recently, the Indian Ocean squadron in 1980, have both been reinforced to counter Western navies during times of crises. These deployment patterns demonstrate the Soviets' capability rapidly to assert their interests in



A KRESTA II-Class Guided Missile Cruiser and KRIVAK II-Class Missile Frigate replenish from a Soviet oiler on the high seas.



Libyan FOXTROT-Class Attack Submarine

regions far from the Soviet Union's borders.

The USSR operates the largest fishing fleet in the world, with nearly 4,000 oceangoing ships. This fleet provides various types of support to Soviet naval units, including modest logistics aid and intelligence reports on Western naval units. The Soviets have also exported a substantial amount of fishing equipment and technology to Third World nations and entered into a number of agreements with 18 nations to help them develop their own fishing industries.

The Soviet merchant fleet has also grown considerably in the past decade, more than keeping pace with major Western shipping firms. Soviet market calls at Third World ports have increased by 60 percent in the past decade. In addition to its important economic activities, the merchant marine has also been used to ship Soviet arms to client states on a routine basis and during times of crisis. The addition of 40 roll-on/roll-off ships, which can unload cargo via large ramps, has increased the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver military cargo such as tanks to ports without sophisticated cargo handling facilities. In a contingency these ships could be used to support Soviet amphibious operations.

The merchant fleet also provides logistic support to Soviet naval units on a regular basis, particularly to units that are deployed to distant regions. Merchant ships possess an important advantage in that they can obtain water, fuel or food in ports which might be denied to warships or auxiliaries, thus giving the Soviets an addi-



tional degree of flexibility in support of their forces.


The Soviet Navy views access to support facilities and protected anchorages as an important adjunct to their operations in distant areas. Currently, the Soviets have access to such facilities in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Cuba and have recently made their first naval port call to Libya.

Access to foreign naval and air facilities has improved Soviet capabilities to monitor and counter Western naval units in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and in the South China Sea. Soviet naval and antisubmarine warfare aircraft routinely deploy to nations offering such facilities to conduct surveillance and training missions. Access to air facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia has been particularly useful for the Soviets in gathering intelligence on US naval units in the Indian Ocean and has improved their ability to conduct strike operations in this region. The operation of these aircraft from client state facilities gives a further visible presence to Soviet military power and influence in the region.

Distinct from enhancing the USSR's military capabilities, access to facilities also has important political utility. Political considerations certainly played an important part in Moscow's shift from supporting Somalia to aiding Ethiopia in 1977. Use of such facilities provides the Soviets with a presence in the region which they can then exploit to serve their interests. A recent example was the transit of the Soviet aircraft carrier MINSK far into the Gulf of Thailand, a not very subtle attempt to pressure Thailand to accept the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The USSR will continue to use the power projection capabilities of its military forces as well as other tactics to support Soviet political-military objectives and those of USSR client states.

VIII THE CHALLENGE






The Soviets begin the 1980s with strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional armed forces and supporting elements that in both absolute and relative terms are substantially more capable than they were at the beginning of the 1970s.

The Soviet leadership, the key members of which have shepherded these forces for over 20 years, places great stock both in the international political influence and in the reality of military power that the forces underwrite in concert with other less visible means in the struggle with the West. In developing and deploying their strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have subscribed neither to Western notions of strategic sufficiency nor to the concept of assured destruction. Instead, while they believe that nuclear war and its debilitating results must be avoided, they see the development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominant postwar position as the only rational approach to nuclear forces. The Soviet Union now exceeds the United States in the number of strategic nuclear vehicles. Soviet SS-20 theater nuclear forces are being deployed in increasing numbers against Western Europe and Asia.

As a result of a decade of missile force modernization and expansion, the Soviets have improved the reliability, payload and accuracy of their ballistic missiles allowing an improved hard-target kill capability. All evidence indicates that the Soviets will continue their steady effort to improve the quality of their land-based

KIROV, the USSR's first nuclear-powered surface warship, symbolizes the increasing strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and the increasing projection of USSR military power around the world. The KIROV carries 20 new-type long-range cruise missiles, and includes 12 vertical launch tubes for surface-to-air missiles in her heavy suit of weaponry.




The ballistic missiles of the DELTA III-Class SSBNs have a range of 7,500 kilometers.

missile force, striving for higher reliability, faster response time and greater accuracy.

In the last ten years, the Soviets have introduced four classes of new ballistic missile submarines. The long-range missiles of the

DELTA-Class SSBNs can reach the United States while still in Soviet ports. The Soviets now have over 30 operational DELTAs. The SS-N-18, a missile installed in the DELTA III, has a range of about 7,500 kilometers and a post-



boost vehicle capable of dispensing MIRVs. The TYPHOON SSBN, twice the size of the DELTA, has been launched and will be deployed in the 1980s.

Throughout the past decade, the Soviets have

maintained their heavy-bomber strike force and have developed and deployed the BACKFIRE bomber capable of both theater and intercontinental delivery. Evidence would indicate that the Soviets are in the process of developing a

new long-range bomber, and possibly a strategic cruise missile carrier.

In the tactical ballistic missile field the 40-mile FROG and 500-mile SCALEBOARD short-range ballistic missile systems were replaced by or augmented with the newly developed SS-21 and SS-22 SRBM systems. Soviet tactical missile systems of the next decade can be expected to incorporate new technology to make them lighter and more mobile, more accurate and more responsive.

During the 1970s, new generations of Soviet infantry weapons—assault rifles, antitank grenade launchers and multiple rocket launchers with greater range and lethality—were introduced. Heavily armed helicopter gunships now number in the thousands.

Over the past ten years the Soviets have expanded their ground forces to more than 180 divisions. The Soviets today have superior ground forces in Europe. They have a substantial advantage both in number of troops and quantity of armored assault vehicles.

During the 1970s, the Soviets fielded two new tanks, the T-64 and T-72. Both exhibit significant improvements in firepower and protection which place them in a family apart from previous Soviet tanks. The Soviets are now experimentally producing a T-80 tank which will likely fire improved ammunition and incorporate further improved armor to meet the West's deployment of the 120-mm gun.

A new generation of Soviet antitank guided missiles was fielded in the mid-1970s to replace the manual systems of the early 1960s. The new antitank weapons are semiautomatic, more accurate, tube-launched systems with greater range and increased armor penetration. The design objectives of future Soviet antitank missiles will emphasize improved armor penetration and fully automatic guidance and control.

In the early 1970s, different Soviet self-propelled artillery pieces began to appear—first the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer, then the 122-mm self-propelled howitzer which, like the BMP all-purpose infantry fighting vehicle, is amphibious and has a nuclear, biological and chemical air filtration system. The 152-mm and 122-mm self-propelled artillery have ranges of over 17 kilometers and 15 kilometers respectively. The trend of at least six Soviet artillery, mortar and cannons developed in the past decade appear to be continuing in the 1980s. Continued application of the self-propelled design principle to different cannon and rocket artillery can be expected in the 1980s. Additionally, ammunition improvements will be made to achieve ever greater range and lethality.

Over the past ten years, the Soviets introduced two new versions of the VICTOR nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and developed the ALFA high-technology attack submarine. In 1980, the Soviets produced OSCAR, the prototype of a new class of nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarine (SSGN) which is about twice the size of any previous SSGN. High Soviet priority is being devoted to antisubmarine sensor technology applicable against ballistic missile submarines.

The Soviets have produced two new classes of air-capable ships, the MOSKVA-Class helicopter cruiser and KIEV-Class VSTOL carrier. The Soviets are expected to have a new larger class of carrier, capable of handling conventional aircraft in the late 1980s.

Four new classes of Soviet surface combatants are entering service. The most capable is the large, multipurpose KIROV-Class nuclear-powered guided missile carrier. These new surface combatant classes are to be outfitted with new suits of advanced weapon systems. The Soviets are expected to continue to develop ma-

for naval combatants during the 1980s.

New Soviet ships and supporting auxiliaries reflect a thrust toward power projection capabilities at increasingly long ranges. The Soviet fleet is working constantly to introduce modern and sophisticated sensors and weapon systems, especially defensive missiles and cruise missiles.

Over the past decade the West's air superiority over Europe has been eroded by the capable aircraft being deployed in Soviet Air Defense Forces and Frontal Aviation. In the past decade, the Soviets introduced three types of new aircraft designed for the ground attack mission.

During the 1980s, the Soviets are expected to give high priority to the development of new fighter aircraft for both the ground attack and air superiority missions. They are expected to deploy precision guided munitions which use laser or antiradiation homing guidance. Improved navigation systems as well as more accurate bombing/navigation radars are expected to improve the all-weather capability of Soviet ground-attack aircraft.

During the past decade, the Soviets deployed a wide variety of new all-weather air defense intercept fighters. New Soviet interceptors, such as the Modified FOXBAT will be the Soviets' first look-down/shoot-down fighter. Armed with four new AA-X-9 missiles and possibly four shorter-range infrared air-to-air missiles, it will

be able to detect, track and engage targets at very low altitudes. The Soviets are expected to deploy a new airborne warning and control system (AWACS) to replace the Tu-126/MOSS, beginning in the mid-1980s.

The trend of improving surface-to-air missile air defense coverage is expected to continue through the modification of existing systems and the introduction of new systems, enhanced by improved command and control procedures to avoid destroying friendly aircraft while rendering the airspace over the ground forces virtually impenetrable to enemy aircraft.

The Soviet Union is intensely engaged in a program designed to achieve a dominant role in space. Soviet space projects have matured into well-integrated systems contributing further to the Soviet military effort.

The Soviet Union's research and development priorities and continued expansion of military industrial production capabilities are keyed to supporting continuing military growth and modernization. In turn, the combined capabilities of the Soviet Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces and Navy are keyed to assisting the projection of Soviet power abroad and the spreading and solidifying of the Soviet Union's political, economic and military influence around the world. This is the challenge we face.





- The entire text ran on the Wireless
File in English, French, Spanish & Arabic

Special
Report No. 91

Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation

December 1981



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is a paper written by Eliza Van Hollen of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in December 1981. It is a sequel to Special Report No. 86, "Afghanistan: 18 Months of Occupation," and No. 79, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation."

Summary

Two years after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the resistance to their military occupation and the Babrak Karmal government, which they installed, continues to mount. The extent of the area under the control of the freedom fighters (*mujahidin*) has increased steadily, despite Soviet military repression. The regime's top-priority political program to undermine popular support for the resistance movement has made little headway, and the Kabul government remains isolated and ineffectual.

The problems that have plagued the Soviets and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) from the beginning of the Soviet occupation have grown worse. Two years of harsh, often terrorizing military campaigns have multiplied the regime's enemies. The shortage of military manpower has worsened. The bitter feuding within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) continues to erode the government's small political base. Opposition to the Soviet presence has even spread to the top levels of the party and government.

The Afghan nationalist movement has made considerable progress in consolidating its position in Afghanistan and improving its military capabilities. It

continues, however, to be highly fragmented and, therefore, lacks the advantage of centralized strategic planning and the international stature of a viable alternative national political movement. Perhaps the greatest liability growing out of the lack of cohesion in the resistance is that it encourages Moscow's calculations that it can exploit the many ethnic and tribal divisions to its ultimate advantage.

The war in Afghanistan has badly tarnished Moscow's reputation both because of the Soviets' callous disregard for the Afghan people's right to self-determination and because of the ability of the Afghan *mujahidin* to fight the Soviet occupation force to a standstill. Accumulating evidence of Soviet use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan throughout their 2-year occupation also is arousing international condemnation.

There are numerous signs that the Soviets have a more realistic appreciation of their difficulties now than they had a year ago and that they are searching for a new political formula with greater popular appeal. This perception could result in some reshuffling of officials and efforts to broaden the political base of the government. Any made-in-Moscow coalition, however, would be likely to arouse the same hostility as the current regime, as long as Soviet occupation forces remained in Afghanistan.

Even if Moscow were able to coopt non-Communist elements into a broadened government, the regime's dependence on the Soviet military presence would quickly vitiate any political gains.

Indeed, the recent introduction of more Soviet troops into Afghanistan, while not a massive reinforcement, underscores Moscow's continuing commitment to a military solution.

Moscow and Kabul agreed in August, after considerable tactical maneuvering, to an active role for the United Nations in seeking a political settlement of the Afghan problem. There is no indication, however, that the Soviets or their Afghan surrogates are prepared to yield on key substantive issues. The overwhelming international consensus demanding withdrawal of "the foreign troops" from Afghanistan was reaffirmed by a 116 to 23 vote in the U.N. General Assembly this fall. This margin represents an increase of four affirmative votes over the tally in November 1980 and of seven votes over the original ballot in January 1980.

The most recent U.N. vote demonstrates that, contrary to evident Soviet expectations, the international community is not allowing the Afghanistan issue to fade from view. Likewise, the ever-increasing refugee population in Pakistan—it has doubled since last December to a total of 2.5 million—and the continuing stream of defections from the Afghan Government and military serve to keep attention focused on this troubled land.

Moscow is willing to pay the price of international censure and apparently anticipates that a policy based on attrition and force eventually will achieve its objectives. Historical experience with Soviet aggression argues against hopes for a negotiated solution, but the tenacity of the Afghan resistance and the persistence of international protest represent unprecedented historical circumstances that clearly have upset Soviet calculations. In these circumstances, the Soviets may yet find that their long-term political interests are better served by regional stability through the restoration of Afghan independence and nonalignment.

Regime's Authority Shrinking

According to a former planning director in the Prime Minister's office, who defected to Pakistan in August 1981, 90% of Afghanistan's districts are under resistance control. The ex-official had attended a secret conference in Kabul in June at which provincial governors had given gloomy assessments of the situation in their respective jurisdictions. While 90% may be an exaggeration, the erosion of

government authority has been corroborated by foreign journalists who traveled with the *mujahidin* in the spring and summer of 1981. They describe being able to move freely, even in the daytime, in areas where a year earlier the presence of government security forces had necessitated extreme caution.

The much publicized, unsuccessful efforts of Soviet/Afghan troops to dislodge the *mujahidin* from strongholds in the Panjsher Valley (northeast of Kabul) and from the Paghman area (only 12 miles from the capital), illustrate the immense difficulties confronting the Soviets as they try to wrest strategic areas from the resistance.

Furthermore, the *mujahidin* have demonstrated during 1981 an impressive capability to bring the war to the major cities, where control is of paramount importance to the Babrak regime. The freedom fighters virtually held Qandahar for much of the summer and early fall; they have kept Herat in periodic turmoil; even in Kabul nightly gun battles, frequent assassinations, and intensifying attacks on government and Soviet installations attest to a significant *mujahidin* presence despite tight security and repeated house-to-house searches.

In the many areas of the country where the liberation movement exercises control, resistance leaders have set up their own administration, making laws, collecting taxes, dispensing justice, and providing services. Even in areas under nominal government authority (maintained by a military presence), the resistance often runs parallel governments. In the cities of Qandahar and Herat, for example, the *mujahidin* dictate curfew hours, establish price controls, and levy taxes. In almost all areas the dividing line between government and resistance authority will be even more clearly drawn at the edge of an important town, with the *mujahidin* controlling traffic, manning roadblocks, and levying duties just beyond this line. This is the situation that prevails just outside of Kabul. Local civilian and military authorities often buy a tenuous peace from the freedom fighters by supplying weapons and ammunition to them.

The *mujahidin* are also engaged in an ongoing battle with the regime for control over the major roads. They conduct ambushes of supply convoys on all the important routes, including the vital links between the Soviet border and Kabul. Recently, in an effort to protect the supply network, government forces have begun to clear away buildings and trees, which afford protective cover to the *mujahidin*, in a wide swath along the roads running north and south from Kabul.

DRA/Soviet Offensive to Counter the Resistance

Political Policy. From the early days of the Babrak regime and the Soviet occupation, the authorities have relentlessly pursued the related political and military goals of establishing the legitimacy of the Babrak government and defeating the nationalist military forces. Over the long run, the political/propaganda war is as important as military action and could ultimately be the decisive contest. If the population at large can be persuaded to drop its support for the resistance and accept a government that has Moscow's blessing, the *mujahidin* will become isolated and vulnerable. That the Soviets are aware of the importance of the political struggle is clear from the enormous effort they have undertaken to try to establish the legitimacy of the current regime and to convince the population of the regime's good faith with respect to such key issues as Islam, nationalities policy, amnesty for refugees and a revised land reform program.

The cornerstone of the political policy has been the formation of a National Fatherland Front (NFF), an umbrella organization composed initially of 12 institutions representing such elements of the population as trade unions, agricultural cooperatives, youth, women, writers, journalists, artists, scholars and religious leaders, and the tribes. Many of the founding organizations were either formed or held their first national meeting after a December 27, 1980, conference which launched the campaign to establish the NFF.

The founding congress of the front was finally held on June 15 after several postponements. It was portrayed as a contemporary version of a *Loya Jirga*—a traditional assembly of Afghanistan's tribal leaders convoked to make historic decisions. As such, it was intended to legitimize the Babrak regime. Indeed, in his "fundamental statement" to the NFF congress, Karmal claimed that the formation of the NFF was evidence of: "the normalization of the situation" in Afghanistan; the unified support of all "patriotic forces" for PDPA principles; the "fraternity" of all of Afghanistan's social classes and ethnic groups; and the ability of the regime to solve difficult problems and create a new society.

A massive political and propaganda effort was devoted to creating the NFF and its constituent members, and the founding congress was portrayed as a momentous historic occasion. When the

Congress was finally held, however, it was generally recognized to be a sham. Relatively little has been heard of it since. Indeed, it was not until over 4 months later that an NFF committee was formed for Kabul Province.

Another important political move during 1981 was the creation of a Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs to replace the former Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs. The new ministry institutionalizes the regime's nationalities policy to promote local language and culture. Like its Soviet model, this policy is designed to appeal to a sense of ethnic uniqueness. It is, in effect, a policy of divide and rule that could become an effective weapon for the Soviets in a country where minority ethnic groups have traditionally not been given due recognition.

The regime reintroduced land reform in August but revised the regulations to offer exemption from land confiscation in return for support for the Babrak regime. The exemptions are skewed to appeal to such key groups as the clergy, military officers, and tribal leaders. The incentives probably will have little impact as they are meaningless in the many areas where the government is too weak to impose a land reform program.

In September, the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council approved a new law on local organs of state power and administration and a new Council of Ministers law, which will strengthen and expand the role of the state in Afghan society. The "local organs" measure embodies the Soviet principle of "democratic centralism" in a system of local councils, which are portrayed as traditional *jirgas*. The regime claims the new law will reinforce democracy, but, in effect, it strengthens party control: Only the PDPA and PDPA auxiliary organizations can nominate candidates for election to the local councils.

There is no indication that these political measures have attracted support for the government. But the Soviets take a long-range view; many of these actions demonstrate that Moscow is counting on long-term benefits from the sovietization of the Afghan Government and party machinery.

Defense Policy. The Soviets are clearly under pressure to produce more immediate results from their military campaigns. During the first half of 1981, political strategy seemed to have the

higher priority, but by midsummer it became clear that the deteriorating security situation once again had become the paramount concern.

In August, the Afghan regime established new defense councils at the national, provincial, and district levels to concentrate all aspects of defense under strict party control. Announcing the formation of the new councils at a meeting of armed forces party activists, Babrak Karmal spoke of "troublesome and difficult conditions" and "increasing armed actions by counterrevolutionary elements." He said it was imperative for all forces to go on the offensive.

New defense councils, however, will not solve the overriding military problem—the critical shortage of manpower for the Afghan army, which stands at about 30,000 out of a normal strength of about 100,000. The lack of recruits is essentially a political problem and highlights the absence of government authority throughout most of the country.

Perhaps the Soviets' most serious miscalculation when they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 was a belief that they could reverse the already far-advanced disintegration of the Afghan armed forces. This process has not only continued but has accelerated. Various counteracting measures—for example, the January 1981 conscription law, which lowered the draft age and extended the obligatory tour of duty, and the September mobilization of all reservists up to age 35—have not helped.

Because of Afghanistan's mandatory service laws, the mobilization in September covered virtually the entire male population in the stipulated age bracket. The announcement provoked antigovernment demonstrations among students; eligible males took off for the hills, emptying government and business offices. The regime immediately began to back-track and announced a number of exemptions. It also quickly revised downward from 450,000 to 85,000 its estimates of eligible reservists. As the year ends, the results of the callup are unlikely to produce more than 15,000–20,000 able-bodied men, many of whom will desert as soon as possible. As it has throughout the past 2 years, the government must rely on press gangs to enforce the directive.

The September callup was obviously prompted by the scheduled discharge in December of perhaps half of the army's enlisted men. The government would prefer not to discharge any of those currently serving. It needs the men, but it also does not want to make available to the *mujahidin* such a large pool of trained soldiers. Nevertheless, it went

ahead with the discharge announcement on December 4, probably because it feared an explosive reaction to a further extension of service. Every effort, however, is being made to insure that those who are officially discharged actually remain in the army or related security services.

The ineffectiveness of the Afghan army has forced the Soviets to assume the lion's share of the burden of pacification. The events of 1981 suggest, however, that Soviet military operations in Afghanistan have been ineffective. They failed to dislodge the *mujahidin* from their strongholds and have been unable to organize a successful defense against *mujahidin* ambush operations even on the main road from the Soviet border to Kabul.

There are numerous signs that the Soviets are concerned about the progress of the war. They have recently introduced additional troops into the country and, while the number—about 5,000—is not large, it suggests that the Soviets think their forces are spread too thin to counteract the growing resistance. A high-level Soviet military delegation led by Deputy Defense Minister Sokolov has, as of mid-December, been in Kabul for a protracted stay. This visit, combined with a recent intensification of offensive operations, indicates that Soviet military authorities in Afghanistan are currently under pressure to produce results.

There is growing concern that this pressure will lead to an increased use of chemical warfare by the Soviets. Evidence of the use of lethal and casualty-producing chemical agents against the *mujahidin* is mounting. The most frequent application of these toxic agents is against *mujahidin* bases inside mountain caves, which are otherwise inaccessible to conventional aircraft or helicopter attack.

The failure of Soviet forces to achieve their objectives in Afghanistan can be explained by factors that are inherent in a confrontation between a large bureaucratic military machine in a foreign land and small mobile guerrilla units operating on their home ground. Poor Soviet morale also contributes to the lack of Soviet success as does the collusion between Afghan army personnel and the *mujahidin*.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan: A House Divided

For the Soviets, the most frustrating aspect of their failures in Afghanistan must be their continuing inability to achieve a truce between the two principal factions of the ruling party, the Khalqis and Parchamis. The deep-seated feud, which dates from the early days of the party in the late 1960s, has continued to rage throughout the past year. The numerically superior Khalqis are struggling to regain some of the power they lost when the Soviets installed Babrak's Parchamis at the time of the invasion. The Parchamis would like a thorough purge of the Khalqis, but the Soviets, mindful of Khalq strength in the military forces, continue to seek a reconciliation and have insisted on maintaining leading Khalqis in top positions.

The feuding was particularly intense during the weeks preceding the sixth plenum of the PDPA in June and a concurrent meeting of the Revolutionary Council to effect party and government organizational changes. The most important task was to name a prime minister, a job previously held by Babrak in addition to his duties as President and General Secretary of the PDPA. The Soviets may have hoped to use this change to achieve a better Khalq-Parcham balance; certainly the Khalqis lobbied hard to improve their position. Compromise, however, proved elusive. In the end the Soviets stuck by the Parchamis. The leading Parcham contender, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, became prime minister and the concurrent expansion of various party and government bodies also gave additional advantages to the Parcham faction.

The reorganization in June further exacerbated the split and led to renewed indications that the Khalqis, in their anger at the Soviets and the Parchamis, are cooperating with the *mujahidin*. In Babrak's mid-August speech to armed forces party activists, he lashed out at party factionalism, which he said was hindering efforts to improve military effectiveness.

Reports of a reactivated power struggle within the PDPA leadership in late November and early December were fueled by the prolonged absence from Kabul of Prime Minister Keshtmand, who spent almost 2 months in Moscow following an official visit to Bulgaria.

Keshtmand's name was not mentioned in the Afghan media during his absence. His return to Kabul on December 13 was a week too late to attend the seventh party plenum on December 7. The proceedings of this plenum have not been published, but the meeting is believed to have been preoccupied with the issue of party disunity and indiscipline.

The most disruptive factor on the political scene continues to be the Khalq effort to stage a comeback, but there are also periodic reports of splits within the Parcham faction that pit Keshtmand against Babrak. In spite of speculation that the Soviets are seeking an alternative to Babrak, however, their public support of him as of mid-December does not suggest that they are prepared to abandon him. On December 15, Babrak left Kabul to pay a state visit to Bulgaria. He stopped in Moscow en route to present Brezhnev with the Afghan Sun of Freedom Order in connection with the Soviet leader's 75th birthday.

Interneine fighting is not likely to abate. In view of the deteriorating security situation and the obvious failure of party and government policies, it is not surprising that the beleaguered leadership is wracked by mutual recriminations. It is becoming apparent that many top leaders want the Soviets to leave and are trying to distance themselves from the odious symbol of close association with the Soviet occupation.

In late 1981, the Afghan regime appears to be making a renewed effort to draw prominent members of former governments into participation in a more broadly based government. Although they may succeed with one or two figures who may have become dissatisfied with exile life, this approach is not likely to be very productive.

There are also reports of efforts to form a new party that would subsume the Khalq-Parcham problem. The Parchamis themselves have sponsored a major party recruitment drive throughout the year to reduce Khalq influence within the PDPA by significantly enlarging and broadening its membership. A high party official claimed in February 1981 that party membership had increased by 25% in the preceding 6 months. Babrak told the fifth party plenum in March that the character of the party was changing and that 25-30% of the new members were workers and farmers. At the sixth party plenum in June, Karmal stated that "thousands of

the best representatives of workers, peasants, craftsmen, employees, intelligentsia, students, and other social strata have been admitted to the party probationary membership."

Given the hazards associated with party membership (members are automatic targets for the *mujahidin* assassins), the recruitment drive is likely to have been less successful than Babrak claims. The lack of published, official figures on the size of the party suggests that it remains small.

Nationalist Resistance Movement

In contrast to the "sinking ship syndrome" that is undercutting morale in party and government circles, the morale of the *mujahidin* remains high, according to foreign visitors who have traveled with them recently. The freedom fighters can look back on a successful year during which they have put the regime increasingly on the defensive. The military situation remains a standoff, but one in which the initiative appears to lie with the *mujahidin*, although the Soviets retain the advantage of vastly superior firepower.

The major source of strength for the freedom fighters continues to be the overwhelming support they receive from the Afghan people, regardless of ethnic group or tribal affiliation. The Afghan people have suffered terribly during the past 2 years. Villages suspected of harboring *mujahidin* have been demolished in ground attacks and repeated aerial bombardment from helicopter gunships. In spite of high civilian casualties and the regime's constant flow of propaganda to discredit the resistance, the nationalist movement has continued to grow.

An important development, which has strengthened the effectiveness of the *mujahidin*, has been greater cooperation among resistance forces in the field. In a growing number of instances, including the campaigns in the Panjsher and at Paghman, freedom fighters from outside the immediate battle zone have come to help. Cooperation among resistance units has led to a more sophisticated military strategy.

The nationalist successes during 1981 are the result, in part, of more and better weapons acquired largely through raids on military supply convoys and access to Afghan army stocks. Although

the *mujahidin* are seeking aid throughout the Islamic world and the West, foreign visitors have observed during the past year that recent media reporting has greatly exaggerated the extent of external assistance. In many parts of the country, the *mujahidin* are still seriously underarmed in relation to the numbers of potential fighters.

While the resistance movement clearly has grown stronger and more effective throughout the year, the limits of its capabilities are clear. The *mujahidin* cannot mount a sustained offensive against a Soviet stronghold; they cannot drive Soviet forces away from major bases or the major cities; and to date they have not been able to take complete control of a provincial capital. If the *mujahidin* push too far—if they threaten to banish all symbols of Kabul's authority in a province—they, or more likely the local civilian population, inevitably will be subjected to ruthless retaliation.

The *mujahidin* have made great strides in cooperating within a given area and have taken tentative steps toward establishing a coordinating leadership council in common cause against the Soviets, but the resistance movement as a whole remains fragmented. It thus lacks the strategic advantages of national coordination. Furthermore, liberation forces occasionally fight each other to establish territorial preeminence. To succeed, these efforts at coordination will require setting aside deep divisions between fundamentalists and moderates, traditionalists and leftists, tribal chieftains and mullahs, Pushtuns and minority ethnic groups, and among numerous rival tribes.

Soviet Long-Range Plans

The Soviets are laying the groundwork for a permanent, predominant role in Afghan affairs. This effort is reflected in the numerous major steps taken during 1981 to remake party and government institutions in the Soviet image. It is also evident in the large numbers of Afghan students dispatched to the Soviet Union for higher education and technical training and in the steady stream of technical and educational delegations traveling between the two countries.

Afghanistan is also becoming more dependent on the Soviet Union for economic assistance and trade. In November 1980, Babrak stated that Moscow was supplying 80% of Afghanistan's foreign aid. In a recent article in *Pravda*, the pa-

per's correspondent in Afghanistan reported that trade turnover between the two countries had doubled in the last 5 years and that trade would treble by 1985.

Most official pronouncements on the Afghan economy are optimistic. The report on the 1981 budget delivered in March by then Deputy Prime Minister Keshtmand painted a relatively rosy picture, as did his economic report to the Revolutionary Council in September. But Keshtmand's speech to a seminar for local government officials in August revealed that the war has caused considerable economic paralysis. At that time, he indicated major concern about the collapse of the transportation system, about the shutting down of many factories and mines, and about inflation, which has risen sharply due to growing shortages.

The breakdown of the Afghan economy may make Afghanistan an expensive investment for the Soviets, at least in the short term. With much of the country in resistance hands, the government cannot collect taxes. The war has also caused a drop in agricultural production, which normally is a source of foreign exchange. On the plus side for the Soviets, however, they continue to receive natural gas from Afghanistan at a price well below what Moscow is asking from the West Europeans for natural gas from Siberia. Moscow's long-range planning undoubtedly envisions further integration of Afghanistan's economy with that of the Soviet Union.

International Spotlight on Afghanistan

The primary objective of the Babrak regime's foreign policy has been to obtain international recognition of the legitimacy of the government (and by extension of the Soviet presence that is required to keep the regime in power). This policy was formalized in the May 14, 1980, proposals, which were modified on August 24, 1981, and is based on the contention that the resistance movement is a creation of outside powers. Accordingly, both sets of proposals require the cessation of all resistance as a precondition for the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

In November 1981, the international community once again demonstrated by a third overwhelming vote in the United Nations that it rejects the Babrak government's claim to legitimacy. The resolution also authorized U.N. Secretary General Waldheim to continue U.N. efforts to seek a political settlement. The U.N. mission, originally mandated in No-

vember 1980, and other international efforts to find an opening for a negotiated solution—such as the proposals put forth by the European Community—reflect widespread international concern over the continuing Soviet occupation.

In February 1981, U.N. Secretary General Waldheim appointed then Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar as his personal representative to seek a political settlement. Perez de Cuellar traveled to Kabul and Islamabad in April and again in early August. Following the August visit, Afghanistan announced on August 24 a modification of its procedural conditions. It agreed to trilateral talks and to U.N. participation, whereas previously it had insisted on separate bilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran and had not publicly accepted an active role for the United Nations. Subsequently, during the autumn U.N. session, Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar met separately with the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan and their representatives in New York.

It is not clear whether Perez de Cuellar, as U.N. Secretary General, will continue to take personal charge of this mission or whether he will name a representative. In either event, further U.N. visits to both countries are anticipated. Perez de Cuellar's intimate involvement in the Afghanistan problem should insure that it will receive priority attention.

Afghanistan's August 24 proposals also dealt with the plan of the European Economic Community, which had been presented to Moscow by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, on July 6. This initiative called for a two-stage international conference to settle the Afghan question. The Soviets and the Afghans rejected this plan, presumably because it excluded Afghan representation altogether from the first stage and left the Babrak regime's status unclear. The August 24 proposals entertain the possibility of an international conference, but one which would seat the Babrak regime as the sole legitimate representative of the Afghan people. There has been no indication that the Soviets or the Babrak regime are willing to make concessions on any of the key substantive issues, including that of the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Meanwhile, the Babrak regime, guided by its Soviet sponsors, has been trying other ploys to bolster its claim to legitimacy. The warm reception which Moscow gave Karmal during his state

visit in October 1980 clearly was designed to enhance his international stature. Likewise Karmal's visit to Czechoslovakia in June 1981 had a similar purpose, all the more obvious as it was timed to occur immediately after the founding congress of the NFF; the congress was to have demonstrated conclusively Karmal's claim to popular support in Afghanistan. Karmal also participated in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's 26th congress in February-March and was received by Brezhnev in the Crimea in July. The year was capped by the Afghan award presented to Brezhnev and by Babrak's state visit to Bulgaria.

A more difficult problem for the regime has been to demonstrate that conditions in Afghanistan are sufficiently settled to allow foreigners to visit Kabul safely. From November 18 to 20, the DRA staged a major propaganda event to prove this point by hosting the 10th Conference of the Presidium of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, a Soviet-front organization. The timing of the AAPSO conference indicates that it was designed to offset the bad press emanating from the Afghan debate and resolution at the United Nations, which was taking place simultaneously. The AAPSO delegates demonstrated full sup-

port for their host, but the extremely heavy security measures surrounding their visit must have made them uneasy. Furthermore, in spite of the security, the *mujahidin* fired several rockets at the Intercontinental Hotel, the site of the conference; there were no direct hits but some damage was done.

The international community is not impressed by efforts to dignify Babrak Karmal and to portray the situation in Afghanistan as stable. Objective observers find the swelling refugee population in Pakistan and Iran more revealing of the true state of affairs. Afghans in Pakistan now constitute the largest refugee population in the world; their numbers doubled during 1981 to about 2.5 million. The refugee population in Iran has also grown considerably and is now estimated at about 1 million.

Included among the refugees are many military defectors and an increasing number of former regime officials who testify to intolerable Soviet control over government ministries and the worsening security situation throughout the country.

It should be clear to Moscow that Afghanistan will not disappear as an issue of major international concern. On the contrary, the rising volume of "inside Afghanistan" reporting by foreign journalists who travel with the *mujahidin* has contributed significantly to a greater awareness of Soviet repression and of the war of liberation being fought by the resistance. On December 16, the European Parliament passed a resolution declaring the European intention to commemorate March 21, 1982, as Afghanistan Day. March 21 is the Afghan New Year and is traditionally celebrated by Afghans as their national day. Free nations around the world are expected to follow the European lead in making Afghanistan Day a demonstration of overwhelming international solidarity with the Afghan people in their struggle against Soviet occupation. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • December 1981
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Special
Report No. 88

Soviet "Active Measures"

Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations

October 1981



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

The following paper was prepared by the Department of State in response to requests for information from a number of individuals, private groups, and foreign governments.

In late 1979, agents of the Soviet Union spread a false rumor that the United States was responsible for the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca.

In 1980, a French journalist was convicted by a French court of law for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959.

In August 1981, the Soviet news agency TASS alleged that the United States was behind the death of Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos.

These are three examples of a stream of Soviet "active measures" that seek to discredit and weaken the United States and other nations. The Soviets use the bland term "active measures" (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) to refer to operations intended to affect other nations' policies, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. Soviet "active measures" include:

- Written or spoken disinformation;
- Efforts to control media in foreign countries;
- Use of Communist parties and front organizations;
- Clandestine radio broadcasting;
- Blackmail, personal and economic; and
- Political influence operations.

None of this is to be mistaken for the open, accepted public diplomacy in which virtually all nations engage extensively. Public diplomacy includes providing press releases and other information to journalists, open public broadcasting, and a wide variety of official, academic, and cultural exchange programs. By contrast, Soviet "active measures" are frequently undertaken secretly, sometimes violate the laws of other nations, and often involve threats, blackmail, bribes, and exploitation of individuals and groups.

Soviet "active measures" do not always achieve Moscow's objectives. In some cases, Soviet operations have failed because of ineptitude or because targeted individuals or governments have responded effectively. However, Soviet "active measures" have had some success, and they remain a major, if little understood, element of Soviet foreign policy.

The approaches used by Moscow include control of the press in foreign countries; outright and partial forgery of documents; use of rumors, insinuation, altered facts, and lies; use of international and local front organizations; clandestine operation of radio stations; exploitation of a nation's academic, political, economic, and media figures as collaborators to influence policies of the nation.

Specific cases of Soviet "active measures" included here are: the Soviet anti-theater nuclear force (TNF) campaign in Europe; the Soviet anti-"neutron bomb" campaign; Soviet activities in support of the leftists in El Salvador; the Soviet campaign against the U.S.-Egypt relationship and the Camp David process.

"Active measures" are closely integrated with legitimate activities and Soviet foreign policy. Decisions on "active measures" in foreign countries are made at the highest level of authority in the U.S.S.R.—in the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee—as are all other important decisions of Soviet foreign policy.

The activities are designed and executed by a large and complex bureaucracy in which the KGB and the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee are major elements. The International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee is also deeply engaged in such activities. Actual operations abroad are carried out by official and quasi-official Soviet representatives, including scholars, students, and journalists, whose official Soviet links are not

always apparent. The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and the state's pervasive control and direction of all elements of society give Soviet leaders impressive free use of party, government, and private citizens in orchestrating "active measures."

The open societies of the industrial democracies and many developing nations, and the ease of access to their news media, often give Soviets open season for "active measures." Many Western and developing countries ignore or downplay Soviet "active measures" until Soviet blunders lead to well-publicized expulsions of diplomats, journalists, or others involved in these activities. The Soviets are adept at making their policies appear to be compatible or parallel with the interests of peace, environmental, and other groups active in Western and developing societies.

By contrast, the Soviet Union denies access to its mass media for foreigners who might criticize Soviet society or the foreign policies of the U.S.S.R.

While the United States remains the primary target, Moscow is devoting increasing resources to "active measures" against the governments of other industrialized countries and countries in the developing world. Moscow seeks to disrupt relations between states, discredit opponents of the U.S.S.R., and undermine foreign leaders, institutions, and values. Soviet tactics adjust to changes in international situations but continue, and in some cases intensify, during periods of reduced tensions.

"Active Measures" Techniques

The tactics and emphasis of Soviet "active measures" change to meet changed situations. For instance, Soviet use of Marxist-Leninist ideology to appeal to foreign groups often turns out to be an obstacle to the promotion of Soviet goals in some areas; it is now being deem-

phasized though not completely abandoned. At the same time, some religious themes—notably the Soviet assertion that the Islamic religion occupies a favorable position in the U.S.S.R.—have assumed greater significance, as Moscow courts Islamic countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Similarly, while Soviet-dominated international front groups still are important in Soviet “active measures” abroad, Moscow is broadening its base of support by using more single-interest groups and fronts formed for particular purposes to promote its goals.

Soviet “active measures” involve a mix of ingenious and crude techniques. A brief sample of types of activities includes the following.

Efforts to Manipulate the Press in Foreign Countries. Soviet agents frequently insert falsely attributed press material into the media of foreign countries. In one developing country, Soviets used more than two dozen local journalists to plant media items favorable to the U.S.S.R. Soviets have also used the Indian news weekly *Blitz* to publish forgeries, falsely accuse Americans of being CIA personnel or agents, and disseminate Soviet-inspired documents. In another country, the Soviets used local journalists to exercise substantial control over the contents of two major daily newspapers.

Forgeries. Soviet forgeries—completely fabricated or altered versions of actual documents—are produced and circulated to mislead foreign governments, media, and public opinion. Recent Soviet forgeries are better and appear more frequently than in the past. Among forgeries that Soviet agents have produced and distributed are bogus U.S. military manuals and fabricated war plans designed to create tensions between the United States and other countries. In some cases, the Soviets used actual documents passed to the KGB by U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson (who was eventually arrested and convicted as a Soviet agent) as models for style and format in Soviet forgeries. In one case, Soviet agents, seeking to disrupt NATO theater nuclear force modernization, circulated a forged “top secret” letter from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to another Western foreign minister.

Disinformation. Soviet agents use rumor, insinuation, and distortion of facts to discredit foreign governments and leaders. In late 1979, Soviet agents spread a false rumor that the United States was behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca. In another case,

Soviet officials “warned” officials of a West European country that the CIA had increased its activities in the country and that a coup was being planned. Sometimes these disinformation campaigns appear in foreign media suborned by the Soviets, enabling Moscow to cite foreign sources for some of the distortions and misstatements that often appear in the Soviet media. A recent and particularly egregious example was the August 1981 TASS allegation that the United States was behind the death of Panamanian General Omar Torrijos.

Control of International and Local Front Organizations. Moscow controls pro-Soviet international front organizations through the International Organizations Section of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Front organizations are more effective than openly pro-Soviet groups because they can attract members from a broad political spectrum. Prominent among these fronts are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. Moscow's agents use Soviet “friendship” and cultural societies in many countries to contact people who would not participate in avowedly pro-Soviet or Communist organizations. The function of front, “friendship,” and cultural groups is to support Soviet goals and to oppose policies and leaders whose activities do not serve Soviet interests.

To complement organizations known for pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets sometimes help establish and fund ad hoc front groups that do not have histories of close association with the Soviet Union and can attract members from a wide political spectrum.

Clandestine Radio Stations. The Soviet Union operates two clandestine radio stations: the National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broadcast regularly from the Soviet Union to Iran and China. Moscow has never publicly acknowledged that it sponsors the stations, which represent themselves as organs of authentic local “progressive” forces. The broadcasts of both of these Soviet stations illustrate the use of “active measures” in support of Soviet foreign policy goals. For instance, NVOI broadcasts to Iran in 1979–80 consistently urged that the American diplomatic hostages not be released, while Soviet official statements supported the hostages' claim to diplomatic immunity.

Economic Manipulation. The Soviet Union also uses a variety of covert economic maneuvers in “active measures”

operations. For example, a Soviet ambassador in a West European country warned a local businessman that his sales to the U.S.S.R. would suffer if he went ahead with plans to provide technical assistance to China. In another industrialized country, Soviet agents sought to increase local concern over the stability of the dollar by driving up the price of gold. This was to be accomplished by manipulating a flow of both true and false information to local businessmen and government leaders. The gambit failed because the Soviet officials who attempted to carry it out did not fully understand the financial aspects of the operation.

Political Influence Operations. Political influence operations are the most important but least understood aspect of Soviet “active measures” activities. These operations seek to exploit contacts with political, economic, and media figures in target countries to secure active collaboration with Moscow. In return for this collaboration, Soviet officials offer inducements tailored to the specific requirements or vulnerabilities of the individual involved. In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalist, was convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. His articles—all subtly pushing the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues—were published in a number of important newspapers and journals, sometimes under the pseudonym of Charles Morand. The journalist also published a private newsletter which was regularly sent to many newspapers, members of parliament, and a number of foreign embassies. The Soviets used Pathe over a number of years to try to influence the attitudes of the prominent subscribers to his newsletter and to exploit his broad personal contacts.

In other cases, Soviet officials establish close relationships with political figures in foreign countries and seek to use these contacts in “active measures” operations. Capitalizing on the host government official's ambition, his Soviet contact claims to be a private channel to the Soviet leadership. To play upon his sense of self-importance and to enhance his credibility within his own government, the host government official may be invited to meetings with high-level Soviet leaders. The Soviets then exploit the local official to pass a mixture of true, distorted, and false information—all calculated to serve Soviet objectives—to the host government.

Use of Academicians and Journalists. Soviet academicians, who often are accepted abroad as legitimate counterparts of their non-Soviet colleagues, frequently engage in “active measures.” Unlike their free world counterparts,

they must play two roles—their legitimate academic pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and their political activities on behalf of the Kremlin. Soviet academicians are obliged to obey instructions from bodies which plan and control Soviet “active measures” activities. Similarly, Soviet journalists often engage in “active measures” operations in addition to serving as representatives of Soviet news agencies. One KGB officer in an industrialized country used his journalistic cover to pass forgeries, as well as to publish numerous propaganda articles aimed at influencing the media of the host country.

Case Studies

The Soviet Anti-TNF Modernization Campaign in Europe. The Soviet campaign in Europe against NATO TNF modernization is a good illustration of Soviet use of “active measures.” After a long and unprecedented buildup of Soviet military strength in Europe, including the deployment of new SS-20 nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe, the NATO ministers in December 1979 decided to modernize NATO's TNF capabilities. The Soviets immediately began an ongoing, intensive campaign to develop an environment of public opinion opposed to the NATO decision. (Of course, not all opposition to the TNF modernization decision is inspired by the Soviet Union or its “active measures” activities.)

In this campaign, Soviet diplomats in European countries pressured their host governments in many ways. In one European country, the Soviet ambassador met privately with the Minister of Commerce to discuss the supply and price of oil sold by the Soviet Union to that country. During the discussion, the ambassador gave the minister a copy of Leonid Brezhnev's Berlin speech dealing with TNF. He suggested that if the host government would oppose TNF modernization, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs might persuade the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable oil prices.

Moscow has spurred many front groups to oppose the TNF decision through well-publicized conferences and public demonstrations. To broaden the base of the anti-TNF campaign, front groups have lobbied non-Communist participants, including antinuclear groups, pacifists, environmentalists, and others. In some cases, the activities of these broad front groups have been directed by local Communist parties. Soviets have predictably devoted the greatest resources to these activities in NATO countries where opposition to the TNF modernization decision is strongest.

In the Netherlands, for example, the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) has set up its own front group—Dutch Christians for Socialism. In November 1980, the Dutch “Joint Committee—Stop the Neutron Bomb—Stop the Nuclear Armament Race,” which has ties to the CPN, sponsored an international forum against nuclear arms in Amsterdam. The forum succeeded in attracting support from a variety of quarters, which the CPN is exploiting in its campaign to prevent final parliamentary approval of the TNF decision.

The Soviet Campaign Against Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW). The Soviets, throughout 1977 and early 1978, carried out one of their largest, most expensive, and best orchestrated “active measures” campaigns against enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons. (Again, not all opposition to the U.S. decision to produce the enhanced radiation weapon is Soviet inspired.)

This Soviet campaign has had two objectives: first, to halt deployment of ERW by NATO; second, to divide NATO, encourage criticism of the United States, and divert Western attention from the growing Soviet military buildup and its threat to Western Europe and the world.

- Phase one occurred throughout the summer of 1977. The Soviets staged an intense propaganda blitz against ERW and the United States, involving numerous demonstrations and protests by various “peace councils” and other groups. This phase culminated in a Soviet-proclaimed international “Week of Action.”

- Phase two began in January 1978 with Soviet propaganda exploitation of a letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Western heads of government warning that production and deployment of ERW constituted a serious threat to detente. A barrage of similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet went to Western parliamentarians. Soviet trade union officials forwarded parallel messages to Western labor counterparts.

- Phase three came in early 1978 with a series of Soviet-planned conferences, under different names and covers, designed to build up the momentum of anti-ERW pressure for the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament of May-June 1978. These meetings and conferences, held throughout February and March, were organized either by the World Peace Council or jointly sponsored with established and recognized independent international groups.

The Soviet campaign succeeded in complicating allied defense planning and focusing criticism on the United States. A top Hungarian Communist Party offi-

cial wrote that “the political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War Two.” The propaganda campaign did not end in 1978; it was incorporated into the anti-TNF effort. With the recent U.S. decision to proceed with ERW production, the Soviets have begun a new barrage of propaganda and related “active measures.”

Soviet “Active Measures” Toward El Salvador. Complementing their overt public support for the leftist insurgency in El Salvador, the Soviets have also engaged in a global “active measures” campaign to sway public opinion. These activities include a broad range of standard techniques, including forgeries, disinformation, attempted manipulation of the press, and use of front groups. The obvious dual purpose has been to increase support for the insurgency while trying to discredit U.S. efforts to assist the Government of El Salvador.

In 1980, Salvadoran leftists met in Havana and formed the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the central political and military planning organization for the insurgents. During the same period, the Salvadoran Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was established, with Soviet and Cuban support, to represent the leftist insurgency abroad. The FDR and DRU work closely with Cubans and Soviets, but their collaboration is often covert.

The FDR also supported the establishment of Salvadoran solidarity committees in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These solidarity committees have disseminated propaganda and organized meetings and demonstrations in support of the insurgents. Such committees, in cooperation with local Communist parties and leftist groups, organized some 70 demonstrations and protests between mid-January and mid-March 1981 in Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand.

The FDR and DRU are careful to conceal the Soviet and Cuban hand in planning and supporting their activities and seek to pass themselves off as a fully independent, indigenous Salvadoran movement. These organizations have had some success in influencing public opinion throughout Latin America and in Western Europe. The effort of the insurgents to gain legitimacy has been buttressed by intense diplomatic activity on their behalf. For example, at the February 1981 nonaligned movement meeting in New Delhi, a 30-man Cuban contingent, cooperating closely with six Soviet diplomats, pressed the conference to condemn U.S. policy in El Salvador.

At another level, the Soviet media have published numerous distortions to erode support for U.S. policy. For example, an article in the December 30, 1980 *Pravda* falsely stated that U.S. military advisers in El Salvador were involved in punitive actions against noncombatants, including use of napalm and herbicides. In another particularly outrageous distortion, a January 1, 1981 article in the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* falsely stated that the United States was preparing to implement the so-called centaur plan for "elimination" of thousands of Salvadorans.

Campaign Against the U.S.-Egyptian Relationship and the Camp David Process. In the Middle East, Moscow has waged an "active measures" campaign to weaken the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, undermine the Camp David peace process, and generally exacerbate tensions. A special feature of Middle East "active measures" activities has been the use of forgeries, including:

- A purported speech by a member of the U.S. Administration which insulted Egyptians and called for "a total change of the government and the governmental system in Egypt." This forgery, which surfaced in 1976, was the first of a series of bogus documents produced by the Soviets to complicate U.S.-Egyptian relations.

- A forged document, allegedly prepared by the Secretary of State, or one of his close associates, for the President, which used language insulting and offensive to President Sadat and other Egyptians and also to other Arab leaders, including King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. This forgery was delivered anonymously to the Egyptian Embassy in Rome in April 1977.

- A series of forged letters and U.S. Government documents, which criticized Sadat's "lack of leadership" and called for a "change of government" in Egypt. These forgeries surfaced in various locations during 1977.

- A forged dispatch, allegedly prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which suggested that the United States had acquiesced in plans by Iran and Saudi Arabia to overthrow Sadat. This forgery was sent by mail to the Egyptian Embassy in Belgrade in August 1977.

- A forged CIA report which criticized Islamic groups as a barrier to U.S. goals in the Middle East and suggested tactics to suppress, divide, and eliminate these groups. This forgery surfaced in the January 1979 issue of the Cairo-based magazine *Al-Dawa*.

- A forged letter from U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Herman F. Eilts, which declared that, because Sadat was not prepared to serve U.S. interests, "we

must repudiate him and get rid of him without hesitation." This forgery surfaced in the October 1, 1979 issue of the Syrian newspaper *Al-Ba'th*.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union continues to make extensive use of "active measures" to achieve its foreign policy objectives, to frustrate those of other countries, and to undermine leadership in many nations. On the basis of the historical record, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet leadership will continue to make heavy investments of money and manpower in meddlesome and disruptive operations around the world.

While Soviet "active measures" can be exposed, as they have often been in the past, the Soviets are becoming more sophisticated, especially in forgeries and political influence operations. Unless the targets of Soviet "active measures" take effective action to counter them, these activities will continue to trouble both industrialized and developing countries. ■

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Problems of Communism

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Book Reviews


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EMPIRE AND SOVIET POWER

Rebecca V. Strode
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China and Offshore Energy

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Problems of Communism

6

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1981 VOL XXX

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided on the inside back cover of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

- 1 The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power
by Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray
- 16 Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula
by Robert A. Scalapino
- 32 China and Offshore Energy
by Kim Woodard
- BOOKS
- 46 Political Change in the USSR: Moving the Immovable?
by Robert V. Daniels
- 51 National Security Perspectives of Soviet "Think Tanks"
by Tyrus W. Cobb
- 60 Writing on Vietnam
by Douglas Pike
- 65 Value Change in China
by Patrick G. Maddox
- 69 Mass Mobilization in Mao's China
by Richard P. Madsen
- NOTES & VIEWS
- 77 Correspondence
- 80 INDEX TO VOLUME XXX

Cover: A Soviet submarine that ran aground near Karlskrona in Swedish territorial waters on October 29, 1981. Photo by Svenskt from Pictorial Parade.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power

Rebecca V. Strobe and Colin S. Gray

Two Hudson Institute analysts look at the impact of the Russian Imperial tradition on present Soviet strategic posture, and see it as a little understood and significant cause—among several—of the recent Soviet military buildup.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula

Robert A. Scalapino

An Asian expert at Berkeley finds the situation on the Korean peninsula to be volatile and potentially dangerous, with the North Korean military buildup creating the major source of tension. Nonetheless, an international trend appears to be under way—albeit slowly, unevenly, and without official acknowledgment—to recognize the reality that two states exist on the Korean peninsula.

China and Offshore Energy

Kim Woodard

A Washington-based energy consultant notes that leveling-off of onshore energy output has sharpened China's interest in joint development of offshore hydrocarbon resources. He describes some of the security issues bearing upon Western participation in development of these resources.

Essay-reviews

Political Change in the USSR: Moving the Immovable?

Robert V. Daniels

An American observer reviews a number of recent studies on Soviet internal affairs, and finds that none encourage expectations of any sudden and fundamental change even after the old guard leaves the political scene.

National Security Perspectives of Soviet "Think Tanks"

Tyrus W. Cobb

A scholar at West Point concludes that the developing Soviet "strategic-intellectual complex" makes a significant input to decision-making in the USSR. A sample of their writings reveals growing sophistication regarding US policies and weapons systems, but continued limitation on discussion of Soviet policies and force posture.

(Essay-reviews continued on next page)

Writing on Vietnam

Douglas Pike

Reviewing five recent books on the Vietnam experience, an American participant and observer feels that despite the high quality of these works, the definitive account remains to be written. When it is, it will not, he notes, reveal any startling secrets because there are none which have not appeared in the news files. The task will be to interpret the experience and to put it into context.

Value Change in China

Patrick G. Maddox

An American academic sees evidence of the durability of human differences in China despite events since 1949. Diversity and individuality endure, and nonparticipation and avoidance have become deeply ingrained in the face of confusing and conflicting messages from the authorities.

Mass Mobilization in Mao's China

Richard P. Madsen

Reflecting on the extent to which mass campaigns coincided with the moral vision of the Chinese people, an American sociologist suggests that the Maoist version of politics enjoyed wide popular acceptance in the 1950's but subsequently became increasingly alien to the Chinese populace.

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power

By Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray

The secrecy and deliberate obfuscation which envelop Soviet defense and foreign policy decision-making processes are not new to the Russian state. As early as the 16th century, an English traveler to Muscovy commented:

the Russe neither beeleveth any thing that an other man speaketh, nor speaketh any thing himself worthie to be beleevd.¹

But the implantation of Marxism-Leninism onto traditional Russian political culture has left the modern Western observer even more perplexed. Information is suppressed; criticism, submerged. Moreover, the political discussion which does take place in open forums is usually inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete.

To be sure, the sharp debate among Western analysts in recent years over the content of Soviet strategy has sensitized the defense community to the dangers of "mirror-imaging," and *Voyennaya mys'* is now as familiar a title to most defense professionals as is the *Annual Report* of the US Secretary of Defense. But the discrediting of one clearly inadequate methodology has not been followed by the construction of a more appropriate one. Similarly, familiarity with Soviet military writings has not forged a consensus about the meaning of Soviet strategic doctrine, or about its operational relevance for Soviet military behavior.

Ms. Strode is a member of the Professional Staff at the Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, NY, specializing in Soviet foreign and defense policy. Mr. Gray, until recently at the Hudson Institute, is now President of the National Institute of Public Policy, a newly formed research organization located in the Washington, DC, area. He is the author of many works on Soviet and American defense policy, including The MX and National Security, 1981.

Some Western analysts have argued that the Soviet military had concluded by 1969 that strategic superiority, however desirable it might be in theory, was not possible in practice. Given the existing levels of survivable nuclear missiles, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), no attacker could be confident of escaping a crushing retaliatory blow from his opponent. According to this interpretation, only ideological scruples prevented the USSR from openly endorsing the concept of mutual assured destruction. It is claimed that Soviet acceptance of societal vulnerability under the terms of the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty of 1972 in fact belies Soviet declarations and provides proof that the Soviets do not consider war-fighting to be a credible option.²

The principal evidence against this viewpoint is provided by Soviet military hardware. Through a sustained and costly drive for military excellence, the USSR has developed a large, modern military establishment capable of projecting nuclear and conventional forces throughout the globe. This effort seems to have gone beyond that required for a strategy of mutual assured destruction. Moreover, the principal weapons in the strategic arsenal of the USSR, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), appear to have been designed in such a way as to maximize their counterforce, damage-limiting potential.

Nevertheless, analysts who believe that the Soviet Union adheres to the notion of strategic stability through mutual vulnerability maintain that the Soviet force posture is compatible with such a strategy. They con-

¹ Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Commonwealth* (1951), facsimile edition, introduced by Richard Pipes, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 42.

² The most important spokesman for this view is Raymond Garthoff, long-time analyst of Soviet military affairs and formerly Executive Officer of the United States SALT I delegation. See Raymond Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1975, pp. 33-34; and idem, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1978, p. 124.

tend that the Soviet force posture, like its American counterpart, is designed to enhance deterrence, but that the Soviet view of deterrence is one which sees the best defense in the capability to mount a good offense.

Although such a view is credible, it fails to provide evidence that the Soviets possess any criteria of sufficiency. In addition, if Soviet military power were generated purely, or even primarily, by the wholly defensive rationale of deterrence, one would expect to see at least some discussion in Soviet strategic literature of the possibilities of early war termination at minimum cost, should deterrence fail. Such discussion is disturbingly absent from Soviet doctrinal writings. Instead, one reads that nuclear war, should the imperialists unleash it, will be a decisive struggle between the two social systems, leading ultimately to the victory of socialism worldwide.³

Other students of Soviet strategy believe that the USSR has never accepted the notion of deterrence through mutual assured destruction. These analysts point out that Soviet military writings insist that nuclear war, with all its horrors, could still be won in a politically meaningful way. Consequently, Soviet strategy emphasizes not stability, but superiority.⁴ These analysts argue that the Soviet Union's truly enormous buildup of strategic and theater nuclear weapons, coupled with its continuing doctrinal emphasis on counterforce superiority and seizure of the initiative, indicates that, should the Soviet leadership determine during a crisis that nuclear war had become inevitable, the USSR would attempt to execute a disarming first-strike against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The goal of such an attack would be the destruction of enemy forces, followed by the "Finlandization," if not outright occupation, of Western Europe, and the removal of the United States

as an effective impediment to the international political ambitions of the USSR.

While there is substantial truth in these propositions, they do not provide insight into the most critical question of Soviet strategic calculation: By what criteria would the Soviet leadership determine that a nuclear war had indeed become inevitable? Certainly, the Soviets can be said to be Clausewitzian in a sense. Lenin himself quoted (or rather misquoted) Clausewitz, and is in turn repeatedly quoted by today's Soviet military theoreticians.⁵ But to say that the Soviets view war as a continuation of politics only raises more critical—and more interesting—questions: What are Soviet political aims? And under what conditions would Soviet politicians choose to further them through nuclear war? Similarly, to note only that the USSR has adopted a war-fighting strategy fails to address the central issue of Soviet-American strategic relations: Under what circumstances would the Soviet leadership choose to fight?

Answers to these questions cannot be found in Soviet military sources, no matter how closely they are read. This is the stuff of high politics, not of defense technique, and it is here, more than anywhere else, that the USSR's powerful few so jealously hide their thoughts. No matter how familiar Soviet military writings become, it remains the difficult task of those who would analyze Soviet defense policy to penetrate through both an enigma and a mystery just to find the central puzzle—a puzzle, incidentally, to which not even Leonid Brezhnev can know the full solution.

Yet another prominent explanation sees the rationale for the Soviet military buildup in the defense of traditional Russian interests.⁶ But such views often fail to appreciate the dynamism of those interests. Muscovy, like

³ N. V. Ogarkov, "Strategy, Military," in *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 7, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1979, p. 564; and A. A. Grechko, "Report of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), No. 8, April 1973, p. 15.

⁴ Richard Pipes, Joseph Douglass, Amoretta Hoerber, and Francis Hoerber are among the most prominent proponents of this view. There are, however, dissenting views, the most notable perhaps being that of Robert Arnett. Both Pipes and Arnett have made thorough attempts to synthesize and interpret the meaning of Soviet strategy, yet they have come to radically different conclusions. For Pipes, the Soviet contention that even nuclear war is a "continuation of politics" implies that the USSR might under some circumstances choose to further its political ends by means of a nuclear conflict. For Arnett, on the other hand, the Soviet endorsement of this Clausewitzian dictum has no operational significance. Rather, Arnett contends, it is merely a statement of the Marxist philosophical principle that war flows from political conflict. In Arnett's opinion, therefore, it need not imply that the USSR would ever consider nuclear war to be an appropriate tool of policy. The discrepancy between Pipes's and Arnett's views is due to the inherent inadequacy and deliberate ambiguity of Soviet strategic sources. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* (New York, NY), July 1977, pp. 21–34; Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), September 1979, pp. 172–91; Francis P. Hoerber and Amoretta M. Hoerber, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: Who, Whom?" *Survey* (London), Spring 1980, pp. 17–24; and Joseph D. Douglass and

Amoretta M. Hoerber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979. For other examinations of Soviet strategy, see John M. Carabelli, "The Role of Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Military Strategy," *International Security Review* (Tumbridge Wells, Kent), Summer 1981, pp. 209–36; and Fritz Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security*, Fall 1978, pp. 138–55.

⁵ When Lenin quoted Clausewitz's famous dictum on the relationship between war and politics, he inserted the clause "namely violent" in it: "War is a continuation of politics by other, namely violent, means." V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 26, Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p. 316. For recent Soviet examples of this use of Lenin, see B. Byely et al., *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army* (A Soviet View), trans. US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 2 and 29; Major General A. S. Milovidov, Ed., *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War* (A Soviet View), trans., US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 5, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 37; and Colonel M. P. Skirdo, *The People, the Army, the Commander* (A Soviet View), trans. US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 14, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 5–6.

⁶ Walter Lippmann was an early proponent of this view (see his *The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy*, New York, NY, Harpar, 1947). Among current scholars, Hans J. Morgenthau is perhaps the most perceptive and eloquent spokesman (see, for example, his contribution to Lloyd C. Gardner et al., *Origins of the Cold War*, Lexington, MA, Xarox Collega Publishing, 1970).



Amphibious carriers of the Soviet military cross a water obstacle during maneuvers in the Baltic region in the summer of 1981.

—Camera Press.

other empires, perceived territorial expansion to be in its interest, and its wars were as often as not wars of expansion. However, what may appear to an expanding empire to be purely the defense of its territory, or the "gathering of Russian lands," might seem quite aggressive from the perspective of those being "gathered," such as the 15th-century Novgorodians, the 16th-century Kazan Muslims, the 17th-century Siberians, the 18th-century Poles, or the 19th-century Turkestanis. Similarly, in the 20th century, the defense of the state interests of the USSR took plainly aggressive forms in Georgia in 1921, Lithuania in 1940, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. Moreover, the USSR has defined its interests in all-encompassing, global terms,⁷ thereby raising the prospect of conflict with the world's other globally interested nuclear power.

To grasp why the Soviets behave as they do with respect to the development, threat, and use of military power, it is helpful to turn to imperial Russian and Soviet history. The Soviet Union has inherited many of the mili-

tary traditions and strategic problems of its tsarist predecessor, and the Soviet regime has assumed the tsars' imperial mantle. The Soviet leadership's military outlook has also been profoundly shaped by the world war which brought the Bolshevik regime to power, the civil war which firmly established it, and a second world war, which brought it superpower status. In addition, Stalin's rule has left its mark—not only through the experience and historical memory of the Great Purge, but also through the creation of the political system in which today's leaders obtained their early experience and advancement.

The variegated nature of historical experience precludes a monocausal explanation of Soviet military development. Diverse social, political, and historical influences have combined and intertwined to produce a military establishment which is an essential part of the Soviet state and which lies well within the boundaries of

⁷ See Andrey Gromyko's "Report to the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1969.

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power

Russian self-expression. This article will examine a number of these factors, but will focus primarily on the role of empire in Soviet military development. This emphasis is warranted not because it is necessarily the most important factor influencing Soviet military behavior—indeed, it would probably be unsound to assign a precise weight to particular factors—but because the influence of the imperial factor on Soviet strategy has received the least attention from Western analysts.

While it can provide insight, history cannot, of course, answer all questions pertaining to Soviet military development—not only because history is infinitely complex and variously interpreted, but also because the idiosyncratic behavior of key personalities plays an important role, and the leaders themselves do not know exactly how they will react to unforeseen circumstances. Differences in personal style between Nikita Khrushchev and Brezhnev are a case in point. Nevertheless, an investigation of historical continuities constitutes a useful analytical tool. It demonstrates, for example, that the military's massive procurements and increasingly active foreign involvement over the past two decades are not at all extraordinary in the context of past developments. However, while Soviet motives may be less fearsome than appearances might lead one to infer, the resulting behavior may nonetheless be profoundly disturbing. Empire is not easily accommodated in today's "post-imperial" world.

Factors in the Military Buildup

As noted above, the modern Soviet armed forces have been shaped not only by the tradition of empire but also by the impact of chronic technological inferiority, the constraints of the planned economy, and the brutality of the Stalinist purges. While each of these factors merits detailed treatment in its own right, it is sufficient in the present context to indicate briefly how they tend to reinforce the regime's proclivity to invest heavily in military power.

Technological shortcomings have inclined Russia's leaders to seek security in quantitative superiority. As early as 1591, Giles Fletcher noted that "the Russe trusteth rather to his number." The capacity to produce

large quantities of war matériel and field large numbers of forces clearly helped to bring the Soviets victory over the technologically superior German forces in World War II. In this connection, the outstanding aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev stressed his country's need for "long production runs" of simple, "black bread" aircraft. "If these aircraft fall somewhat behind those in the West in terms of technology," he explained, "to hell with them; we'll get by on quantity."⁸ Similar considerations probably hold true for Soviet military leaders today.⁹

The working of the planned economy in high-priority sectors such as the military also mandates high force levels. Military industries strive for smooth operation to facilitate plan fulfillment, and the uninterrupted operation of production lines assures the constant re-equipping of the force. Moreover, the powerful bureaucratic interests involved in the process of arms production, coupled with the rigidity of the centralized administrative system, render it unlikely that ongoing programs could be easily stopped. The result is a large volume of military production.¹⁰

Finally, the priority given to military allocations and concerns may to some degree reflect an effort by the political leadership to reassure the military in the wake of the purges and to make amends—however insufficient—for past abuses. What sort of outlook the purge experience may have inculcated in Soviet military officers is unclear, but Timothy Colton's observation is suggestive: "The Soviet military may have had little part in perpetuating the outrages of the state founded by Lenin, but it also has had little to do with the long and only partly efficacious struggle to contain and reverse them."¹¹ Such an institution is not likely to diverge in fundamental ways from the goals of the regime which has so enhanced its prestige and power, and of which it is now so integral a part.

While these non-imperial factors encourage large military outlays, they say nothing about the uses to which Soviet military power might be put. The Soviet Union's imperial considerations, however, represent a political factor capable of bringing Soviet nuclear posture and strategy into action. Thus, to understand the motivating forces behind Soviet strategy, it is important to examine the extent to which the Soviet Union has adopted Tsarist Russia's imperial ambitions, attitudes, and style.

⁸ A. N. Tupolev, quoted in G. Ozerov, *Tupolevskaya shraga* (The Tupolev Construction Bureau), 2nd ed., Frankfurt-am-Main, Posev, 1973, p. 57. (*Shraga* describes a construction bureau run by the secret police and staffed by prisoners.)

⁹ For further discussion of the impact of relative technological inferiority on Soviet weapons development, see Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Paper No. 147, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978/79; idem, *R & D in Soviet Aviation*, R-589-PR, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1970; and David Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision in Soviet Armaments Policy."

Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 257-79.

¹⁰ An excellent discussion of the economic aspects of Soviet military development may be found in Arthur Alexander et al., *Significance of Divergent U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military Expenditure*, N-1000-AF, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, February 1979. See also Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, Vol. 1, Croton-on-Hudson, NY, Hudson Institute, 1981, pp. 127-29.

¹¹ Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 289.

Power and Empire

An analysis of the imperial factor influencing the present Soviet leadership must begin with the notion of centralized power. From the start, the princes of Moscow sought to obtain, enhance, and sustain centralized command of all social and economic forces.¹² They took care to break local ties and allegiances by requiring the constant presence of the hereditary nobility at court, by frequently confiscating that nobility's hereditary landholdings, and by granting estates for military or civilian service in areas not native to the nobles. Economically, Moscow had a monopoly on all foreign trade and on the income from Siberia's resources. As Hugh Seton-Watson has noted, "There was never any suggestion that government by autocrat should give place to government in which power would be divided between classes and institutions."¹³

The one exception might have been the Conditions accompanying the offer of the Russian throne in 1730 to Anna, Duchess of Courland—an offer made by the Supreme Privy Council, a body of men who had risen to prominence under Emperor Peter I and who had in fact been ruling the state since his death in early 1725. Under their Conditions, the authority of Anna to wage war, make peace, choose a successor, and elevate men to high military and civilian rank would have required the agreement of the Supreme Privy Council. Although the Duchess Anna initially accepted the Conditions, such a substantial transfer of authority to the Privy Council was contested both by the *generalitet*, the high-ranking civil and military state functionaries, and by the rank-and-file nobility. Their petitions and plans showed such a fear of being ruled by an oligarchy of competing family clans or favorites that autocratic power seemed a preferable alternative. Eventually, a demonstration by the nobility asking that Anna retain full autocratic power was "graciously accepted" by her. Anna tore up the Conditions and embarked upon her rule of "maternal benevolence." She increased still further the already heavy burden of taxation on the peasantry, kept the

nobles in line through fear of denunciation to the police, seized Azov from Turkey, and took the first steps to colonize the Ukraine.¹⁴

In sum, the events of 1730 showed that the Russian monarchy had succeeded in preventing the development of regional or class loyalties. The nobility lacked the cohesion necessary to impose limits on autocratic power. This weakness of class and local loyalties meant that political and social change until well into the 19th century would occur at monarchical instigation in order to enhance central power.¹⁵

That Anna forthwith turned her attention to military conquest and colonial expansion is paradigmatic of the pattern of Russian rule. If centralized power was the supreme goal, imperial domination was its primary expression, and military prowess its essential support. A strong army and navy were indispensable for the creation and preservation of empire. It is thus not surprising that the foundation for the modern Russian armed forces was laid by Peter the Great, the official founder of the Russian Empire.

Peter was at war during virtually all of the 35 years of his reign, and the massive reforms which he introduced in all areas of Russian economic, social, and political life were designed to bolster his army's effectiveness. Just as serfdom had originally been established in Russia largely out of military considerations, so military requirements led Peter vastly to expand it—increasing the conscript pool by eliminating many of the intermediate categories of free men, and altering the basis of taxation for serfs in order to increase state revenues.¹⁶ Henceforth, the individual male serf, rather than the peasant household, became the basic unit of taxation. This reform greatly increased the burden of taxation on the peasant by reducing the opportunities for avoiding taxes which existed when the household, regardless of the number of able-bodied men it contained, constituted the basic unit of direct taxation.¹⁷ With the introduction of the capitation or "soul" tax on the serf, the peasant was transformed, in the state's eyes, from a tiller bound to the land he worked into a movable object of taxation. As Marc Raeff has pointed out, the way was

¹² It may be argued that in the early modern period, almost all European states moved, or tried to move, to centralized power. But the Russian case remains unique in several respects. First, centralization came quite early in Russia's political development. Second, it progressed further than in Western states. The nobility, for example, depended for status on service to the state, as opposed to birth. In addition, the state retained a much greater degree of economic control and initiative in Russia than it did elsewhere.

¹³ Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 11.

¹⁴ While Anna's reign is not generally noted for outstanding military conquest, the lack of more spectacular expansion was not for want of trying. During her rule (1730-40), Anna fought (with moderate success) the War of the Polish Succession (1733-35), invaded (but failed to capture) the Crimea in 1735, and fought (with limited success) the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39. In the last case, Russian troops scored impressive victories against the

Ottoman forces; however, defeats suffered by Austria (Russia's ally) and French diplomatic support of Turkey limited Russia's ultimate gains. By the Treaty of Belgrade (1739), Turkey ceded Azov to Russia, but Russia agreed to dismantle its fortress and promised not to deploy naval forces in the Black Sea. For these gains, Russia lost 100,000 men. See *ibid.*, p. 42; and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 3rd ed., New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 279.

¹⁵ Marc Raeff, *Imperial Russia, 1682-1825: The Coming of Age of Modern Russia*, New York, NY, Knopf, 1971, pp. 14-17; and Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18.

¹⁶ On the rise of serfdom, see Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1971. On Peter's reforms, see Vasily Klyuchevskiy, *Peter the Great*, trans. by Lilliana Archibald, New York, NY, Vintage, 1958.

¹⁷ Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 259; and Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, New York, NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974, p. 121.

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power



A 1721 depiction of Peter the Great by Russian engraver A. G. Zubov; the title reads "Peter the Great—Father of the Fatherland, Emperor of All-Russia."

—*Grafiyura petrovskogo vremeni—katalog vystavki* (Engravings of the Time of Peter—Exhibit Catalog), Leningrad, State Russian Museum, 1971, p. 9.)

thus cleared for turning the serf into movable chattel, at the mercy of his lord and the needs of the state.¹⁸ The nobility was also pressed into lifelong service to the state, with their status dependent on their rank in state service.¹⁹

Thus, to strengthen the armed forces, Peter—one of the few tsars venerated today by the Soviet regime—not only impoverished his people; he virtually enslaved them.²⁰ Not until 1861 would emancipation be granted, and this development, too, was precipitated by military exigency—the need to overcome the demoralization and economic stagnation which had contributed to defeat in the Crimean War. For the sake of empire, Russia's social organization was subordinated to the needs of the military.²¹ Society served the army; not the army, society.

Whom, then, did the army serve? Without question, it was the Russian state, and the state was wholly distinct from the people. Since these developments predated the rise of modern nationalism, there was no notion of popular sovereignty. "Imperial officials," writes Raeff, "were hardly conscious of Russian 'nationalism,' although they were very much aware of the All-Russian state, the empire, and possibly the cultural character and religious mission of its history."²² Loyalty to the state was deemed possible for all subjects of the empire, no matter what their nationality. A loyal Pole, Baltic German, or even Tatar was considered just as valuable to the state as a loyal Russian. The erosion of local autonomy which accompanied incorporation into the empire was not inspired by hostility to non-Russian culture, but by the drive for administrative uniformity to facilitate centralized control. Still, this drive often entailed the repression of local national culture. In the Ukraine, for example, the Russian government fostered the disintegration of the traditional Cossack social organization and the enslavement of the Ukrainian peasantry; in the Crimea, it promoted Russian colonization and land ownership.²³

Modern Russian nationalism began to stir in the early 19th century, particularly during the wars against Napoleon.²⁴ The legitimacy based on monarchy by divine institution was gradually augmented by a notion that the monarch somehow embodied the nation.²⁵ One effort to come to grips with the concept of modern nationalism which emerged from the French Revolution was embodied in the ideas of the Russian Minister of

¹⁸ Raeff, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Technically, the capitation tax removed the distinction between slaves and serfs, making all the landlord's peasants into serfs. But in fact, the arbitrary power which the landlord enjoyed over his peasants made Russian serfdom differ little from slavery. Although supposedly tied to the land, Russian serfs could in fact be bought and sold, separated from their families, and transferred from one estate to another. For further information on the de facto "enslavement" of the serfs, see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, pp. 122–23; and Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 259–60.

²¹ Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, pp. 120–22.

²² Raeff, op. cit., p. 43.

²³ On the extent to which loyalty was expected not only toward the state, but toward the tsar personally, see Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 267–68; and Raeff, op. cit., pp. 43–57.

²⁴ It is difficult to ascribe a precise date to the rise of modern nationalism in Russia. For certain groups of intellectuals, aristocrats, officers, and officials, a sense of nationalism had begun to develop out of a more general national consciousness by the late 18th century. Nevertheless, the Napoleonic Wars mark something of a watershed in the general process of the emergence of nationalism.

²⁵ Although the term "divine right" may seem too Western to be fully applicable to the Russian case, in fact the tsars frequently did justify their rule in similar terms. See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 85 and 96–98.

Nevertheless, in the pre-Petrine era, legitimacy was also based on the notion of patrimonialism. Peter the Great introduced the principle of the tsar as the first servant of the state. These concepts were not incompatible with the idea of rule by divine right, with which they coexisted.

On the rise of the nation as a legitimizing principle, see *ibid.*, pp. 77 and 102–03; and Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 268.

Education, S. S. Uvarov. In 1832, he proclaimed that three principles would guide the work of his ministry: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and the National Principle (*narodnost*).

Precisely what Uvarov meant by this national principle, or "official nationality," is not entirely clear. Most state officials, including Nicholas I, interpreted it to mean only that the Russian people were supremely devoted to their tsar and hence comprised an essential buttress of autocracy. With time, however, a number of prominent officials and intellectuals imparted to the concept of official nationality a decidedly romantic and nationalistic content. These men believed Russia to have a messianic duty toward all Slavs, a duty which ought to be fulfilled by conducting an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, even though the consequences for other European states might be revolutionary.²⁶

Such ideas were anathema to the conservative and legitimist Nicholas I.²⁷ But considerations of stability persuaded Nicholas and his successors to adopt Russification policies toward their non-Russian subjects. The rise of nationalism among the empire's non-Russian subjects had sharpened their resentment of Russian rule. In 1830, a Polish rebellion broke out. The consequent sense of insecurity this produced in St. Petersburg led the government to initiate efforts intended to curtail both political and cultural autonomy in the empire. From the 1830's on, native languages began to be suppressed; native landholdings, especially in the western borderlands of the empire, confiscated and transferred to Russian ownership; non-Orthodox religions, circumscribed.²⁸ As the century progressed, nationalism and its associated imperial policy of Russification became increasingly prominent features of tsarist rule.²⁹

Nationalism also tended to constrain the foreign policy options of the Russian Empire. While it is true that nationalism facilitated Great Russian appeals to the sense of community among all Orthodox and Slavs, it at the same time opened the way for outside states and groups to mobilize minority peoples living within the empire. In principle, then, one could see the need for ever larger buffer zones to shield against the pull of various magnets beyond the empire's borders.

At times, however, territorial buffers could not be expanded without serious risk of defeat by another major power. Prussia's strength, for example, made any expansion at its expense unthinkable. But the dynamism of an imperial ideology, particularly when a regime sees a close link between the imperial mission and its own legitimacy, may convince the leadership that an empire which does not grow must eventually die. Consequently, if power relationships rendered expansion in one area

difficult, the tsars directed their acquisition efforts to areas where resistance might be weaker (Turkistan, the Balkans, China). Within territories already held, moreover, Russification was pursued even more vigorously.³⁰

The Soviet Empire

Such was the legacy inherited by the Bolshevik regime in 1917: a centralized government inclined to expand, even if the concomitant military efforts meant the wholesale alteration of fundamental social structures. While this state—professing a transnational legitimacy (Orthodoxy and Autocracy), but relying in fact on the national patriotism of the core region—was apparently destroyed by the revolution of 1917, the underlying dynamics of empire soon found expression in the Bolshevik regime. The party was even more centralized than the tsarist administration, and it too aspired to control the tsar's vast and disintegrating empire.³¹ Having escaped the foreign occupation of Russia through desperate diplomacy and not a little luck (Germany, after all, was defeated by Tsarist Russia's World War I allies), Lenin secured his power only through bloody struggle and ideological compromise in a fierce civil war. The Bolsheviks reinstated the draft almost immediately, and former tsarist officers were encouraged (and compelled) to command the Red Army recruits in accordance with traditional military discipline for the sake of the Bolshevik cause. Party members who objected to this concession were accused by Lenin of nostalgia for "underground printing presses and discussion circles."³² In the throes of the civil war, Lenin came to understand the extent to which Bolshevik power was dependent on the military for its very survival, and he reordered priorities accordingly.

²⁶ Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 269–70.

²⁷ For further discussion of "official nationality," see Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I . . .*, pp. 124–38 and 144–45.

²⁸ Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, pp. 368–69; Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 269; and A. Korelin, *Dvoryanstvo v poreformennoy Rossii 1862–1904* (The Nobility in Postreform Russia, 1862–1904), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p. 45.


²⁹ Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, pp. 433–40.

³⁰ On the dynamics of imperialism, see Richard Koebner, *Empire*, New York, NY, Grosset and Dunlap, 1965; Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism*, New York, NY, Random House, 1980; and C. C. Eldridge, *Victorian Imperialism*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1978.

³¹ The Bolshevik (later Communist) Party was at least as centralized as the tsarist government in theory, and more so in practice, owing to the party's origin in conspiratorial politics and to such technical factors as improved communications and transportation. For a discussion of centralization under the tsarist administration, see Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I . . .*, pp. 41–42. On the early centralization of the Communist Party, see Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 39–48.

³² Unpublished speech by Lenin, cited in Colton, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power



Key leaders of the Soviet government, party, and military establishment pose in the Kremlin in February 1978 on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Victory to party chief Leonid Brezhnev (front row, seventh from the left).

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Having regrouped his forces, Lenin proceeded wherever possible to reincorporate the former tsarist territories into the new Soviet state. Imperialism, of course, was roundly condemned. But the Soviet regime espoused a substitute ideology which claimed to legitimize the expansion of Communist, and hence Soviet Russian, influence on a truly unlimited scale.

The Bolshevik nationality policy developed by such men as I. V. Stalin and G. K. Ordzhonikidze, like its imperial predecessor, took on ever more the appearance of centralization and Russification. In early 1923, for example, the leading "national Communist" among the Muslims, Mirza Sultan-Galiev, was arrested on orders from Stalin.³³

Upon consolidating his power, Stalin undertook a major industrialization campaign, the primary purpose of which was to provide a modern base for Soviet military power. The First Five-Year Plan set the precedent of ac-

cording top priority in resource allocation to the military products industries, a trend which continues to this day. Defense spending grew 20 times over between 1933 and 1938.³⁴ Like Peter before him, Stalin forced upon the peasantry a brutal program of social reorganization, collectivizing agriculture to finance industrial development.

But while the matériel for the armed forces was improved, Stalin's policies seriously weakened social and political cohesion, and the socialist empire very nearly collapsed under the strain of World War II. Indeed, the brutality of Adolf Hitler may have been the only thing that ultimately saved Stalin. Still, the Soviet Union not

³³ See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Atheneum, 1974, p. 262.

³⁴ The defense budget rose from 1.4 billion rubles in 1933 to 23.2 billion rubles in 1938. Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 477.

only survived but also emerged from the war with an East European "quasi-empire" even larger than that of the tsars—East Prussia at last was under Russian control.

The war proved Russian nationalism to be a far more effective mobilizing tool than Marxist ideology. This was an important lesson—one which Stalin and his successors were quick to learn. Since the war, and especially since the revelations about Stalin in 1956, the Soviet population has become thoroughly cynical toward the official ideology. The regime has consequently come to rely increasingly on Russian nationalist pride (in the guise of Soviet patriotism) to maintain popular support. The effect of this policy on the non-Russians is difficult to gauge, but the persistent concern over independent rumblings, whether within the borders of the Soviet Union or beyond them, in the Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc, gives some indication of the regime's disquiet.

Like its tsarist forerunner, the Soviet empire can be expected to remain intact in times of relative peace. But the non-Russian dominions of the empire have constituted one of its greatest strategic vulnerabilities. Whether the empire would withstand the strains of war in the future must be a troubling question for the USSR's defense planners. This is especially the case for nuclear war, with its potential for the prompt disruption

of command, control, and communications assets, and for the large-scale elimination of leadership cadres.

At the same time, the empire today, just as in the tsarist period, provides international prestige for the regime and may even serve as a source of its legitimacy. The Soviet system compares unfavorably with its Western opponents in virtually all areas of interest—social, economic, and political. One of the few achievements to which the current leaders can point with pride is the preservation of Russia's imperial holdings. This factor reinforces the importance of the empire to the regime. Thus, the non-Russian territories constitute not only a vulnerability, but an important asset as well.

The Russian and Soviet regimes have repeatedly fought to retain their empires, and there is every reason to believe that the Soviets would do so again, provided there existed both the need and a credible prospect for success. On the other hand, Soviet leaders have a mixed record when the defense of imperial interests has seemed likely to lead to defeat. The Lenin who fought to win back territory in the Ukraine and Georgia was the same Lenin who a short time earlier had accepted the truncation of the empire at Brest-Litovsk. However important the empire, it is valued for its enhancement of the center's power, not as an end in itself. When defense of the borderlands clearly would have damaged the regime's control of the center, Lenin sacrificed them.



Observing the Soyuz 81 joint maneuvers of Warsaw Treaty Organization forces in Poland in March 1981 are, from right to left: Heinz Hoffmann, East German Defense Minister; Wojciech Jaruzelski, Polish Defense Minister; Viktor Kulikov of the USSR, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Treaty forces; and Martin Dzur, Czechoslovak Defense Minister.

—SYGMA.

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power

Stalin, of course, came close to losing everything by attempting a forward defense of all Soviet territory in 1941, but even Stalin's policy found its rationale in the drive for control from the center. For Stalin, this was defined as the continuation not only of Soviet rule but, more importantly, of his own personal power. As Adam Ulam has cogently observed:

... the Soviet regime recognized that a prolonged war on Russian soil, even if the Soviet Union were eventually victorious, could bring with it a breakdown of the Communist system—just as the three years of World War I spelled disaster for the Tsarist regime. . . . If the Communist system could survive the war and if the multinational structure of the U.S.S.R. would hold together, there was still another danger: would Stalin's personal regime, which had treated its people so cruelly, withstand the test of war? . . .

*These considerations explain why Russia's great weapon, space, was allowed to figure but little in Soviet military doctrine. A temporary loss of territory might not affect the final outcome of the war, but it could spell disaster to Stalin. . . .*³⁵

In the end, Stalin survived his initial defeats. Yet, as has already been suggested, his success in maintaining power may have been due to the gross brutality of the alternative presented by Hitler. A more benign opponent might have found the multinational composition of the USSR to be a critical weakness of Soviet power.

Militarism and Empire

The dynamics and tradition of empire contributed not only to the importance of the military under the Russian and Soviet governments but also to the militarization of society itself. This is best seen in the frequency with which virtually every public endeavor is described in military terms. The Soviet population is exhorted to "fight" for peace or socialism, to "struggle" for a better harvest or industrial output, to "combat" waste or

parasitism, and so forth. The roots of this militarism extend back to the old regime. Because the Russian military establishment appeared to be the most efficient and disciplined institution at the tsars' command, its officers were frequently given civilian administrative posts, such as state minister or governor of a province. As a result, the imperial civilian bureaucracy tended to develop a militarized outlook as well.³⁶

Just how far this militarism could go is evident from the experimentation with "military colonies" in the reign of Alexander I. Peasants were to be resettled in appropriate locations, trained, and given special economic assistance for their agricultural pursuits; in return, they were to serve as a ready militia. Though the plan was a disaster and was soon abandoned, it is indicative of the government's mentality. In his well-intentioned effort to improve the condition of the serfs, the tsar could conceive of nothing better than to force them into a barracks-type existence.³⁷

The militarism of Russia's government has deepened under Soviet rule. The threat of war is constantly evoked; the glorious victories of World War II are repeatedly lauded. This militarism is not founded on any jingoistic desire for war, but seems to grow largely from the regime's legitimacy problem. The ideological and economic promise of socialism having obviously failed, the regime has come to rely on its military accomplishments for justification of its right to rule. The Red Army under party guidance, it is claimed, saved the country from the Nazis; for this reason alone, the memory of World War II must not be allowed to die. Yet time inexorably blunts the past, and even the feats of the Great Patriotic War must eventually fade in the national consciousness. But as the memory of that war recedes, the threat of nuclear catastrophe takes on some of the same legitimizing function.³⁸ Only Soviet military power, the regime can claim, has deterred the imperialists from unleashing a nuclear war. The symbolism of "party as protector" affords, in and of itself, an important rationale for unsurpassed military power.

Beyond its utility for legitimacy, a powerful military force has a strong psychological effect on other states


³⁵ Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, Praeger, 1974, p. 315.

³⁶ Raef, op. cit. p. 40.

³⁷ On the connection between the military colonies and the state's militarism, see Marc Raef, *The Decembrist Movement*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 13. For comment on the continuation of militarism under Nicholas I, see Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I . . .*, pp. 27, 37, and 43.

³⁸ On the declining utility of World War II as a legitimizing experience, note the statement that "the present younger generation has not experienced that stern school of combat and toughening that fell to the lot of the older generation. This is why ideological conditioning of youth and its training to defend the homeland are acquiring particular significance." Milovidov, op. cit., p. 132. (Continued in next column.)

For an example of the implicit shift of the role of legitimation from the Great Patriotic War to the threat of a future nuclear war, see the frequent transitions directly from one to the other in Col. Skirdo's discussion of the importance of the "moral-political" factor in warfare found in Skirdo, op. cit., pp. 48-57. Note also General A. A. Yepshev's statement that "in this struggle, one system, the socialist one, is advancing along the path of comprehensive progress, and the other, the capitalist system, entails the threat of new, devastating wars. The words pronounced by L. I. Brezhnev at the 23rd CPSU Congress—"We must never forget the possibility of future ordeals which may again lie on the shoulders of the Soviet people"—are topical today as never before. This is why the Soviet armed forces, led by the CPSU, are taking all measures for reliably ensuring the security of the Soviet Motherland and the entire socialist community from any intrigues of the imperialist aggressors." *Pravda*, Mar. 25, 1971.



Part of the display of military hardware at the November 1981 parade in Moscow's Red Square commemorating the 64th anniversary of the October Revolution. The sign at the rear refers to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in February-March 1981.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and on the Soviet population itself. Military power demonstrably begets international deference and respect—which might not be accorded to the Soviet regime on the basis of its performance in other areas of international competition. The appearance of Soviet parity with the US, or even of superiority, at the highest level of potential violence facilitates Soviet policy in the Third World not only by impressing small powers but also by deterring strong counterescalation by the United States in local conflicts where the USSR is involved in a combat or supporting role. But above all, from the Soviet perspective, the respect born of military power seems essential to guard the USSR's contiguous non-Russian holdings—in Eastern Europe as well as along the border with China—from too much meddling by powers which might harbor irredentist ambitions. This aspect of "preventive control" can be provided only by the armed forces; the internal security forces can play merely a peripheral role.

The appearance of enormous military power is essen-

tial also to overawe Russia's own people and those of its imperial holdings. Being repressive, the regime requires what in the West might seem to be inordinately large forces. However, when the state looks invincible, national dissent is held to a minimum. In the suppression of dissent, of course, the KGB (Committee for State Security) and its East European counterparts play a major part. But the overwhelming strength of the regular military is also important. It hardly enters one's head that another government is possible. Given the state's overwhelming power, speculation on alternative regimes seems futile. Here, indeed, is the motivation behind the annual Red Square missile and tank parades—the stark show of such enormous firepower numbs the political will of disgruntled subjects. The myth of invincibility is an important pillar of the regime. The Politburo fears nothing more than that someone should say, "This is a paper tiger." Chinese leaders have done so already; how would the regime react if Soviet Ukrainians did so tomorrow?

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power

The need to appear invincible raises interesting questions concerning the regime's resilience in war. To some extent, the sheer will to power and a capacity for ruthlessness enabled both Lenin and Stalin to maintain a tenacious grip on government even in the face of serious military defeats. Nevertheless, Russian and Soviet imperial rule has been most fragile when the myth of omnipotent control has been shattered by defeat of the regime's armies on the battlefield. Even defeat in the limited Russo-Japanese War brought political instability in 1905. Losses in more general wars have posed still greater threats. Russian defeats in World War I may not in themselves have caused the February 1917 revolution, but they surely helped to topple the tsarist regime by making its vulnerabilities all too evident. Moreover, when the government collapsed, the empire disintegrated; and it may well be that had the Whites not been so intent on complete Russian domination themselves as to preclude alliance with non-Russian groups, the fledgling Bolshevik regime could have been toppled. Again, had Hitler been capable of a more humane policy of occupation, Stalin might not have survived. The effect that

losses in a major conflict might have on the cohesion of the empire and, with it, on the stability of the regime must be of serious concern to Soviet military planners.

Imperial Strategy

The imperial thrust of Russian and Soviet policies seems also to have played a major role in shaping Moscow's military strategy. Territories have to be not only won but also held, and their ever-lengthening borders have to be made secure. In addition, territories have to be administered—a function which under the tsars fell heavily upon the military establishment. These factors have argued for large forces, and the availability of cheap peasant conscripts has made such forces feasible. Imperial Russia consistently maintained the largest standing army in Europe, and in the 19th century it sought (not always successfully) to outnumber the Prussian and Austrian armies combined. Today, too, the Soviets pursue numerical superiority in most categories of military power.³⁹ In part, quantitative advantage is sought to compensate for the relatively inferior quality of some Soviet weaponry (a problem which plagued the tsarist army as well). But the Soviet emphasis on mass probably reflects a more general carry-over of the imperial military tradition as well. And while the Soviet army is less involved in civilian administrative functions than was its tsarist counterpart, it performs many functions (particularly in the construction sector) which in the West would fall to civilians.

The emphasis on mass has important implications. Because of the USSR's tendency to accept a large military establishment as part of the natural order of things, and because the USSR's strategy of mass firepower met with considerable success in World War II, it is unlikely that Soviet leaders will show much proclivity for unilateral restraint in the procurement of weaponry, however restrained they may be in its use.


A large standing army also carries out an important propaganda function for the Soviet state. Through the universal draft, the USSR's armed forces touch the lives of almost every male in the Soviet Union. During their military service, young men of all nationalities are trained in the spirit of a supposedly trans-ethnic Soviet



Training of young Soviet soldiers in June 1980. The sign on the building to the rear reads "Defense of the fatherland is the soldier's sacred duty."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

³⁹ On Imperial Russia's emphasis on numerical preponderance, see Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1980, p. 3; and P. A. Zayonchkovskiy, *Samoderzhaviye i russkaya armiya na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletiy* (Autocracy and the Russian Army at the Turn of the 19th–20th Centuries), Moscow, Mysl', 1973, pp. 126–27. The current Soviet numerical advantage in tanks, artillery pieces, tactical aircraft, and strategic nuclear launch vehicles is well documented in recent issues of *The Military Balance*, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.



Laying of a cornerstone for a monument to Aleksandr Suvorov on Moscow's Commune Square in May 1950, on the 150th anniversary of the death of the famous tsarist general.

—Sovfoto.

patriotism. Those who do not speak Russian are given language instruction (with only modest success), and all recruits are warned of the dangers of "national cliqueism" (*natsional'naya gruppovshchina*).⁴⁰ That, during military service, Soviet patriotism is explicitly tied to a recognition of the leading role of Russian culture is an indication of the importance that the regime attaches to the military as an instrument for maintaining imperial rule through Russification.⁴¹

The imperial dimension seems to have affected the strategic emphasis not only on mass but also on the value of the offensive in Russian military tradition. The

foundation for the now much-discussed Soviet preference for the offensive was laid in the 18th century by the talented General Aleksandr Suvorov.

Realizing that since the defeat of the Swedes at Poltava in 1709, Russia's wars had been wars of expansion, Suvorov concluded that the empire would be better served by a more offensive strategy than was then current in Europe. Most continental armies of the day fielded mercenaries; and mercenary armies, being expensive, were not to be squandered. Commanders were therefore wary of pitched battles. As in a game of chess, the preferred strategy was to maneuver into a position in which one's adversary would realize the inevitability of his defeat. When further play could not improve this situation, the enemy would concede rather than play to the bitter end. Marshal Maurice de Saxe went so far as to contend that a good commander might never have to fight a "general engagement," explaining: "I am persuaded that an able General might avoid them

⁴⁰ *Serzhanty i starshiny Vozrúzhennyykh Sil SSSR* (Sergeants and Sergeant-Majors of the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p. 54.

⁴¹ See, for example, the military's implication that non-Russians should adopt Russian as their native language ("mere" fluency is apparently not enough) in V. Samoylenko, "The Flourishing and Mutual Cultural Enrichment of Fraternal Peoples," *Kommunist voorúzhennyykh sil*, No. 21, November 1972, pp. 32-33. On the leading role of the Russian people, see *Serzhanty i starshiny Vozrúzhennyykh Sil SSSR*, p. 57.

The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power



A helicopter and planes of the Soviet Group of Forces stationed at Legnica, Poland.

—SYGMA.

and yet carry on the war, as long as he pleased."⁴²

Suvorov saw no need for Russia to restrict itself to limited campaigns. With a large population from which to draw conscripts, a Russian general could afford a higher level of violence. Suvorov therefore escalated the strategic goal from maneuver for position to destruction of the opposing forces. To execute this strategy, he instituted the practice of immediate pursuit. Forcing the opposing troops into retreat was not enough; it was necessary to chase them, killing or capturing the scattered soldiers so that the enemy would not be able to regroup. "Speed and onslaught are the soul of modern war," he contended. "Only pursuit can destroy the fleeing enemy."⁴³ This policy increased the level of battlefield casualties, but Suvorov believed that any failure to eliminate future threats rendered victory and bloodshed vain.

Suvorov's strategic innovations find an echo in current Soviet strategy. As Suvorov stressed the desirability of speed and surprise, so Soviet strategists discuss the ad-

vantages of rapid tank advance and of a first nuclear strike. As Suvorov favored direct engagements with enemy troops over sieges of fortresses, so Soviet strategists give primacy to countermilitary over countereconomy targets. As Suvorov sought decisive battles, so Soviet strategists expect nuclear war to be a decisive struggle between two opposing social systems.⁴⁴

But the point here is not simply to note the harmony between the two strategies; rather, it is to underscore the imperial concerns which lay behind much of Suvorov's later popularity. It is significant that the first half of the 19th century, when Russia faced a severe threat to its imperial integrity from Napoleon, and lesser challenges from Polish and Ukrainian nationalism, probably saw the greatest influence of Suvorov's thought.⁴⁵ After

⁴² See Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, Colonel General of the Engineers, V. Shabanov, in *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), July 26, 1981; and Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, quoted in General S. S. Lototskiy, *The Soviet Army*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1971, p. 332.

⁴³ Suvorov's *Nauka pobezhdat'* was not published until 1809—nine years after his death. The volume appeared in the aftermath of the Russian defeats at Austerlitz and Friedland, and it was hoped that the memory of Suvorov's victories would help to restore morale. A. I. Khatov, who during 1807–10 wrote the first thorough textbook on tactics to appear in Russia (*Essay on General Tactics*), explicitly acknowledged his debt to Suvorov for his stress on speed, maneuverability, and loose formation on the battlefield. Suvorov's practice of exhorting and instructing the rank and file was adopted by progressive officers in the early 19th century. See Philip Longworth, *The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov, 1729–1800*, London, Constable, 1965, p. 303; and G. Meshcheryakov, *Russkaya voyennaya mysl' v XIX v.* (Russian Military Thought in the 19th Century), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, pp. 22 and 55–56.

⁴² Maurice de Saxe, *Reveries, or Memoirs Upon the Art of War*, London, 1757, p. 163. Eighteenth-century warfare was, nevertheless, often very bloody. When "general engagements" did occur, the close-in exchange of volley fire from musket-armed troops produced heavy losses.

⁴³ Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Suvorov, "The Orders and Instructions of Suvorov for the Training of the Austrian Army in 1799," in N. N. Golovin, Ed., *Suvorov i ego "Nauka pobezhdat'"* (Suvorov and His "The Science of Victory"), Paris, Vozrozhdeniye—La Renaissance, 1931, p. 125.

a subsequent eclipse, the national crisis of 1941 led the Soviet government to glorify Suvorov. Multiple editions of his *The Science of Victory* were published. Stalin meanwhile had assumed the rank of Generalissimo, which had been held by only one Russian before him—Aleksandr Suvorov. Immediately after the war, Suvorov's territorial conquests were praised.⁴⁶ Thus, the 18th-century general's strategic views have enjoyed their greatest popularity at times when Russia has felt the most keenly its national and imperial vulnerability. Perhaps the USSR's current strategy is at least partly informed by the suspicion that a protracted conflict might release the centrifugal forces which are always latent in a multinational empire.

Conclusion

Broad overviews such as that undertaken here may provide insights that more narrowly technical studies cannot. For example, the foregoing historical review indicates that high levels of defense spending and force procurements are not unique to the last few years, or even to the Soviet period. The regime's apparent obsession with military power, and even its explicit preoccupation with the value of the offensive, need not mean that the USSR is planning to capitalize on a "window of opportunity" during the 1980's. Rather, the militarist nature of the regime springs from its drive to maintain full sway over a large and ethnically diverse population among which it has little popular support.

Nevertheless, this essentially defensive motivation can find aggressive expression. To keep control over what it has, the regime feels compelled to control more. To maintain its stature at home, the regime needs successes abroad. The Soviets want not so much unlimited power as unlimited security. But the former is the only means to the latter. Resistance on the part of other states to this process is viewed as a challenge to the entire system, and must therefore be suppressed if the

myth of omnipotence on which the empire rests is to be preserved. As a result, while Soviet strategy and foreign policy may be genuinely defensive from the Soviet point of view, they may be just as genuinely aggressive from the perspective of others. Herein lies the potential for interstate conflict.

This potential is increased by the prospect that younger individuals will assume the leadership of the Soviet Union over the next decade—men who have not been chastened by first-hand experience of near-catastrophe in World War II, men who have reached maturity not under the specter of fascist domination of Europe but in the luxury of Soviet domination of East Germany. How these men will calculate the risks and benefits of various options in times of crisis is as yet unknowable. In the past, the Soviets have shown considerable circumspection in the use of force, and they will probably do so in the future. Nevertheless, the possibility of miscalculation should not be ignored. It is worth remembering that Russia entered World War I to defend its imperial interests, and it is sobering to read in the memoirs of then Minister of Defense V. A. Sukhomlinov: "Russia was never so prepared for war as in 1914."⁴⁷

To the extent that Soviet leaders are driven by the internal dynamics of imperialism, there is little that the West can do to reassure them that their "legitimate" interests are not threatened. How, in the Soviet perspective, can they not be threatened, since Moscow sees danger in any independent source of authority? Listening in this context to Soviet pronouncements of peaceful intent, it must seem to the outside observer, as it did to the English diplomat four centuries ago, that the Russians neither mean what they say nor say what they mean, and Western defense strategists would probably agree that "these qualities make the[m] very odious to all their neighbours. . . ."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ V. A. Sukhomlinov, *Vospominaniya Sukhomlinova* (The Memoirs of Sukhomlinov), Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1926, p. 224.

⁴⁸ Fletcher, op. cit., p. 42.

⁴⁶ See, for example, *Suvorov v Krymu* (Suvorov in the Crimea), n. p., Krymizdat, 1947.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula

By Robert A. Scalapino

The old adage that Korea is a shrimp living among whales continues to hold true. Now, however, what was one shrimp has become two, with bitter hostility dominating relations between the North and South. And the whales, larger than ever, thrash about, with both their love-making and menacing thrusts at each other having a profound impact upon the Korean scene. Indeed, the external environment remains crucial to the two Koreas, influencing domestic as well as foreign policies. But influence does not necessarily mean domination, and both Koreas have shown unmistakable independence on occasion, sometimes to the discomfiture of their major allies.

There is, in short, nothing foreordained about the future of the Korean peninsula, whatever probabilities one may discern. Leaders—North and South—have choices to make, further tactics and strategies to devise. As the recent past has shown so clearly, their role in taking initiatives both on the home front and in external policies, including North-South relations, is a variable of major importance, notwithstanding the pressures that will continue to emanate from abroad.

This article will explore the key factors that will shape the dynamics of events on the peninsula in the years ahead. It will look first at the military situation there. Then it will examine domestic developments in the two Koreas and the interaction between the North and the South. Finally, it will analyze the attitudes toward the

two Koreas of the four major outside powers involved in the peninsula's affairs—the USSR, China, Japan, and the United States.

The Military Situation

It is now more than three decades since the outbreak of the Korean war, but even though an uneasy peace has been maintained on the peninsula since 1953, no frontier except part of the Arab-Israeli border is more tightly closed or more overlain with mistrust and hatred than that separating the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Thus, the cold war that prevails on the Korean peninsula must be treated as a war-peace issue, volatile and potentially dangerous. It is one, moreover, which directly concerns the major nations of the Pacific-Asian region quite as much as the hot wars that simmer in Indochina and Afghanistan.

What are the risks of another Korean war at some point in the 1980's? On the surface at least, the present situation does not seem comforting. Few regions are so heavily militarized, and a new arms expansion is currently under way. The situation parallels that characterizing developments in US-USSR relations, only at a lower level.

During the second phase of the Carter administration, Washington as well as Seoul finally took cognizance of the fact that over a number of years North Korea had been augmenting its military forces. Each side now had some 600,000 men regularly under arms, although the 17 million people of the North numbered barely half of the 33 million people of the South. In such categories as aircraft, submarines, and tanks, as well as in selected types of ground weapons, moreover, the North possessed a substantial advantage over the South.¹

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This imbalance, to be sure, did not take into account the military strength of the United States in the area and US commitments to South Korea, but the Carter administration had earlier decided to withdraw the remaining US troops from South Korea and increasingly "Koreanize" the situation. Furthermore, the military capacities of North Korea's two neighboring allies, the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC), had to be considered as well as those of the United States.

In any case, South Korea embarked upon a military modernization and expansion program in 1979, effecting substantial increases in its military budget in that year and the following one. The figure for 1980—about US\$3.6 billion—amounted to more than 6 percent of GNP and represented more than one-third of the total budget. Budgetary projections for 1981 were in the same range. After assuming office in early 1981, the Reagan administration pledged its full cooperation with this program, and in the spring of 1981, it agreed to sell the ROK F-16 fighters as well as provide other forms of military assistance. A weapons agreement totaling US\$327 million—to be dispensed in two installments, in 1981 and 1982; with repayment over 12 years—was approved.² The current assumption is that the North-South military imbalance will be closed by the late 1980's.

This assumption, however, embodies judgments about the North Korean response to the ROK arms expansion which may or may not prove accurate. The earlier major boost in DPRK military expenditures came in two stages. In the 1961-66 period, military outlays rose to an average of approximately 20 percent of the total North Korean budget, and a further increase, to about 30 percent of the budget, took place during 1967-72. Afterward, there was a decline, which presumably reflected the adverse effect of such high expenditures upon the overall economy. Defense costs were officially blamed for the need to prolong by three years the first Seven Year Plan, originally scheduled to have been completed in 1967. According to the latest official figures, DPRK military expenditures accounted for 15.1 percent of the 1979 budget and 14.5 percent



Members of the Korean People's Army of North Vietnam during regular training.

—EUPRA.

of the 1980 budget. Some professional observers, however, question the accuracy of these figures, believing actual expenditures to be higher.³ In any case, the North Korean government is not likely to accept South Korean military expansion without mounting a counter-offensive sooner or later.

One critical question is whether the USSR will accede to DPRK requests for more sophisticated military equipment, including MiG-23's. As yet, there are no firm indications that Moscow has moved in this direction, but as we shall note, there are signs that the USSR has increased its general efforts to woo the North Koreans. Thus, the issue of future Soviet economic and military assistance (as well as Chinese aid) to the DPRK will remain a matter of continuing importance.

At this point, however, the North Koreans must operate on the assumption that—barring some future catastrophe in the ROK—they have reached their optimal military position vis-à-vis the South. In this context, the periodic incidents which occur in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula cannot be treated lightly. On August 26, 1981, for example, the North Koreans, according to the United States, fired a surface-to-air missile at an SR-71 high-altitude reconnaissance plane which was

¹ For figures on DPRK and ROK military strength, as of July 1980, see International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1980-81*, London, 1980. According to the IISS, DPRK forces totaled 678,000, and ROK forces, 600,000. For these and other data, see pp. 70-71.

² An excellent recent survey of security issues relating to the Korean peninsula and US-ROK agreements is Byung-joon Ahn, "The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula in Global Perspective," *The Journal of Asiatic Studies* (Seoul), September 1981, pp. 257-87.

³ See Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security—1980*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 137. IISS figures as of July 1980 indicate that the DPRK, with an estimated GNP of US\$10.5 billion, was expending US\$1.3 billion on defense; the ROK, with an estimated GNP of US\$46.0 billion, US\$3.46 billion. *The Military Balance, 1980-81*, pp. 70-71.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula

over international waters. Although the DPRK insisted that the missile incident had been fabricated, Washington swiftly promised retaliation if such an incident were repeated. It may be only coincidental that this event followed rather closely upon an American confrontation in the Mediterranean with planes of Libya, a country whose pilots North Korea helped to train. Nevertheless, both Libya and North Korea have put forth claims regarding jurisdiction over neighboring waters which the United States rejects. In addition to the jurisdictional issue, the North Koreans have complained repeatedly at the meetings of the military armistice commission that such spy planes violate DPRK air space. Behind these charges lies the fact that these aircraft have carried the art of surveillance to a new level of effectiveness, thereby representing a serious worry to the North.

More recently, on October 31, 1981, North Korean military forces, according to South Korean authorities, fired some 520 machine-gun shots at ROK guard posts, and ROK forces responded with a 10-minute barrage.



A South Korean officer points to a drill hole that enabled United Nations troops to discover a North Korean tunnel under the Demilitarized Zone near Panmunjom in May 1980.

—Douglas Wetzstein/FPQ.

Two additional but briefer exchanges took place later. DPRK sources acknowledged the exchanges; however, they assigned the initiative to the ROK.⁴


The possibility of another arms race, the recurrent incidents, and the possible fear of the North that its military superiority is fading are sufficient to warrant concern. Yet, on balance, there are very powerful deterrents to the type of open conflict which erupted with the invasion of the South by the North in 1950. First and foremost, the American commitment appears once again credible in all quarters, and it is very difficult to conceive of North Korean leaders risking massive destruction from air and sea. Even if Northern forces, taking advantage of the initiative, were able to rush to Seoul, seize the capital, and then seek negotiations from their new position of strength—a scenario often advanced by US and ROK military spokesmen—to what avail if, in the course of these events, the North were virtually obliterated? And the prospects of that happening are excellent, given the fact that American patience with limited, protracted wars seems to have ended with Vietnam. Reinforcing and interacting with the American commitment, moreover, is the attitude of the major states surrounding the Korean peninsula. No one wants another Korean war. On this issue, the Soviet Union and China appear at one with the United States and Japan, for each nation recognizes the enormous risks that would be involved to its own national interests.⁵

The oft-repeated assertion of North Korea that "US imperialism and the South Korean puppet-traitors" are planning a war can be dismissed as propaganda. Pyongyang must know that such a conflict could not conceivably advance American interests. And apart from the fact that US influence upon Seoul with respect to any aggressive actions would be commanding, the Southern leaders could not possibly envisage success from a move to the North, given the position and proclivities of the USSR and the PRC. Despite their mutual hostility, neither big Communist state would allow the unification of Korea by anti-Communists using force.

If the risks of another 1950-type Korean war do not appear to be great under current circumstances, there are other risks of a more complex nature. The most serious relates to the possibility of economic and political destabilization in one or both Koreas, a destabilization which, if extensive, could have peninsula-wide and international repercussions. At present, as we shall discuss in more detail shortly, the North is actively

⁴ See *Korea Newsreview* (Seoul), Nov. 7, 1981, p. 9.

⁵ For a discussion of the earlier attitudes of the major powers toward the Korea problem, see the essays in William J. Barnds, Ed., *The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs*, New York, NY, New York University Press, 1976.



A military parade in Seoul on October 1, 1981, marks the 30th anniversary of the South Korean armed forces.

—Kaku Kurita/Gamma-Liaison.

engaged in seeking to exploit and advance destabilization in the South. Seoul has very limited opportunities for retaliation in this respect, but developments in the North, both economic and political, augur a change at some point in the 1980's—with what degree of calm or trauma remains to be seen. It is essential, therefore, that we turn now to the most salient internal developments in the two Koreas and the current status of North-South relations.

The South's Domestic Scene

As 1981 comes to a close, the South Korean economy appears to be en route back to health after the severe downturn of the last several years. The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, for 1982–86, projects an optimistic future.⁶ It envisages a 7–8 percent annual growth rate, the decline of inflation to less than 10 percent, a significant increase in domestic savings, a narrowing of the trade deficit, export growth averaging about 20 percent per annum, increased investments in social services,

defense expenditures at approximately the same ratio as at present, and a somewhat slower, but more balanced growth of industry, emphasizing light as well as heavy industries.

South Korean authorities acknowledge that to meet these goals, some US\$53.5 billion in foreign capital and at least US\$2.5 billion in direct foreign investment will be required. In addition, good harvests will be essential; several bad crop years recently contributed mightily to the slump. Equally vital will be political stability at home and the recovery of the major industrial economies, especially the United States and Japan.⁷

It may not be easy to get the desired performance in all of these areas, but the most recent trends, on bal-

⁶ For an analysis of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, see the report of the press conference of Shin Byong Hyun, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning, in *Korea Newsreview*, Aug. 29, 1981, pp. 10–11.

⁷ The Korea Development Institute in a recent report to the ROK President took the position that growth in 1982 would be 7–8 percent; inflation, between 10 and 14 percent; and the international payments deficit, US\$4.5 million. It warned, however, that the global trend toward high interest rates, together with the strong American dollar, would create continuing pressures on the economy, as well as make economic recovery of the major industrial nations slow. See *ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1981, pp. 10–11.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula

ance, are encouraging. After the severe downturn in 1979-80, the South Korean economy is moving upward. Total real growth in 1981 will be at least 6 percent; inflation will be about 20 percent (approximately one half of the 1980 figure); and a sizable expansion of foreign markets is now taking place. Not all problems, however, have been resolved. Foreign investors are still cautious, partly because of past bureaucratic obstacles and erratic government policies. The foreign debt already incurred is substantial, and high US interest rates make the debt-service burden all the heavier. Trade deficits, moreover, will remain a problem, with Japan draining sizable amounts of Korean foreign exchange. And inflation will continue to be a supreme challenge. Consequently, while foreign experts generally concur with the ROK government's positive prognosis, most predictions are advanced with caution.⁸


On the political front, too, various uncertainties persist in the midst of considerable progress toward political stabilization. In the tumultuous aftermath of President Pak Chong-hui's assassination in the fall of 1979, a period of "liberalization" ensued, with the old political parties expanding their activities and well-known politicians preparing to contest elections along Western parliamentary lines. However, in mid-December, the first step was taken to challenge this development. A group of younger officers, with General Chun Doo Hwan as leader, conducted a coup within the military and established themselves as the central source of military power in the country. For a time, an incongruous dual structure existed. Civilian politics remained in operation, with political competition and open debate flourishing and with leaders promising further liberalization; but military power was also manifest, with the victorious young generals directly involved in the political process and capable of further intervention at any point. This dualism was finally ended after the student riots of May 1980, and a new era was proclaimed. The military, under Chun, took full control—declaring martial law, outlawing the old parties, purging hundreds of prominent political figures, and suppressing various forms of opposition. The young leaders publicly committed themselves to ending corruption, revitalizing the economy, creating a new constitution, and nurturing a fresh group of politicians. Although an opposition spearheaded by a portion of the student-intellectual community sought to resist, with the climax coming in the form of the student-led Kwangju riots of May 18-27, 1980, the government put down the resistance with all of the power at its command.

⁸ See, for example, the projections of Business International and the Crocker National Bank. Also see US Embassy, Seoul, *Economic Trends Report*, Jan. 12, 1981.

Less than two years have passed since the events of May 1980, but there has been a sustained effort to implant the new order firmly through a series of political acts. Under a constitution authorizing the Fifth Republic, a president and national assembly have been elected. Chun easily won the former office, but he is limited under the constitution to a single seven-year term. The assembly, elected partially in the regular manner and partially through proportionally allotted seats, is in the hands of the Democratic Justice Party, the party created to support the government. With the old parties banned and most of the former political leaders barred from political activity, the parliamentary elections of March 1981 witnessed the emergence of eight new parties within a dominant-party system. Although criticism of governmental leadership or policy was clearly circumscribed, a framework for competitive party politics was retained, and peaceful, democratic succession was pledged by the President and his party.

Meanwhile, changes have taken place within the inner military circle surrounding Chun that suggest his increasing control of the levers of power. From the beginning, a small group of generals surrounded Chun, some of them potential rivals. Just beneath them, a number of younger colonels operated, many imbued with a strong nationalist idealism that fueled some of the more radical policy proposals. The ouster of General Pak Se-chik, commanding general of the Seoul military forces, on charges of involvement in interest-peddling and the transfer of General No Tae-u, widely regarded as the second most powerful figure on the political scene, to the civilian post of Second Minister of Political Affairs are generally believed to indicate that Chun has advanced his personal control. Unquestionably, Chun's successful trips to Washington and to the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) greatly strengthened his hand, as have signs of economic improvement.

To date, however, a certain paradox has continued to exist in South Korean politics. On the one hand, almost every interest group in the society has been somewhat unhappy: business, because of the economic slump and the abrupt policies of the young military officers; labor, because of the steep inflation and a decline in real wages; the farmers, because of a reduction in purchasing power as a result of poor harvests; and especially the student-intellectual-journalist communities, because of restrictions on political freedom. On the other hand, the evidence has steadily accumulated that President Chun is increasingly accepted as the leader of the nation, and political stability is being restored after the turmoil of the earlier period. Various reasons exist



South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, US President Ronald Reagan, and their wives at the White House on February 2, 1981.

—Dirk Halstead/Gamma-Liaison.

for these latter developments: the sense of no acceptable or feasible alternative; improving economic conditions; and Chun's growing world acceptability, particularly the firm support of the United States, Japan, and the ASEAN states.

In sum, while many unexpected events (from another oil crisis to assassination) might change the scene, the prospects for a strengthened economy and continuing political stability in South Korea are now better than at any time since the late Pak era. Yet, as we shall see, North Korea continues to gamble on a snowballing South Korean revolution and directs its policies toward the overthrow of the Chun administration.

The North's Internal Situation


Prior to exploring this strategy in greater detail, however, let us turn to an assessment of the North Korean domestic scene. Concerning the DPRK economy, three generalizations are in order. First, the overall record of economic development in North Korea is good, especially in comparison with other statist, autarkic economies and with the early record of South Korea. Second, the very successes scored have given rise to certain new challenges, challenges that cannot be met

merely by pursuing old policies. Dynamism now lies with the South, and the risk for the North is that the trend first apparent in the 1970's—namely, the accelerating growth of the South Korean economy, pushing both the size and power of that economy as well as the standard of living of ROK citizens ahead of the DPRK—will continue. Finally, the broad route that must be taken is one of further modernization, and this in turn requires that increased authority be given to the "technocrats" and to rational economic policies at home, and that there be a turning outward to the advanced industrial societies so as to tap the most modern science and technology. Yet while DPRK leaders recognize these imperatives and have to some extent moved to adjust policy to them, the transformation will not be easy, and various complex problems lie ahead.

Each of these three general propositions requires brief additional comment.⁹ In regard to the first, North Korea serves as a prototype of the Stalinist, autarkic, command economy. With *chuche* (self-reliance) the omnipresent watchword in economic as in political affairs, the DPRK has operated on the basis of an inward-directed strategy with strong emphasis upon heavy industry but with early and continuous attention to agricultural modernization. Relying upon ideological exhortation to an extraordinary degree, it has achieved an unprecedented mobilization of available domestic resources. No society in the contemporary world has been so thoroughly organized and committed as the DPRK. By using isolation and intensive indoctrination as interrelated weapons, and by advancing mass education, DPRK leaders have managed to build a highly disciplined, increasingly efficient, politically committed work force. Intellectuals and managers who conform, moreover, are rewarded both in status and in economic terms. Many of the past mistakes of the PRC in this respect have been avoided. The DPRK has also benefited from the great advantage of scale and, in the immediate post-Korean war era, from sizable amounts of foreign aid.

In certain respects, the results have been impressive. While statistics provided by official sources must be treated with caution (and special attention should be paid to omissions), overall growth in the 1960's probably averaged 8–10 percent despite the strains and dislocations produced at the end of that decade by heavy military costs. In this period, the foundations for North Korea's heavy industry were laid, and agricultural mod-

⁹ In the preparation of this section, I have benefited greatly from three papers presented at the conference on North Korea held in San Francisco in February 1981 and scheduled for subsequent publication. They are Joseph S. Chung, "Economic Planning in North Korea: Shifting Goals, Management and Performance"; Ki Hyuk Pak, "Agricultural Policy and Development in North Korea"; and Sang-Chul Suh, "Industrial Policy and Trade in North Korea."



A massive public demonstration crowds the center of Pyongyang in October 1980 to observe the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Worker's Party.

—Camera Press.

ernization was greatly advanced. During the 1970's, growth probably slowed to an overall average of around 6 percent—a respectable figure, although one considerably less than that of South Korea during the same years.

In the DPRK's Second Seven-Year Plan, published at the end of 1977 and scheduled to run from 1978 to 1985, Pyongyang's leaders have set as their goal "the further strengthening of the economic foundations of socialism" via a *chuche*-oriented, modernized, scientific economy. The specific aims are full utilization of current industrial capacity; strengthening of the fuel, energy, and resource bases of industry; substitution of domestic resources for imported ones to the extent possible; improvement of the transport system and completion of

the modernization of agriculture; and the launching of various large-scale "nature-remaking" projects. Concrete targets include raising national income by 9.6 percent per annum, increasing grain production by 2.4 percent per annum, and upping the gross value of industrial output by 12.1 percent per annum.¹⁰

North Korea has already reached a very high level of mechanization-modernization in the agrarian sector. Self-sufficiency in food probably was achieved around 1974, and sizable gains were realized in grain production, which is reported to have totaled 9 million tons in 1979.¹¹ Since figures on rice production and on gross value for agricultural output have not been published for many years, however, it may be presumed that corn accounts for much of the grain production increase, and

¹⁰ See the section entitled "Major Tasks of Socialist Economic Construction in the 1980's," in Kim Il-song's "Summing-Up Report on the Work of the Party Central Committee to the Sixth KWP Congress, October 10, 1980." This report was published in full in *Kulloja* (Pyongyang), October 1980, pp. 6-67, and translated in Joint Publication

Research Service, *Korean Affairs Report* (Washington, DC), No. 127 (JPRS 77442), Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 5-73.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14. Kim also indicated that grain yields per chongbo (2.45 acres) had reached 7.2 tons in wet-field rice and 6.3 tons in corn.

from all reports the North Korean diet is scarcely luxurious, though adequate. Electrification and mechanization of the agricultural sector have been largely accomplished. As early as 1967, 92 percent of the paddy fields were reported to be under irrigation, and 100 percent electrification was proclaimed in 1970.¹² In his report to the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in October 1980, Kim Il-song announced that there were, on the average, seven tractors per 100 chongbo of cultivated land in the plains areas and six in the intermediate and mountainous zones, and that 1.5 tons of fertilizer had been applied per chongbo of wet and dry fields.¹³ It is not surprising, therefore, that projected yield increases of grain have been modest ones, and according to certain accounts, even these have not been attained thus far.¹⁴

The industrial sector remains the primary focus in the Second Seven-Year Plan, but continued decline of growth in this sector appears certain—unless very radical remedial measures are undertaken. Like other command economies, the DPRK achieved dramatic results in the initial stages, when full mobilization of all resources and a relatively simple structure prevailed. These early achievements, in turn, produced a growing complexity of structure and placed an ever higher premium upon more advanced mechanization, more sophisticated technical skills, and improved managerial capacities. Hence, new problems have emerged. For example, a labor shortage now exists, and has been compounded by the large standing army. Bureaucratism—pronounced in the DPRK, as in all heavily statist societies—has been repeatedly acknowledged to be a serious problem by top authorities. And the fine tuning of the economy has become ever more difficult. But beyond these problems, the central difficulty lies in the inability of an autarkic economy with a small domestic market to operate at optimal size in terms of scale of production, or to keep up with the rapid advances in technology available at the international level.

The North Koreans recognized at least a portion of this last problem a decade ago, as they witnessed the growing obsolescence of their plants in comparison with those being constructed by the South. Consequently, Kim and his subordinates moved to turn outward, seeking to tap the advanced technology of Japan and West-

ern Europe. This move, however, ran squarely into the oil crisis of 1973, and the ensuing sharp rise in prices for industrial products. North Korea, with its meager capacity to generate foreign exchange, built up a sizable debt. This amounted to some US\$1.4 billion to hard-currency countries, primarily Japan, and about US\$1 billion to the Communist states. Unable to meet payments, the DPRK was forced to default on these debts. While repayments have now been scheduled in at least some cases, the credit rating of North Korea remains low, complicating any rapid modernization program.

Nevertheless, there have been significant changes in DPRK trade patterns over the past decade, and the commitment to increased interaction with the advanced industrial world continues.¹⁵ At the beginning of the 1970's, trade with the Communist nations accounted for approximately 85 percent of DPRK total trade, and that with non-Communist states, for only 15 percent. By 1979, those figures were 51.5 percent and 48.4 percent respectively. Total trade, moreover, increased rapidly, with an average per annum growth rate of 15.8 percent. Among the Communist states, the Soviet Union continues to account for the largest share, with 51 percent of that category of trade in 1979. Although China has increased its trade share during the 1970's, the 1979 figure of 30 percent was lower than the percentages between 1975 and 1978. Among the non-Communist advanced industrial states, Japan holds a commanding lead, taking 52 percent of DPRK exports to and providing 72 percent of the imports from that category of states in 1979.

These statistics, as we shall detail in a moment, are not unrelated to political considerations. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that North Korean exports to the Middle East, and particularly to Saudi Arabia, have risen significantly since 1977, indicating that trade is not necessarily inhibited by political barriers.

Despite the increases in general trade and in trade with the non-Communist world, however, the DPRK problem, on balance, remains how to generate foreign exchange and participate more fully in the international marketplace, given the inwardly directed economic system Pyongyang has created and its almost fanatical emphasis upon *chuche*, the DPRK hallmark. The past patterns of ideological exhortation and isolation will not suffice for the future if North Korea is to move forward economically. Yet any major changes will unquestionably raise new political as well as economic issues.

Meanwhile, observers are watching with interest the opening stages of a succession process in North Korean

¹² Ki Hyuk Pak, op. cit., using figures from the ROK Institute of National Unification, "Comparative Economic Power between South and North Korean Industries and Its Long-Term Outlook," December 1972, pp. 56-57.

¹³ Kim Il-song, "Summing-Up Report . . .," loc. cit., p. 11.

¹⁴ For example, Joseph S. Chung, op. cit., provides an analysis of targets and performance in the agrarian, as well as the industrial, sector in which he raises basic questions about system performance at this juncture.

For Kim's official pronouncements on North Korean agricultural policies, see Kim Il Sung, *On the Agrarian Reform*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979.

¹⁵ For a recent survey of trends in North Korean trade, see Lee Hong-youn, "Structure and Prospect of North Korean Trade," *Vantage Point* (Seoul), September 1981, p. 13.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula



North Korean leader Kim Il-song pictured with his son Kim Chong-il in October 1980.

—*Korea Today* (Pyongyang), No. 11, 1980, p. 3.

politics. After lengthy preparations, Kim Il-song's son, Kim Chong-il, has finally been presented to the North Korean people as the Great Leader's chosen heir. Privately sensitive to the charge that this is a highly unsocialist, very traditional approach to power—the creation of the first Communist monarchy—DPRK spokesmen defend the move as one intended to avoid the problems that came after the deaths of Iosif Stalin and Mao Zedong. Unquestionably, the issue of succession is an unresolved problem for current socialist systems, and in the case of the DPRK, where one man has ruled with an iron hand for nearly 30 years, the problem could be more acute.

Is Kim Chong-il going to be acceptable to those elements that will remain when Kim Il-song is gone? A young man approaching 40, Chong-il's abilities have yet to be tested in any full sense, although various organs praise his accomplishments in advancing "the three revolutions—Ideological, technical, and cultural" (the slogan under which the DPRK has operated in recent years) and in performing other feats in emulation of his father. Nonetheless, rumors regarding the issue of the anointment of Kim Chong-il abound: that it has caused problems within the family—stemming from Kim's second wife, from his younger brother, from others; that elements of the old Kapsan faction who have been at Kim Il-song's side for years (although their ranks are now dwindling) have reservations. While such rumors, in light of the universal nature of dynastic politics, have

logic on their side, there is absolutely no hard evidence to substantiate them.

It may be doubted whether even those at the top of the North Korean political hierarchy know precisely what the future holds. Some analysts speculate that with respect to policies, the young Kim may be at once more pragmatic and less cautious than his father—but that too is pure speculation. Much may depend upon timing and the nature of the external as well as the internal environment at the point when the actual transfer of power comes. When, then, will Kim Il-song pass from the scene? While the growth on his neck is large (although presumably benign) and he has long been overweight, Kim seems in reasonably good health as he approaches 70. Thus, the answer to this question is shrouded.

Some observers surmise that the chances for a smooth transition improve if the elder Kim can remain in power for another five years at least, enabling his son to acquire additional age and experience and to implant his own followers in key positions, while the older generation fades away. Even now, young Kim reportedly surrounds himself with individuals, both military and civilian, of a roughly similar age. Consequently, his advent to power presumably will be accompanied by the rise of a younger, more technologically-minded generation, a few of whom (like Chong-il) have had at least brief exposure to the outside world. (Kim Chong-il was for a time in East Germany as a student.)

Indeed, the trend toward elevating experts is already under way. The Sixth Central Committee of the KWP contains a sizable number of "technician" types.

There is no reason to believe, however, that as long as Kim Il-song lives, the role of ideology will be downgraded as in the USSR and the PRC. That task lies with the leaders of the next era. Nor is there any sign of a reduction in the intensity of the cult of personality surrounding the elder Kim, which has reached truly extraordinary heights and now extends to Chong-il and other members of the Kim family as well. Recent foreign visitors tell that at a banquet given for them, the North Korean hosts would not raise their glasses above the Kim Il-song button worn on every DPRK citizen's blouse!

Despite the growing role of technicians in the political and military system, "red" seems likely to predominate over "expert" for the foreseeable future—particularly in view of the dangers that Pyongyang perceives in further entry into the external world. Generalists will be in command, and ideological exhortations together with the nearly lost art of hero-worship will continue to be employed in an effort to sustain the "steel-like unity" achieved and to prevent any decline in the work ethic or flagging of loyalty.

Yet can this extraordinary system be maintained if the process of turning outward gains momentum? Can individuals who have been subjected to the most intensive (and simplistic) indoctrination, whose world is peopled by angels and devils, who march to and from work, who regard their small universe as the appropriate model for all others, and who are inured to a life composed of great public monuments but minimal private possessions and a relatively dull, spartan existence—can such individuals remain “pure” if they have sustained contact with the real world? Scanty evidence from an earlier time relating to the return of North Korean students who had studied in Eastern Europe suggests that such exposure can pose a danger.¹⁶ And what will a protracted drive toward modernization and a long-prevailing turn outward—if these come to pass—do to the primitive Stalinist model in both its political and economic forms? Can the DPRK escape the trauma that is developing in other Communist states as a result of combined internal advances and external contacts?

In sum, the 1980's promise to be a decade of changes for North Korea. Whether the changes can be accomplished without political instability or economic crises after the lengthy period of political monolithism and Stalinist economic policies constitutes a fascinating, currently unanswerable question. And if political instability were to emerge, what would be the international repercussions? Would embattled factions request immediate assistance or direct intervention from either the USSR or China, or both? Among the many possible scenarios of the future, this one cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Continuing North-South Impasse

Within this context, how are North-South relations to be viewed today? The predominant trends are negative, even retrogressive. No negotiations or discussions are taking place; all is hostility. Put simply, the North's position represents a giant paradox. On the one hand, DPRK spokesmen advance a familiar set of proposals defined as measures for peaceful reunification, via a structure that would allow the retention of systemic North-South differences. On the other hand, Northern leaders proclaim adamantly that Pyongyang will never deal with Chun Doo Hwan, and openly call for the revolutionary overthrow of the present ROK government.

¹⁶ See, for instance, an episode reported by a North Korean defector concerning young returnees from Czechoslovakia in which he was personally involved. This is recounted in Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: The Society*, Vol. II, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 898-99.

The current reunification proposals of the DPRK are only slight modifications of ideas long advanced by Kim and his followers. The central premise is the establishment of a so-called Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK), constructed on the basis of equal representation of the two existing political entities. Such a federated state would operate according to 10 principles. These include independence; democracy; separate but “organically combined, self-supporting” economies; unrestricted communications and cultural intercourse; a united national army, with an initial reduction of the armed forces on each side to 100,000-150,000; a joint defense of the rights of overseas Koreans; and a nonaligned foreign policy.¹⁷

To further this proposal, the North Korean leaders have called for the convening of a national gathering that would discuss it and possibly other plans. Such a conference would be attended by individuals representative of various political parties, social organizations, and occupational groups from North, South, and overseas. But “the South Korean military hoodlums who pursue the division of the country” are not to be included. On the contrary, Chun and his key supporters, who are now being treated to such epithets as “military butchers, traitors, splittists, and Fascists,” are to be liquidated via an uprising of the “patriotic, democratic South Korean people.”¹⁸

In their essence, the DPRK proposals are intimately related to Communist programs advanced shortly after World War II and repeatedly thereafter. Then, too, the concept was one of an all-embracing unity that would ensure the numerical equality of Northern and Southern representation and pit Northern monolithism against Southern pluralism. Then, too, the North Koreans, with Soviet support, called for an All-Nation People's Conference composed of various parties, social organizations, and “patriotic individuals”—but excluding “anti-democratic, pro-Japanese elements”—to determine the method of unification. Moreover, if one looks at the later proposals of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland set forth in 1949, it will be seen that they called for the completion of Korean unification and independence via American troop withdrawal and the destruction of “Syngman Rhee's puppet government.”¹⁹

The South's position has been that, given the long

¹⁷ Kim, “Summing-Up Report . . .,” loc. cit., pp. 44-51. It should also be noted that Kim has certain preconditions for the DCRK—namely, “the democratization” of South Korea and the withdrawal of US military forces from the ROK. If his proposals were accepted in their original form, he would already have directed South Korean political changes to his specifications.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ For the background, see Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: The Movement*, Vol. I, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1972.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula



A North Korean painting depicting the May 1980 student-led riots in the South Korean city of Kwangju as a popular uprising aimed at "tearing apart Chun Doo Hwan." The painting is on display in the Korean Fine Arts Gallery in Pyongyang.

—Rinn-sup Shinn.

history of violence and mistrust, any realistic approach to reunification must be a gradual, step-by-step process. Initial concentration should be upon humanitarian measures such as allowing visits between divided families; then would come economic exchanges; only after a network of cultural and economic ties had been created would the thorny political and military issues be tackled. President Pak also advanced the idea of a non-aggression pact between the DPRK and the ROK while such programs were being pursued. In addition, the South announced its support for crossrecognition of the two Koreas by the major nations (the US, the USSR, China, and Japan) and the admission of the two existing states into the United Nations pending peaceful reunification.²⁰

All of these proposals Kim Il-song has rejected as a "two Koreas plot." Furthermore, the North has kept

maximum pressure on the Soviet Union and China to ostracize the ROK even as Kim tried to open relations with Japan and the United States.

The most recent addition to the South's proposals came on June 5, 1981, when Chun Doo Hwan urged a summit meeting between himself and "President Kim Il-song" (so addressed), to be held at a time and place of the latter's choosing—a meeting that could set the stage for the reopening of the North-South dialogue. Chun's proposal was indignantly dismissed by Northern spokesmen.²¹

At present, however, the DPRK is on the defensive with respect to the reunification issue. While Kim's position has been endorsed by a predictable group of states, including the USSR and China, Chun has managed to garner support for his idea of an early meeting of the two leaders from a variety of sources, including all of the ASEAN states (notwithstanding the fact that four

²⁰ Official statements of the South's position on reunification and connected issues, including ROK policies on relations with the Communist states and regarding the UN question, may be found in *South-North Dialogue in Korea*, a journal published by the ROK International Cultural Society of Korea.

²¹ For the official text of Chun's proposal, see "Address by President Chun Doo Hwan at the Inauguration of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy," June 5, 1981, as distributed by the Korea Information Service in San Francisco.

of the five ASEAN nations—the Philippines excepted—have official relations with the DPRK as well as the ROK). Moreover, the general hope of Pyongyang for extensive support from the members of the nonaligned movement now seems less promising, despite the DPRK's major gains in this area during the 1970's. Aside from the fact that the movement is now rent with controversy and division, many of its members have diplomatic relations with both Koreas and, in a number of cases, growing economic ties with the South. They are not prepared to follow Kim's unofficial declaration of war upon the Chun government.

The current DPRK gamble that Chun can be overthrown, while in line with the basic North Korean commitment to a reunified Korea ultimately under Communist rule ("Kim Il-song, our Great Leader, our Sun, the Head of 50 million Korean people"), appears to be running up against lengthening odds, unless some unpredictable event such as assassination intervenes. Meanwhile, the DPRK is caught in paradoxes obvious to all external observers: support for "peaceful reunification" but a championing of revolution in the South; opposition to any "two Koreas" approach yet acceptance of dual recognition at present from more than 60 states²² and eagerness for recognition from the United States and Japan, with no demand that either nation break relations with the ROK.

Relations with the Major Nations

It remains to analyze the complex ebb and flow of DPRK and ROK relations with the four states most centrally concerned with the Korean peninsula—namely, the USSR, the PRC, the United States, and Japan. Once again, it is useful to set forth some general propositions at the outset. First, while North Korea has long claimed to be a nonaligned and wholly independent nation, "pure nonalignment" for it and for almost all other states is impossible. In reality, it has constantly maneuvered toward or away from one of its major Communist neigh-

bors while avoiding complete alignment with either, for obvious reasons. The current situation of Vietnam undoubtedly reinforces DPRK avoidance of total alignment, but it should not be thought that Pyongyang has been able to practice perfect equidistance.

Second, contrary to general belief, it is relatively easy to chart the differences between the DPRK and its Communist neighbors in a fairly precise manner, merely by reading what the parties say and do not say to each other in official messages and major addresses. Indeed, the differences are real with respect to both the USSR and the PRC. But the differences are not the same, either in substance or intensity.

Third, both North and South are making some progress, against considerable odds, in their separate efforts to penetrate the strongholds of the other side. It is unlikely, however, that any major breakthrough will be scored by either party as long as the international environment is so tense.

Let us now elaborate upon each of these propositions briefly. As for the first one, it is important to recall that North Korea was a virtual satellite of the USSR until the Korean war. With the massive introduction of Chinese troops, this situation was susceptible to change. In the initial postwar period, Kim faced intervention in Korean affairs from both major Communist states, but by the end of the 1950's, he had become deeply antagonized by Soviet leaders and their policies and was commencing his tilt toward Beijing. This continued until there was almost a complete break between the DPRK and the USSR at the end of the Khrushchev era, with serious consequences for North Korea's economic and military capabilities. Relations were patched up to a limited extent with the advent to power of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin in 1964, and during the Cultural Revolution in the PRC, DPRK relations with Beijing deteriorated sharply. But beginning in 1970, with Chou En-lai in charge of Chinese foreign policy, DPRK-PRC relations steadily improved. Pyongyang's tilt toward Beijing was perceptible throughout the early and mid-1970's.

Currently, however, the situation is more fluid. In the last several years, the Soviet Union has sought to improve its relations with the DPRK—primarily to complete its encirclement of the PRC—by taking advantage of certain strains that have developed between Pyongyang and Beijing. It should quickly be pointed out that Soviet efforts and North Korean responses do not signify the emergence of a deep friendship and camaraderie. The Soviets neither like nor trust Kim Il-song, and the feeling is mutual. Moscow finds the cult of personality in North Korea appalling, North Korean society too reminiscent of the USSR's Stalinist past, and North Korean attitudes on international issues unpredictable.²³

²² As of August 1980, 113 nations recognized South Korea, and 100 nations recognized North Korea. Of these totals, 61 states recognized both governments. This figure can be broken down as follows: Asian states—14; American states—9; European states—9; Middle Eastern states—5; African states—24. Data furnished by an ROK government source.

²³ While circumspect in public utterances, Soviet intellectuals and governmental officials have long been critical of the North Korean regime in private conversations. Even in recent Soviet publications, there is no indication of genuine warmth to be found, although they express strong support of the DPRK, in regard to both the past and the present. For example, Ivan Kovalenko's *Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security*, revised English ed., Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1979, praises the DPRK's accomplishments and voices support for North Korean reunification proposals, but the author manages to cover North Korean progress (and Soviet aid) for seven pages without mentioning Kim Il-song's name once. See pp. 72–78.

Nevertheless, in recent years, the Soviet Union has raised its rhetorical support for North Korean positions, including reunification; upgraded the status of the delegations sent to North Korea; and facilitated (at long last) a meeting between Brezhnev and Kim Il-song, at Belgrade on the occasion of the funeral of Josip Broz Tito—a meeting now hailed by both sides as contributing to a strengthening of relations. The USSR, moreover, is currently participating in the modernization or construction of various industrial projects in North Korea and has presumably agreed to reschedule debt payments on a timetable acceptable to the DPRK.²⁴ Whether additional military support has been pledged is, as indicated earlier, unclear.

Has North Korea reciprocated? Kim's support for Norodom Sihanouk of Kampuchea and Kim's declared opposition to Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea still stand. Moreover, North Korea, along with Romania, refused to sign a Communist-bloc statement supporting Soviet policies in Afghanistan shortly after the Soviet invasion. On the other hand, Pyongyang exchanges civil messages with Hanoi, despite their differences; recognizes the Babrak Karmal government in Kabul;²⁵ and cultivates very cordial relations with Cuba, India, and other states aligned in varying degrees with the USSR. Furthermore, the Soviets are now using the DPRK's Najin port in accordance with a recent agreement, thereby fulfilling their long-time goal to obtain a year-around ice-free port in the north Pacific.²⁶ In addition, North Korean statements about the USSR and its current leadership are for the most part cast in a more cordial tone than they have been for many years.

Recently, a Soviet spokesman described relations



North Korean President Kim Il-song, left, seen with Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng in Belgrade on May 8, 1980, for the funeral of Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito.

—Gamma-Liaison.

with the DPRK as "normal—quite proper—not heated nor elevated, but not cool either." One can read this description as a less-than-ecstatic evaluation of present conditions, but also as an indication that improvements have taken place.

In contrast, certain Chinese knowledgeable in international affairs evidence worry about PRC-DPRK relations.²⁷ On the surface, this might seem unwarranted. The messages exchanged between Chinese and North Korean leaders on ceremonial occasions remain warm and effusive, speaking of "comrades in arms whose friendship is cemented with blood."²⁸ Moreover, Chinese verbal support for Pyongyang's views has, if anything, increased in intensity. Calls are regularly issued for a withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, and the Chun government is denounced in terms only slightly less shrill than those used by North Korea itself. Recently, after the SR-71 incident, the Chinese pointedly refused to transmit a message to the DPRK at

²⁴ According to a Moscow report, the Soviet Union in 1981-85 will supply facilities needed for the expansion of the Pukchang thermal power plant, the Kimchaek iron works, and one major coal mine. In this same report, it is asserted that "some 3,000 Soviet technicians have been to North Korea" (dates unspecified). See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 11, 1981, p. C/3.

An article by A. Yelizarov states that from the USSR and other "fraternal" countries, the DPRK has received and is receiving assistance with about 70 industrial and other projects, and it adds that the USSR at present accounts for about one third of the entire volume of DPRK trade, with the volume of commodity turnover scheduled to increase by more than 40 percent in 1981-85. See *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1981, pp. C/2-3. Other accounts speak of recent or current assistance to some 40-60 projects.

²⁵ DPRK messages to Karmal, however, cannot be entirely pleasing to Moscow, for they stress the need for a continuing struggle "to consolidate the country's independence." In a rather pointed response to this theme, Karmal recently stated: "I assure you that the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan will defend national sovereignty and independence, achieve territorial integrity and resolutely safeguard the gains of the April revolution from the aggression of imperialism and all the reactionary forces." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), July 31, 1981, p. D/5. Emphasis added.

²⁶ For one interesting discussion of the Najin port question, see "The Soviet Union Advances into North Hamgyong Province—The Situation with Respect to the Port of Najin," *Kita Chosen Kenkyu* (Tokyo), July 1978, pp. 19-22.

²⁷ At least one Chinese authority, however, insists that the PRC retains top priority in DPRK efforts. Using Kremlinological methods, he cites the recent listing of delegations and the use of pictures in *Rodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang) as proof. Some South Korean specialists concur. But to me the evidence that they advance is not conclusive; moreover, even they admit slippage for the PRC recently.

²⁸ See, for example, the speeches by Ambassador Lu Zhixian and Chong Chun-ki on July 10, 1971, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the conclusion of the Korean-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, in *FBIS-APA*, July 13, 1981, pp. D/1-2; "On the Road of Fraternal Friendship and Cooperation," *Rodong Sinmun*, July 11, 1981, in *FBIS-APA*, July 13, 1981, pp. D/2-3; and the PRC leaders' message to the DPRK on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of its founding, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 11, 1981, pp. D/1-2.

American request, asserting that North Korea was an independent nation and there were other channels available to the United States.²⁹

Then why the concern in Beijing that PRC-DPRK relations are in "a very delicate stage"? The fact is that Kim Il-song and his followers are decidedly unhappy with certain trends relating to both the domestic and foreign policies of the PRC: the economic reforms, which go counter to Pyongyang's cherished beliefs in a highly centralized, completely statist system; de-Maoization, which strikes indirectly at the cult of Kim; and, above all, signs that the US-China rapprochement may diminish Beijing's ardor in supporting the North Korean cause. Beyond these considerations, the economic and military weakness of China makes it a dubious reed upon which to lean. While reports are conflicting, some sources assert that Chinese oil shipments to the DPRK, which rose at one point to nearly equal those of the USSR, have had to be cut back.³⁰ In any case, China cannot, in any appreciable degree assist the DPRK in its industrial or military modernization.

A careful perusal of official messages, nonetheless, reveals that North Korea continues to harbor specific concerns with respect to each of its giant neighbors. When a ceremonial occasion is celebrated with the USSR, for example, DPRK spokesmen invariably speak of the cooperation between the two peoples and parties forged "on principles of complete equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and noninterference in others' internal affairs."³¹ No such language is directed at the Chinese. But when Kim Il-song, addressing the Sixth KWP Congress, says "socialist countries and nonaligned nations, all newly emerging countries, must make no unprincipled compromise with imperialism . . . must not bargain with the imperialists on matters of principle or sell out the basic interests of revolution to the imperialists,"³² the target is unmistakable.

In sum, North Korean-Soviet relations have recently improved for wholly unemotional reasons relating to mutual perceptions of national interests. North Korean-

Chinese relations, on the contrary, have become more troubled, with Pyongyang keeping maximum pressure on Beijing "to stand firmly by principle" as the interests of these two states diverge in some measure. It is interesting, for example, to note the numerous occasions on which the DPRK pledges its complete support to the union of China and Taiwan, thereby reminding Beijing both of the similarity of the reunification issue for the two countries and of China's "international duty."

In broader terms, North Korea is profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo. Hence, it applauds such signs of confrontation with the United States as the current tension between Moscow and Washington, and it views with a jaundiced eye any signs of an emerging American-Chinese-Japanese entente.

Yet at the same time, Pyongyang pursues its own attempts to forge a more meaningful relationship with Japan and the United States, hoping thereby to establish a larger presence in South Korean strongholds.³³ In both cases, a dual policy is being attempted: fierce attacks on the two governments (the Suzuki administration is referred to as "militarist reactionaries;" the Reagan administration, as "imperialists bolstering Fascism in the South") but intensified efforts to advance economic and cultural relations via any contacts that can be set up.

This dual policy has reaped some limited dividends. With respect to Japan, trade has grown in recent years, notwithstanding the debt problem. In 1980, it amounted to approximately US\$500 million.³⁴ Taking advantage of the assistance of a pro-Pyongyang faction headed by Kuno Chukl within the Liberal-Democratic Party, the DPRK also got a parliamentary delegation invited to Tokyo in June 1981 over the vigorous protests of Seoul. In the Japan Socialist Party, moreover, the DPRK has a staunch ally, and the *Chochongyon* (General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan), which the DPRK subsidizes and controls,³⁵ provides a political outlet of importance.

In reality, Japan would like to see a two Koreas solution evolve, so that its economic and cultural intercourse with the North could advance alongside its much greater interaction with the South. Neither the Suzuki government nor any successor, however, is likely to put itself at odds with the United States on Korea policy or to jeo-

²⁹ Vice Foreign Minister Zhong Xidong told foreign correspondents in Beijing on Sept. 1, 1981, that North Korea was an independent state and that the United States had other ways of contacting Pyongyang. For the Kyodo dispatch concerning Zhong's remarks, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Sept. 2, 1981, p. B/1.

³⁰ Although a Chinese source insisted to the author that oil shipments to North Korea would be maintained as pledged despite cuts to Japan and other quarters, a Japanese source has asserted that reduction in PRC oil shipments to the DPRK have been necessary.

For an earlier discussion of North Korea and the oil issue, see "North Korea's Oil Problems," *Kita Chosen Mondai* (Tokyo), August 1979, pp. 1-9.

³¹ See, for example, the speech of Chong Chun-ki at the celebration on July 6, 1971, of the 20th anniversary of the conclusion of the Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, in *FBIS-APA*, July 7, 1981, p. D/1.

³² Kim Il-song, "Summing-Up Report . . .," loc. cit., p. 55.

³³ To at least one American-Korean visitor, moreover, a Pyongyang official recently advanced the thesis that the DPRK did not want to be under pressure "solely from the north," implying that relations with Japan and the US could be used as countervailing weights to relations with the PRC and the USSR.

³⁴ For a detailed discussion of North Korean trade trends, see Lee Hong-youn, loc. cit., pp. 1-13.

³⁵ For an extensive account of Chochongyon, see Changsoo Lee and George DeVos, *Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1981.

Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula

pardize its vital economic and security interests in the ROK for limited gains in the North.

The barriers to major DPRK gains with respect to the United States are even greater. Throughout the 1970's, North Korea indicated from time to time, via such groups as American-Koreans, journalists, politicians, and scholars, an interest in advancing political and cultural ties with the United States. These efforts have been accelerated in recent years. American-Korean scholars have headed the list of invitees, as the North Korean leadership has sought to solicit support for DPRK reunification proposals and, some believe, for the strengthening of pro-Pyongyang organizational undertakings in the United States on the pattern of the *Chochongyon*. But other Americans have made the trip as well. These have included Representative Stephen Solarz, ex-Department of State officer Thomas Reston, and assorted journalists and scholars. In addition, the DPRK has endeavored to advance some type of exchange or conference program that would enable DPRK scholars to come to the United States.

At an earlier point, North Korea attempted to induce the United States to enter into negotiations with it to replace the Korean armistice with a peace treaty. The United States (President Jimmy Carter) and the ROK (President Pak) countered with a proposal for trilateral negotiations among the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK, but Pyongyang would go no further than to accept the presence of Seoul as an observer.³⁶ There is virtually no possibility that the Reagan administration will move toward unilateral recognition of the DPRK or an abandonment of US commitments to the ROK.

It can be argued, nevertheless, that the DPRK is slowly advancing toward unofficial relations with segments of American society, and that a similar trend, of a more pronounced sort, is observable with respect to Japan. Is there a counterpart in ROK-Communist relations? The broad answer, with certain caveats, is in the affirmative. For some years, the USSR has allowed South Koreans to attend international conferences or meetings in the USSR over the violent protests of the North Koreans. Even an ROK Minister of Health, accompanied by several journalists, was permitted to enter the Soviet Union in connection with an international meeting. In other respects as well, the Soviets have at points in the past indicated an interest in exploring further contacts with South Koreans. At the same time, they have indicated that crossrecognition or UN admission of the

two Koreas cannot be supported over Pyongyang's veto lest the Chinese take advantage of the situation—a position identical to that taken by Beijing, except that the Soviets are cited as possible gainers. In recent times, moreover, it would appear that the USSR, as a result of the hardening of Soviet-American relations, has shelved thoughts of a further softening toward the ROK.

Until recently, the PRC took a tougher line on contact with the ROK than did the Soviet Union, but the situation has been changing. From various sources, it now becomes clear that unofficial trade with South Korea has increased, with one source estimating that it reached US\$300 million in 1980.³⁷ Initially, such trade took place via Hong Kong, but lately there have been reports that ships bearing Chinese coal and returning with South Korean industrial products have gone directly from Chinese ports to the ROK.³⁸ Furthermore, one citizen of the PRC has now visited South Korea, in connection with a conference on the law of the sea. It should be noted, however, that he came from the United States, where he had been a student.

South Korea's policy of openly soliciting relations with the Communist states is the natural counterpart to North Korea's efforts to establish ties with the United States and Japan. Both states, in sum, are actively pursuing a two Koreas policy, even as Pyongyang vigorously denounces the idea. And each is seeking to protect its economic-strategic strongholds from the other side.


In contrast to improved ROK-US official relations, ROK-Japan relations have been marked by periodic explosions in recent times—over the kidnapping of Kim Tae-jung, a former presidential candidate against Pak; Japanese gestures toward the DPRK; the major trade imbalance in favor of Japan; and, lately, the initial rebuff to Korean requests for US\$6 billion in economic assistance, a request tied to Seoul's insistence that Tokyo recognize South Korea's sacrifices on behalf of Japanese as well as Korean security. But despite the problems—and the deep prejudices that exist on both sides—South Korea is too important to Japan (and vice versa) to permit any full-scale breach. In 1980, Japan-ROK trade totaled some US\$7 billion, in contrast to the US\$500 million trade which Japan carried on with the DPRK.³⁹

³⁶ For the Korea-US joint communique of July 1, 1979, see *The New York Times*, July 2, 1979. For one analysis from a South Korean standpoint, see Kim Hak-Joon, "January 19 Proposal and South-North Dialogue," *South-North Dialogue in Korea*, September 1979, pp. 7-30.

³⁷ Norman Thorpe, "South Korea, China Resume Trade after 30-Year Break," *The Wall Street Journal* (Asian ed., Hong Kong), Feb. 13, 1981. This figure was later used by V. Ganshin, giving *The Wall Street Journal* article as the original source, in an attack on the PRC. See "International Notes—Hypocritical Policy," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 20, 1981, as translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 9, 1981, pp. B/2-3. For another Soviet commentary on Sino-South Korean trade, citing a Reuters correspondent in Seoul, see *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 13, 1981, p. B/1.

³⁸ Thorpe, loc. cit.

³⁹ See Lee Hong-youn, loc. cit.; Suh, op. cit.; US Embassy Seoul, *Economic Trends Report*, Jan. 12, 1981.



A street scene in Pyongyang, North Korea, in June 1980.

—Fabien/SYGMA.

Conclusion

Slowly, unevenly, and without official acknowledgment, then, a trend appears to be under way to recognize the realities of the Korean peninsula. That is, two states exist there and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

The present impasse in North-South relations, however, poses dangers. A return to negotiations could reduce these, but it will not do so unless the dialogue is based upon a realistic appraisal of the present situation. If the DPRK persists in holding to the Kim Il-song formula and the premise that Korean reunification must be fashioned so as to lead to eventual Communist control, there is no hope of progress. Unfortunately, the current indications are very strong that the present DPRK position will remain unaltered for the lifetime of Kim Il-song at least.

Sooner or later, nonetheless, realism will have to enter the scene. This will mean an acceptance by the DPRK of the fact that a dynamic, advancing South Korean state will continue to play a vital role not merely in Northeast Asia but in other regions as well. Possibly the turning outward of the DPRK, if sustained, will abet this recognition.

In the meantime, there will probably be a mixture of tension and small steps to ameliorate these. It is not inconceivable, for example, that informal scholarly contacts between North Koreans and Americans or South Koreans, and between South Koreans and Soviets or Chinese can be advanced under conditions insuring reciprocity, genuine scholarly standards, and political balance. It is very unlikely, however, that the major nations will move toward crossrecognition, or that either Japan and the United States or the PRC and the Soviet Union will unilaterally proffer diplomatic recognition to "the other Korea" under present circumstances.

China and Offshore Energy

By Kim Woodard

Major offshore exploration for oil and gas is about to be launched along the Chinese continental shelf in the South China Sea by some 40-50 foreign (primarily American) oil companies. When combined with subsequent development work, this has the potential for becoming the largest commercial venture ever undertaken in China by foreign corporations. If the offshore projects proceed as scheduled, the capital outlay for exploratory drilling in the South China Sea alone would amount to US\$1-3 billion between 1981 and 1985, with an additional US\$10 billion investment required to develop each million barrels a day of production capacity.¹ Roughly equivalent investments would be required for onshore facilities—supply and logistics, data processing, communication and control, and new pipelines and refineries.

It is against this level of financial risk that foreign oil companies and banks (and indeed governments) must assess the probability of political stability and economic prosperity in China over the period of two to three decades required for offshore oilfields to reach full capacity. Yet, the timing of these offshore projects, so critical to their commercial success, could hardly be less certain. It should be remembered that offshore petroleum development in the North Sea required some 15 years to reach commercial production under conditions that included firm jurisdictional division of the shelf, advanced industrial technology, and stable democracy in all of the littoral countries. None of these conditions pertain in the South China Sea or elsewhere along the Chinese continental shelf.

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Indeed, by some twist of fate, the political and economic background against which the major undertaking is about to be launched is highly fluid. For example, at the end of 1981, as in mid-1971 and late 1978, the basic political relationship between China and the United States—a primary source of exploration capability—is in flux. Assumptions valid just a year ago no longer apply. A new American administration, in power for just a year, emphasizes the strategic (i.e., military) concert of interests with Beijing and Washington vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, while seeking at the same time to strengthen the US security commitment to the Kuomintang government on Taiwan. The Chinese government is experiencing its own change of administration, with the demotion of Hua Guofeng and the rise of two protégés of Deng Xiaoping to the posts of Premier and Party Chairman. As the post-Mao political transition draws toward completion, the government in Beijing is as intent as that in Washington on a reassessment of foreign as well as domestic policy. In its first major foreign policy initiative, the government of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang is opening a direct assault on the Kuomintang with a barrage of flowers. Not content with a nationwide celebration of "Double Ten" and Sun Yat-sen's birthday, Beijing is deluging Taiwan with unrequited offers of commercial and cultural ties.² And just in case US President Ronald Reagan goes a step too far with Taiwan, the Chinese government is toying with a new round of border diplomacy with the Soviet Union, as a geopolitical insurance policy.³

China's foreign commercial relations are also in a

¹ These are conservative estimates, in 1980 dollars. See Kevin Fountain, "The Development of China's Offshore Oil," *China Business Review* (Washington, DC—hereafter CBR), January-February 1980, pp. 30-35.

² "Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification," *Beijing Review* (hereafter—BR), Oct. 5, 1981, pp. 10-11.


³ Dusko Doder, "Soviets Propose to Chinese That Talks Be Renewed," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 20, 1981, p. A-27; and Christopher S. Wren, "Soviet-China Talk Still in Deadlock," *The New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1981, p. A-11.

highly fluid state. For example, US-China trade, after doubling to US\$4.8 billion in 1980, is expanding at a more moderate 20-25 percent a year. The euphoria of 1978 is gone, and in its place there lurks an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, fueled in particular by the dramatic cancellation in January 1981 of contracts with Japan for the Baoshan steel mill. The new sense of distrust pervades even the most routine contract negotiations. Chinese orders for American plants and equipment are drying up, reaching a meager US\$25 million in the first half of 1981.⁴ Faced with a 45 percent cut in the capital construction budget, China's economic ministries are trying to squeeze as much technology transfer as possible into the framework of each contract. Chinese trade officials fear the career consequences of overextension in negotiations and tend to protect themselves by making exaggerated bargaining demands that slow or disrupt the trading process. Foreign traders react to this caution with emotions ranging from gloom to overt anger.

China's Energy Crisis

Despite this atmosphere of uncertainty, negotiations for a massive program of offshore exploration continue, and bidding may occur as early as the first quarter of 1982. China's pursuit of major foreign participation in exploration of its continental shelf reflects a new sensitivity to energy constraints on its development and foreign trade. Back in the heady days of the first Arab oil embargo (November 1973), when the Daqing oilfield seemed bottomless and China's own crude oil output was leaping up at 20 percent a year, Chinese polemicists delighted in poking fun at the Western "energy crisis," which they wrote off as either a blunder by the multinationals or the natural fruit of imperialism.⁵ Of late, however, *Hongqi*, the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical journal, is taking a somewhat more cautious tone regarding natural limits on energy resources:

Energy resources are an important material foundation for raising the people's livelihood and implementing socialist modernization. The pace of economic construction and the framework for development are closely related to energy output and utilization. If energy supply does not keep pace with the demand generated by eco-



Chinese offshore drilling rig "Nanhai No. 1" in operation in the Yinggehai area of the Gulf of Tonkin in February 1980.

—Xinhua from UPI.

nomc development, then there is the danger that the future progress of the Four Modernizations will be affected.

The author then goes on to discuss the urgent need for energy conservation measures throughout the Chinese economy.⁶

Removal of the "gang of four" from power and the renaissance in China's scientific community are not the only reasons for this new attitude. In 1978, after nearly three decades of steady growth in primary energy production (which expanded 9-10 percent a year over the entire post-1949 period), the Chinese energy system suddenly reached a sustained output plateau (see Table 1 on page 34). All four commercial energy industries were affected. Coal production peaked at 635 million metric tons in 1979 and then declined to 620 million tons in 1980 and an estimated 600 million tons in 1981. Crude petroleum production, which had grown at an average rate of some 20-30 percent a year from 1950 through 1978, flattened out at 106 million tons (2.1 million barrels a day, or b/d) in 1979 and 1980 and is likely to decline to about 100 million tons in 1981. Recent official output statistics for natural-gas production reveal that in 1978 it had reached only about a third of the out-

⁴ My estimate, based on figures listed in *CBR*, May-June 1981, pp. 55-59; July-August 1981, pp. 70-73; and September-October 1981, pp. 80-82.

⁵ See, for example, Chang Chien, "Behind the So-Called Energy Crisis," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 270, February 1974, pp. 83-86, as translated in *BR*, Mar. 15, pp. 5-7.

⁶ Wu Zhonghua, "Understanding the Energy Crisis from a Scientific Perspective," *Hongqi*, No. 357, 1980, pp. 31-43.

Table 1: China's Primary Energy Production and Oil Exports, 1970-81

Year	Raw coal (mmt)	Crude oil (mmt)	Natural gas (bcm)	Hydropower (bkw/h)	Total energy (mmtce) ^b	Petroleum exports ^a		
						Crude (mmt)	Products (mmt)	Total (mmt)
1970	354.0	30.7	2.9	20.5	305.0	-0.4 ^c	Negl.	-0.4 ^c
Annual growth rate, 1970-75	6.2%	19.4%	22.4%	16.8%	9.1%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1975	482.2	77.1	8.9	47.6	481.8	9.9	2.2	12.1
Growth rate, 1975-76	0.3%	11.9%	13.6%	-4.3%	3.4%	-15.2%	-4.7%	-13.2%
1976	483.5	86.8	10.2	45.6	498.3	8.5	2.1	10.6
Growth rate, 1976-77	13.0%	7.5%	17.1%	4.5%	11.4%	6.8%	4.7%	6.4%
1977	550.7	93.6	12.1	47.7	558.3	9.1	2.2	11.3
Growth rate, 1977-78	11.5%	10.5%	12.4%	-6.7%	10.7%	21.7%	8.7%	19.3%
1978	617.9	104.0	13.7	44.6	621.5	11.3	2.4	13.7
Growth rate, 1978-79	2.8%	2.0%	5.7%	11.6%	3.0%	17.8%	34.8%	21.0%
1979	635.5	106.1	14.5	50.1	640.2	13.5	3.4	16.9
Growth rate, 1979-80	-2.5%	-0.2%	-1.4%	15.0%	-1.3%	-0.7%	16.3%	3.5%
1980	620.1	105.9	14.3	58.2	632.1	13.4 ^d	4.0 ^d	17.5 ^d
Growth rate, 1980-81 ^c	-3.4%	-5.7%	-9.5%	3.0%	-3.8%	-11.0%	0.0%	-9.0%
1981 ^c	600.0	100.0	13.0	60.0	608.3	12.0	4.0	16.0

^a Gross exports.

^b Million metric tons coal equivalent.

^c Author's estimate.

^d Planned.

SOURCES: Official data from the Ministries of Coal, Petroleum, and Electric Power.

put. estimated by Western (CIA) experts.⁷ Natural-gas output followed the crude petroleum production curve closely, and has been essentially constant at 14 billion cubic meters a year since 1978. The electric power industry has fared somewhat better in absolute terms, with output continuing to grow at 5-8 percent a year since 1978. However, relative to electricity requirements, the industry continues to lag seriously behind industrial growth, and inadequate power supply keeps manufacturing industries in major cities operating below capacity.⁸

Meanwhile, on the consumption side of the energy balance, continuing growth in industry, transportation, and urban requirements is pressing harder each year on available commercial energy supplies. A mission from the World Bank in 1980 that assessed the entire Chinese economy was shocked at the energy ineffi-

ciency of Chinese industry.⁹ China's commercial energy consumption per dollar of GNP is more than twice as great as India's or Thailand's. Since the industrial sector consumes 70 percent of commercial energy supplies, it is obviously the main villain and the main target for the ambitious energy conservation program initiated in 1979. The energy inefficiency of Chinese industry may be a blessing in disguise, for it offers an available "conservation pad" that can be drawn down over the coming years if output of primary energy continues to stagnate. But once the relatively cheap and easy efficiency measures are implemented, the pad is harder to narrow. Wasteful energy practices are built into the ancient equipment used in many Chinese industries and into the domestic price structure, which values crude oil at one third the international market price and fuel oil at the same price

⁷ See State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, "Communique of Fulfillment [sic] of China's 1979 National Economic Plan," Issued April 30, 1980, in *BR*, May 12, 1980, p. 13. Cf. US Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Economic Indicators*, ER 78-10750, Washington, DC, National Foreign Assessment Center, December 1978, p. 22.

⁸ Dori Jones, "Recharging the Electric Power Sector," *CBR*, March-April 1981, pp. 9-13.

⁹ Because of the sensitivity regarding its conclusions, the World Bank study was embargoed for release for a time, and is still restricted. It cannot, therefore, be directly quoted or cited. Nonetheless, it remains the most authoritative listing of economic and energy data for the PRC published to date. For reports on the study, see Robert Deffs, "A New Kind of Planning," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 14, 1981, pp. 48-50; and Nicholas Ludlow, "World Bank Report: China's Options in the 1980s Hinge on Saving Energy," *CBR*, July-August 1981, pp. 6-8.


believe that even with a massive conservation effort and stabilization of the onland oil industry at current output levels, China's energy export earnings will drop to US\$2.3 billion in 1990. Under less optimistic scenarios, the World Bank believes that China could become a net oil importer within the decade.¹³ Even if these projections are unduly pessimistic, it is not likely that China's earnings from energy exports will increase between now and 1985. Constant or declining energy commodity exports will impose a sharp ceiling on plant and equipment imports for the foreseeable future.

Structural Factors

It is important in the context of China's prospective offshore oil development to understand the reasons for the current crisis in the country's energy industries. The reasons for the production plateau in the energy industries seem deep and structural rather than superficial and organizational. By Beijing's lights, the Chinese economy is moving through an extended "readjustment" to correct its structural problems. Consumer demand and light industry are receiving attention for the first time in decades. Enterprise management is being decentralized and rationalized, while central planners struggle to hold down excess capital and foreign-exchange outlays. But a number of key structural problems remain and are evident throughout the energy system. Briefly, they include the following:

Technology absorption. Foreign visitors and scholars frequently comment on the state of technology in Chinese energy industries, comparing it unfavorably to Western models. The difficulty, however, is not just with the absolute level of technology, but with the pace and manner in which it is absorbed and integrated with existing facilities. Barriers in the communications system and the weakness of technical education continue to dampen the introduction of advanced technology and to cause inappropriate maintenance and use of new plants and equipment.¹⁴

Overutilization of capacity. Many of the current production problems in Chinese mines and oilfields can be traced to overutilization of existing capacity. The coal output plateau followed a period of excessive extraction and inadequate tunneling. Early water flooding at



Chinese geologists performing seismic surveys in the Daqing oil fields in 1977.

—Wide World.

Daqing and other oilfields pushed short-term output at the expense of long-term recovery. If output and capacity figures are correct, Chinese power plants operate an annual average of 4,500 kilowatt-hours per kilowatt of capacity, with thermal plants running at about 5,300 kwh/kw.¹⁵ (Thermal plants in the United States average only about 4,500 kwh/kw.)

Price and planning distortions. Planning from the top down yields an overemphasis on output and on large, highly visible enterprises. The production orientation of the economy is exacerbated by the practice of setting physical output targets and the lack of adequate base-level data. Price levels in the energy sector ignore scarcity or replacement and opportunity value, and encourage massive waste of certain energy commodities.

Uneven resource development. This problem is most visible in the petroleum industry. Heavy development of the northeast fields yielded a spectacular growth rate for crude-oil production in the short term, at the expense of steady growth in oil and gas reserves. Onland crude-oil reserves are now in the vicinity of 2 billion metric tons, while gas reserves are 100–150 billion cubic meters.¹⁶

¹³ Sharon Gamsin, "World Bank Analysis Suggests China to Become Net Importer," *Petroleum Information International* (Houston, TX), Oct. 12, 1981, p. 11.

¹⁴ For a comprehensive review of the state of science and technology in China, see Leo A. Orleans, Ed., *Science in Contemporary China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980.

¹⁵ According to official figures from the Ministry of Electric Power, hydropower capacity was 19.1 gigawatt (GW) in 1979, with output at 50.1 billion kwh. Thermal capacity in 1979 was 43.9 GW, with output at 231.8 billion kwh.

¹⁶ Gamsin, "World Bank Analysis . . .," loc. cit., p. 12.

While this reserve level can sustain current output for some time to come, it is insufficient for future growth of the petroleum industry.

These deep and structural constraints on the Chinese energy system are imposing a production plateau that will most likely extend well into the 1980's in the coal and petroleum industries. Indeed, the projected end of the overall economic "readjustment" program keeps receding into the future, with the latest official forecast stretching it out through 1985.¹⁷ None of the problems alluded to above will disappear overnight. Solution of each will require, even with strenuous effort, years of careful planning and resource allocation. It is precisely the long time horizon involved in overcoming these structural deficiencies that places an extraordinarily high premium for Beijing on rapid development of the offshore theaters. It could accurately be said that the development of the energy sector as a whole, and ultimately the success of the modernization program, hinges on an effective program of offshore exploration and development.

Given the state of China's energy industries, and of the economy generally during the prolonged "readjustment" period, there is a very high priority attached to successful exploration and development of the hydrocarbon resources of the continental shelf. The plateau in onland petroleum production was caused by the overly rapid development and premature decline of major oilfields in the northeast corridor (see the map on page 39 and Table 2). Even assuming that these fields can be stabilized over the next five years, it is unlikely that new fields in the southern or western sedimentary basins will more than balance declining output at older fields in the northeast. To be sure, Western exploration technology is gradually being brought to bear on the older fields to extend drilling depths and enhance recovery ratios, and extensive seismic surveys are being undertaken in the Caidam and Tarim basins in the far west. But even if these programs are successful beyond current expectations, onland crude oil production will not be able to rise from its current plateau until the middle of the decade.

Offshore exploration and development, of course, is itself a process that will consume the greater part of the

Table 2: Chinese Crude Oil Production, by Field, 1977-80^a

	(million metric tons)			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Northeast corridor	88.1	96.2	97.0	95.6
of which:				
Daqing fields	50.3	50.4	50.8	51.5
Shengli fields	17.5	19.5	18.9	17.6
Renqiu fields	12.3	17.2	17.3	16.0
Liaohe fields	4.5	5.7	6.6	7.1
Dagang fields	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.9
Other	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5
Northwest region	4.2	4.9	5.7	6.1
Central-South region	1.3	2.8	3.4	4.2
Southwest region	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
TOTAL	93.6^b	104.0	106.1^b	105.9^b

^a Total 1981 output is projected by the author at about 100 million metric tons or 2 million barrels a day, based on half-year output figures.

^b Differs from total of regional figures due to rounding of the latter.

SOURCES: Ministry of Petroleum.

1980's, and cannot therefore be counted on for immediate relief of current tightness in the commercial energy supply. Aside from existing Chinese platforms in the shallow waters of the Bo Hai, which now yield about half a million tons a year (10,000 b/d), large-scale commercial oil production on fields explored by foreign oil companies will not begin before 1985.¹⁸ The "conservation pad" may tide the Chinese energy system over the next five years, but beyond 1985, offshore development will become critical. Nevertheless, to date, the pace of the offshore projects has been less than breathtaking.

Early Offshore Exploration

By its own account, the Chinese Ministry of Geology commenced preliminary exploration of the continental shelf in the 1950's. But early surveys of the shelf were limited to mapping water depths, recording weather conditions, and taking samples from the ocean floor. It was not until 1968 (see Table 3 on page 38) that the first seismic profiles of the vast sedimentary basins along the shelf were shot, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and without official Chinese sanction.¹⁹ The results of these broad-gauge seismic surveys in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea portions of the shelf stimulated a wave of speculation regarding its hydrocarbon potential, and various littoral countries, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and the Philippines began mapping concession zones

¹⁷ For a recent review of economic policy, see Xia Zhen, "A New Strategy for Economic Development," *BR*, Aug. 10, 1981, pp. 12-17, 31.

¹⁸ "China's Oil Outlook Grows Brighter," *Oil and Gas Journal* (Tulsa, OK), May 25, 1981, p. 120.

¹⁹ United Nations Development Program, Office of Technical Support for Regional Offshore Prospecting in East Asia, "The Offshore Hydrocarbon Potential of East Asia," *CCOP Technical Bulletin* (published by UN ESCAP, Bangkok), No. 11, October 1977, pp. 1-68. China drilled its first well in the Bo Hai in 1965. See Yu Xueli, "PRC Platforms Call for Special Study," *Offshore* (Tulsa, OK), September 1981, p. 83.

China and Offshore Energy

Table 3: Offshore Exploration Activity, 1968-81

Date	Location	Activity	Operator	Result
1968-70	East China Sea Yellow Sea South China Sea	Seismic surveys	United Nations ECAFE	Identified major sedimentary basins
1974	Bo Hai	Seismic survey	Compagnie Française Géophysique	Not known
1972-75	Yellow Sea	7 exploratory wells	South Korea ^a	No commercial discoveries
1974-77	East China Sea	24 exploratory wells	Taiwan ^a	3 oil and gas shows
1974-78	Bo Hai South China Sea	Seismic surveys	PRC Geological Bureau	Basic mapping
1969-80	Bo Hai	Approximately 100 exploratory wells	PRC Ministry of Petroleum	22 oil and gas shows. Production about 0.5 million metric tons/year, or 10,000 barrels/day
1980	Bo Hai	Seismic surveys	46 foreign companies	Profiles on 215,000 sq. kilometers
1976-80	South China Sea	18 exploratory wells	PRC Ministry of Geology	9 oil and gas shows
February-March 1981	Gulf of Tonkin	Wushi 16-1-1 well	Total Chine	4,700 b/d API 44° crude, ^b plus 129,000 cu. meters/day natural gas
Dec. 1980-May 1981	Bo Hai	BZ 28-1-1	Japan National Oil (JNOC)	7,300 b/d API 39° crude, ^b plus 600,000 cu. meters/day natural gas
February-July 1981	Bo Hai	PL 71-1-1	Elf Aquitaine	Minor oil and gas shows
May-? 1981	Gulf of Tonkin	Welzhou 11-1-1 well	Total Chine	Not yet known
May-Sept. 1981	Bo Hai	Well on Chengbei structure	JNOC	2,600 b/d crude, plus 27,000 cubic meters/day natural gas
Aug.-? 1981	Bo Hai	Wildcat well	JNOC	Not yet available
August 1981	East China Sea	Longjing-1 well	PRC Ministry of Geology	Oil and gas shows

^a Various companies operating in government concessions.^b Degree API is "specific gravity measured in degrees on the American Petroleum Institute scale. . . . On the API scale, oil with the least specific gravity has the higher API gravity. . . . Most crude oils range from 27 to 35 degrees API gravity." See Howard R. Williams and Charles J. Meyers, *Oil and Gas Terms*, 3rd ed., New York, NY, Matthew Bender, 1971, p. 19. Thus, the crude from this well is at the light (and hence valuable) end of the API range.SOURCES: Kim Woodard, *The International Energy Relations of China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980, Chaps. 7 and 8; and various issues of *Petroleum News* (Hong Kong).

for preliminary exploratory drilling. The concession zones overlapped with each other and with Chinese claims in certain portions of the shelf, particularly in the East China Sea, giving rise to a protracted jurisdictional dispute over control of the shelf and its resources. About 110 wildcat wells were drilled in these early concession zones from 1972 through 1977, but they yielded just 22 oil and gas "shows" and only one exploration area of proven potential—the zone off Palawan Island in the Philippines in what became the Nido field. The haste with which these early drilling programs were conducted reflected political urgency in the host countries, rather than careful geological assessment by the foreign operators.²⁰

China, meanwhile, had initiated its own offshore exploration program, by purchasing a fleet of advanced seismic vessels and costly drilling rigs from shipyards in Japan and Singapore. From 1974 onward, the People's Republic mounted its own offshore wildcat program,


concentrating in the Bo Hai and the shallow waters of the Pearl River delta in Guangdong Province, but also attempting occasional exploratory wells in the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. To date, only a few production platforms have been built, all of which are in near-shore areas of the Bo Hai.

The Chinese program has produced few results. It faced serious technical and managerial problems, which caused excess idle time for the rigs, damage to some of the rigs, and a rig accident that killed 72 Chinese roughnecks in November 1979. Lack of technical expertise was compounded by what appeared to be overt competition between the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Geology for control of the offshore program.²¹

Toward Foreign Involvement

Already by 1978, the bloom was fading from the Chinese offshore drilling program, and Beijing had begun to cast about for a more effective alternative. In

²⁰ Woodard, op. cit., Chap. 7.²¹ Stephanie R. Greene, "The Offshore-Oil Race," *CBR*, July-August 1981, p. 57.



China and Offshore Energy



Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, right, is shown oil drill bits by James Leach, President of Hughes Tool Company, while visiting the Houston firm on February 3, 1979.

—Wide World.

the spring of that year, a number of large foreign oil companies (many of them American-based) were invited to send technical delegations to China. These early delegations were ostensibly to provide technical seminars and exchanges, but the visits resulted in quiet talk about China's offshore prospects. That the Chinese did mean the invitations as an initiative was confirmed by an official US energy delegation that visited China in November 1978. The mission, headed by then Secretary of Energy James R. Schlesinger, established a framework for technical cooperation in hydropower development, high-energy physics, and a number of other energy-related fields. Deng Xiaoping's post-normalization visit to the United States in February 1979 included stops at advanced petroleum facilities.

These early contacts led to agreements for extensive seismic surveys in eight large zones, six in the South China Sea and two in the Yellow Sea. Each of the zones was placed under the jurisdiction of a main operator

(Amoco, Arco, Mobil, Exxon, Caltex, Phillips, British Petroleum, and Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine). Some 38 other companies then bought into the cost of the surveys, acquiring a "key to the door" in the bidding process but no assurance of preference for any given area.²² The total cost of the surveys was about US\$25 million a zone, or US\$200 million in initial risk investment for all eight zones. Seismic work was conducted in each zone throughout 1980, and the results were delivered to Beijing in June 1981 after a six-month extension of the deadline.

Many of the companies that participated in the seismic surveys did so in the expectation that Beijing would open bidding for contract areas along the entire shelf at the end of 1980. These hopes were soon dashed. The Ministry of Petroleum limited the areas that

²² For a list of the participants in the seismic surveys, see *Petroleum News* (Hong Kong—hereafter *PN*), January 1981, p. 12.

would be opened to bids to approximately one third of the area surveyed, and then began to drag its feet in calling for the bids. Bidding was delayed from the spring of 1981 to the fall, and then to "early 1982 at the latest." Beijing exacerbated the frustration of the American companies by proceeding with exclusive exploration contracts with three government-controlled foreign oil companies in joint ventures in the Bo Hai and the Gulf of Tonkin. In May 1980, the Petroleum Corporation of the People's Republic signed joint-venture contracts with the Japan National Oil Company (JNOC) and Elf-Aquitaine (SNEA) for large areas in the Bo Hai and with Total Chine (a subsidiary of Compagnie Française de Pétrole—CFP) for 10,000 square kilometers in the Gulf of Tonkin just west of the Leizhou Peninsula. Under the "Bo Hai formula," these early contracts provided for establishment of a joint-equity venture in which the Chinese share would consist of exploration already performed, and profits as well as crude production would be split according to a complex formula.²³

The potential American participants wanted nothing to do with the profit-sharing and joint-equity features of the Bo Hai formula, preferring a simple split of crude output, along the lines of the standard Indonesian Production-Sharing Contract (PSC). They were also concerned about the ambiguity of Chinese tax law, under which up to 50 percent of oil profits may be taxed away. The tax issue became a major sticking point when the companies realized that under the structure of Chinese tax law, they would be exposed to double taxation on the same profits. In contrast, Indonesian PSCs are structured in a way that permits Pertamina, the Indonesian participant, to carry part of the tax burden, while the rest can be credited against US corporate profit taxes.²⁴

Meanwhile, in the closing months of 1980, JNOC, Elf-Aquitaine, and Total Chine had leased Chinese jack-up rigs and commenced drilling operations in their respective contract areas. The quick results of these early operations only served to deepen the frustration of American participants, who were locked into a seemingly endless round of fruitless talks on basic contract terms. Two of the first three wildcats down struck what may prove to be commercial discoveries. Total Chine led off in February 1981 with a discovery (Wushi



A technician of the French firm Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine discusses offshore drilling operations with his Chinese counterpart in Tanggu.

— F. Lechon/Gamma-Liaison.

16-1-1) 15 kilometers west of the Leizhou Peninsula that tested at 5,000 b/d of light, low-sulphur crude at an easy depth of 3,300 meters.²⁵ JNOC created a stir in oil industry circles in March with a well in the Bo Hai (BZ 28-1-1) that had test yields of 7,300 b/d of high-quality crude and 600,000 cubic meters per day of natural gas.²⁶ There was immediate speculation that the JNOC discovery could indicate a field with potential capacity in the range of 100,000–300,000 b/d, but further confirmation wells are required to determine the real extent of the field. Analogous onland fields have proven to have high pressure but relatively small reservoir size, leading to early production ceilings (e.g., the Renqiu oilfield). Elf-Aquitaine had sub-commercial oil and gas shows from its first well in the Bo Hai. A second JNOC wildcat yielded 2,600 b/d in September from a different structure in the southern Bo Hai.²⁷

If the combination of the early joint-venture contracts and repeated delays in the bidding were intended as a Chinese negotiating tactic in talks with American companies, it may have backfired. As one American executive put it to me, "A year ago (1980), the atmosphere

²³ Chi Fu, "China's Upcoming Offshore Oil Contract," *Economic Reporter* (Hong Kong) June 1981, p. 17.

²⁴ For analysis of the Indonesian contracts, see Corazon Siddhaya, *The Supply of Petroleum Reserves in Southeast Asia: Economic Implications of Evolving Property Rights Arrangements*, Sengalor, Malaysia, and New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1980.

²⁵ "Total Discovers Oil Offshore South China," *PN*, March 1981, supplement.

²⁶ Henri Hymans, "Bohai Crude—A Little Light Relief," *PN*, June 1981, supplement.

²⁷ *PN*, September 1981, supplement.

China and Offshore Energy

was right, and the Chinese could have gotten very good terms. Now we have hardened our position, and we are leaving more room at the margins." The risk, from the American perspective, is that the Chinese side will instigate intentional delays to gain more concessions in the future, perhaps even after the bids are in and contracts have been signed. Once the rigs are in place, they can easily run up a tab of \$100,000 a day, whether or not they are engaged in active drilling. The fear that delays or cancellations will be employed to extract concessions—the offshore equivalent of the "Baoshan syndrome"—haunts companies that must design exploration programs within very tight cost parameters.

Meanwhile, a ray of light has appeared at the end of the long tunnel that leads through the bidding process and contract negotiations to exploration. On June 4, 1981, Atlantic Richfield and Santa Fe announced that they had achieved a Memorandum of Agreement with the Petroleum Corporation of the People's Republic designed along the basic lines of the Indonesian PSC. The Arco-Santa Fe agreement provides for exclusive (i.e., without competitive bidding) exploration rights in a 9,000-square-kilometer block south of Hainan Island, evidently in the area of Arco's earlier seismic survey. The details of the agreement have not been released, but it apparently calls for a crude split, defers the tax issue with an escape provision for the American participants, and avoids an explicit profit-sharing formula. The agreement, once confirmed with a final contract, would provide for the drilling of a specified number of wells over a period of some 25–35 years.²⁸

One of the problems raised but not settled by the Arco agreement is the future configuration of supply and logistical arrangements for offshore operations. About half of the investment that goes into offshore exploration in any theater must be devoted to the construction and operation of supply bases, the establishment of reliable logistical lines that may reach half way around the world, housing and transportation for crews, and repair and maintenance of highly sophisticated mobile drilling rigs. If commercial fields are discovered, then a new wave of investment is required for fixed production platforms, subsea pipelines, and refining and marketing networks.

It is natural that China, like Norway or Great Britain, would like to capture as great a proportion of the economic value of this "spin-off" activity as possible within the framework of its own economy. The first in a series of "forward bases" has already been built in the

port of Zhanjiang, to the east of the Leizhou Peninsula. That supply base now services the lone Total China rig operating in the Gulf of Tonkin on the other side of the peninsula. It has housing for the French roughnecks, a data-processing center, a wharf replete with drilling chemicals and drilling pipe, and a small fleet of supply and service vessels. China's airline provides fixed-wing transportation from Canton, and a fleet of Bell helicopters ferries the crews on rotation to the rig.

So far, the South Sea Branch of the Petroleum Corporation of the PRC has bought all of the necessary equipment and managed the entire project itself, with some foreign companies providing specialized technology such as the computer center. But assuming that all goes well in the bidding and contract negotiations, there will be a sudden need, within the space of a single year (1982), to provide such services to perhaps a dozen rigs operating at intervals along a 1,200 kilometer coastline. Five or six forward bases will be required, with a level of logistical activity by 1984 or 1985 that would challenge even an advanced industrial country. It is unlikely that the South Sea Branch will be able to gear up rapidly enough to furnish anywhere near the services required, at least in the short term. That implies the need for contracts with foreign supply and service companies, perhaps on a joint-venture basis, with long-term technology transfer and training built into the structure of the contracts.

Behind the front line of supply bases, which will be spaced at intervals along the South China Sea coast from Hainan to Shantou, there will be a need for at least one "rear base." Rear-base support activities include: rig repair, or even rig construction; overseas air service; long-distance communications; rest and relaxation for foreign personnel; and, most important, the theater command headquarters of each company. Hong Kong and Guangzhou (Canton) are likely candidates for a role as a rear base, a function that could be very valuable to both. China wants Guangzhou to become the "Houston of the South China Sea," and has planned a conference there for the end of November 1981 to draw in foreign supply companies.²⁹ The oil companies, on the other hand, would prefer Hong Kong, with its existing communications, recreational, and financial institutions already in place and compatible with Western habits. Shipyards in both Hong Kong and Guangzhou have contracted to build drilling rigs, and China may insist that successful bidders purchase or lease rigs built in Chinese shipyards.³⁰ In any event, both cities will prob-

²⁸ Bernd Knoll, "Arco Gets Its Foot into China's Offshore Play," *PN*, June 1981, supplement; and Stephanie Greene, "The Offshore Oil Race," *CBR*, July-August 1981, pp. 55–57.

²⁹ "Conference Watch," *PN*, September 1981, p. 44.

³⁰ Bernd Knoll, "China's Rigs: Slow Recovery from Bohai Scandal," *PN*, July 1981, pp. 22–23.

ably benefit from the rear-base support activities. Deeper logistics will be provided by Singapore, with its established petroleum service industries that supply offshore operations from India to the Philippines.

At the time of writing, the precise schedule for bidding, contract negotiations, and initial operations by foreign oil companies is still uncertain. Slow progress is being made on the tax tangle and on the basic structure of likely contract terms. Industry sources indicate that the Chinese may call for bids in early 1982. The bidding process will most likely be tied into an important oil conference scheduled for Beijing in late March. Bidding and contract negotiations would then proceed over the summer and fall, with the first rigs in place by the following year (1983). Even this schedule may be overly optimistic and could easily be upset by extrinsic events or by a failure to come to terms on basic tax and contract provisions.

Should wildcat drilling get under way in earnest by early 1983, it will take at least until 1985 before sufficient commercial deposits have been discovered and defined to justify construction of production platforms. This extended time horizon means that even under ideal conditions, significant commercial production from the South China Sea will not begin before the second half of the decade. China's domestic petroleum and energy industries must be prepared to hold the line in supplying the energy consumption needs of Chinese industry until the late 1980's. Additional oil exports will be out of the question until then, and existing export levels will have to be cut in the absence of severe conservation and substitution measures.

This is not to suggest, however, that all advantages to be gained from offshore development must necessarily await commercial production from the South China Sea. The benefits of shoreline construction, increased financial credibility, and technological upgrading will begin to be felt almost immediately. The main beneficiaries in the short term will be Guangdong Province, which spans China's entire South China Sea coastline, and the Ministries of Petroleum and Geology. Beyond immediate economic returns, the first discoveries in the South China Sea would give a visible return on the modernization policies of the Deng government and greatly increase its political legitimacy within China. A successful exploration effort would also provide enormous returns to China internationally by cementing existing commercial ties to the United States, Japan, and other Western countries. All of these benefits, in sum, can precede commercial-level production, just as in the North Sea

the effects of offshore exploration were felt long before the first million tons of oil had been produced.


Security Aspects

Finally, a word of caution must be sounded regarding the security implications of offshore development in the South China Sea and in the other theaters along China's 14,000 kilometer coastline. There has long been a security dimension to Chinese energy development. During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, coal mines and power plants were constructed that served as a supply base for Japanese war industries. When the Japanese left, the Soviet Red army moved in for a time and stripped these mines and hydropower plants of their equipment.³¹ Nonetheless, in the 1950's, China's northeast corridor resumed its development as the country's principal industrial and energy-producing region (a process that was under Soviet tutelage until the latter part of the decade). The process accelerated in the early 1960's with the discovery and exploration of China's principal oilfields—Daqing, Shengli, Dagang, and Renqiu—all of them in the northeast corridor. Today well over 50 percent of China's commercial energy production capacity is located in the region between Beijing and the northern border of Heilongjiang Province.

The concentration of China's commercial energy infrastructure in the northeast corridor leaves China's economy terribly vulnerable to the more than 45 Soviet mechanized divisions stationed in an arc around the region from Vladivostok to Mongolia. Even in the absence of a nuclear exchange, conventional Soviet forces could move swiftly through the northeast corridor, pushing back or snaking through less well-armed Chinese divisions, destroying the energy production base, and then withdrawing across the border with little need to hold Chinese territory. The results would reduce the region to its condition in 1949, and would wipe out 30 years of hard-won growth in China's energy system and industry.

Offshore development can only deepen the vulnerability of the Chinese energy system. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, based in the Sea of Japan, has grown in recent years and is now active throughout the Western Pacific. Soviet warships are now frequent visitors to the South China Sea and have access to bases along the coast of Vietnam, including Haiphong and the former US naval base at Danang. Offshore drilling rigs or production platforms would be sitting targets for Soviet, or even Vietnamese, naval harassment or attack. (The docks in Zhanjiang harbor, an offshore supply base and Chinese naval base, are still visibly pockmarked from a sneak Viet-

³¹ Yuan-li Wu, *Economic Development and the Use of Energy Resources in Communist China*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1963, pp. 224-25.



A shot of the Daqing oil fields in Northeast China.

—James Anderson/SYGMA.

namese raid during the 1979 border war.³²) Should there be a serious Sino-Soviet conflict, the presence of the American flag in the South China Sea might be reassuring to Beijing, but American oil companies would hardly enjoy the role.

Another aspect of the security problem that bears constant attention is the persistent jurisdictional disputes along the entire length of the shelf and down into the South China Sea among Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, China, Taiwan, both Koreas, and Japan. China has never relinquished even its most extreme claims in the South China, East China, and Yellow seas. In the case of Japan, the best hope is that the two countries could reach a modus vivendi under which the issue of jurisdiction and formal division of the shelf would be deferred to some future generation, while joint projects proceed on a contractual basis in the disputed areas. But Beijing has done little to reassure Japan or any of its other neighbors regarding its posture on the jurisdictional problem. As recently as August 1981, the Ministry of Geology announced that an exploratory well (Long-jing-1) had been drilled by one of its rigs right in the middle of an old Taiwan concession zone, and just 50 kilometers west of the boundary of the Japan-Korea Joint Development Zone, where active drilling by foreign

companies is under way.³³ (China refuses to accept the legitimacy of the Joint Development Zone.) If the PRC presses its claims in the East China Sea, or if Vietnam presses its claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, the entire offshore program would be disrupted.

The importance of the Taiwan issue to offshore development must also be noted. Taiwan sits at the southern axis of a sedimentary basin in the East China Sea called the Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone.³⁴ This belt of sediments, which stretches northward under the Senkaku Islands almost to the southern tip of Korea, is the thickest and potentially the richest basin on the Chinese continental shelf. Even if Beijing and Tokyo set aside their differences over the jurisdictional status of this area, which is located between the midline (Japanese claim) and the line of natural prolongation (Chinese claim), it is highly unlikely that exploration could proceed without at least tacit acceptance by Taipei. That acceptance is not forthcoming in the absence of a political settlement between China and Taiwan. The vision of Taiwan patrol vessels harassing an American-owned rig in a China-Japan joint-contract area is enough to rule out exploration of the Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone for the immediate future.

³² Personal observations during a March 1981 trip to Zhanjiang.

³³ "Chinese Find Oil Offshore Zhejiang," *PN*, September 1981, supplement.

³⁴ K. O. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of East China Sea and Yellow Sea," *CCOP Technical Bulletin*, No. 2, 1969, pp. 3-43.

The possible impact of governmental actions on the state of commercial offshore exploration activities has already been suggested in dealings between the Chinese and Royal Dutch Shell. Beijing linked contract negotiations to a decision by the Hague to sell submarines to Taiwan. When the Netherlands proceeded with the sale, Chinese entry visas were suddenly denied to Shell personnel, and Shell walked out of the negotiations.³⁵ Similar complications loom large with respect to Washington's pending "FX decision," regarding possible US sales of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. The Reagan administration, in looking for a way to strengthen Taiwan's air defenses under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, is considering basically three options: (1) continuation or upgrading of the F-5E currently in coproduction on Taiwan; (2) licensing the more advanced Northrop F-5G for export or coproduction; or (3) export of an advanced fighter-bomber such as the F-16. Beijing, which has never accepted the legitimacy of the Taiwan Relations Act, opposes all three options as a violation of the sovereignty and unity of China.³⁶ Beijing has mounted a major propaganda campaign over the issue, has taken its own initiatives toward the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China (initiatives rejected by Taipei), and has threatened to downgrade relations with the US to the level of *chargé d'affaires* if Washington proceeds with the sale of advanced aircraft.³⁷

There can be little question that if the US government selects an advanced-aircraft option and Beijing reduces the level of formal relations, the offshore projects, along with a wide range of other commercial relations between the two countries, would be affected. Even if the Chinese government does not slow or halt the offshore bidding process, US oil companies and banks would be concerned about the long-term political risk posed by a reduction in the level of diplomatic relations. The issue could conceivably be defused—and the offshore projects moved ahead—if both sides lowered the level of political rhetoric on the question, and if there was a stretching out over time of the implementation of whatever decision is taken.

Not all of the security implications of offshore development are potentially disruptive. If the projects proceed smoothly, they will stimulate growth in the Chinese economy and provide foreign exchange for a higher level of technology import. One of the areas of tech-

nology most directly affected would be China's military technology. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China and the United States have been moving toward greater security cooperation, including possible selective sale of advanced American weapons to the People's Liberation Army. Offshore development would greatly increase China's ability to pay for those weapons systems that both sides might agree on for the upgrading of Chinese defense capabilities.

The security dimension of China's offshore development will not by itself determine the pace or outcome of the offshore projects. There are many other political and economic factors that enter the mix. Nonetheless, security considerations were among the key motivating factors for the Nixon-Kissinger initiatives toward China in 1971, and mutual security concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union remain at the bottom line of political relations between the United States and China today. American oil companies and banks considering major long-range investments in the South China Sea will assuredly take careful account of the security risks posed by offshore development and will constantly monitor those risks as offshore development proceeds.

During the mid-1970's, foreign assessments of China's offshore prospects were carelessly euphoric. There was a need then to stress the very real constraints on rapid development of the Chinese continental shelf. Today, we have perhaps overcompensated with a wave of depressing assessments of the state of China's domestic technical and managerial capabilities. Perhaps it is time to move to middle ground. Recognizing the existing limits on the Chinese petroleum industry is a far cry from saying that the industry has no future. Caution in light of the constraints on rapid offshore development is different than abandonment of the prospect altogether.

Despite delays, confusion on both sides, security risks, and other factors that dampen enthusiasm for exploration offshore China, the fact remains that the Chinese continental shelf is underlain with some of the largest unexplored sedimentary basins in the world. Seismic surveys and early drilling have revealed that these basins may hold significant commercial deposits of crude petroleum and natural gas. In a world of limited petroleum resources, the hydrocarbon potential of the Chinese continental shelf could be tapped to speed the process of China's modernization and to meet the energy needs of East and Southeast Asia. Perhaps "cautious optimism" is a term that could be used to describe an attitude that will lead in the direction of greater cooperation in the development of these offshore oil and gas resources.

³⁵ "Dutch/Shell Reprisal," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Jan. 20, 1981.

³⁶ Zhuang Qubing et al., "On the US 'Taiwan Relations Act,'" *BR*, Sept. 7, 1981, pp. 19-23; also *BR*, Sept. 14, 1981, pp. 23-25.

³⁷ The threat was reported in A. Doak Barnett, "Don't Sell the FX to Taipei," *The New York Times*, Oct. 23, 1981, p. A-31.

Books

Political Change in the USSR: Moving the Immovable?

By Robert V. Daniels

DONALD R. KELLEY, Ed. *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1980.

GORDON B. SMITH, Ed. *Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1980.

STEPHEN F. COHEN et al., Eds. *The Soviet Union Since Stalin*. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980.

ARCHIE BROWN and MICHAEL KASER, Eds. *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev*. London, Macmillan, and New York, NY, Free Press, 1975.

T. H. RIGBY et al., Eds. *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR: Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

RONALD J. HILL. *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform*. Oxford, Martin Robertson and Co., and White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1980.

ONE PREDICTION which can be made about the imminent political future of the Soviet Union with the same assurance as about taxes is that the death of the present gerontocracy, and its replacement by a cadre of younger leaders, is inevitable. As Peter Frank points out in

the Brown-Kaser volume, the "immobilism" of the Brezhnev years is destined to yield to a new generation whose personal political consciousness no longer embraces the experience of Iosif Stalin's purges or even, for many, the Great Patriotic War. What change this renovation may bring to the world's most powerful political system is, as another reviewer of the literature on Soviet politics has noted in this journal, a matter of intense concern to every other government on earth.¹ However, the nature of the change can only be inferred by projecting from current pressures and movements in the Soviet system insofar as we can observe them. The examination and assessment of such forces, done as scientifically and objectively as possible, is the great merit and importance of the genre of works under review here.

Western scholarship on the Soviet system in the various social science disciplines has reached a high level of sophistication and has yielded a plethora of empirical and bountifully documented studies on the various facets of the Soviet phenomenon. A broad sampling of the latest of such inquiries by eminent American, British, and Australian scholars

is brought together in the virtually simultaneous symposia reviewed here. On the American side, these include collections edited by Donald Kelley, Gordon Smith, and Stephen Cohen et al.; from the Commonwealth come volumes edited by Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, and Harry Rigby et al. Ronald Hill's monograph on the work of Soviet political scientists bears on many of the same issues.

Current work in the West on the Soviet government, economy, and social system has established a broad but firm consensus. No longer have we emotional debates or terminological hairsplitting over whether the Soviet Union is revolutionary or conservative, totalitarian or pluralistic. All the authors represented here acknowledge the existence of what Rigby calls the "monorganizational system," in which the leading and controlling role is reserved for the apparatus of the Communist Party. At the same time, all agree that the image of a completely centralized totalitarian despotism, rigidly imposing its orders on everyone, is outdated. All also stress that the distinctive characteristics of the Brezhnev regime of the last 15 years have been pragmatic conservatism and gradualist rationality, within which the imperatives of a complex modern society can be at least partially contained.

¹ Robert F. Miller, "Whither the Soviet System," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1980, p. 52.

None encourage expectations of any sudden and fundamental change even after the old guard leaves the political scene.

The impetus to change, in the view of every Western expert represented here, comes, ironically, from the socioeconomic base—that is, from the growing technological sophistication of the industrial economy and from a more affluent (or less impoverished) population which aspires to self-fulfillment in everything from consumer goods and services to literary expression and professional accomplishment. The superstructure of political power and control institutionalized in the party is thereby confronted with a chronic dilemma, to which it responds with an equally chronic ambivalence. How to derive the advantages from high technology and educated manpower in the form of economic and military power without making concessions with respect to decentralization of initiative or special-interest values that might compromise the essential principle of control and goal-setting from the top? This dilemma lies at the heart of what is variously perceived as the “immobilism” (Frank), “inertia” (Rigby), or “incrementalism” (Smith) of the Brezhnev era, and it will clearly require that the successor leadership formulate some coherent policy to move the system off dead center.

Economically, the Soviet system has come to be threatened by the implications of its own success. One might argue that in building a tremendous modern industrial plant and resource base and in avidly espousing the “scientific-technological revolution,” the Communist regime that Stalin bequeathed to his successors has sown the seeds of its own destruction or, at least, discomfiture. In a wide range of areas, the Soviet economy has reached a level of complexity, diversification, and scientific refinement which cannot

be properly accommodated and taken advantage of by the traditional Stalinist model of centralized administration and directive planning. As George and Ida Feiwel observe in the Kelley volume (p. 73), the continuing use of quantitative output norms constitutes a drag on the upgrading of industrial quality, while wasteful overinvestment leaves insufficient resources for incentives in the consumption sector.

To be sure, there has been steady progress until recently in wage levels and in the supply of consumer goods and services such as health and housing, though these accomplishments have always fallen short of the rising expectations of the Soviet populace, not to mention of Western standards (Michael Kaser in Brown and Kaser, pp. 212–13; Carol R. Nechemias in Smith, pp. 172 ff.).² But the USSR no less than the West has of late been overtaken by a growth-rate crisis, as the possibilities for development become progressively narrower within

the constraints of the Soviet administrative structure (Smith; Jane P. Shapiro in Kelley, pp. 121–22; Arthur W. Wright in Cohen et al., p. 126). In classic Marxian terms, the Soviet system of “relations of production” has become a “fetter upon the mode of production,” and one anticipates the time when “this integument is burst asunder.”³

There is no easy way out of the impasse. Further gains entail greater costs; the marginal return to increased investment drops; and the economic trade-offs become more agonizing. Even the natural riches of Siberia pose increasing obstacles of cost to their economical exploitation (Robert N. Taaffe in Cohen et al., p. 173). Soviet agriculture, as the world well knows, has been particularly disappointing despite the shift under Brezhnev from squeezing the peasants to providing them with costly subsidies; giantism and centralism in agriculture seem to be counterproductive at least under Soviet conditions (Roy Laird in Kelley, pp. 55 ff.; James Millar in

² See also Nick Eberstadt, “The Health Crisis in the USSR,” *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Feb. 19, 1981, pp. 23–31.

³ Karl Marx, *Capital*, New York, NY, Modern Library, 1936, Vol. 1, p. 837.

Reviewers in This Issue

ROBERT V. DANIELS—Professor of History, University of Vermont (Burlington, VT); author and editor of numerous works on Soviet history, including (with Paul Cocks and Nancy Whittier Heer), *Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, 1976.

TYRUS W. COBB—Lt. Colonel (US Army) and Associate Professor of International Politics, US Military Academy (West Point, NY); in 1973–76, analyst of Soviet political-military affairs at the Department of the Army (Washington, DC); author of articles and of a forthcoming book on Soviet national security matters.

DOUGLAS PIKE—formerly US Foreign Service Information Officer in Vietnam;

now Director, Indochina Center, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California (Berkeley); author of many works on Vietnam, including *Viet Cong*, 1965, and *History of Vietnamese Communism*, 1979.

PATRICK G. MADDOX—Associate Director, John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA).

RICHARD P. MADSEN—Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of California at San Diego (La Jolla, CA); author (with Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger) of *Chen Village: The Recent History of a South China Farming Community*, forthcoming.

Book Reviews

Cohen et al., pp. 146-47; Alec Nove in Brown and Kaser, p. 5). People in the middle management and professional class are particularly irritated by the inadequacy of material incentives and the contrast of relative opulence visible on their frequent visits to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany (Kaser in Brown and Kaser, p. 209; John Bushnell in Cohen et al., p. 191).

The potential for technological innovation and its effective application requires, more than ever, the devolution of responsibility and initiative to the local level and the enterprise manager, but the system balks at any such alteration in its principles (Feiwei in Kelley, p. 98). One of the probable reasons for Soviet interest in détente with the West and circumspection toward dissenters was the importation of technological innovations which its own system frustrates. Yet for the same reason it is doubtful that such imports are effectively utilized (Philip Hanson in Brown and Kaser, pp. 35-36; Peter Reddaway in Rigby et al., p. 186). Similarly, the subtleties of environmental protection break down because of the lack of responsibility and commitment to their observance on lower levels (Thane Gustafson in Kelley, p. 142).

Law has also emerged as a visible indicator of the Soviet Union's systemic dilemma. Traditionally subordinated to the leadership's insistence on total and arbitrary decision-making power (under Nikita S. Khrushchev as well as Stalin), law has begun to come into its own as a reflection of the need for a rational and consistent structure of rules and expectations within which local authorities can begin to exercise some initiative (Robert Sharlet in Kelley, pp. 209-10). Soviet legal experts and political scientists have begun to find that they are taken seriously when they address the petrification of the administrative

system (Smith, p. 125; Hill, pp. 156 ff.). But a real change in principle about the force of law has yet to win acceptance.

In some facets of life, the authorities have retreated in the face of complexities that they cannot master. They have no effective answer to the demographic erosion of Great Russian dominance nor to the perennial nationality problem. As is noted in the one essay on religion included in these books (Michael Bourdeaux in Brown and Kaser), repression and manipulation are failing to guarantee conformity even in this area. Overall, one is struck again and again by evidence of an anachronistic political system muddling through its social and economic difficulties with a minimum of concessions in its traditional style of rule.

WESTERN SCHOLARSHIP universally perceives the Brezhnev regime as conservative. It is elephantine, glacial, leaden. It is not averse to pragmatic improvements of a material sort, but it can hardly move under its own weight. The bureaucratic system built by Stalin (or recreated from the ruins of the Russian Empire) could in his day be moved to all manner of revolutionary actions by a leader strong enough. Khrushchev was still able to throw the bureaucratic establishment off balance with his erratic initiatives and his appeal to a populist spirit (Smith, p. 208; Cohen, p. 22; George Breslauer in Cohen et al., pp. 50 ff.). The Brezhnev tendency, immanent in that bureaucratic establishment which now sets de facto limits to the leader's power (Brown in Rigby et al., p. 147), is to avoid the big issues and confine undertakings to "incrementalism" of the most practical and unthreatening sort (Smith, pp. 10-14; Hill, pp. 179 ff.; Erik P. Hoffmann, in Cohen et al., p. 88).

This fear of change has probably inflicted its greatest costs in the realm of economic reform. The new Brezhnev regime, evidently cognizant of all the logical reasons for decentralizing industrial decision-making along the lines of the Liberman proposals, nevertheless backed away in the late 1960's from such a drastic change in the familiar way of doing business (Kaser in Brown and Kaser, pp. 208-09; Feiwei in Kelley, p. 75). Its apprehensions seemed to confirm Alec Nove's reasoning that the central plan requires the party dictatorship, and the party dictatorship requires the central plan—the economic price for a political principle.

Still, the spirit of the dictatorship in the Brezhnev era has changed to a "substantive rationality," in Rigby's words, so that personalist fanaticism has yielded to "the natural caution of entrenched elites." Ideology has not lost its importance, but its function is legitimation rather than guidance. Wherever the doctrinal cloak has fit too tightly, it has been re-tailored. The latest alteration is the proposition of "developed socialism," a historic stage of indefinite duration in which the Soviet system now professes to find itself—a notion which seems to make the leadership more comfortable with entertaining pragmatic policy suggestions from the experts (Kelley, pp. 185 ff.; Hill, pp. 155-56). There is now considerable evidence to support the initially controversial argument of Jerry Hough that the regime tolerates and even invites empirical policy studies and professional controversy to a far greater degree than formerly, as long as they do not overtly question official claims to Marxist legitimacy.⁴

⁴ Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978; see also Richard F. Vidmer, "Soviet Studies of Organization and Management: A 'Jungle' of Competing Views," *Slavic Review* (Chicago, IL), Fall 1981, pp. 404-22.

According to Roy Medvedev (*On Stalin and Stalinism*, excerpted in Cohen et al., p. 46), the demurrers of loyal intellectuals sufficed to deflect the proposed rehabilitation of Stalin in 1969. Open dissent may still be firmly curbed, much to the detriment of the quality of cultural life (George Gibian in Cohen et al.; Martin Dewhurst in Brown and Kaser), but with respect to the inner circles of specialists the regime appears to be bothered not so much by what they say as by how they say it.

THE CONFLUENCE of socioeconomic modernization and political-administrative immobilism has given a distinctive, if not always neatly categorizable, form to the evolving Soviet system. It is neither despotic nor free, neither totalitarian nor pluralistic, but a curious amalgam of functional interests and technical imperatives embedded in a commitment to monopoly of power. In its very rigidity, the system has become more rational, more routinized, more rule-bound than it has ever been since the days of the tsars. Laws and regulations, within which everyone knows his permitted scope, operate with a high degree of predictability. According to Max Weber's typology of authority, as Rigby observes, Russia has passed from the "traditional" to the "charismatic" and then through the "routinization-of-charisma" to the "legal-rational" model—although Rigby prefers to call it "goal-rational"—now approximated in the Soviet bureaucracy.

Within this context, two conclusions emerge which to a degree vindicate the adherents of both the totalitarian and the interest-group models of the Soviet system. The party continues to dominate the system as a supreme bureaucracy, integrating all other political and social functions through the hierarchical personnel controls of *nomen-*

klatura (Rolf H. W. Thoen and Stephen Sternheimer in Smith). But it does not obliterate the identity or the responsibility of the manifold functional and geographical entities that make up the institutional structure of Soviet society. These, in turn, are differentiated by a multitude of organizational interests and specialized perspectives. They pursue their diverse functions and needs with whatever latitude the party center has accorded them and vigorously compete with one another for resources, influence, and turf. Smith cites Jerry Hough's phrase, "institutional pluralism," and my own term, "participatory bureaucracy," as possible conceptualizations for a complex hierarchy which contributes to policy inputs by its information and advice, and plays an even more influential role in policy outputs by shaping or impeding implementation. Perhaps the leadership attempts so little in the way of grand initiatives because it is not sure of its own power to drive a major innovation through the bureaucratic jungle.

HOW A REVOLUTIONARY leadership, dedicated to the eradication of Russia's bureaucratic heritage, erected this enormous system of bureaucratic administration belongs to the annals of historical irony. Alone of the works under review, the volume edited by Rigby et al. includes a number of contributions that look again at some of the roots of the present regime—Neil Harding on the political theory of the Civil War period as a model for Stalinism; Richard Taylor on the Communists' early use of film for propaganda; Graeme Gill on Stalin's manipulation of the Lenin myth; and A. Kemp-Welch on Stalinist control of the intellectuals. These and many other facets of Stalin's dictatorial legacy remain both the strength and the

burden of his successors. The dilemma is that while they cannot do well with this legacy, they also cannot do without it.

Foreign policy is not the focus of any of the works under review, but a few essays in them point to an analogous pattern of continuity and conservatism. Cautious opportunism and the incremental pursuit of low-risk advantage are hallmarks of the Brezhnev regime in the external as well as in the internal realm (Charles Gati and others in Cohen et al.). Détente with the West was but an expedient for the Soviets, even at the height of Soviet-American good feeling when Philip Hanson's and David Holloway's essays on the subject were published (in the Brown and Kaser volume). Nevertheless, William Zimmerman, writing much more recently (in the Cohen et al. collection), observes a persisting tempered stance toward the West. Roger Kanet and Rajan Menon (in the Kelley volume) find that Soviet ventures in the Third World continue to be inhibited by the unreliability of Moscow's temporary clients. For the Soviets as for the West, in foreign affairs as in domestic, there are no simple answers.

WHAT CHOICES, burdens, and opportunities does all this portend for the prospective new leadership of the Soviet Union? When the irresistible force of socioeconomic change comes up against the immovable object of autocratic government, one has the makings of a revolutionary situation. Will the new leadership be of a mind to entertain the more fundamental reforms which seem essential in order to avert such a collision?

Little is really known, unfortunately, about the inclinations of the middle-aged individuals who are likely to emerge from the party apparatus when the day of the succession arrives. The works under review

Book Reviews

offer no more than passing conjectures about their presumed conservatism. But it must be kept in mind that the current upper echelon still represents the Stalinist post-purge leadership generation who have collectively grown old in office for more than four decades. We know that the new leadership will not carry the direct burden of the Stalinist experience, and is therefore likely to have a higher level of confidence about the stability of the Soviet system and its place in the world. To this extent they may be freer to consider the big decisions, the basic reforms, which Western empirical studies have underscored as logical necessities for the Soviet system. A dramatic new departure is at least conceivable even within the mono-organizational structure of Communist rule. After all, there is the example of the "Prague spring" and "socialism with a human face" from 1968 Czechoslovakia—brought

about by the frustrated lower echelons of the party. Such an initiative had been inconceivable until it actually occurred.

The limits and deterrents to such a rosy resolution of the Soviet Union's quandaries are most likely to be found in the deeper continuities of Soviet life that are not directly or primarily addressed in the present selection of studies. Among other factors, one might mention the bent toward hierarchy and centralism in the old Russian political culture; the consolidation of the New Class with its perquisites and privileges; the reaffirmation of Russian nationalism, at the expense of greater friction with the other nationalisms in the USSR; and the profound and increasing militarization of the Soviet system and its priorities. It is at least open to question whether the people who benefit from the system really want to change anything unless circum-

stances compel them to do so. Indeed, the future could bring change along a path leading to naked reactionary chauvinism as well as to liberal reform.

In the near term, however, it appears from the close-up studies reviewed here that the successor regime will have enough challenges to preoccupy it at home without incurring new entanglements abroad that are not forced upon it. It is odd that many contemporary assessments of the Soviet global challenge fail to give much manifest weight to such considerations. Whatever rhetoric the politics of competition for the succession may generate, the likelihood is that cautious opportunism will continue to be the order of the day in Soviet foreign policy while the country's prospective new rulers try to settle on an identity that will, in some way, soften the rigidity which has passed for stability in Brezhnev's USSR.

National Security Perspectives of Soviet "Think Tanks"

By Tyrus W. Cobb

A. G. ARBATOV. *Bezopasnost' v yadernyy vek i politika Vashingtona* (National Security in the Nuclear Era and Washington's Policy). Moscow, Politizdat, 1980.

G. A. TROFIMENKO, Ed. *Sovremennyye vneshne-politicheskiye kontseptsii SSHA* (Contemporary American Foreign Policy Concepts). Moscow, Nauka, 1979.

R. G. BOGDANOV et al., Eds. *SShA: voyenno-strategicheskiye kontseptsii* (USA: Military-Strategic Concepts). Moscow, Nauka, 1980.

D. M. PROEKTOR. *Puti Yevropy* (Paths of Europe). Moscow, Znaniye, 1978.

V. B. VORONTSOV. *Kitay i SShA: 60-70-ye gody* (China and the USA: The 1960's and 1970's). Moscow, 1979.

Ye. M. PRIMAKOV. *Anatomiya blizhnevostochnogo konflikta* (Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict). Moscow, Mysl', 1978.

IN THE STALIN ERA, Soviet treatises on Western foreign policies and defense strategies were uniformly simplistic in analysis and predictable in content. The West, and the United States in particular, was portrayed as being in the clutches of a ruling elite dominated by a clique of finance capitalists and corporate moguls concerned only

with the advancement of their own pecuniary interests. This cabal monopolized the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies directed toward the exploitation of the proletariat internationally and the encirclement and ultimate destruction of the Soviet state.

Soviet studies of Western political behavior became somewhat more sophisticated in the Khrushchev period, but it was only subsequently that research of a more analytical, less ideological nature really blossomed. This expansion emanated from an emerging "strategic-intellectual complex" obviously replicating the Western "think tanks" once derided as "intellectual factories in the service of the state."¹

This complex, comprising both new and revitalized institutes largely under the nominal supervision of the USSR Academy of Sciences,² appears today to be assuming a growing role in the Kremlin's intelligence analysis and policy evaluation process. It is therefore of interest to examine the six studies reviewed here, written or edited by prominent specialists at these institutes. Each of the volumes is oriented toward national security studies, an area of increasing attention for Soviet ana-

lysts, who previously tended to shy away from subjects that might be considered the proprietary concern of the USSR Ministry of Defense.³

BEGINNING in the late 1950's, the Soviet leadership, seeking to improve the quality and scope of analytical studies at its disposal, set out to refurbish and expand the network of research institutes charged with studying several regions of the world and functional problem areas. Of particular interest in the present context are two academic centers concerned with global politics and the Soviet-American relationship: the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), directed by N. N. Inozemtsev, and the Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN), headed by G. A. Arbatov.

IMEMO is possibly the most prestigious of all the centers and certainly the one with the broadest

² For a comprehensive, annotated listing of Soviet research organizations, see Blair Ruble et al., *Soviet Research Institutes Project*, 3 vol., Washington, DC, Office of Research, US International Communications Agency, 1980-81. Ruble's report was prepared at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

³ The author spent a total of three months in the USSR over the last two years studying the formulation and implementation of Soviet national security policy, as part of the IREX-USSR Academy of Sciences exchange program. In the course of his research, the author met with various Soviet officials and scholars in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the emerging "strategic-intellectual complex," including all of the authors/responsible editors of the books reviewed here.

¹ For example, see I. L. Sheydina's *SShA: "fabriki mysl'" na sluzhbu strategii* (The USA: "Think Tanks" in the Service of Strategy), Moscow, Nauka, a 1973 publication focusing on the work of the RAND Corporation and the US government.

charter.⁴ The institute, located in a new 18-story building on the outskirts of Moscow, is staffed by 700 "professionals," who examine a wide spectrum of problems ranging from the prospects for a new international economic order to the use of capitalist managerial techniques in the economy and defense work,⁵ from comparative politico-military policies to global disarmament programs. To a considerable extent, the function of the IMEMO professionals is to integrate the technical expertise found in the functionally specialized academic centers with the regional studies performed by the area institutes. The institute staff chairs or sits on several interdisciplinary councils and coordinates research and analysis being performed by numerous institutes.⁶

Arbatov's USA institute was spun off from IMEMO in 1967, when the

requirements for specialized analyses of North American foreign and defense policies multiplied (it was renamed the Institute of the USA and Canada in 1974). ISKAN, housed in a series of historical buildings in the center of Moscow, has about 300 full-time professional staffers. It also maintains a liaison office in Washington, whose function is to gather information on American political developments and to meet with a broad cross section of government, business, and academic leaders.⁷

The primary focus of ISKAN has been on the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy, on which it has produced several capable studies.⁸ Another topic that has absorbed institute staffers is US domestic politics, an area in which Soviet observers have not been entirely comfortable. With the exception of a few credible works on public opinion and the presidency,⁹ Soviet treatises on American internal politics have been sophomoric and less than insightful. In addition, several "sectors" at ISKAN do research on multinational economic and political issues.

The life of the *Amerikanisty* (American specialists) at ISKAN or *mezhdunarodniki* (international affairs specialists) at IMEMO is glamorous by Soviet standards—providing opportunities for foreign travel, access to forbidden journals and novels, considerable prestige, excellent working conditions, and frequent discourse with scholars from abroad—and positions are much sought after. As noted by a former "ISKAN" staffer, who defected while on a junket in the West, many of the analysts and researchers assigned to these two institutes are the sons and daughters of the elite (referred to in Russian as the "*synki*"—literally the "sons").¹⁰ Among the offspring of the ruling elite employed in the "think tanks" are L. G. Nikonov, son-in-law of former Foreign Minister and old Stalin confidante V. M. Molotov, at IMEMO (Molotov himself occasionally appears there), and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko's son Anatoliy, who now heads the Africa Institute. The son of Yu. V. Andropov, Chief of the Committee for State Security (KGB), worked for Arbatov until recently and still serves as a consultant for ISKAN.

Although one might be inclined to doubt the quality of studies produced in such a nepotistic network, these privileged researchers for the most part do credible work. Certainly, their enviable exposure to the thoughts and ambitions of the powerful has done them no harm, and their early immersion in the real political questions at issue in the Kremlin affords them unique insight into the actual workings of the Soviet system.

⁴ IMEMO traces its lineage back to 1925, when it was founded as the Institute of World Economics and World Politics. In the late 1940's, institute director E. V. Varga, a Hungarian economist, ran afoul of Iosif Stalin's ideological watchdog Andrey Zhdanov. Although Varga recanted his sins and the controversy that raged over his predictions that the Western capitalist countries would recover from the ravages of World War II rather than collapse died down, the institute's prestige was severely damaged. In 1956, the institute was renamed IMEMO and began an evolution into a respected center of study where ideological verbiage was subordinated to analytical expertise as the standard for academic excellence.

⁵ IMEMO researchers show considerable interest in economic modeling, in managerial techniques (such as "PERT") used in American defense procurement, and methodologies (e.g., systems analysis) employed in Western defense programming and planning. A perusal of articles published in IMEMO's monthly journal, *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*, illustrates the heavy focus on management techniques. For an excellent synopsis of the Soviet attempt to integrate Western technologies and organizational skills with a socialist economy, see Richard F. Vidmer, "Soviet Studies of Organization and Management: A 'Jungle' of Competing Views," *Slavic Review* (Urbana-Champaign, IL), Fall 1981, pp. 404-22.

⁶ Inozemtsev serves as the chairman of the Peace and Disarmament Council, a research body under the joint supervision of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology. Members of the Council include the directors of most of the leading Soviet research institutes. Ostensibly designed to study problems of peace and disarmament, the Council appears to be assuming a major role in coordinating national security research.

⁷ Valentin Berezkhov, formerly editor of the institute's journal *SShA* and a translator for Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, currently heads ISKAN's Washington office. The liaison office is officially accredited to the Soviet Embassy and Berezkhov holds the title of "First Secretary," although his post is not co-located with—and appears to operate quite independently of—the Embassy.

⁸ In addition to the works reviewed here, see G. A. Arbatov et al., Eds., *Global'naya strategiya SShA v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii* (The Global Strategy of the USA in Conditions of the Scientific-Technological Revolution), Moscow, Mysl', 1979; and R. Bogdanov and A. Kokoshin, *SShA: Informatsiya i vneshnyaya politika* (The USA: Information and Foreign Policy), Moscow, Nauka, 1979—an interesting examination of the American use of intelligence and analysis in the formation of policy.

⁹ See, especially, Andrey Mel'vil', *Sotsial'naya filosofiya sovremennogo amerikanskogo konservatizma* (The Social Philosophy of Contemporary American Conservatism), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980 (a thoughtful analysis of neo-conservatism in the US); and Yu. Zamoshkin and Ye. Batalov's *Sovremennoye politicheskoye soznaniye v SShA* (Contemporary Political Consciousness in the USA), Moscow, Nauka, 1980 (a study of "left" and "right" tendencies in American thinking).

¹⁰ Galina Orionova, formerly a research assistant at Arbatov's institute, discussed her perspectives on the functions and status of the *Amerikanisti* at ISKAN in an interview with Nora Beloff, "Escape from Boredom: A Defector's Story," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Boston, MA), November 1980, pp. 42-50. Orionova felt very lucky to have gained employment at the institute a few years back, because "all the jobs are now reserved for the children of very exalted families" (p. 42).

An increasing number of the professional staffers are career diplomats or government functionaries studying at the institutes. Like the RAND Corporation and Lawrence Livermore Labs, ISKAN and IMEMO are degree-granting graduate institutions. Many of the products of this schooling will later occupy important posts in the foreign policy or economic bureaucracies. ISKAN even has an arrangement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by which eight diplomats are exchanged for a similar number of institute staffers for a year's time, giving cross-exposure to the academic or "real" worlds.

THE RAPID proliferation of national security studies at these institutes is an interesting development. In the West, this area has long been considered a proper area of inquiry for civilian strategists (indeed, one is struck by the dominance of civilians and the veritable absence of uniformed officers in US strategic debates). But in the USSR, politico-military affairs were long considered the province of the armed forces.

The observable shift to defense-related studies at Soviet civilian institutes doubtless relates in part to assignment there—as researchers—of several retired, and even some active-duty, officers, although the latter are rare. Among the most prominent at ISKAN are Lt. Gen. (ret.) M. A. Mil'shteyn, a former professor at the General Staff Academy, and Col. (ret.) L. S. Semeyko, now a specialist in military aspects of US foreign policy. Col. (ret.) D. M. Proektor and Col. Gen. (ret.) N. A. Lomov, both former instructors at senior armed forces academies, are now in residence at IMEMO, and the highly respected Col. (ret.) V. M. Kulish has worked for several academic centers. Their experience has brought a decided sophistication to the institutes' analyses of Western politico-

military affairs, particularly with respect to the logic of weapons development and the role of military power in support of foreign policy objectives. However, as will be noted later, their refusal to openly discuss Soviet military policy and force planning hampers their credibility and renders their analyses somewhat stultified.

This focus on national security matters in institute studies naturally leads to the key question of just how good is the information and data on which the analyses are based. Are institute analysts denied access to classified materials and therefore incompetent to discuss sensitive global issues?

Certainly, it is true that the Ministry of Defense, the primary repository of this restricted data, does not eagerly part with its vast store of secrets. However, several additional points must be kept in mind. First, the institutes do have access to most of the Western open-source materials (which are certainly a sufficient base for learned judgments). Second, professional staffers do have classified libraries to consult at the institutes and friends in sensitive positions with whom they can share data and papers. In particular, the retired military officers at the "think tanks" tend to live in the same housing areas as many top military officers on active duty and thus manage to maintain their expertise on most issues through the "old-boy" network. Third, Arbatov and Inozemtsov, as full members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), clearly have access to sensitive data, and their top assistants maintain close working contacts with the CPSU's analytic staffs, particularly with Boris Ponomarev's International Department, where current political-military issues are evaluated. Finally, several institute analysts are as-

signed to the "think tanks" from organizations in the Soviet intelligence community, and staffers frequently coordinate their estimates with civilian and military intelligence analysts responsible for assessing foreign policy issues.

HOW INFLUENTIAL are the institute analysts? Estimates range from a portrayal of these scholars as intimate advisers to the highest levels of the partocracy down to a characterization of the institutes as carefully-staged "front" organizations with no real ties to the corridors of power.

Galina Orionova charges that ISKAN is no more than a disinformation and intelligence-gathering outfit with little access to the halls of power; that its reports, written in an unscholarly manner by individuals who have secured their position by family ties rather than academic ability, are read by no one. However, while first-hand, this evaluation may have been clouded by a tendency to focus on her own apparently intellectually unrewarding experience at Arbatov's institute.

A perhaps more dispassionate evaluation would suggest that institute staffers do have considerable influence in certain areas. Central Committee members Arbatov and Inozemtsev both seem to enjoy frequent access to the partocracy's top policymakers. Arbatov, for example, meets frequently with General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, with party ideologist Mikhail A. Suslov, with Ponomarev, and with L. M. Zamyatin, head of the Central Committee's International Information Department. When Brezhnev came to the United States in 1973, he not only brought Arbatov along but took him to Camp David to meet with President Richard M. Nixon. Inozemtsev played a key role in the preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress held last February, prob-

ably focusing on policy integration and on the drafting of Guidelines for the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan.¹¹

Actually, Kremlin leaders would be foolish to ignore the counsels of these advisers. Not only Arbatov and Inozemtsev but all of the top staffers at the institutes have considerable contact with well-placed Western academics, businessmen, and government officials. When scholars, officials, and business groups from North America and Europe journey to Moscow, their hosts are invariably these academic centers, which, while wining and dining their foreign guests, see to it that the visitors have little opportunity to meet with Soviets outside of the officially sanctioned fold. Thus, the information flow outward is focused and susceptible to careful targeting to gain the maximum response. Conversely, when the *Amerikanisty* come to the US, "they have," as William and Harriet Scott note, "ready access to influential organizations and leaders in every field of activity. They can travel almost as freely around the country as can any American."¹² Upon their return to the USSR, they can collate data obtained from diverse sources and contribute greatly to the Kremlin's ability to formulate coherent policies toward the West.

As for the charge that the primary functions of the institutes are to perform intelligence operations and to serve as conduits for disinformation, one must be cautious with terminology. If by "intelligence functions" one means that institute staffers do analytic work similar to that performed by the US Central Intelli-

gence Agency's National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), the assertion is quite correct. Although Soviet scholars appear to have much less access to current classified data than do their Western counterparts, they do draft long-range estimates and perform some analyses of on-going crisis issues for government and party organs. On the other hand, if one has in mind covert intelligence operations, then the conclusion is less clear. This writer, for one, has not seen any reliable evidence that would associate the "think tanks" with clandestine operations.

As for "disinformation," there is no doubt that the institutes do serve as conduits for launching "trial balloons" and as a means for disseminating certain policy positions. Since one seldom encounters significant policy differences on major issues in talking with these staffers, it is likely that what will be published or discussed with Westerners (yes, even that off-the-record tidbit whispered to you over the fourth vodka) is carefully orchestrated beforehand. Further, whenever the Kremlin's propaganda machine is in need of a patent piece denouncing a particular action of the West or defending Soviet initiatives, institute staffers are expected to provide TASS, *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and other organs with an appropriate "analysis," to be communicated as an "independent" observation.

Regarding the more serious charge that the academic centers exist to present an image of reasonableness and understanding (the "soft" line) while the Kremlin secretly continues to pursue diametrically opposite objectives, such as strategic superiority, judgment is much more difficult. This reviewer doubts that the institutes function as part of a well-coordinated scheme to deceive the West as to the USSR's true intentions. Still, stated Soviet posi-

tions must be carefully compared with and evaluated against the USSR's actual track record in the international arena. For example, the rapid expansion and modernization of the Soviet armed forces should be considered in light both of the threat to the Soviet Union that Moscow claims to perceive and of the country's increased tendency to intervene in areas far beyond its normal sphere of influence. "Analyses" that mirror official statements in portraying the USSR as a victim of an anti-Soviet conspiracy probably reflect a mixture of analytical objectiveness and of conscious distortion designed to pander to the proclivities of the officials sponsoring their research work—a mixture not altogether unique to Soviet "think tanks."

The Soviet research institutes thus perform numerous functions for the party-government leadership, ranging from policy analysis to dissemination of official lines both domestically and abroad. Given their close ties with the Brezhnev group, Arbatov and Inozemtsev should be regarded as leading Politburo advisers. Although not ultimately responsible for final policy decisions or the implementation of policy, the institutes play a significant role in the preliminary analysis of strategic options and in the evaluation of Western responses to Soviet policy.

HAVING SET the Soviet "think tanks" in their political framework, let us turn to some recent examples of their output on national security themes. The first volume, by A. G. Arbatov, is an encyclopedic, essentially reportorial study of the evolution of American national security policy over the last two decades. The author, the son of the director of ISKAN and himself a researcher at IMEMO, has established a reputation as a young firebrand. A paratrooper in the Army Reserves, Aleksey Arbatov writes with a fervor and

¹¹ On the network of personal and institutional relationships through which Soviet *Amerikanisty* influence top Kremlin leaders, see Steven A. Grant, *The Soviet Americanists*, Research Report R-1-80, Washington, DC, US International Communications Agency, Feb. 15, 1980.

¹² William and Harriet F. Scott, "The Social Science Institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences," *Air Force Magazine* (Washington, DC), March 1980, p. 64.

flair for statistical detail reminiscent of such Western defense analysts as Colin Gray and William Van Cleave. Unfortunately, the title of the work—*Security in the Nuclear Age and the Policy of Washington*—promises more than the book delivers; the volume is less an analysis of the major issues relating to global security generated by the development and refinement of nuclear weaponry than a comprehensive history of US strategic force programs and doctrine from the Kennedy era to the present.

Aleksey Arbatov reiterates the familiar Soviet theme that in the immediate postwar period the United States sought to define its relationship with the rest of the world on the basis of "nuclear superiority and an unprecedented politico-military expansion abroad," but that in the late 1960's, the US was "forced" to retreat from its attempts to deal with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength" and to recognize the supreme reality of the nuclear era—attainment by the USSR of nuclear parity with the US. Not that the Americans gave up easily. Particularly guilty in this respect have been the Democratic administrations, which—in Arbatov's eyes—have been much more inclined to seek unrealistic strategic advantages. Republican leaderships, in contrast, are viewed as possessing a greater comprehension of the limitations of military power as an instrumentality of foreign policy and of the essentially quixotic nature of the quest for nuclear supremacy (pp. 87–104).

A considerable portion of Aleksey Arbatov's analysis examines the development of American strategic systems in the 1970's, both offensive (Poseidon, Trident, Tomahawk cruise missiles, etc.) and defensive (antiballistic-missile, or ABM, systems). The inordinate amount of space devoted to analyzing US policy toward ABM systems—programs

generally regarded in the US to be of secondary importance—probably reflects the much greater priority given to strategic defense in the USSR and the importance such systems carry in the eyes of Soviet security analysts.

The volume edited by G. A. Trofimenko, one of the more visible of the Soviet Americanists and a frequent writer in American journals,¹³ represents an attempt to examine several aspects of US politico-military thinking in the 1970's and to predict how these strategic concepts may be modified in the last two decades of this century. The contributions, from a number of ISKAN specialists, devote particular attention to the link between the theoretical foundation and the actual practice of American foreign policy.

While all of the essays do not pursue a coherent theme (a common failure of edited volumes in the West as well), the thrust of the book is toward an examination of shifting American thinking on the role of force in international politics, of the durability of the Soviet-American détente relationship, and of emerging questions of political economy. Considerable attention is also devoted to what the authors view as a new form of collusion between the capitalist countries—the formation of "clubs" of Western powers designed to encourage coordination of foreign and military policies and international economic cooperation. Professor A. A. Kokoshin's introductory chapter on "American Concepts of International Relations in the '80's and '90's" offers an incisive critique of the "faddism" that characterizes much of Western thinking on global politics. Of interest, too, is Professor

I. L. Sheydina's examination of the "Non-Military Elements of Force in US Foreign Policy," although it conveniently skirts assessing the impact of American attempts to use technology or economic power to influence Soviet policy.

Yet another appraisal of current US national security thinking is the new volume edited by R. G. Bogdanov, Lt. Gen. Mil'shteyn, and Col. Semeyko. In some respects, this work is the most useful for the Soviet reader, since it attempts to provide the student of American policy with a basic introduction to the principles and structure of national security decision-making in the US and to American military doctrine. The book lays out in rather simple terms the basic structure of American strategic forces (the triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine missile launchers, and long-range bombers) and provides an introduction to US national security jargon ("essential equivalence," "strategic sufficiency," etc.). Theater nuclear warfare concepts are discussed, and several pages are devoted to an analysis of conventional forces. An overview of American power projection forces, strategic mobility, and naval power is likewise included.

The chapters on limited nuclear conflict, general war, and theater nuclear forces by Lt. Gen. Mil'shteyn and Col. Semeyko demonstrate a firm understanding of the various permutations through which American nuclear doctrine has gone. Although presented in a somewhat pedestrian style, these pages do capture the essence of the debate in the US over the practicality of conducting a nuclear exchange with limited objectives (the "Schlesinger doctrine"), the difficulty in preventing a theater nuclear conflict from escalating to a central strategic exchange, and the search for a doctrine that achieves "sufficiency" in nuclear force levels.

¹³ Trofimenko has contributed articles to *The New York Times* and *Orbis*; his most recent effort is "Counterforce: Illusion of a Panacea," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1981, pp. 28–48.

Book Reviews

Disappointingly, the volume by Bogdanov et al. contains no discussion of the objections raised by American critics of the SALT II treaty. The book obviously appeared too early to comment on the dominant defense issue in the 1980 US elections, the supposed "window of vulnerability" that US land-based ICBM forces are under and the postulated lack of a viable counterforce alternative in the American arsenal. Still attention should have been directed to the rationales for new US strategic (the MX missile or the Trident submarine) and theater (the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile) nuclear systems.

Daniel Proektor, a former Army Colonel and professor at the Frunze Military Academy and now a senior researcher at IMEMO, has produced one of the most thoughtful essays reviewed here. His *Paths of Europe* is a broad retrospective examination of the problems of space, war, and European security throughout history and a prognosis for the future of these vexing questions. Proektor views the contemporary politico-military situation in Europe (which, in his analysis, definitely includes the Soviet Union) through a Marxist perspective which tends to obscure the fundamental issues rather than illuminate them. Still, after discoursing on the voracious imperialist appetite as the root cause of global instability and making the required nod to the contemporary wisdom of Leonid Brezhnev, Proektor does manage to focus the reader's attention on the most pressing security problems of the day. He stresses the necessity of achieving a true "military détente" in Europe through an immediate reduction in both nuclear and conventional systems on both sides, the establishment of an agreement denouncing the use of force as a means of settling disputes, and the development of greater "trust" and

cooperation between the military establishments on both sides.

The book *China and the USA: The 1960's and 1970's* by IMEMO analyst V. B. Vorontsov, assesses the establishment of normalized relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. Although he asserts that the Soviet leadership approves of this development, Vorontsov cautions that the Soviet Union and all other "progressive" peoples are extremely concerned lest this new partnership become tied to the "harmful foreign-policy path" being pursued by Beijing. More to the point, the author warns that adoption of China's "militant anti-Sovietism" would have "serious consequences" for the West (p. 4).

In Vorontsov's estimation, the current rapprochement between the US and the PRC is quite artificial and without substance. He argues that the weaknesses of both powers, rather than their strengths, drove them together. Vorontsov sees the US seeking an ally in response to a declining position in the Atlantic alliance, growing economic difficulties, the achievement of nuclear parity by the USSR, and the rise of the global "national-liberation movement." By 1970, China, too-racked internally by the failures of the Cultural Revolution and by the rejection by other Communist countries of Beijing's "great-power chauvinism, hegemonism, and anti-Sovietism"—found itself in desperate need of an ally. According to Vorontsov, it was on this basis of mutual need and reciprocal weakness that China and the US allowed their common dislike and fear of the Soviet Union to drive them together in 1972 (pp. 44-51).

The reader will be struck by the vehemence of Vorontsov's denunciation of Chinese actions over the last two decades, an emotional tone not present in the other works reviewed

here. For example, Vorontsov contrasts China's behavior in the 1950's with its later actions:

... in the period of the war in Korea, China coordinated the politico-military efforts of the socialist countries, during the war in Vietnam she actively opposed the assistance of the socialist countries to the warring Vietnamese people; China united its efforts in the cause of a peaceful solution to the conflict in Korea. ... [but] it for a long time sabotaged the Paris talks designed to bring a peaceful outcome to the war in Vietnam. (pp. 27)

In Vorontsov's opinion, there is no doubt that the US is the big winner so far, for China has been forced to make many fundamental concessions (primarily on Taiwan). He expresses considerable concern that the budding affair between the PRC and the US will pursue a more aggressive anti-Soviet course. In particular, the author fears that the Chinese-American tie will evolve into active military cooperation that might include PRC coordination with NATO, Western arms deliveries to Beijing, and the eventual division of Asia into spheres of influence between the former antagonists (pp. 4, 141-43). Clearly, in the eyes of this Soviet analyst, the "China card" is a major concern of Soviet policy-makers in this decade.¹⁴

The final volume reviewed here is *Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict*, by Ye. M. Primakov, formerly a deputy director at IMEMO and now head of the Institute of Oriental Studies. The author has a solid reputation in the USSR as an incisive

¹⁴ Trofimenko echoes Vorontsov's concern over the direction of US-China relations, which he views as leading to a "hostile encirclement of the Soviet Union." Trofimenko charges that such an alignment of forces would be "extremely irresponsible," and he adds that "the Soviet state would not allow international relations to proceed along such a course" (p. 22).

scholar of international energy affairs, Arab politics, and American policy toward the Persian Gulf region. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the first half of his book simplistically blames the interminable conflicts endemic to the Middle East on two sole culprits—"Zionist expansionism" and "American imperialism"—and ignores the complex tangle of ethnic divisions, religious splits, tensions between traditional and radical regimes, and enmity between the rich oil-producing states and resource-poor nations that influence regional events.

The second half of the book, however, is much more scholarly, less polemical, and quite provocative in its analysis—as if, having proffered the required ideological tirade, the author is ready to get down to the critical material. In this section, Primakov provides a thorough examination of various American national interests in the Middle East—focusing on petroleum supplies, of course, but also looking at the power of the "Jewish lobby" in the United States, the role of the region in the Soviet-American global competition, and the influence of China in prodding American reassertion of influence in the area. There is a long historical survey of US involvement in the Middle East, with a particularly interesting discussion of the 1973 "Yom Kippur" war. Primakov sees the conflict as a solid defeat for the United States and Israel, an event that marked the beginning of a downward slide of American influence in the region. In making this judgment, he concentrates on the split among the Western allies over assistance to Israel and the economic ramifications of the oil embargo and rapid price hikes.

HOW, THEN, does one evaluate the work of these international relations experts in the USSR? Compared to the drivel that formerly passed for

foreign policy analyses in Moscow, the output of these writers rates very high marks. No longer is the reader treated to a simple world-view which sees the West in crude ideological caricatures. However, while movement away from an earlier simplistic pattern is to be applauded, the products of the institutes are still hardly models of scholarship and objectivity. Soviet analysts must operate in accordance with the domestic requirements of the Soviet political system, a milieu that imposes demands which are often in conflict with Western standards of academic objectivity.

The Moscovite "think tankers" have demonstrated a solid grasp of many essential aspects of the American foreign policy decision-making process and of the strategic philosophy that guides US military plans and programs. They comprehend the critical role of the executive branch in the formation and implementation of policy,¹⁵ and are beginning to appreciate better the influence of Congress. Interest groups

¹⁵ Trolimenko perceptively notes at the outset of his volume (p. 5) that American political leaderships frequently abandon one foreign policy concept for another more "fashionable" philosophy in order to establish their own imprint on the direction of American policy, and that "bourgeois theoreticians" et "think tanks" struggle to come up with imaginative new theories and strategies for Washington mentors to adopt.

¹⁶ To borrow the conceptual apparatus of Graham Allison, one would say that Soviet writers rely heavily on the "rational actor" model and eschew the potentially richer explanations offered by the "bureaucratic politics" or "organizational process" paradigms to interpret US policy formulation. US foreign policy decisions are thus presented as the logical culmination of a highly structured and rational decision-making process. Decisions are never accidental or the result of compromise and bargaining, as the second two models suggest, but represent the result of a big "cause."

Why this is so is not entirely clear. The nature of the Soviet political system may impel them to look for a powerful elite in the American system that makes all the political decisions. However, the Soviet system also manifests bureaucratic squabbling, organizational impediments to rational decision-making, and confused lines of command and control—a state of affairs which might suggest to Soviet analysts useful ways of looking at American decision-making.

On Allison's concepts, see Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

other than the representatives of the "military-industrial complex" are not well understood, nor are the often capricious nature of American public opinion and its impact on political programs fully appreciated.¹⁶

A major deficiency of all these works is the absence of official Soviet statistics and evaluations of the military balance. Aleksey Arbatov, for example, uses Western data exclusively. His book describes American force levels in some detail, but one fails to find any discussion of Soviet weapons systems, strategic thinking, or changing force postures. While making several references to the need of the USSR to "catch up" with the US, he never says in what sort of disadvantageous position the poor Soviets were mired. He speaks of each side having advantages as well as deficiencies relative to the other, but we are not told (except by oblique reference to statements by Western experts) what these are. Similarly, Primakov gives us ample evidence of American arms sales to the Middle East, yet he completely ignores both Soviet weapons assistance to this region and the increasing naval presence of the USSR in the Indian Ocean area. Bogdanov et al. deal in some detail with American plans and programs for the conduct of limited, theater, and general nuclear war; however, they do not discuss the Soviet arsenal these weapons and strategic formulations are designed to counter.¹⁷

¹⁷ Actually, one could make a case that a discerning reader can find sufficient data in these books to arrive at fairly accurate judgments about the extent of the Soviet weapons arsenal. Aleksey Arbatov, for example, provides extensive statistics regarding US forces over time; then later he quotes statements from Western journals indicating the existence of an American lead at given times and other statements indicating that the Soviet Union had reached parity. By employing what Sovietologists call "esoteric communications analysis," a careful reader could probably reconstruct a reasonable approximation of the military balance over the years. Still, a few simple tables of comparison so common to Western sources would have been preferred.

Closely related to the problem of data is the failure to assess Soviet national security policy. Aleksey Arbatov's rather complete rendering of the various debates that have taken place in the US over strategic policy and his critical assessments of various politico-military programs and doctrines are incomplete without reference to Moscow's changing strategic philosophy and military doctrine. Analyses of the "massive retaliation" policy of the US in the 1950's, for example, are deficient without a corresponding examination of the Kremlin's nuclear backwardness and continuing dependence on large land armies. The reader will learn little from these books regarding Soviet strategic philosophy or about the direction of the future evolution of the USSR's armed forces. We would certainly profit greatly from a Russian version of the US Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report*, from which Arbatov, Trofimenko, and Semeyko quote so freely.

Finally, a serious shortcoming of these works is the completely unilinear presentation of Moscow's position in the global arena. While Western governments are seen as floundering and pursuing policies that are often contradictory to stated doctrine, the Soviet Union appears to be "stable and unwavering," rational and thoughtful, and, of course, always oriented toward the objective of securing world peace. No discussion of frequent Soviet policy shifts or opportunistic maneuvering is even entertained, let alone evaluated.

Can it be that there is no debate in the USSR over strategic issues? Is it possible that Moscow has never reversed itself on major policy positions? We know the answer, of course, but we are also painfully aware of the realities of the Soviet political system that prevent honest acknowledgment and discussion of

these problem areas.¹⁸

Although Soviet writers do not explicitly elaborate on the military threat that faces the USSR, a discerning reader can formulate a fairly good picture of the potential adversaries that the Kremlin's force planners take into account. The composite picture of the world situation as reflected by these volumes depicts a correlation of forces especially threatening to the USSR. To the Soviet analysts, there appears to be a concerted attempt by the major power centers in the world to "contain" the USSR. There is an informal alliance system, they seem to suggest, stretching from NATO on the West in an arc through the Middle East to Pakistan, China, South Korea, and Japan. The "threat" as it might appear to a prudent Soviet defense planner is a composite of American military strength, West European and Japanese economic power, and Chinese manpower.

Proektor, for instance, provides some interesting glimpses into certain aspects of Soviet politico-military thinking. He notes that the experience of the USSR as the lone socialist state struggling against "capitalist encirclement" has made it absolutely necessary that the Soviet Union have "sufficient military power not to be threatened by the forces of a superior potential aggressor" (pp. 165-66). To the reviewer, the inference to be drawn is that a prudent Soviet planner would have to seek the possession

of superiority himself in order to achieve a true sense of security. Although this conclusion runs counter to stated Soviet postulates that the USSR does not seek or require military superiority or a first-strike capability, it tracks more closely to the reality of Soviet force developments. This quixotic Soviet search for "absolute security" demonstrates the difficult task that any future arms control agreement must surmount: the mutual achievement of levels of armaments that create a reliable sense of security for both sides.

In these volumes a reader will detect a clear respect for the United States military machine. The Soviets seem to view it as a powerful and flexible instrument of American foreign policy. Concurrently, there is a grudging admiration for the accomplishments of American diplomacy, which, in combination with the military instrument, has permitted the United States to play a leading role in international affairs.

At the same time, they appear to be greatly perturbed by the perceived American refusal to treat the USSR as a co-equal great power, even though Soviet military might is acknowledged by most Western analysts. One frequently finds Soviet writers complaining that the US tends to disparage the USSR's attempts to play a responsible role in international politics. There is a suggestion here, I suspect, for a condominium between the US and the USSR to act as a composite "global policeman." After all, as some Soviets say in private, "*Mezhdu nami, my reshim vsë*" ("Between us, we decide everything").

TO BE FAIR to the authors, the collective worth of these volumes should be measured not in terms of the impact they have on a Western reader, but in terms of what influence they have on the perceptions

¹⁸ While these authors do not deny these shortcomings, they hasten to remind us that our critiques are taken in the context of the open societies in which Westerners exist. Their writings must simultaneously strive for analytical excellence and remain within the confines of politically acceptable parameters, or the works will simply not be published. Morton Schwartz, in his thorough analysis of the works of the institute professionals, acknowledges the shortcomings but reminds us that these analysts "succeed (or fail) according to the rules of the game which prevail in Moscow—not in American universities or even political Washington." See his *Soviet Perceptions of the United States*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978, p. 148.

of a Soviet specialist in international affairs. After all, the works are designed for the domestic audience, and not just a fairly selective readership either. Most of the volumes to date have had impressive sales in the USSR; Arbatov and Proektor had initial printings in excess of 50,000 copies.

In this light, the volumes do represent a great leap beyond those which the Soviet student of international affairs had available to him only a few years ago. Nonetheless, they fall short of the dispassionate analyses that must be made available to create an informed Soviet public—a necessary precondition to the establishment of a true “strategic understanding” between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Western readers will be interested in perusing these volumes for several reasons. First, they afford a look at the sort of strategic literature that is becoming available to the Soviet citizenry. We should be aware of the expanded scope of the materials that have recently appeared and encourage this trend whenever we can. At the same time, we must be alert to the deficiencies of these works so that our expectations with

respect to an informed Soviet body politic are not unrealistic.

Second, many of these essays provide useful insight into Moscow's security concerns, the Kremlin's evaluation of Western military forces, and the USSR's estimate of the “threat” to its armed forces. Indeed, they help us to understand which Western politico-military developments generate concern in Moscow and which Western defense policy shifts cause ripples in the Kremlin.

Finally, these authors are among a growing group of specialists who appear to be part of an emerging “strategic-intellectual complex” in the Soviet Union. Previously, decision-making on national security in the USSR was quite compartmentalized, and the integrative approach to politico-military issues was eschewed, by leaving defense to the military, foreign policy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee, and the economy to the State Planning Committee and the Council of Ministers. There is some evidence that the Kremlin is now seeking to achieve better coordination of its national security policy-making process.

In the absence of an American-style “National Security Council” and given the traditional monopoly of defense analysis by the military, change will be gradual. The impetus now is the sinking economy. Resource allocation will be increasingly subject to rigorous evaluation, and defense outlays will no longer necessarily be sacrosanct. In this milieu, it appears that the Soviets will perceive a requirement for independent national security evaluations conducted by analysts capable of integrating political and military concerns against a backdrop of economic constraints. The expertise for conducting this type of policy analysis may be emerging in the research centers staffed by scholars such as those reviewed in this essay.

Reading these volumes will not make one a Russian expert. However, as one student of the USSR once remarked, “there are no experts on the Soviet Union—only varying degrees of ignorance.” At a time when uncertainty regarding Soviet intentions appears to be growing, a perusal of these books may provide a useful service in lowering the degree of ignorance a notch or two.

Writing on Vietnam

By Douglas Pike

WILLIAM J. DUIKER. *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

DAVID W. P. ELLIOTT, Ed. *The Third Indochina Conflict*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

STEPHEN T. HOSMER et al. *The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders*. New York, NY, Crane, Russak, 1980.

DANIEL PAPP. *Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, and Washington*. Jefferson, NC, McFarland and Co., 1981.

WILLIAM S. TURLEY, Ed. *Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

THERE IS a scene in Margaret Mitchell's durable novel, *Gone With the Wind*, in which the heroine, Scarlett O'Hara, yields momentarily to the overwhelming trauma of the American Civil War (or the Late Great Struggle for Succession by the Glorious Forces of the Confederacy, as she preferred to call it). Scarlett has returned to her ancestral home of Tara and is seen sitting in the devastated ruins of this once magnificent antebellum mansion, lost in reverie as she recalls the balls, cotillions, and graceful days now gone forever. She is interrupted by her

still loyal retainer, who comes in with the mundane complaints that the roof leaks and the plumbing does not work. Scarlett reacts with a famous line: "I won't think about that today. I'll think about that tomorrow."

That line could well be the slogan of American academia, indeed the whole body of American intellectuals, in their treatment of the United States' great social trauma, second only to the Civil War, that is, the Vietnam war. The way the Vietnam war ended—not with a bang but a shudder—engendered a peculiar reaction in the United States. While many had professed to believe that Hanoi some day would win, the suddenness and unexpectedness of its victory shocked (we now know) even the Vietnamese generals in Hanoi. The South Vietnamese Army, a force that had stood and fought under far worse circumstances, hardly stood and fought at all. Americans did not know what to make of it, and for several months, government officials, especially those at the Pentagon, were nonplussed and puzzled.

Such a denouement, if South Vietnam had to go down to defeat, was a fortunate one for the United States. Consider the alternative: brave South Vietnamese troops, fighting valiantly, driven back step by step all the way to the Camau Peninsula, there to make their bloody last stand and be exterminated—a

prolonged agony displayed nightly on the 7 o'clock television news. The United States would have been swept by enormous feelings of guilt and rage, which could have manifested themselves in a dozen ugly ways, each to the detriment of the democratic process.

But Vietnam vanished into the limbo of collapse, and then there was silence. In the United States, there was no bitter introversion, no stirring of recrimination, no search for scapegoats. Rather, there was studied indifference, by influential councils and the general public alike, as if no one cared. In the US government, even at the highest levels, there was a stubborn refusal to think about the effect of the war's outcome on ongoing policies, as if it did not matter. If pressed—as by returning veterans—Americans pleaded permission not to think about Vietnam, promising to do so tomorrow.

WE HAVE under consideration here five recent works on Vietnam. Reviewing them also offers an opportunity to comment briefly on the whole matter of telling the Vietnam story.

American writings on Vietnam appear to be divisible into three stages: the wartime stage, the initial postwar stage, and (still to come) the stage at which ultimate historical judgment is reached.

The wartime stage (1960–75) produced the work of insiders or close-

standing observers, who were obliged to deal with a complex dynamic condition as it was in the process of unfolding, a task as difficult as counting the spokes of a revolving wheel. They succeeded in producing much accurate description, often with considerable insight, but not much by way of analysis. Their chief shortcoming was a lack of historical perspective, an inability to distinguish between the significant and the trivial. These works remain valuable today, however, as source materials.

The second stage of Vietnam war literature, the present one, might be called incipient or initial. Much of the work produced here is less dogmatic and passionate than first-stage writings. But it is still not what could be called fully objective, since its authors remain too close to and too emotionally involved with their subject to permit the desired detachment. Many of these works will not stand the test of time. They are important, though, because they are icebreakers. The longest journey begins with the first step, say the Chinese, and it is the second-stage writers who are taking that first mandatory step.

Eventually, there will come a third stage, the point at which history makes some final judgments. If the cynical Frenchman is correct—that history is a lie agreed on—this is the moment when agreement is reached and the ultimate historical truth is established. It will probably not come much before the year 2000.

All five of the books being considered here are products of the second stage—that is, icebreakers, or serious incipient efforts to examine one or another aspect of contemporary Vietnam. They can be described in capsule form as follows:

The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, by William J. Duiker, is a history of the Vietnamese revolution-

ary movement and its political strategy in the 20th century. The book's 13 chapters trace events from the first turn-of-the-century stirrings of modern Vietnamese nationalism through the two world wars and into the postwar years. It is a history written in the framework of the strategic plan and doctrinal devices employed by Ho Chi Minh and his followers to achieve their goal, unification of the two Vietnams under the banner of communism. The final chapter has some thoughts on the reasons for Communist success, with the thematic restatement that Ho and his followers won essentially because they devised the correct strategy. The final chapter also offers some guarded predictions as to the ultimate meaning and consequences of the Communist victory. Duiker, a former US Foreign Service Officer who saw duty in Vietnam, is professor of East Asian history at Pennsylvania State University, in State College, Pennsylvania.

The Third Indochina Conflict, edited by David W. P. Elliott, is a collection of seven papers by Elliott and five others, originally presented at the March 1979 meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, in Los Angeles, California. External in orientation, the papers consider the strategic/political meaning of the Indochina scene for outsiders, chiefly China, the USSR, and the United States. The "third Indochina conflict" (and it really has not come to that) refers to the face-off between Vietnam and China, now devolved into a lingering cold war, and to Hanoi's efforts to pacify Kampuchea and create a viable government out of the Heng Samrin regime. In addition, the "conflict" embraces the tragic refugee flow out of Indochina and Vietnam's various other troubles, such as its isolation in the region and its intimate association with the USSR. The chapter by Robert G. Sutter (Library of Con-

gress, Congressional Research Service) on Chinese strategy against Vietnam is fact-packed and a highly useful brief review of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in recent years. Elliott, a RAND Corporation staff member in Vietnam during the war, is now assistant professor of government and international relations at Pomona College, in Pomona, California.

The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, by Stephen T. Hosmer et al., is in effect a proffered rationale for South Vietnam's defeat. The authors worked with or interviewed some 27 former military and civilian officials of the Saigon government, and what they present is not objective history (nor do they so pretend) but accounts by South Vietnamese in key positions as to events in the last days of the war and conclusions by these same Vietnamese as to why Hanoi won. While the 27 South Vietnamese participants can hardly be expected to shoulder much of the blame for the defeat, they do offer many useful insights, and in any event the book is most valuable as source material. The three authors are senior RAND staff members, and their book is a distillation and refinement of a longer RAND study commissioned by the Pentagon in an attempt to answer the question why Saigon lost the war.

Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking and Washington, by Daniel Papp, is designed as a study in perceptions, a study of the way the war was seen (which may or may not have been reality) in each of the three capitals. It is a well-done book, obviously the product of much work, and it offers a clear if sometimes bewildering description and comparison (or contrast) of the three great powers' views of the war in Vietnam, as well as of the conclusions each came to at war's end as

Book Reviews

to its meaning and significance. Papp graphically illustrates the spread in perceptions, particularly between Moscow and Washington, and confirms what most of the field people in Vietnam believed throughout the war, that the view of the struggle from the outside was vastly different from the view held by those on the ground. This is a muzzy business, historical accounts in terms of perception rather than reality, and there may be some question as to just how useful it is. However, the work is an invaluable short but meaty history of Hanoi's wartime relationships with Beijing, Moscow (particularly strong here), and, in a different way, the United States. Papp is director of the School of Social Sciences at the Georgia Institute of Technology, in Atlanta, Georgia.

Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective, edited by William S. Turley, is a collection of papers presented at the October 1978 regional meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, in Washington, DC. The nine essays, some of which already seem a bit dated, deal with various doctrinal aspects of Vietnamese Marxism, for the most part with ideology and various functional activities in Communist Vietnam, such as history writing, economic development, political participation, and foreign relations. The book probably will prove most useful to persons engaged in comparative Communist studies as well as to specialists in Vietnamese communism. Turley is associate professor of political science at Southern Illinois University, in Carbondale, Illinois.

We have in these five books a rather disparate assemblage. True, all deal with contemporary Indochina in some way. But that is about all they have in common. There is no parallel structure in terms of issues, and thus it is not possible to align

the five and compare treatment. Two are the work of single authors. Two are collections of somewhat unrelated essays (15 in all) written for academic conferences and suffering all of the attendant strengths and weaknesses—namely, more expertise than in a book produced by a single mind, but also lack of coherence as each author rides off in his own direction, sometimes unfortunately astride his own all-too-familiar hobbyhorse. Some of the books are narrowly theoretical, particularly that edited by Elliott. Others are patently down to earth, as with the study by Hosmer et al.

Even so, all five books are commended without reservation to those seeking to assess the Vietnam war or present-day Indochina. The strongest general impression they leave is that of uniform high quality, and if this is the level we can expect from second-stage works on Vietnam, it augurs well for future scholarship. It is imperative that high quality be established and maintained, for we have had too much of the pat, oversimplified wartime writings that reduced multifaceted complexities to sloganized explanations, of pseudo-French sociology full of airy nothingness, and, above all, of propagandistic output by members of what George Bernard Shaw called the "Soot and White-wash Brigade."

Still and all, these are incipient works. They illustrate the chief problem faced in the second stage: that there still does not exist any clear, generally agreed-upon frame of reference for dealing with the subject. None of these works goes very far toward arriving at conclusions about the war and its effects; indeed, it is hardly possible to do so, since we have not yet come to a definition of what is important and what is mere seductive triviality. We cannot supply the answers because we have not yet framed the questions (a

point amplified below).

Duiker correctly places great emphasis on the necessity of being well grounded in Hanoi's strategic thinking before dealing with the course and outcome of the Vietnam war and postwar developments. The heart of the matter is Ho Chi Minh's concept of the armed-political struggle. Whether this doctrine was the product of rational creativity, as Duiker seems to think, is but a side argument (I tend to regard the Vietnamese pattern of thought as being far more arational). The point to be stressed here is that there did exist a concept, more strategic than ideological, that was devised early and pursued unceasingly for some 40 years. To some it was a vision; to others, an extraordinarily effective device for motivation and mobilization, if not manipulation. In any event, it is impossible to present a meaningful account of the Vietnam war without dealing with this concept (which is not to say the attempt has not been made; witness the much-vaunted *Pentagon Papers*, which totally ignored Communist strategy).

Papp, by way of further illustration, deals only tangentially with Hanoi's strategy and even then only in terms of how it was perceived in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. No analysis is offered in its own right. This is not exactly a criticism, since his is a book about the view of the war from abroad. Embedded in this treatment (especially Chapter III), however, is evidence that none of the three outsiders did their homework. Intentionally or not, the book illustrates how Moscow, Beijing, and Washington went through the entire war without ever fully asking themselves what sort of strategy their ally/enemy was pursuing. With their calculations thus rooted in error, it is understandable how their postwar policies, especially those of China, compounded the error.

John Whitmore, in the Turley book, does good service in reminding us that history in Vietnam, perhaps more than elsewhere, is an unbroken chain of events. Of course, there is a practical limit as to how far back one goes to begin an interpretative history. In the case of Vietnam, certainly one must go back at least to the arrival of the French in strength, in the last half of the 19th century. But an extraordinary number of accounts of the war are written as if Vietnamese history began only with the arrival of US Marines at Danang in the spring of 1965.

There is a tendency among some authors, especially in the Turley book, to be extremely skeptical of all statements made by Washington and to take pronouncements by Hanoi at face value. The intent, a commendable one, apparently is to create balance, but it often leads the writer astray. This is particularly true in the incautious embrace of whole banks of Hanoi statistics that cannot possibly exist.

Reflecting on the Hosmer et al. interviews with ex-Saigon officials as to why their cause was lost, I am inclined to think that South Vietnam was the victim of a historical accident—namely, the Watergate scandal. That scandal had nothing to do with the war at all, yet it doomed South Vietnam. Watergate and its aftermath sapped US presidential will and ability to act, it shifted much authority from the White House to Capitol Hill, and it so preoccupied the US government that it was rendered impotent when tested in Vietnam. Had there been no Watergate, I believe, there would still be two Vietnams today, and peace would now have returned.

WRITERS of the printed word, it seems probable, will eventually lead the way into the third-stage reexamination of the Vietnam war. Not television or Hollywood writers, but

authors of book-length works, both fiction and nonfiction, will circumnavigate the subject, light the beacons to illuminate our final enduring image, and establish the reality beyond truth. If a revisionist history does emerge—to supplant the present orthodoxy, which might well be called the *Apocalypse Now* version of the war—it will be because of these scribblers.

There is room for enormous influence here by individuals, even the lone and obscure. Quite possibly, our ultimate view will be largely shaped by a single work by some unknown American genius who manages to produce a *Vietnam War and Peace*. (Many of us who labored long in Vietnam, having tried, then and since, to explain the war, despair that it ever can be told the way it was, and hold that the only hope is the advent of an American Tolstoy.)

In any case, we can expect eventually a vast outpouring—good, bad, and indifferent, all struggling to bring the word. It will be much as is the case with the American Civil War, which, it has been said, has given birth to a book on every conceivable subject except Lincoln's doctor's dog. We shall see macro- and micro-studies, "definitive" works, reevaluations, "now it can be told"s, and 10,000 Ph.D. theses. The assault will be justified, for certainly no account of any event in recent history is quite as distorted, myth-filled, fiction-packed, and generally misrepresented and overstated as the present-day account of the Vietnam war. Future historians are going to have difficulty understanding how Americans came to believe many of the things they said they believed about the Vietnam war, just as we today have trouble grasping the mentality of the generals and politicians who created and sustained the ghastly trench warfare of World War I.

Work on Vietnam, at least nonfic-

tion, is likely to fall into two main categories. One will consist of postmortems, on what really happened and why. The second will deal with the residual effects, with the war not as history but as contemporary influence that shaped and continues to shape the United States today.

The first type, the postmortem, is the more easily done. It requires a patient sorting out of the facts, an uncovering of new evidence, and a rejection of the simplicities that so gripped interpretation during the war years. The books by Duiker and Papp are both admirable products of refined analysis and careful scholarship. So too is the book by Hosmer et al., although it is of a different genre, providing not so much a postmortem as source material on what the Saigon leadership experienced, believed, and later concluded about the outcome of the war.

Personally, I expect no blockbuster postmortem accounts of the Vietnam war to appear, now or later, no startling revelations of hitherto secretly held information. As an insider in the Vietnam war from start to finish, with access to virtually all classified information, I never encountered any significant secret information that did not eventually appear on the news agency wire service tickers. The "secret bombing" of Cambodia (a term still used by some newspaper columnists), for example, was known throughout by every correspondent in Saigon and reported by them at the time. There may have been personal scandals of which I was ignorant, but the fact remains that there simply is no "hidden" story of the Vietnam war waiting to be told. All the data are there, available to anyone willing to wade through the mass. The University of California at Berkeley, for instance, is establishing a Vietnam war archive that will contain more than 2 million pages of documentary source material, some 6,000 books

and pamphlets, and an assortment of graphic materials such as maps, photographs, and charts. Going through this material alone would take at least a year's time. The point is that the "truth" about the Vietnam war is that which will be created out of the mass of data now on hand.

Vietnam studies in the years ahead will be obliged to address some fundamental questions. One set has to do with the course of the struggle and the reasons for Hanoi's victory. Exactly what was the Communist strategy, and why could the United States and South Vietnam not devise an effective counterstrategy? How did the leadership on the two sides compare? What were the instruments of mobilization and motivation employed by each, and why were they successful or unsuccessful? What was the role of outside elements—the contributions by China and the USSR—and how important were they in the final outcome? Is the strategy devised by Hanoi exportable—for instance, to Africa or Latin America?

Another set of questions has to do with the outcome. Was Communist victory inevitable, or were other outcomes possible? Could the South

Vietnamese government have eventually become viable, or was Hanoi's nationalism-rooted drive so strong that it was destined to prevail? Was a negotiated settlement, a federated arrangement, or some other form of power-sharing ever a realistic possibility? Was the United States' decision to involve itself in the struggle a fatal error from the start, or was its failure due to other, external factors? These are difficult questions, not the least because they involve broader considerations, such as perennial philosophical questions as determinism vs. free will.

The second type of Vietnam book, on the lingering effects of the war, probably is the more important, but it will be far harder to write. It can be, and is, argued that the conduct of American foreign policy has irrevocably been altered as a result of the Vietnam experience, not only because of the outcome but also because of institutional and social change, principally the advent of television. Never again, it is asserted, can US foreign relations that involve in any way the application of force be conducted as they were in the pre-Vietnam war days. These propositions need careful study.

What is involved here, and the reason it is so difficult to do, is separating the influences of the Vietnam war from all the other forces at work in the American "cultural revolution" of the 1960's. There is a tendency to put the war down as the central if not exclusive cause of recent social change in the United States. Conceivably, however, future historians may conclude that other forces—for instance, the changing status of women—had far greater effect in shaping the United States of the 1980's and 1990's than did the Vietnam war.

Writers of and about the Vietnam war era must get busy. The "gone with the wind" syndrome is still with us. There must now begin a concerted effort to retrieve the social trauma of the Vietnam war from the collective American subconscious, however painful this may be, and to hold it up for examination in the bright light of day. What is past is prologue, it has been proclaimed, and correctly so. But what is past is also heritage. The United States will not recover its full national psychic health until it comes to grips psychologically with the fact of the Vietnam war and its historical legacy.

Value Change in China

By Patrick G. Maddox

GODWIN C. CHU and FRANCIS L. K. HSU, Eds. *Moving a Mountain: Cultural Change in China*. Honolulu, HI, University Press of Hawaii, 1979.

B. MICHAEL FROLIC. *Mao's People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980.

ROSS TERRILL, Ed. *The China Difference*. New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1980.

RICHARD W. WILSON et al., Eds. *Value Change in Chinese Society*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1979.

KAM LOUIE. *Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

GODWIN C. CHU. *Radical Change Through Communication in Mao's China*. Honolulu, HI, University Press of Hawaii, 1977.

C. BROYELLE et al. *China: A Second Look*. Sussex, England, Harvester Press, and Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1980.

CONTEMPORARY Chinese values—have they changed and, if so, to what extent?—is a vast and rather humbling topic. It focuses on the past 32 years, but it could well take the preceding two millennia as a base line. Obviously, one cannot treat post-1949 China as a single, locked-in period any more than one

can treat any period in an isolated way. And even the most profound revolutionary experiences cannot fully pry loose the bulldog jaws of the human continuum. If value changes are to be more than merely superficial and transient, they must be internalized as a part of that continuum.

The cautiously hopeful response of Chinese of all social stations to the recent easing of internal restraints and to the concomitant increase in contact with foreigners has provided Western scholars with a rather special opportunity to observe that continuum. Many Chinese are now asking, with some measure of guarded openness, the same questions we have been asking—where is China in relation to where it was, and what does that suggest about tomorrow? If we, as foreign observers, listen very carefully, we are likely to learn something from the Chinese themselves, more than we have been able to do in the past. We seem now to have an unusual convergence, or at least similarity, of questions. We may not understand the answers the Chinese give, or may misunderstand them, and we may be pleased or bemused or outraged. But their answers, "right" or "wrong," ultimately will be the most important and the most enduring.

The increased interaction between China and other countries, particularly during the last five years, has helped to define the question of value change, but not

necessarily to answer it. Such interaction, particularly through freer access to China, has increasingly revealed, or confirmed, the great diversity and complexity of the People's Republic. And the many hues of post-1949 China make the identification and analysis of "changes" more difficult than they would be were Chinese Communist society clearly a new and distinct phenomenon.

The greater opportunity to look, listen, and ask has helped us define the question of "value change" in broad terms. Neat definitions of Chinese society have almost always tended to die aborning. Comparisons between the pre- and post-1949 periods should put the nails in that coffin. And the requisite broad terms should start with ourselves as observers. We are now, perhaps more than ever before, able to learn a good deal about at least some parts of contemporary Chinese society. The extrapolation of findings from one part to the broader context is always difficult and, perhaps equally, always dangerous. The most intimate understanding of life in a village is just as important, and just as inadequate, as the view from the Peking Hotel, even if the latter is accompanied by the frankest, most high-level discussions.

What we need is a story for each individual Chinese, each free market, state market, factory, street committee, hotel for foreigners, production team or brigade, county or

province, minister or official, taxi driver, army trooper, sent-down youth, and unemployed youth. And we need a synthesis of all of these. But, in looking at values in Chinese society—which is almost synonymous with looking at Chinese society—what in fact do we have that might give us a chance to be better listeners and questioners, given our present and not necessarily enduring opportunity?

We shall try to answer that question within the confines of the volumes under review. The question is as broad as China, and so some confinement is of course a necessity. It is a necessity that neatly reflects the information we have about China—important but inadequate. That is inevitable. The more immediate question is the degree to which these works successfully deal with those unavoidable limitations.

OF THE volumes under review, Godwin Chu and Francis Hsu's *Moving a Mountain: Cultural Change in China* stands out. The numerous contributors provide us with a feeling for the broad range of issues that must be looked at. The editors in particular deserve credit for directing this diversity around a set of common themes. On the one hand, they ask how the party has tried to penetrate and manipulate Chinese society. On the other, they look at how Chinese society (only a part of it, to be sure, but still a substantial part) has responded.

We emerge from the Chu and Hsu volume on cultural change with a rather deep sense of slowness—indeed, of moving a mountain. What comes across most frequently and most clearly is avoidance on the part of Chinese—frequent withdrawal, insofar as possible, in the face of confusing, conflicting, and sometimes frightening policies, messages, and instructions. As Merle Goldman concludes her perceptive contribution

on media campaigns as weapons in political struggle:

Confronted with an onslaught of contradictory, erudite, ideological exegeses, there is evidence that the public turned off . . . and made their own interpretations. . . . we may speculate that the nonparticipation and diverse interpretations of events caused in part by the contradictory media campaigns of the post-Cultural Revolution may prove more destructive to the reimposition of the Party's overall ideological control than will any other legacy of the era of the Shanghai group. (pp. 203-04)

Several of the other authors reach similar conclusions, with the idea of defensive (and, sometimes, simply bored) nonparticipation forming a thread throughout the book. The second part of Goldman's statement, that concerning diverse interpretations, is of at least equal importance, and it too is treated, although less systematically, throughout the book.

These two notions—avoidance and diversity—should be at the heart of virtually any investigation of Chinese society, whether of value change or bureaucratic factions. For the combination of the two begins to explain the individual Chinese. It helps move us beyond a corporate, or overly collective, vision of Chinese society, not inevitably toward an atomized view of the scene, but toward a sense of lying low, of the diversity that goes on beneath the regime's "radar." It is this sense that is essential to an appreciation of Chinese society, for what the new interaction with China has revealed, at least in part, is the tenacity with which Chinese retain individual identity even within the sometimes reassuring and sometimes almost stifling contexts of group and consensus.

Thus, when one talks of value change, one is really in substantial measure talking about individual perceptions and interpretations and about the context in which they must operate. There, with the qualified exception of *Mao's People*, by B. Michael Frolic, this particular set of volumes (and, one suspects, a goodly number of others as well) falls short. Frolic is wonderfully revealing of at least 16 "hearts and minds" (if one can take these portraits as composites, then, of course, many more than 16). He gives the reader a fecund feel for the individual in China: "Pigeon Turd is doing well. He became animal tender on the new team and continued to sell pigeon shit" (p. 40). Unfortunately, however, Frolic leaves his people a bit stranded from their environment, from the vast and sprawling central apparatus under whose radar people like Pigeon Turd (be he individual or composite) proceed carefully with their lives.

Mao's People and *Moving a Mountain* would have benefited from each other. Together, they provide a needed measure of balance in range and perspective—the former the worm's-eye view, the latter the context. (Martin Whyte's article on small groups, in *Moving a Mountain*, comes closest to blending the two.) Both books stand alone, and stand well. But together they would have moved us even closer toward that kind of sensitivity which often does not answer questions, but which encourages us to keep asking them and to acknowledge their frustrating persistence. Who listens, and what is heard? That is the toughest question, and the one least asked. But *Moving a Mountain* and *Mao's People*, particularly in tandem, represent a laudable and unusually readable approach, and merit a pondering and discerning audience.

Other contributors to the books

under review also convey a sense of the enduring individual, a sense that however exciting China may be, it is not an "object" to be "conquered" intellectually. A touch of honest earthiness is useful, and Richard Baum's "Politics and the Citizen," in *The China Difference*, edited by Ross Terrill, is excellent in this light. In a remarkably few pages, Baum takes China out of theories and paradigms (which sometimes have their important functions concerning contemporary China) and gives us a ground-level view of society. He reminds us that "it is necessary to go beyond simple stereotyping to examine the multifaceted political orientation and behavior of actual individuals and groups of Chinese citizens under actual conditions" (p. 165). He suggests that "even in China—ostensibly the most highly politicized nation on earth—the penetration of the traditional social order by the modern political apparatus of Party and State has been limited and imperfect" (pp. 167–68). As Baum and others make clear, China consists of separate individuals and groups, all with different needs and with different responses to attempts by the party and the state to influence and change their lives.

Obviously, China has been altered significantly in the past three decades. There have been extensive changes in social organization, and there have been noticeable and beneficial improvements in the areas of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, for example. All the same, such changes, many quite dramatic, do not necessarily mean equally dramatic changes in deeply ingrained habits, attitudes, and values. There may be new organizational forms, but it is less certain whether new organizational forms create new values or whether old values assimilate and adapt to new forms, so that the forms, in becoming

part of the continuum, are no longer quite so new. There may be new high-rise apartment buildings in the heart of Beijing, but the ways in which one obtains the apartments have not altered. The methods of *hou men* ("back door") and *quanxi* ("who knows whom") have not lost their vitality; they still represent the best ways to get things done in a society marked both by scarcity and by stultifying inefficiency. All such phenomena speak loudly of avoidance, diversity, and self-interest. All are part of the Chinese human continuum.

What the works reviewed here suggest above all is the durability of the human continuum in China. They in no way deny the many kinds of changes that have taken place since 1949. But they indicate, both explicitly and implicitly, that the changes in social organization have been made on a base of human habit that has altered very slowly, and in some ways very little. At least to foreign observers, it is true, post-1949 China has been a source of great intellectual and emotional stimulation, even fascination, and the drama and excitement of a vast and violent revolution has quite naturally fostered assumptions of change on a commensurate scale. But if we are to become better listeners in this period of unusual interaction, we would do well to keep questioning those assumptions.

TO DO that wisely, we must have a keener appreciation of Chinese cultural history. Western scholars of contemporary China have not always received the needed training, which is difficult and demanding. For the effort, however, they might better understand what otherwise might seem incongruous at best.

An excellent sense of cultural and historical place is conveyed by Tu Wei-ming's "Confucianism: Symbol and Substance in Recent Times," in

Richard Wilson et al.'s *Value Change in Chinese Society*. Tu moves gracefully between recent events and their Confucian counterparts, suggesting that China's modern humanist scholars are the counterparts of the traditional bureaucrat-literati: they are rootless in the sense that they are expendable (at least in terms of their perceived scientific value), and they are cosmopolitan in the sense that they represent the power, often frightening and disruptive, of the pen. Tu also reminds us that there is more to human nature than class origins, and reiterates the importance of harmonious human relations and of the concern for social stability and cohesiveness, which, then and now, depend on the "basic trust of the people."

Kam Louie's *Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China* also does this, although in a less elegant, somewhat tedious fashion. But he does make some interesting points about the parallels between periods of radical change in post-1949 China and strident attacks on Confucius, and about the parallels between periods of nationalism and modernization and more sympathetic evaluations of Confucius. Whatever the period, Confucianism, and the relevance of its philosophic legacy, always seems to be a present, and potent, question.

Both Louie and Tu note the pervasiveness and adaptability of Confucian thinking. This adaptability, or flexibility, is a key point. For Confucianism has aged so well partly because of these characteristics. They are characteristics that recall selective avoidance, diversity, back doors, and *quanxi*. They have served the Chinese well for a long time.

The entire *Value Change* volume, which deals with Taiwan as well as the mainland, blends traditional underpinnings and contemporary events. The overall effect is not as

Book Reviews

cohesive and even as *Moving a Mountain*. But the blending of traditional and modern performs an important function. Several contributors ask those frustratingly persistent questions about past and present values, and about who listens to whom and what, and why. They challenge the reader to grapple with the syncretistic character of China's stock of knowledge (Sidney L. Greenblatt); with the idea that family status and social value continue to be contingent upon one's usefulness to others (Carol Lee and Richard Baum); and with the question concerning the Chinese health care personnel who really do believe that they should "serve the people" (AnElissa Lucas)—that is, with the key question of internalization and what becomes of it.

Godwin Chu helps to shed light on these issues in his *Radical Change Through Communication in Mao's China*. He describes well the theory and practice of communication in China. Information, he notes, can alter the basis for a relative sense of deprivation—what once was perceived as being satisfactory or tolerable can thus become perceived as the opposite. But Chu does not convince this reader that manipulated communication has effected radical change. He shows that the party has attempted, not always successfully, to use controlled communication as a means of blunting or deflecting popular confusion or dissatisfaction. He also shows that even brief intervention into the educational system by those privileged few who in better times (it matters not so much when, as that they were better) had greater access to scarce goods and services prevented the Maoist educational system from taking on a life of its own. One can con-

clude from Chu's book that the Chinese have learned when to listen and, with sophisticated discernment, when not to listen.

Attempted central control that goes beyond communication is the issue in *China: A Second Look*, by C. Broyelle et al. The book is a long and bitter invective against the Chinese Communist Party by former "true believers" who rail against the "church" as only the once-devout can do. It does not deal explicitly with value change; rather, it details the ways in which the party has, in the contributors' opinions, insidiously blocked changes and all manner of advances in the interest of its self-preservation, as if ideological reeducation can be a substitute for reform. What is interesting about this book, however, is that it imparts the sense that the party, the primary agent of change, has helped, through its self-serving, confusing, and boring ways, to ensure the durability of the old ways of getting along. There was, for example, the woman who experienced a certain sly pleasure at a particularly long and tedious struggle meeting: she was able to finish knitting an entire sleeve of a sweater.

THERE IS a peculiar "push and pull" in the study of contemporary China. One is easily pushed toward the past, in the search for historical origins, historical parallels, and historical explanations. One is just as easily pulled toward the contemporary, not only because of the drama with which today's China was born and the apparent magnitude of the changes it has experienced, but also because of current international relations (none of the volumes considered here deals at any length with foreign affairs). China's interna-

tional relations are particularly important now, of course. Questions of national security—from military to commercial—are engaging Washington and Beijing in broad measure. The immediate, perforce, takes on primary importance. The "pull" is very practical and very exciting.

Because of the pressing issues involved, the focus of Western attention has been on those in China who make policy and try to carry it out. This focus is both appropriate and essential. Yet it can also become distorting and, in the long run, may present disadvantages. After all, this relatively new—for Americans at least—form of high-level interaction may be transient. Nevertheless, the issues themselves are now real, and one has to grapple with them.

Such grappling, which requires a good deal of listening, might benefit were it to give the most serious attention to Chinese society, defined not only as current leaders but, at least equally, as a diverse collection of people who have gotten along—not always well but somehow along—by doing things very much their own way, by avoiding, shifting, and enduring. In the last three decades, there have been extraordinary changes. Some are obvious. Others are more subtle. What is remarkable, however, is the degree of continuity in spite of all the changes.

As we said at the outset, we cannot look at pre- or post-1949 China as if it were locked in time. The Chinese bulldog has as much staying power as any. It has some rotten teeth, and has had a few extracted. But it can still catch mice.¹

¹ Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's best-known observation is that it does not matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice.

Mass Mobilization in Mao's China

By Richard P. Madsen

CHARLES P. CELL. *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China*. New York, NY, Academic Press, 1977.

THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN. *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth From Urban to Rural China*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

THERE WAS nothing so distinctive, so important, and (to outsiders at least) so puzzling about China under Mao Zedong as the phenomenon of mass mobilization campaigns. The Chinese regime began mass mobilization campaigns within months of the Communist seizure of power in 1949, and in the next 26 years, until Mao's death in September 1976, mounted more than 70 such campaigns at the national level (and more than a dozen at the regional and local levels). They included such diverse endeavors as the "Buy People's Victory Bonds" campaign of 1950, the Land Reform campaign of 1950-52, the Campaign to Combat the Four Pests (rats, flies, mosquitoes, and sparrows) of 1956, the Great Leap Forward of 1957-61, and the Socialist Education Movement of 1962-65. The best-known, and indeed the culmination, of such campaigns was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPRC), whose stormy course and troublesome consequences dominated the last decade of Mao's life.

Nowhere else but in China under Mao has the mass mobilization campaign been such an important part of the social and political landscape. Some sense of this is conveyed in the official Chinese view of the mass mobilization campaign, as an "organized mobilization of collective action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power relationships and/or economic institutions and productivity."¹ Like most definitions, however, this one constitutes, as Max Weber once phrased it, "an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony hands seek to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with it."² A better sense of that blood-and-sap is given by the metaphors used in the directives launching various campaigns: "upsurge," "torrent," "high tide," great "storms" in which "tens of millions of people" pour out their "boundless enthusiasm" in "glorious struggles." Campaigns in China were indeed vast outbursts of popular emotional and moral energy, methodically stirred up by party leaders but sometimes taking on a force and a logic of their own, so that they might rage at least temporarily out of the control of the leaders who had

started them. Like South China typhoons, these tumultuous events swept across the political landscape as regularly as the seasons, even though their precise timing, their direction, and their ultimate impact could never be predicted. In the process, they defined the shape of contemporary Chinese history. When you ask a Chinese who lived through the Maoist era of Chinese history to tell the story of his life, most often he will spontaneously arrange his story around the periods of history marked by China's major political campaigns.

Just exactly why mass mobilization campaigns were launched with such frequency remains unclear. Mao believed that they were good for destroying bureaucratic routine, increasing production efficiency, eliminating social inequality, and teaching a heartfelt love of selfless service to the Chinese people. Yet Mao's ideas about the value of mass mobilization campaigns flew in the face of the common sense of most non-Chinese observers, a common sense that suggests that one cannot constantly disrupt administrative routine, as mass mobilization campaigns do, and still establish the foundations of a stable, expanding economy; that one cannot stir up people's emotions too often without producing psychic exhaustion; that one cannot demand total self-sacrifice too often without having people rebelliously assert their need for in-

¹ A definition given in Cell, p. 7, based on a discussion in the official journal *Hongqi* (Beijing), Nov. 1, 1959.

² Max Weber, in "Science as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 140-41.

dividual autonomy. And, as it now appears from the popularity of the current leadership's repudiation of the Maoist legacy, such ideas seem eventually to have flown in the face of many Chinese people, too.

Precisely because Mao's vast experiments with mass mobilization ran so counter to common sense, they have raised a host of extremely challenging questions. Were the experiments at all successful? Could they have been successful? Would it have been good if they had been successful? If the answer to any of these questions is even a qualified "yes," in what way would we have to modify our traditional ideas about economic development and political modernization? In what way might we have to readjust our understanding of what constitutes a good and just society? If the answer to all of these questions is an unqualified "no," how are we to explain such a colossal failure, and what part can we play in seeing that such failures never happen again, in China or anywhere else in the world?

As is perhaps inevitable given the immensity and complexity of such questions, Western scholars have given contradictory answers. Much as scholarly controversies add spice to academic life, however, such questions are too important for any of us—China specialists and non-specialists alike—to be satisfied simply with saying that the answers to those questions are "debatable." How are we to judge which, if any, of the various assessments given in scholarly debate about the success of mass mobilization in Mao's China are right?

Part of the answer, of course, lies in the quantity of data available to the scholar. But another part has to do with the quality of the concepts and analytic strategies used by the scholar to extract significance from the data. Until about 1978, when the Chinese government began to

allow a few Americans to conduct fieldwork in China, most China specialists had to get their data by analyzing officially published Chinese documents and by interviewing refugees from China. These methods have produced some rather impressive work and some rather shoddy work. The difference has usually stemmed not so much from the quantity of available data—most China scholars have access to basically the same (often ambiguous) materials—as from the quality of the analytic techniques used to make sense of the data. One important guide to judging the accuracy of contradictory opinions about the success of Mao's revolutionary experiments in China is, then, a critical awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the interpretative methods used by different scholars.

In this essay, I wish to suggest some standards for assessing mass mobilization in China—specifically, for judging the adequacy of the concepts and analytic strategies used to squeeze the blood of meaning out of the hard dry pebbles of data with which we China scholars have had to work. In order to do so, I shall examine two recent books which arrive at contradictory conclusions about the success—the economic, political, and what one might call the moral success—of Maoist mass mobilization in China.

THE FIRST book is Charles Cell's *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China*. This sociological study examines a wide range of mass mobilization campaigns and concludes that the Maoist approach has been basically successful and should indeed be recommended for export to the rest of the world. The second book is Thomas Bernstein's *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China*. This study analyzes one major, pro-

tracted mass mobilization effort and concludes that it has been at best a qualified failure. The two books are fairly representative of the kinds of positions that "leftist" and "liberal" scholars have taken in debate about Maoist China over the past decade, so a discussion of what makes one or both books "right" or "wrong" might be helpful for judging many other books by Western China scholars.

The two books are similar in that they both represent elaborate exercises in cost-benefit analysis. Both view Maoist mass mobilization campaigns in an instrumental way, as means to some end. Both then proceed to count and compare the costs and benefits to determine whether such campaigns have been effective means to that end. But they reach different conclusions, in large part because they use different measures to calculate the costs and benefits of campaigns.

Cell distinguishes three types of campaigns: economic, aimed at increasing productivity; ideological, aimed at changing the way people think; and struggle, aimed at "elimination of the power base and/or class position of enemy classes or groups" (p. 9). For Cell, the ultimate goal of the campaigns was simply the goal consistently and explicitly proclaimed by the Communist Chinese propaganda apparatus under Mao: the goal of "socialist transformation" or, in other words, the achievement of "complete political and economic equality." And, for Cell, mass mobilization campaigns were indeed an effective means of reaching that goal.

To prove this, Cell develops quantitative measures for campaign "achievements" and "shortcomings." To measure achievements, he first compiles a list of things which the Chinese Communist leadership publicly declared to be achievements. "Where the leadership is divided, the state-

ments most closely associated with Mao Zedong have been selected as standard, for his thought, more than any alternative view, has inspired and emphasized the mobilization approach central to the campaign" (pp. 133-34). Using the statements of China's Maoist leadership, Cell then distinguishes 22 indicators of achievements, either "ideological" or "economic." "Ideological achievements" include "raising of political consciousness," "increase in Party membership," "reduction in urban-rural differences," and "increased equality between groups." "Economic achievements" encompass "improvement of collective economic conditions," "decrease in living costs," "increase in occupational opportunities," and "improvement of family conditions." Similarly, using errors admitted in the Chinese press and problems recounted by refugee informants in Hong Kong, Cell chooses 22 indicators of shortcomings, either "ideological" or "physical." "Ideological shortcomings" include "failure to reform or eliminate all the targets of the campaign," "leftist or rightist deviations of policy," "conflict among cadres regarding the campaign," and "work or study slowdowns." "Physical shortcomings" encompass "destruction of property," "individuals receiving insults or abuse," "suicides," "armed clashes resulting in injury," and "people indiscriminately killed."

Cell ranks all of these indicators in an ascending order, so that, for instance, "increased equality between groups" is considered a better measure of ideological achievement than "raising of political consciousness," and "people indiscriminately killed," a better measure of physical shortcomings than "destruction of property." A Guttman scaling technique is used to develop a consistent system for assigning numerical weights to the different levels of

achievements and shortcomings. From refugee informants in Hong Kong, Cell then acquires data on whether his indicators were present or absent in a sample of 36 campaigns. His conclusion is that the achievements, especially those of economic campaigns, generally outweigh the shortcomings. For Cell, therefore, campaigns have positive marginal utility as an instrument for achieving socialist transformation.

But cost-benefit calculations are only as good as the measures used to quantify the costs and benefits. And Cell's measures of "shortcomings" and "achievements" are framed so loosely that they inspire little confidence.

Take, for instance, one of Cell's heavily weighted indicators of "ideological achievement": "reduction in urban-rural differences." This measure can encompass a wide variety of things: the transfer of urban youth to the countryside, increasing mobility of peasants to the cities, a leveling of differences in wealth between city and countryside, industrialization of the countryside, greater similarity in social and political attitudes between city people and peasants, and so forth. If any one of these things occurred, Cell would presumably record a "plus" for "reduction in urban-rural differences." But the extent of China's progress toward "socialist transformation" would be very different depending on *which* one of those things occurred, and on *how* it occurred. It would be one thing, for example, if urban-rural differences were reduced by pressuring large numbers of reluctant urban youth to go live in the countryside and these dissatisfied youth spent much of their time antagonizing the peasants and plotting how to escape from the villages back to the cities. It would be quite another if there were an increase in wealth and opportunities for mobility for peasants relative to city people. Cell's simple measure

for the reduction of urban-rural differences admits of only a yes or no answer and thus flattens out all of the complex kinds of data that could give it real meaning. Many of his other measures of achievements and shortcomings do the same. The result is a sloppily executed kind of cost-benefit analysis.

The sophistication of Thomas Bernstein's intellectual craftsmanship stands in sharp contrast to the clumsiness of Cell's. Bernstein's case study of the Maoist attempt to reduce urban-rural differences by sending youth to the countryside is, like Cell's, centered on a kind of cost-benefit analysis. But by narrowing his focus to one particular attempt to narrow urban-rural differences and by carrying out an extraordinarily exhaustive research effort, Bernstein is able to distinguish far more subtle, far more nuanced indicators of costs and benefits. And he concludes that the costs have generally outweighed the benefits.

Let us examine Bernstein's argument in more detail. Between the early 1960's and 1975, the Chinese government, with considerable fanfare, transferred more than 13 million urban secondary school graduates—about 10 percent of China's total urban population—to the countryside. In most cases, the resettlement was supposed to be for life. Like Cell, Bernstein sees this mass movement in instrumental terms: it is viewed as a means to an end, not an expression of an ideal. Unlike Cell, he distinguishes two different goals for the movement. The first goal is the one Cell talks about: the achievement of equality through the elimination of differences between city and country. The second goal is that of economic development: China's cities had too many people and not enough jobs for efficient economic development, and China's rural sector needed an injection of modern attitudes, skills,

and knowledge. For Bernstein, in contrast to Cell, these two goals are not necessarily congruent.

In a superficial way at least, the physical transfer of so many city people to the countryside has indeed brought some progress toward these goals. Cell would probably have coded such progress as an "achievement." But that progress has been surrounded by a complex constellation of costs, which in the long run have tended, perhaps fatally, to undermine the entire program. To put it simply, the costs have come from the fact that most urban youth have not wanted to go to the countryside and most peasants have not wanted them to come. Bernstein documents these discontents in great detail. (Unfortunately, the amount of carefully qualified detail makes the book somewhat hard to read.) Because of these discontents, the government has had increasingly to rely on "management"—that is, a mixture of persuasion, coercion, and economic remuneration—to resettle the young people. As time has gone on, the resettlement program has caused so much resentment among the sent-down youth that the government has increasingly had to resort to coercion, which is extremely costly and dangerous. Bernstein's cost-benefit calculus would thus suggest that the Chinese leadership made a grave mistake in carrying out the youth-to-the-countryside program.

Simply by virtue of its technical prowess, Bernstein's relatively pessimistic account of the Maoist program for socialist transformation is more believable than Cell's optimistic version. Both Bernstein and Cell make use of the same kinds of data: officially published Chinese documents, interviews in Hong Kong with émigrés from China, and reports from Western travelers to China. (Before completing his book, Bernstein had never been able to

travel to China, although he had had access to a number of detailed written reports from Americans who had been there. Cell was among the first Americans to visit China after the thawing of US-China relations in 1971.) But Bernstein discerns many subtle shadings of color where Cell sees only black and white. Bernstein is thus able to bolster his case with a richer variety of interwoven information than Cell. Although both book manuscripts were completed at about the same time—around the end of 1976, before the full impact of Mao's death and the overthrow of the Maoist "gang of four" could become apparent—it is, not surprisingly, the relative pessimism suggested by Bernstein's data that is increasingly confirmed by official revelations of Mao's mistakes.

There is a simple moral to this tale: when two China specialists are in dispute, the outside reader would do well to judge them by their scholarly rigor, rather than by their political commitments. But there is yet another moral: beware of social scientists who try to calculate the costs and benefits of Maoist political programs in China. Precisely because they share a set of intellectual habits derived from the mainstream traditions of social science, both Cell and Bernstein share some blind spots which render them both equally unable to account for certain important aspects of the mass mobilization experience in China. While trying like good social scientists to calculate the costs and benefits of Maoist mass mobilization, they, like most social scientists, neglect to try to interpret what those costs and benefits mean to the Chinese people involved.

THE INGENUOUSNESS of Cell's book helps demonstrate all the more clearly the pitfalls of this failure to interpret. Cell ventures to resolve profoundly problematic moral issues

by simple arithmetic: assign a numerical weight to such "achievements" as raising political consciousness and reducing urban-rural differences; assign another number to such "shortcomings" as destruction of property, suicides, and people indiscriminately killed; process the numbers; and *voilà!* you have the marginal utility of a campaign. But what moral weight would people in China assign to the different factors in these cost-benefit equations? Exactly how much reduction in urban-rural differences is worth a certain number of suicides or indiscriminate killings? Calculations like these depend on a wide range of assumptions about the value of life, the nature of moral responsibility, the demands of justice, and the requirements of loyalty. Unless one understands how different groups of people in China might think about such issues, Cell's marginal utility equations give us little hint about how the Chinese people have reacted to the mass mobilization campaigns.

Cell himself seems dimly to realize this. As he concludes his book, he confesses uncertainty about China's future:

There should be little doubt that the Chinese people wholeheartedly support the visible achievements of the Chinese revolution, in areas such as health care, a secure livelihood especially for the young and old, and universal education. . . . Less clear is the acceptance of the costs of struggle endured for the benefits secured. For everyone who has benefited there may be some who have had to sacrifice. . . . Even for the older generation there may be limits to sacrifice, to how much struggle is acceptable at any given time. (pp. 183-84)

But if Cell cannot begin to answer the questions implied by such state-

ments, what is the use of his marginal utility equations? What is the use of his book? Since its publication, China's leadership under Deng Xiaoping has, in fact, repudiated much of the mass mobilization strategy that Cell describes. The evidence suggests that this repudiation is very widely popular. At the same time, there are widespread signs of a profound demoralization within Chinese society, especially among the young—signs that although many Chinese are sure that they do not want to endure Maoist mass mobilization efforts, they are not sure what, in fact, they do want.³ Though Cell, in his first paragraphs, hints that such a situation could come to pass, nothing in the body of his book prepares us for it. His book gives us no feel for the flow of Chinese history.

Bernstein's book is marred by a somewhat similar—though because of its sophistication, less obvious—inattention to the issue of how Maoist mass mobilization might have been understood by various segments of the Chinese people. If the Chinese Communists made a mistake in promoting the youth-to-the-countryside programs, why did they make that mistake? Why were so many youth unwilling to go "up to the mountains and down to the villages?" Why were the peasants often so inhospitable? And how did the Chinese Communist leadership get so out of touch with the Chinese people that it failed to appreciate the true hopes and aspirations of both urban youth and peasants?

Bernstein says that most youth did not want to go to the countryside because deep down they valued individual upward mobility and material well-being over the rewards that might come from self-sacrificial service to the Chinese people. But how does one account for the zealous idealism expressed by many of the "activists" among China's urban

youth? Chinese government documents on the youth-to-the-countryside movement contain some striking testimonials of the ardent desire of urban youth to follow the revolutionary road to the countryside.⁴ They also speak of many urban youth who were wavering between selfish ambitions and collectivist ideals and who had their commitment to collectivist ideals deepened through various kinds of education. It is possible but, I think, not probable that these stories of idealistic youth are simply fabrications. The interviews which I and various colleagues have carried out in Hong Kong indicate that, especially in the early phases of the youth-to-the-countryside movement, significant numbers of genuinely idealistic urban youth did consider it supremely meaningful to sacrifice their hopes for an urban career for service in the countryside. In many cases, wavering youth do seem to have been won over to the government's point of view by appeals to their idealism. Was it inevitable, however, that for the majority of young people, individualistic careerist impulses triumphed over idealistic ones?

It begs the question simply to assume that for most people self-interests are stronger than the willingness to make self-sacrifices. Few would deny that ideas about what constitutes a legitimate pursuit of self-interest and what constitutes a sacred duty of self-sacrifice have some bearing on conduct. But the precise impact depends on what the

ideas are, how plausible they are to what groups of people, and how congruent they are with the demands of a society's economic, social, and political institutions. What conceptions of human nature and moral responsibility did China's Maoist leaders have that encouraged them to think that they could indeed appeal to a spirit of self-sacrifice among China's youth? How and why did the ideas of China's youth differ from those of their government leaders, and what were the behavioral consequences of those differences? Why did the government's leaders seem to fail to anticipate those differences? Like Cell and most other social scientists who write about China, Bernstein neglects to systematically answer such questions. Thus, he cannot fully account for the resistance of urban youth to going to the villages.

Nor can Bernstein fully explain the reluctance of the peasants to welcome the young people into their communities. Characteristically, when he discusses the reactions of the peasantry, he does so in terms of cost-benefit calculations: it required a significant effort for the peasants to help the young people get settled, especially if the young people were unhappy with the idea of spending the rest of their lives in the countryside. In many cases, the young people could not provide great benefits, especially if they lacked the motivation to work hard. They may even have consumed more of the village's resources than they produced. But after setting up this basic cost-benefit equation to explain why many peasants might have been inhospitable to many urban youth, Bernstein adds an important qualification, stated matter-of-factly, without further explication:

I have argued that peasant acceptance of UYs [urban youth] hinges on the degree to which UYs make an

³ For a good summary of recent evidence on this question, see Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1980: Modernization and Its Discontents," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), January 1981, pp. 31-50.

⁴ To catch the flavor of some of this youthful idealism, it is useful to read Peter Seyboldt, Ed., *The Rustication of Urban Youth in China*, White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1977. This is a collection of translated Chinese government documents on the youth-to-the-countryside movement. It includes a fine introduction by Thomas Bernstein succinctly summarizing the argument of his own book.

effort not to be burdens on the local community. Yet there is also evidence suggesting that, even if the UYs do make the requisite effort, the peasants do not necessarily then accept UYs as full-fledged members of the local community. Informants who tried hard to cultivate good relations with peasants report that they were not fully accepted, that barriers between them and the peasants remained, that peasants did not treat them as one of "us." (p. 139)

Here again, in the face of peasant particularism, Bernstein's cost-benefit analysis breaks down, just as it did with the idealism of urban youth. What his observation of peasant particularism points to is a fundamental clash of culture between city and country in China: different ways of understanding what is important in life, different ways of determining to whom one ought to be loyal. But Bernstein does not give us the deeper understanding of urban-rural cultural differences we need if we are to get a comprehensive understanding of the successes and failures of the youth-to-the-country-side program.

Thus, cost-benefit analysis has substantial limitations. One can leave aside objections raised, on purely philosophical grounds, against an instrumental conception of morality. One might even leave aside the objection that cost-benefit analysis can explain something of what happened but very little of why it happened, precisely because it is interested not in the process, only in the end points (ends and means, goals and achievements) of the process. But one cannot pass by the objection that cost-benefit analysis tends to come up short even on its own terms. Such analysis purports to judge costs and benefits; however, by ignoring what these costs and benefits mean to the people af-

fected, it does not always find it easy to judge exactly what these costs and benefits are. Given the moral passions aroused by the mass mobilization campaigns, a failure to understand the webs of meaning underlying such campaigns makes it impossible to understand whether, why, and how they succeeded or failed. The mass mobilization campaigns thus involve profoundly moral issues—moral in any of the senses treated above—and, it seems to me, they must be examined on precisely those grounds.

The lesson here, then, is that to get a really adequate assessment of Maoist mass mobilization in China, one needs to go beyond standard Western social science techniques. The resources for such an enterprise are not totally lacking from the academic scene. The last two decades have seen enormous strides in the development of the intellectual tools needed to unravel the tangled strands of meaning that make up a cultural system. But most of this work has been done by cultural anthropologists—Clifford Geertz and Victor Turner come immediately to mind—and it is only slowly being disseminated into the disciplines of sociology and political science.⁵ What might our understanding of Mao's experiments in mass mobilization be if sociologists and political scientists who study contemporary China borrowed some of the insights of contemporary cultural anthropology?

HERE ARE some suggestions, based on my own, still tentative work in this area.⁶ It is helpful to view mass mobilization campaigns not simply

as means to some end, as both Cell and Bernstein do, but as expressions of a particular kind of vision about the nature of a good person and a good society. Seen from this perspective, mass mobilization campaigns are like vast public or religious rituals, in which a wide range of ideas about the nature of the world and the requirements of reality are fused into a dramatic, emotion-charged synthesis.

The key point, in China as elsewhere, is the plausibility of the vision. A careful analysis of this ritual aspect suggests that the Maoist mobilization campaigns brought together, in a uniquely Chinese way, a very wide range of ideas: Confucian ideas about the moral perfectibility of man, Marxist ideas about the redemptive nature of class struggle, and the ideas of tough guerrilla warriors about the need for a spirit of heroic brotherhood. If large parts of the Chinese population could believe in the Maoist vision, then continual participation in mass mobilization campaigns could make sense. If they could not, those campaigns would become a horrible burden.

In the early years of the People's Republic of China, the vision of life implicit in Mao's brand of politics was, my own research suggests, widely plausible. Precisely because the Maoist mobilization rituals were able to plausibly synthesize such a wide range of traditional and modern moral themes, they were able to bring the actions of such diverse groups as cadres and masses, intellectuals and peasants, together into a passionate focus. Many of those I have interviewed in Hong Kong speak of the early 1950's, for all their hardships, as times of great enthusiasm and hope. But the vision that made even hardship and struggle seem like exciting challenges began to crumble by the late 1950's, with the arbitrary brutality of

⁵ See, for example, Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, NY, Basic Books, 1973; and Victor Turner, *A Ritual Process*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1977.

⁶ For an extended development of this argument, see Richard Madsen, "The Moral Basis of Political Activism in Rural China," unpublished book manuscript.

the anti-rightist campaign of 1957 and the subsequent blunders of the Great Leap Forward—and it was almost totally eroded in the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's:

The reasons that vision failed are too complex to explore in this short essay. Suffice it to say that by the early 1960's, Mao's words and actions tended to make that vision unrealistically simple and one-sided and abstracted from the living experience of most Chinese people. Later mass mobilization rituals—and especially those of the Cultural Revolution—thereby failed to embody the kind of resonant mix of traditional and modern moral themes that had characterized earlier campaigns. They therefore became vehicles for sectarian struggle rather than widespread cooperative action in the service of moral transformation. This, in turn, led to a breakdown in common frameworks for moral discourse within China.

Thus, I would argue, the youth-to-the-countryside movement was not initially based (as Bernstein's argument seems to imply) on a simple miscalculation by China's Communist leadership. When the program was launched in the early 1960's, it was not at all clear that it would be so unpopular. Although Mao seemed worried that China's youth were losing their revolutionary fervor, there was still a widespread idealism among the youth, expressed in an almost worshipful veneration of Mao. There was an ideological resonance between the moral visions of leaders and led in China. It was not implausible that appeals to the idealism of youth might deepen that resonance.

Clearly, though, the world view supporting youthful idealism was fragile, susceptible to doubt. In the 1960's, Maoist propaganda told young people that ultimate meaning in life came from their willingness to sacrifice themselves in service of the

people. To "serve the people" meant to make a positive contribution to the Chinese revolution. It meant making full use of one's individual talents to push China along the revolutionary road defined by Maoist ideology. If one had been educated in a good city school, it would make sense to assume that one should fully exploit one's intellect in the cause of revolution. But what sense could one then make out of Mao's call to leave the city to work side by side with the peasants? Was not this a waste of one's talents? The Maoists assured the young people that, appearances to the contrary, they knew better. In going to the countryside, they said, one would not be wasting one's intellectual talents but learning more deeply about the true meaning of the revolution from the poor peasantry, thereby becoming better able to carry the revolution forward. In the early 1960's, significant numbers of urban youth were still able to believe this Maoist rhetoric and volunteered to go the countryside.

But the Cultural Revolution shattered this fragile basis for idealism. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in the name of the highest ideals, yet it quickly degenerated into arbitrary violence and mindless terror. How, then, could one seriously believe that Maoist ideology could truly point the way toward making a positive contribution to the country? How could one believe that by going to the countryside and giving up one's opportunity to cultivate one's mind in an urban academic setting, one was making any meaningful contribution to the revolution? Was not one being simply thrown (as an informant in Hong Kong put it) "into the garbage can of history"? Was it not better—better not just for selfish but also for idealistic reasons—to do whatever one could to get back to the city? It was in this way, my own research suggests,

that the breakdown in the pattern of meanings binding the Chinese people together led urban youth to strongly resist the youth-to-the-countryside program after the Cultural Revolution.

It is this breakdown, too, that has produced a cynicism, all too common among Chinese young people, about any appeals to self-sacrifice for the good of the country. A letter written by a young woman in the spring of 1980 to the editor of the magazine *Zhongguo Qingnian* (Chinese Youth) seemed to strike a pervasive national chord:

*My father, my mother and my mother's father are Party members. Naturally as a child I believed in Marxism. I had scarcely entered primary school when the great cultural revolution began. I witnessed the ransacking of houses, physical fights, loss of human life, human life taken for no reason. At home there were no more smiles on any lips. . . . I discovered that life is not like what is written in books. . . . I was searching for the meaning of life. The revolution? An empty word. Making a name for oneself? Who can reach that? Amusement, food, and drink? In death one takes with one only one's skin. . . . There is no perfect man. Man is selfish. Propaganda for "man living for others" is a myth. . . . Formerly I had believed that one lives to make the lives of others more beautiful. Now I came to regard this as ridiculous. . . .*⁷

If anything like this point of view has become common in China (and we need to do more research to determine whether and to what extent it has indeed become common), the moral basis for Maoist-style mass mobilization would be

⁷ *Zhongguo Qingnian* (Beijing), May 1980, as translated in *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1189, Sept. 12, 1980.

Book Reviews

gone. To the extent that significant numbers of people could be persuaded that it is a moral duty to make personal sacrifices to "serve the people," Mao's campaigns could make sense. To the extent that they could not be so persuaded, Maoist-style campaigns would no longer be possible. Given any such loss of faith, the cost of this sort of campaign, from the point of view of the Chinese people involved, would inevitably outweigh the benefits. The moral algebra implicit in the Maoist mass mobilization effort would have lost its logic.

To explain the history of the Maoist mass mobilization strategy, then, Western social scientists have to complement their attempt to "objectively" count the costs and benefits of campaigns with an attempt to interpret changes in the vision of life that give different groups of Chinese their distinctive kinds of moral algebra.

SUCH A STUDY of changing Chinese moral visions may indeed do more than help us answer academic questions about the Maoist era of Chinese history. It may also help us think subtly about the moral implications of that history for ourselves. Even though moral reflection is not generally considered a formal part of social-science inquiry, it remains a compelling human task for all intellectuals. Indeed, both Cell and Bernstein are interested in making quasi-moral judgments on the Mao-

ist mass mobilization enterprise.

Of the two, Cell is characteristically more moralistic, though not necessarily the more sophisticated morally. Throughout his book, he makes it clear that he is deeply committed personally to Mao's revolutionary vision. The first sentence of his preface notes that "Mao would have been 83 today" (p. xi). He conveys a sense of deep personal loss at Mao's death, almost as if a friend or relative had passed away. And in the last paragraph of his book, he concludes that one can conceive of "no greater gift of the Chinese people to Mao's legacy than to have another GPCR" (p. 185). But his attempts to count the cost of Mao's mass mobilization campaigns are not accompanied by any disciplined ethical reflection about that cost. If one believes that the complete economic and political equality supposedly sought in socialist transformation is an end that justified almost any means, then one can unambiguously agree with Cell about the greatness of the Cultural Revolution. But Cell gives us no thoughtful arguments as to why one should believe that. To do this, he would need not just to judge the Maoist vision of what a good society is and of what means are legitimate, but to do so within the traditions of his own culture and society.

Although Bernstein does not invest his book with the moralistic tone that Cell employs, he too seems interested in making a final

moral judgment on one Maoist attempt at mass mobilization. His final chapter asks whether a youth-to-the-countryside program might be recommended to other countries in the Third World. And, like Cell, he attempts to base his judgments on a cost-benefit analysis: for most Third World countries, he suggests, the costs would outweigh the benefits. But Bernstein's attempt to base moral evaluations on marginal utility calculations encounters the same problems of moral sterility as Cell's. How does one evaluate costs and benefits when human lives are at stake?

A study of China's youth-to-the-countryside program, and of Mao's mobilization efforts in general, does indeed present us with important opportunities for moral reflection. But to make use of those opportunities, we must come to appreciate the vision of human nature and moral responsibility which led China's leaders to carry out that program; then we must try to understand the limits of that vision as revealed by that program's difficulties. Doing this will not automatically lead us to any clear-cut judgments about the politics of Mao's China. And it will certainly not give us any simple principles for making assessments of politics in other parts of the world. But, just possibly, it may render the not inconsiderable service of making us more sensitive to the moral dilemmas inherent in the politics of social change.

Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

POLISH CRISIS

TO THE EDITORS: The art of book reviewing is one that often goes unappreciated—especially by the authors whose works are under review. More difficult, perhaps, than the reviewing of a single book is the preparation of a review essay covering a number of books on a related topic. The author of such an essay should, in my view, not only provide the reader with some idea of the contents and arguments of the various books; he should also provide critical evaluation of the materials and attempt to place the volumes under consideration in some type of perspective. Mr. Tadeusz Szafar took such a task upon himself in "Brinkmanship in Poland" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, pp. 75-81). Unfortunately for both the authors and the readers of the review, Mr. Szafar has succeeded in performing only one of these tasks. He has spent slightly more than half of the less than six pages allotted to his review of nine books discussing the context

of the present crisis in Poland. However, the reader of his review obtains only a glimpse of the contents of most of the books—only two historical volumes are discussed in any detail. Moreover, Szafar's evaluative commentary is exceedingly brief, though strongly negative for most of the books, and consists largely of broad unsupported (and often unsupportable) assertions.

As the coeditor of one of the volumes that Szafar attacked—this is the only word that readily describes his commentary—I would like to point out several deficiencies in his treatment of *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*. The basic criticisms leveled at the articles comprising the book are scattered over several pages of the essay (pp. 77-78) and can be summarized as follows. First, the authors refuse to recognize the fundamental divisions in Polish society between the political system imposed from above and the vast majority of the population—in Szafar's words, "the fundamental distinction between *le pays légal* (the legal country) and *le pays réel* (the real country)." Second, the authors of this book, as well as others whose works are reviewed in Szafar's essay, have "to a greater or lesser extent succumbed to the 'success propaganda' of the Gierek regime." Third, a number of the authors have fallen into a pitfall of accepting official statistics at face value. Finally, the most general critique is that the articles provide little "enlightenment" to those eager to understand the reasons for the

failure of the political, economic, and social mechanisms in Poland. None of these assertions is supported with evidence from the book itself. In fact, with a single exception, Szafar refers to not a single article or author. Even that single reference to the introductory chapter by Adam Bromke is made in such a way as to mislead the reader entirely concerning the gist of Bromke's argument.

One wonders how carefully Mr. Szafar read the book, if he can come away with the impression that the authors refuse to recognize the basic divisions between the dominant party-state leadership and the Polish population. The following brief citations from the book are all based on the assumption of such a division: (1) "The upward flow of information about mass feelings and local conditions was not well tuned to the realities of the Polish situation in the 1970's" (Jack Bielasiak, p. 121); (2) "... Gierek fell prey to the same mistake as his predecessor and misjudged the feelings of the population. . . . The open defiance of the workers at this time once again testified to the existing gap between the regime's policies and popular expectations" (Bielasiak, p. 127); (3) "The existing communications gap between the peasants and the apparatchiki was also responsible for the government's habitual ignorance of the actual state of affairs in the countryside" (Andrzej Korbonski, p. 290); and (4) "Overall the Polish communist party and government are no longer leading the country, but to

a substantial degree must respond to popular pressures" (Roger Kanet, p. 390).

Adam Bromke, the only author referred to in Szafar's review, is cited as an example of one of those who has "succumbed to the 'success propaganda' of the Gierek regime." The evidence cited is Bromke's statement that "On several occasions in the past, Gierek has proved to be a clever politician with a good sense of timing" (*Background to Crisis*, pp. 20-21—emphasis added). The fact that Szafar's citation leaves out the italicized phrasewords results in more than a slight change in Bromke's meaning. More important is the fact that this citation and another quotation to the effect that "too much pressure . . . [by the liberal faction in the party for reform] could be counterproductive" totally ignore the overall thrust of the article, which can best be summarized with Bromke's concluding sentences: "There is a strong possibility, however, that Gierek eventually will be deposed by a palace revolution in the upper echelons of the party or by popular explosion, or both. As the decade of the seventies drew to its conclusion, the inefficaciousness of the Polish political system remained and tempers among the people were short" (Bromke, p. 21).

Numerous similar statements appearing throughout the book indicate that those authors who dealt with the issue saw the crisis proportions of the Polish situation: (1) "The danger now confronting the regime is that the

Correspondence

sands of moderation are again running low in the hourglass—and that, the longer concrete action is put off, the more likely it becomes that whatever concessions Gierk (or his successor) might reasonably be expected to offer will be perceived as 'too little, too late' (Sarah Terry, p. 54); (2) "Tragic as it is, it seems that only further deterioration of the general situation might force the communist leadership to pay more attention to the voices of the 'Church'" (Vincent Chrypinski, p. 264); (3) "... the regime appeared to pay only scant attention to the various developmental crises... which have been plaguing the farm sector for some time... One [factor causing deteriorating agricultural performance] was the continued presence of a high degree of mistrust between the regime and the peasants" (Korbonski, pp. 277-88); (4) "Failure to accomplish these tasks effectively will result, at best, in the continuation of the present situation of economic and political instability. At the worst, widespread upheavals, political and economic chaos, and direct Soviet intervention loom as distinct possibilities" (Kanet, pp. 391-92). These citations and the analysis presented in the book of the serious problems permeating all aspects of Polish society would hardly seem to be the result of accepting the "success propaganda" of the Gierk regime.

The accusation of accepting official data at face value is hard to fathom, since Szafar fails to indicate the problems that have resulted from such "acceptance." All of the articles dealing with the Polish economy detail the serious problems facing the economy in both the domestic and foreign spheres. Neither Korbonski nor Zbigniew Fallenbuchl seem to be taken in by these data in their analyses of Polish agriculture and foreign trade. The data employed by the political scientists—who come in for Szafar's strongest criticism—concern such matters as demographic characteristics of party officials and student attitudes as reported in opinion

surveys. Szafar does not indicate what errors have resulted from "acceptance" of these data.

The final and broadest accusation can perhaps be rephrased as follows: "*Background to Crisis* sheds no light on the factors that have resulted in the current situation in Poland." Either Szafar has read the book so superficially that he has missed much of the argumentation or he has not found the type of discussion that he would prefer and, thus, has dismissed it. As the brief statements cited above should indicate, the authors have discussed the development of some of the serious issues currently facing Poland. In general, most of the authors, who were writing in late 1978, were pessimistic about the prospects for a solution to Poland's basic problems. Clearly relevant to an understanding of the current situation, in my view—but, as coeditor of the book, my evaluation is possibly suspect—are such issues as the division between reformers and conservatives within the party (discussed in some detail by Bromke, among others), the push by reformers for an expanded parliamentary role for the Sejm (Terry), the evolution of Church-state relations in Poland (Chrypinski), the general failure of the party to afford new recruits into the party with effective means to influence policy (Bielasiak), or the studies already referred to of the problems of the Polish economy.

I recognize that in preparing a rejoinder to a review, as I am presently doing, the author or editor is probably doomed to failure. First of all, the majority of those who read the original review are likely not to see the rejoinder. Moreover, the author of the review will be provided with the opportunity to rebut. He will, then, dig out citations to support his original broadside attacks. However, I believe that it is appropriate on occasion—and this is the first such occasion in my career—to respond to shoddy and unfair reviewing practices. Szafar's comments on *Background to Crisis* are unfair both to

the authors and to the potential readers of the book. No one who relied on Szafar's commentary for guidance could have the slightest idea of the contents of the book; his criticisms are unsupported and, as I hope to have demonstrated, largely inaccurate. I grant that some of the chapters have lost their sense of "urgency" in the wake of the revolutionary events of the past year. Yet, can they be dismissed out of hand as irrelevant? Is the debate about participation that occurred in Poland in the 1970's (Terry) really irrelevant to more recent events? Are the attitudes of Polish youth in the 1970's on matters ranging from personal aspirations to political participation (Maurice Simon) useless to an understanding of the revolutionary ferment in which, as Szafar himself points out, Polish youth has played such a dominant role?

As I noted at the beginning of these comments, the author of a review essay covering a number of books takes upon himself several interrelated tasks. Mr. Szafar has—at least in the case of *Background to Crisis*—failed to fulfill at least two of them.

ROGER E. KANET
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THE AUTHOR REPLIES: Professor Roger E. Kanet is obviously right when he points out that a short review dealing with several books on a related subject cannot do justice to individual contributions and, even less, evaluate them critically. The most it can do is to indicate to the reader to what extent, if at all, they are worthy of his attention and apt to deepen his knowledge of the problem.

As a coeditor of one of the volumes reviewed, Professor Kanet tries to refute my negative assessment by numerous quotations, unavoidably sometimes taken out of their context. He invites me to have recourse to a similar meth-

od. Regrettably, I have to refuse—I do not believe the reader will be better served by a protracted duel with such weapons. I see, however, no reason to change my mind about the book itself.

Conceived in the fall of 1976 (p. xii), completed by the end of 1978, and only cosmetically updated in the light of later developments, this collection of scholarly papers—whatever their individual merit—virtually achieved the unachievable: it summed up the second half of Gierk's rule without pinpointing the main problem of those years, the gradual disintegration of the Communist central-command economy and of the body politic in Poland and the emergence of an opposition movement qualitatively, not only quantitatively, different from all the previous protests. Out of 14 chapters, only the Introductory one (by Adam Bromke) as much as mentions the organized political opposition groups, treating them at par with more or less fictitious citizens' "voluntary associations." Not a single uncensored publication has been quoted, including, for instance, the "Black Book" on the censorship, first published in 1977. Yet, this book had rendered the chapter on journalists as a pressure group inside the establishment totally irrelevant—long before some (Polish) journalists themselves in their rush to jump on the "Renewal" bandwagon started to beat their own (and everybody else's) breasts. The extremely interesting analyses prepared under the auspices of the "Experience and Future" (DiP) group, which included both non-party and party members, were totally ignored. The listing of similar oversights—in my opinion, the result of too much attention being paid to the *pays légal* and of neglecting the *pays réel*—can be continued at will.

Readers interested in the antecedents of the current Polish crisis would do well to compare the reviewed volume with the double issue of *Survey* (London), Nos. 109-10, dated Autumn 1979/Winter 1980, but actually put on sale in August 1980. This

was, of course, a coincidence [with the Gdansk shipyard strikes—Eds.], which meant, however, that the contributions had been written and edited more or less simultaneously with the Kanet-Simon volume. One might easily conclude that the two publications described two different countries, or at least two different stages in one country's development. But, while *Survey* fully justified its title "Poland from Inside," the book *Background to Crisis* did not keep the promise implied in its title.

And that was the warning that I have tried to convey in my "shoddy and unfair" review. Even after Professor Kanet's rebuttal, I stand by my opinion.

TADEUSZ SZAFAR
Visiting Scholar
Russian Research Center
Harvard University

ON THE SWEDISH COMMUNIST PARTY

TO THE EDITORS: In the article "The Soviet Union and Northern Europe" (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1981), there is one remark we want to draw to your attention. On page 8 of the article, it is said that a schism took place in the Left Party of Communists (VPK) which led to "the formation of a pro-Moscow party, the Swedish Communist Party (Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti, or SKP)."

This is not true. There is indeed a Communist Party of Sweden (SKP). It was founded in 1973 on the basis of a party-building organization called the Communist League, Marxist-Leninist (KFML), which had existed since 1967. KFML was founded after a

CORRECTIONS

The following corrections should be noted in Boris Meissner's article "The 20th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981):

On page 5, column 1, lines 17-18, Yu. L. Brezhnev is the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.

On page 7, in the photo caption, it should read I. V. (not P. G.) Kapitonov.

On page 12, column 1, line 4, it should read "112 members" of the Council of Ministers.

On page 22, line 4 of the "Conclusion," it should read "developed socialism."

. . .

In Abram Bergson's "Soviet Economic Slowdown" (*POC*, May-June 1981), the economic reform referred to on page 30, column 2, was actually promulgated by a joint Central Committee-Council of Ministers resolution of July 29, 1979.

. . .

The following corrections should be noted in Paul B. Henze's article "Communism and Ethiopia" (*POC*, May-June 1981):

On p. 57, column 2, line 3, the name of the first post-Haile Selassie head of state should be Aman Andom.

On page 73, footnote 57, line 4, the word "Eritrean" should be deleted.

. . .

The photo on page 44 of the July-August 1981 issue, showing the results of April 1981 demonstrations in Calcutta, was by Santoch Basak/Gamma-Liaison.

The photo of Herbert Mies on page 10 of the September-October 1981 issue is by Regis Bossu/SYGMA.

split in the Left Party of Communists, mainly over the question of the Soviet Union.

The SKP is well known in Sweden as an anti-Soviet force. Among other things, it has been involved in solidarity work with the Charter 77 group in Czechoslovakia, since 1976 with the Committee for Defense of the

Workers (KOR) in Poland, with the government of Democratic Kampuchea and the resistance movement against the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and for the last two years with the resistance movement in Afghanistan. We are sure that if you asked a politically interested Swedish citizen who in

Sweden are the most well-known anti-Soviet force, you would receive the answer: the Communist Party of Sweden (SKP).

Our party has good and friendly connections with the Communist Party of China, but we always determine our own policy. Because of historical, cultural, political traditions and other differences we do have another view in various ideological questions compared with the Chinese Party, which you can see by studying our program.

PER AXELSON
Vice Chairman, SKP
Stockholm, Sweden

THE AUTHORS REPLY: We are grateful for comments made by Per Axelsson, Vice Chairman of the SKP, clarifying his party's attitude toward the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He is quite correct. Similar clarification was made earlier in a letter to the authors from Leif Leifland, Sweden's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

We are delighted that the article has received wide attention outside the United States, and have taken notice of the policies and attitudes discussed by Mr. Axelsson. While this is an important clarification concerning the Left in Sweden, we do not feel that it detracts from the major theme of the article—Soviet policy toward Northern Europe.

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INDEX TO VOLUME XXX

Annual indices for Volumes IV-XXIX appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954). Numbers appearing at the right in the columns below refer to bimonthly issues.

THE SOVIET UNION

The "Action Arm" of the CPSU (review)	4
by John J. Dziak	
CSCE in Madrid	4
by H. Gordon Skilling	
East Central Europe and the Soviet Model (review)	5
by Antonin J. Liehm	
The Essence of Stalinism (review)	3
by Georg Brunner	
The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power	6
by Rebecca V. Strobe and Colin S. Gray	
Mathematization of Soviet Planning (review)	1
by S. E. Goodman	
The Military Factor In Soviet Foreign Policy (review)	1
by Max Beloff	
Moscow and the German Question: Continuities and Changes (review)	2
by F. Stephen Larrabee	
Moscow and the Western Alliance	3
by Pierre Hassner	
Moscow, Havana, and Africa (review)	4
by Kenneth Grundy	
National Security Perspectives of Soviet "Think Tanks" (review)	6
by Tyrus W. Cobb	
Political Change in the USSR: Moving the Immovable? (review)	6
by Robert V. Daniels	
Psychiatry and the Soviet State (review)	4
by Harvey Fireside	
The Rise of Soviet Naval Power (review)	2
by Hedley Bull	
Soviet Demographic Dilemmas (review)	5
by Jeffrey W. Hahn	
Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1981-85 Plan	3
by Abram Bergson	
Soviet Leaders: Roots of Behavior (review)	4
by Joel C. Moses	
The Soviet Political System Since Stalin (review)	1
by Rolf H. W. Theen	
Soviet Strategy In Northeast Asia (review)	5
by Hiroshi Kimura	
The Soviet Union and Northern Europe	2
by Trond Gilberg, George K. Osborn, William J. Taylor, Jr., and John R. Fairlamb	
Toward a Political Economy of East-South Relations (review)	3
by Robert H. Donaldson	
The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics	3
by Boris Meissner	

Understanding Soviet Military Power (review)	2
by Colin S. Gray	
The USSR and Germany	5
by Angela Stent	

EASTERN EUROPE

Brinkmanship in Poland (review)	3
by Tadeusz Szafar	
CSCE in Madrid	4
by H. Gordon Skilling	
East Central Europe and the Soviet Model (review)	5
by Antonin J. Liehm	
Poland Today and Czechoslovakia 1968	5
by David W. Paul and Maurice D. Simon	
The USSR and Germany	5
by Angela Stent	
Worker-Party Conflict in Romania	5
by Daniel N. Nelson	

CHINA

China and Offshore Energy	6
by Kim Woodard	
Chinese Global Strategy and Soviet Power	1
by Jonathan D. Pollack	
Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest	1
by Parris H. Chang	
Doing Business with China (review)	4
by David L. Denny	
Egalitarianism in Chinese Society	1
by William L. Parish	
Legacy of the Cultural Revolution (review)	5
by David S. G. Goodman	
Mass Mobilization in Mao's China (review)	6
by Richard P. Madsen	
Politics, Modernization, and Science in China	1
by Richard P. Suttmeier	
Value Change in China (review)	6
by Patrick G. Maddox	

EAST, SOUTHEAST, & SOUTH ASIA

Communism and India: A New Context	4
by Bhabani Sen Gupta	
Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam (review)	2
by Stephen B. Young	
Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula	6
by Robert A. Scalapino	

Korean Politics in the 1980's (review)	5
by Young Whan Kihl	
Mongolia and Socialism (review)	2
by Tania A. Jacques	
New Evidence on Kampuchea (review)	3
by Carlyle A. Thayer	
Soviet Strategy in Northeast Asia (review)	5
by Hiroshi Kimura	
Toward a Political Economy of East-South Relations (review)	3
by Robert H. Donaldson	
Writing on Vietnam (review)	6
by Douglas Pike	

WESTERN EUROPE

Cataluña, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism	2
by Eusebio Mujal-León	
CSCE in Madrid	4
by H. Gordon Skilling	
Moscow and the German Question: Continuities and Changes (review)	2
by F. Stephen Larrabee	
Moscow and the Western Alliance	3
by Pierre Hassner	
The Soviet Union and Northern Europe	2
by Trond Gilberg, George K. Osborn, William J. Taylor, Jr., and John R. Fairlamb	
The USSR and Germany	5
by Angela Stent	

AFRICA & THE NEAR EAST

Arab Communism at Low Ebb	4
by Arnold Hottinger	
Communism and Ethiopia	3
by Paul B. Henze	
Moscow, Havana, and Africa (review)	4
by Kenneth Grundy	

LATIN AMERICA

Cuba in the 1980's	2
by Jorge I. Domínguez	
Moscow, Havana, and Africa (review)	4
by Kenneth Grundy	

INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE STUDIES

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1980	2
by Richard F. Staar	
Poland Today and Czechoslovakia 1968	5
by David W. Paul and Maurice D. Simon	
Toward a Political Economy of East-South Relations (review)	3
by Robert H. Donaldson	

HISTORY & IDEOLOGY

East Central Europe and the Soviet Model (review)	5
by Antonin J. Liehm	
The Essence of Stalinism (review)	3
by Georg Brunner	

BOOKS REVIEWED¹

Ahn, Byung-joon. <i>Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution</i> . (D.S.G. Goodman)	5
Albright, David E., Ed. <i>Communism in Africa</i> . (Grundy)	4
Arad, Ruth W., et al. <i>Sharing Global Resources</i> . (Donaldson)	3
Arbatov, A. G. <i>Bezopasnost' v yadernyy vek i politika Vashingtona</i> . (Cobb)	6
Barron, John, and Anthony Paul. <i>Murder of a Gentle Land</i> . (Thayer)	3
Barry, Donald D., and Carol Barner-Barry. <i>Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction</i> . (Theen)	1
Belova, V. A., and L. E. Darskiy. <i>Statistika mneniy v izuchenii rozhdayemosti</i> . (Hahn)	5
Bernstein, Thomas P. <i>Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China</i> . (Madsen)	6
Bertram, Christoph, Ed. <i>Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's</i> . (Beloff)	1
Besemeres, John. <i>Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications of Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe</i> . (Hahn)	5
Bialer, Seweryn. <i>Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union</i> . (Moses)	4
Blazynski, George. <i>Flashpoint Poland</i> . (Szafar)	3
Block, Sidney, and Peter Reddaway. <i>Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry Is Used to Suppress Dissent</i> . (Fireside)	4
Bogdanov, R. G., et al., Eds. <i>SShA: Voyenno-strategicheskiye kontseptsii</i> . (Cobb)	6
Booth, Ken. <i>Naviges and Foreign Policy</i> . (Bull)	2
Bortoli, Georges. <i>Mort de Staline</i> . (Brunner)	3
Breyer, Siegfried, and Norman Polmar. <i>Guide to the Soviet Navy</i> . (Bull)	2
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. <i>The Storm Petrels: The Flight of the First Soviet Defectors</i> . (Dziak)	4
Brown, Archie, and Michael Kaser, Eds. <i>The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev</i> . (Daniels)	6
Broyelle, C., et al. <i>China: A Second Look</i> . (Maddox)	6
Burchett, Wilfred. <i>Vietnam: Un + Un = Un</i> . (Young)	2
Camey, Timothy Michael, Comp. and Ed. <i>Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion</i> . (Thayer)	3
Cell, Charles P. <i>Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China</i> . (Madsen)	6
Charles, Milene. <i>The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement</i> . (Grundy)	4
Chu, Godwin C. <i>Radical Change Through Communication in Mao's China</i> . (Maddox)	6
Chu, Godwin C., and Francis L. K. Hsu, Eds. <i>Moving a Mountain: Cultural Change in China</i> . (Maddox)	6
Cohen, Stephen F., et al., Eds. <i>The Soviet Union Since Stalin</i> . (Daniels)	6
Collins, John M. <i>U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980</i> . (Gray)	2
Collins, John M., and Anthony H. Cordesman. <i>Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths</i> . (Gray)	2
Conquest, Robert. <i>Present Danger: Towards a Foreign Policy</i> . (Beloff)	1
D'Encausse, Héliène Carrère. <i>Staline: l'ordre par la terreur</i> . (Brunner)	3
DePauw, John W. <i>U.S.-Chinese Trade Negotiations</i> . (Denny)	4
Desfosses, Helen, Ed. <i>Soviet Population Policy</i> . (Hahn)	5
De Weydenthal, Jan B. <i>The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline</i> . (Szafar)	3

¹ Reviewers' names appear in parentheses.

Dismukes, Bradford, and James M. McConnell, Eds. <i>Soviet Naval Diplomacy</i> . (Bull)	2	Kim, Young C., and Abraham M. Halpern, Eds. <i>The Future of the Korean Peninsula</i> . (Kihl)	5
Duan, Le. <i>This Nation and Socialism Are One</i> . (Young)	2	Klinghoffer, Arthur J. <i>The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World</i> . (Grundy)	4
Duiker, William J. <i>The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam</i> . (Pike)	6	Krutsikh, A. V. <i>Amerikanskaya politika "partnerstva" v vostochnoaziatskom regione</i> . (Kimura)	5
Duiker, William J. <i>The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941</i> . (Young)	2	Kusin, Vladimir. <i>From Dubcek to Charter 77: A Study of Normalization in Czechoslovakia 1968-1978</i> . (Liehm)	5
Eidlin, Fred. <i>The "Logic" of Normalization: The Intervention in Czechoslovakia of 21 August 1968 and the Czechoslovak Response</i> . (Liehm)	5	Lane, David. <i>Politics and Society in the USSR</i> . (Theen)	1
Elliott, David W. P., Ed. <i>The Third Indochina Conflict</i> . (Pike)	6	Lange, Peer H. <i>Zur Aufwertung der Aussenpolitischen Rolle der Sowjetischen Militärmacht</i> . (Beloff)	1
Endicott, John E., and William R. Heaton. <i>The Politics of East Asia: China, Japan, Korea</i> . (Kihl)	5	Lebedev, N. I. <i>A New Stage in International Relations</i> . (Donaldson)	3
Erickson, John, and E. J. Feuchtwanger, Eds. <i>Soviet Military Power and Performance</i> . (Beloff)	1	Lee, Chong-sik. <i>Korean Worker's Party: A Short History</i> . (Kihl)	5
Flshlow, Albert, et al. <i>Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy</i> . (Donaldson)	3	Lee, Chong-sik, Trans. and Ed. <i>Materials on Korean Communism, 1945-1947</i> . (Kihl)	5
Foster, Richard B., et al., Eds. <i>Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia</i> . (Kimura)	5	Lee, Hong Yung. <i>The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution</i> . (D.S.G. Goodman)	5
Friang, Brigitte. <i>La Mousson de la liberté: Vietnam du colonialisme au stalinisme</i> . (Young)	2	LeoGrande, William M. <i>Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980</i> . (Grundy)	4
Frolic, B. Michael. <i>Mao's People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China</i> . (Maddox)	6	LeoGrande, William M., et al. <i>Cuba in Africa</i> . (Grundy)	4
Gerson, Lennard D. <i>The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia</i> . (Dziak)	4	Leslie, R. F., Ed. <i>The History of Poland Since 1863</i> . (Szafar)	3
Goetz-Stankiewicz, Marketa. <i>The Silenced Theatre: Czech Playwrights Without a Stage</i> . (Liehm)	5	Lewy, Guenter. <i>America in Vietnam</i> . (Young)	2
Grigorenko, P. S. <i>The Grigorenko Papers</i> . (Fireside)	4	Leys, Simon. <i>The Chairman's New Clothes</i> . (D.S.G. Goodman)	5
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Hoeber, Francis P., et al. <i>Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981</i> . (Gray)	2	Marr, David G., Ed. <i>Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's Prison Notes and Ho Chi Minh's Prison Diary</i> . (Young)	2
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Hosmer, Stephen T., et al. <i>The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders</i> . (Pike)	6	Mazurov, V. M. <i>SShA-Kitay-Yaponiya: perestroyka mezhgosudarstvennykh otnosheniy (1969-1979)</i> . (Kimura)	5
Hough, Jerry F. <i>Soviet Leadership in Transition</i> . (Moses)	4	McCagg, William O., Jr. <i>Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948</i> . (Brunner)	3
Hruby, Peter. <i>Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of the Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia</i> . (Liehm)	5	Medvedev, Roy A. <i>On Stalin and Stalinism</i> . (Brunner)	3
Hung, G. Nguyen Tien. <i>Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam, 1955-80</i> . (Young)	2	Meissner, Boris, et al., Eds. <i>Einparteiensystem und bürokratische Herrschaft in der Sowjetunion</i> . (Theen)	1
Hwang, In K. <i>The Neutralized Unification of Korea in Perspective</i> . (Kihl)	5	Meissner, Boris, Ed. <i>Moskau-Bonn: Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955-1973</i> . (Larrabee)	2
Jagchid, Sechin, and Paul Hyer. <i>Mongolia's Culture and Society</i> . (Jacques)	2	Merkulov, S. K. <i>Amerikansko-kitayskoye sbliizheniye (vtoraya polovina 70-kh godov)</i> . (Kimura)	5
Johnson, U. Alexis, et al., Eds. <i>The Common Security Interests of Japan, The United States, and NATO</i> . (Kimura)	5	Michnik, Adam. <i>L'Eglise et la Gauche: le dialogue polonais</i> . (Szafar)	3
Jones, David R., Ed. <i>Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual. Vol. 2, 1978</i> . (Gray)	2	Mlynar, Zdenek. <i>Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism</i> . (Liehm)	5
Jones, David R., Ed. <i>Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual. Vol. 3, 1979</i> . (Gray)	2	Munro, Julie, Ed. <i>The China Phone Book & Address Directory</i> . (Denny)	4
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Katsenelinboigen, Aron. <i>Studies in Soviet Economic Planning</i> . (S. E. Goodman)	1	Myagkov, Aleksei. <i>Inside the KGB: An Expose by an Officer of the Third Directorate</i> . (Dziak)	4
Kelley, Donald R., Ed. <i>Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era</i> . (Daniels)	6	Nayyar, Deepak, Ed. <i>Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries and the Third World</i> . (Donaldson)	3
Khodorovich, Tatyana, Ed. <i>The Case of Leonid Plyushch</i> . (Fireside)	4	Nekipelov, Victor. <i>Institute of Fools: Notes from the Serbsky</i> . (Fireside)	4
		Nolte, Ernst. <i>Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg</i> . (Larrabee)	2
		Osborne, Milton. <i>Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy</i> . (Thayer)	3
		Papp, Daniel. <i>Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, and Washington</i> . (Pike)	6

Paul, David W. <i>The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia.</i> (Liehm)	5	Toko, Colonel Gad W. <i>Intervention in Uganda: The Power Struggle and Soviet Involvement—Reflections of a Ugandan Exile.</i> (Grundy)	4
Petrov, D. V., Ed. <i>Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v aziatsko-tikhookeanskoy regione.</i> (Kimura)	5	Trofimenko, G. A., Ed. <i>Sovremennyye vneshnepoliticheskiye kontseptsii SSHA.</i> (Cobb)	6
Pike, Douglas. <i>History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1976.</i> (Young)	2	Tucker, Robert C., Ed. <i>Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation.</i> (Brunner)	3
Piskunov, V. P., and V. S. Steshenko, Eds. <i>Demograficheskaya politika.</i> (Hahn)	5	Turley, William S., Ed. <i>Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective.</i> (Pike)	6
Plyushch, Leonid. <i>History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography.</i> (Fireside)	4	Ulanis, B. Ts. <i>Problemy dinamiki naseleniya SSSR.</i> (Hahn)	5
Podrabinek, Alexander. <i>Punitive Medicine.</i> (Fireside)	4	US Congress, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. <i>Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive.</i> (Dziak)	4
Ponchaud, François. <i>Cambodia: Year Zero.</i> (Thayer)	3	US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (Senior Specialist Division). <i>The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?</i> (Donaldson)	3
Potichnyj, Peter J., Ed. <i>Poland and the Ukraine: Past and Present.</i> (Szafar)	3	US Senate, Committee on Commerce, <i>Soviet Oceans Development.</i> (Bull)	2
Primakov, Ye. M. <i>Anatomiya blizhnvestochnogo konflikt.</i> (Cobb)	6	Vishnevskiy, A. G. <i>Demograficheskaya revolyutsiya.</i> (Hahn)	5
Proektor, D. M. <i>Puti Yevropy.</i> (Cobb)	6	Vorontsov, V. B. <i>Kitay i SSHA: 60–70-ye gody.</i> (Cobb)	6
Radio Free Europe Research. <i>August 1980: The Strikes in Poland.</i> (Szafar)	3	Wandycz, Piotr S. <i>The United States and Poland.</i> (Szafar)	3
Radio Free Europe Research. <i>The Pope in Poland.</i> (Szafar)	3	Wassmund, Hans. <i>Kontinuität im Wandel, Bestimmungsfaktoren sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik in der Nach-Stalin-Zeit.</i> (Larrabee)	2
Ram, Jane, Ed. <i>Business in Today's China.</i> (Denny)	4	Weinstein, Franklin B., and Fuji Kamiya, Eds. <i>The Security of Korea: US and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980's.</i> (Kihl)	5
Rigby, T. H., et al., Eds. <i>Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR: Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro.</i> (Daniels)	6	White, Nathan N. <i>US Policy Towards Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations.</i> (Kihl)	5
Rosenfeldt, Niels Erik. <i>Knowledge and Power: The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government.</i> (Brunner)	3	Wilson, Richard W., et al., Eds. <i>Value Change in Chinese Society.</i> (Maddox)	6
Rositzke, Harry. <i>The KGB: The Eyes of the People.</i> (Dziak)	4	Zauberman, Alfred. <i>The Mathematical Revolution in Soviet Economics.</i> (S. E. Goodman)	1
Rothenberg, Morris. <i>The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power.</i> (Grundy)	4	Zauberman, Alfred. <i>Mathematical Theory in Soviet Planning.</i> (S. E. Goodman)	1
Rothstein, Robert L. <i>The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System.</i> (Donaldson)	3		
Rupen, Robert. <i>How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900–1978.</i> (Jacques)	2		
Rupnik, Jacques. <i>Histoire du Parti Communiste Tchecoslovaque: Des origines à la prise du pouvoir.</i> (Liehm)	5		
Ryavec, Karl W., Ed. <i>Soviet Society and the Communist Party.</i> (Theen)	1		
Sakharov, Vladimir, and Umberto Tosi. <i>High Treason.</i> (Dziak)	4		
Schier, Peter, and Manola Schier-Oum. <i>Prince Sihanouk on Cambodia: Interviews and Talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk.</i> (Thayer)	3		
Schwartz, Hans-Peter, and Boris Meissner, Eds. <i>Entspannungspolitik in Ost und West.</i> (Larrabee)	2		
Scott, Harriet Fast, and William F. Scott. <i>The Armed Forces of the USSR.</i> (Gray)	2		
Selucky, Radoslav. <i>Marxism, Socialism, Freedom.</i> (Liehm)	5		
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom. <i>War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia.</i> (Thayer)	3		
Sik, Ota. <i>The Communist Power System.</i> (Liehm)	5		
Simon, Maurice D., and Roger E. Kanet, Eds. <i>Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierke's Poland.</i> (Szafar)	3		
Slabinskiy, B. N., et al., Eds. <i>Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy na dal'nem vostokey 1945–1977.</i> (Kimura)	5		
Smith, Gordon B., Ed. <i>Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union.</i> (Daniels)	6		
Solomon, Richard H., Ed. <i>Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Politics for a Time of Transition.</i> (Kimura)	5		
Suda, Zdenek. <i>Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.</i> (Liehm)	5		
Teiwes, Frederick C. <i>Politics and Purges in China.</i> (D.S.G. Goodman)	5		
Terrill, Ross, Ed. <i>The China Difference.</i> (Maddox)	6		
Thompson, W. Scott, and Donaldson D. Frizzell, Eds. <i>The Lessons of Vietnam.</i> (Young)	2		

CONTRIBUTORS' INDEX

Beloff, Max—Review	1
Bergson, Abram—Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1981–85 Plan	3
Brunner, Georg—Review	3
Bull, Hedley—Review	2
Chang, Parris H.—Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest	1
Cobb, Tyrus W.—Review	6
Daniels, Robert V.—Review	6
Denny, David L.—Review	4
Domínguez, Jorge I.—Cuba in the 1980's	2
Donaldson, Robert H.—Review	3
Dziak, John J.—Review	4
Fairlamb, John R., et al.—The Soviet Union and Northern Europe	2
Fireside, Harvey—Review	4
Gilberg, Trond, et al.—The Soviet Union and Northern Europe	2
Goodman, David S. G.—Review	5
Goodman, S. E.—Review	1
Gray, Colin S.—Review	2
Gray, Colin S., and Rebecca V. Strode—The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power	6
Grundy, Kenneth—Review	4
Hahn, Jeffrey W.—Review	5
Hassner, Pierre—Moscow and the Western Alliance	3
Henze, Paul B.—Communism and Ethiopia	3
Hottinger, Arnold—Arab Communism at Low Ebb	4
Jacques, Tania A.—Review	2
Kihl, Young Whan—Review	5

Kimura, Hiroshi—Review	5	Sen Gupta, Bhabani—Communism and India: A New Context	4
Larrabee, F. Stephen—Review	2	Simon, Maurice D., and David W. Paul—Poland Today and	
Liehm, Antonin J.—Review	5	Czechoslovakia 1968	5
Maddox, Patrick G.—Review	6	Skilling, H. Gordon—CSCE in Madrid	4
Madsen, Richard P.—Review	6	Staar, Richard F.—Checklist of Communist Parties	
Meissner, Boris—The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic		and Fronts, 1980	2
Politics	3	Stent, Angela—The USSR and Germany	5
Moses, Joel C.—Review	4	Strode, Rebecca V., and Colin S. Gray—The Imperial Dimension	
Mujal-León, Eusebio—Cataluña, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism . .	2	of Soviet Military Power	6
Nelson, Daniel N.—Worker-Party Conflict in Romania	5	Suttmeler, Richard P.—Politics, Modernization,	
Osborn, George K., et al.—The Soviet Union and Northern Europe .	2	and Science in China	1
Parish, William L.—Egalitarianism in Chinese Society	1	Szafar, Tadeusz—Review	3
Paul, David W., and Maurice D. Simon—Poland Today and		Taylor, William J., Jr., et al.—The Soviet Union and Northern	
Czechoslovakia 1968	5	Europe	2
Pike, Douglas—Review	6	Thayer, Carlyle A.—Review	3
Pollack, Jonathan D.—Chinese Global Strategy		Theen, Rolf H. W.—Review	1
and Soviet Power	1	Woodard, Kim—China and Offshore Energy	6
Scalapino, Robert A.—Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula	6	Young, Stephen B.—Review	2

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Introduction

On September 11, 1945, the U.S. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote President Harry S. Truman a proposal for international control of atomic bombs:

"If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon...it would be one thing... But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts...it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control -- his moral power....."

Stimson proposed and the President authorized approaches to the Soviet Union and Western Allies to seek controls over atomic weapons, to use the benefits of nuclear research "for commercial or humanitarian purposes." This led to a study and report, the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report," made public in March 1946, that called for the creation of an international authority that would hold a monopoly over nuclear research and development. This in turn led to a plan presented at the United Nations by American advisor to Presidents and elder statesman, Bernard Baruch.

The United States had begun an enduring search for a world at peace.

This chronology describes the most important milestones in that search. It is comprehensive but not all-inclusive; for the search by this nation has extended into far-flung avenues. The American effort ranged from the early scrapping of its war machine and the return of millions of Americans to civilian status in a matter of months, to the ongoing effort to grapple with the nuclear genie, to the exploration of ways to prevent more esoteric and equally odious forms of warfare.

It is vital to understand the historical context of the chronology. The United States was scarcely affected by the devastation of World War II. America possessed unchallenged economic, technological and military power. The world knew the immense power of atomic weapons. American officials

- 2 -

were aware of Soviet research on nuclear weapons, yet felt confident of American strength, and willing to give up the nuclear advantage in order to prevent a nuclear arms race. Despite repeated disappointments, this nation has persisted for the past 36 years.

The negotiation process with the Soviet Union has not been easy. Frequently the United States has been confronted by sweeping Soviet proposals with superficial appeal that left out important safeguards, or were in fact highly prejudicial to Western interests and security.

Throughout the past three decades, the United States has emphasized a step-by-step approach, based on scientific and technological research, and sensitive to the concerns of the USSR and other states. The United States has also always stressed the need for verification, believing that without such measures no arms control measure could be trusted. The Soviet Union has often resisted this approach because of Soviet suspicion of any outside presence within the USSR -- a fear not shared by the United States and West European nations. At times, moreover, American desires for verification provided the pretext for the Soviets to slow or cease negotiations or portray the U.S. as the reluctant partner. Quiet diplomacy has not always won global appeal, but it serves the long-range purpose of achieving meaningful results.

The chronology does not show the steady buildup and modernization of Soviet forces of all types while the USSR preached the virtues of detente.

Also, not shown by the chronology, but important to note, is that from the mid-1970s the American public has become increasingly worried about the growth and modernization of Soviet forces, and wholeheartedly supports the "dual-track" approach of improving Western security while renewing arms reduction efforts.

In sum, the chronology is a document of continuity, hope, disappointment, ingenuity, patience and perseverance. It offers hope that in time and despite the growing complexity and danger of modern weapons, we can achieve the traditional American ideal of peace and security.

HIGHLIGHTS OF INITIATIVES FOR ARMS REDUCTION
BY THE UNITED STATES

- * June 14, 1946 - The Baruch Plan for controlling atomic weapons
- * April 16, 1953 - President Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" proposal
- * December 8, 1953 - The U.S. "Atoms for Peace" plan
- * July 21, 1955 - The U.S. "Open Skies" proposal
- * January 14, 1957 - Comprehensive U.S. proposal for force limitations
- * October 25, 1958 - The unilateral suspension of U.S. nuclear tests
- * June 27, 1960 - U.S. proposal for phase-out of different types of forces
- * September 25, 1961 - President Kennedy's call for comprehensive disarmament
- * April 18, 1961 - U.S. three-step comprehensive disarmament proposals
- * July 25, 1963 - The Treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere
- * January 21, 1964 - U.S. proposal for a verified freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles
- * August 17, 1965 - U.S. draft for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty
- * March 18, 1969 - The U.S. initiates study of a ban on nuclear weapons on the seabed
- * November 17, 1969 - Beginning of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union
- * November 25, 1969 - U.S. renounces first-use of chemical agents and all methods of biological warfare
- * November 24, 1974 - The U.S. and USSR agree, at Vladivostok, to a formula for limiting strategic arms
- * May 26, 1975 - The U.S. and USSR sign SALT I documents
- * April 13, 1976 - The U.S. proposes the prohibition of further production of chemical weapons and reduction of existing stockpiles
- * March 1977 - Secretary of State Vance proposes major nuclear arms reductions to the USSR
- * November 18, 1981 - President Reagan's initiative for arms reduction and world peace

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVES, 1946-1982

June 14, 1946. Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, submits detailed U.S. proposals for international control of atomic energy. The "Baruch Plan" proposed "the creation of an International Atomic Energy Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material" and including direct control of all potentially dangerous atomic activities and licensing of all other atomic activities. The Authority was to be empowered to send officials into states to conduct comprehensive inspections for violations of the treaty. Decisions of the Authority were not to be subject to veto in the Security Council. The Baruch plan emphasized the fundamental U.S. position that establishment of international control of atomic energy should precede the prohibition of national atomic forces.

January 20, 1953. President Eisenhower, in his first inaugural address, states that the United States stands ready to engage with any and all others in a joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations and thus to make possible drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites for undertaking such efforts, he continues, are that, in their purpose, they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all, and that, in their result, they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge.

April 16, 1953. In his major "Chance for Peace" speech, President Eisenhower proposes that nations set limits on the portion of total production of strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes. National military and security forces might be restricted in size either by a numerical limitation or by an agreed national ratio between states. The President suggests that the resulting savings be applied to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. He calls for the conclusion of an armistice in Korea and the solution of outstanding political problems in Indochina, and Malaya, as well as the Austrian Treaty, peaceful unification of Germany and Korea, and the restoration of independence to the nations of Eastern Europe.

December 8, 1953. President Eisenhower presents to the United Nations General Assembly his "Atoms for Peace" plan, calling for the creation of an international atomic-energy agency which would receive contributions from nations holding stocks of nuclear materials and would utilize them for peaceful purposes. The President also welcomes the General Assembly's resolution of November 28 suggesting a Disarmament Subcommittee.

- 2 -

February 18, 1954. At the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union agree to an exchange of views on disarmament or reduction of armaments, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly.

August 30, 1954. President Eisenhower signs the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, authorizing the exchange with other countries of information for the peaceful use of atomic energy, and supporting the development of commercial nuclear power.

May 26, 1955. The first comprehensive report of Harold Stassen, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament is presented to the President. It stresses the extreme importance of providing against surprise attack, the absolute necessity of stipulations for an effective inspection system in any agreement, and the role of an aerial component and of scientific instruments and photography in such a system.

1. Nuclear Weapons: Neither American nor foreign scientists are able to devise methods for accounting completely for all past production, and the margin of error in known methods is beyond acceptable limits; there is no method that could search out clandestine weapons; the solution is control of the atom bomb, not visionary, unenforceable "elimination."

2. The United States should accept only rigidly reciprocal proposals.

July 21, 1955. Meeting with the Heads of Government of France, the U.K. and U.S.S.R., President Eisenhower makes his "Open Skies" proposal at a meeting in Geneva. The proposal would protect nations against military buildup and surprise attack. He proposes that the Soviet Union and the United States agree immediately to exchange blueprints of their military establishments and to furnish each other facilities for aerial reconnaissance, in order to provide against surprise attack and as a beginning of a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament.

(In a letter to President Eisenhower, September 19, 1955, Soviet Premier Bulganin, criticized the "Open Skies" proposal for not including overseas bases and not covering the broader need for reducing armaments and blanket elimination of nuclear arms. However Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov later recognized the genuineness of the U.S. proposal.)

October 11, 1955. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Bulganin, asks that the Soviets study further his "open skies" proposal and states the willingness of the United States to accept a Soviet proposal for ground-control teams if the Soviets accept aerial inspection. (Bulganin, in a letter to the President, September 19, 1955, had raised objections to the "open skies" proposal and advocated a control-post system proposed by the U.S.S.R. on May 10.)

- 3 -

March 1, 1956. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Bulganin, adds to his "open skies" proposal a statement that the United States is prepared to work out with other nations suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. The President indicates that this idea might be combined with his proposal of December 8, 1953, to furnish nuclear materials to an international agency which would utilize them for peaceful purposes.

March 21, 1956. The United States presents to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee a proposal for a demonstration test area of "open skies" inspection. The United States also proposes immediate exchanges, for a test period, of technical missions for purposes of preliminary study of methods of control and inspection.

(The U.S.S.R. proposed on March 24 to the Disarmament Subcommittee the cessation of thermonuclear tests, the removal of atomic weapons from Germany, the reduction of military budgets, and the gradual reduction of conventional armed forces over a period of two years to the levels specified in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955.)

January 14, 1957. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge presents the January 12 memorandum to Committee I of the United Nations General Assembly. The memorandum sets forth basic policy on disarmament: Future nuclear production would be restricted to peaceful purposes under adequate inspection; action would be taken at a later stage to reduce existing stockpiles and to convert them to peaceful purposes; when future production is effectively controlled, it will be possible to limit and eventually eliminate nuclear tests; first-stage reductions in conventional arms would limit the United States and the Soviet Union to 2,500,000 men and the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men; at the same time an effective inspection system, including aerial reconnaissance and ground control, would be established; further reductions would depend on major political settlements; space-missile tests would be inspected, and an international armaments agency would come into being at once.

(The Soviet Union on April 30, 1957 introduced partial proposals in the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee. It accepted the January 14 U.S. force levels proposal, provided the Western powers agree to the second-stage force levels proposed by the Soviet Union on May 10, 1955. The Soviet Union suggested that armaments be cut by 15 percent. During the first

- 4 -

stage of disarmament an international control organ would collect and analyze "information provided by States" on their implementation of the program and would operate control posts in the "western border regions" of the U.S.S.R., the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and the eastern United States. The use of nuclear weapons would be renounced and tests halted at an early date. The Soviet Union would still abolish foreign bases "within one or two years", reduce foreign forces in Germany by one third, and reduce great-power forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.)

August 2, 1957. Secretary of State Dulles presents in the Disarmament Subcommittee a Western paper proposing a combined system of aerial inspection and ground control. All territory of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada would be opened for inspection. Alternatively, there might be an Arctic and Bering Straits zone. If the Soviet Union accepted either of these zones, there might also be a European zone from longitudes 10° west to 60° east, bounded on the south by the 40th parallel. The Western powers are prepared, however, to discuss other proposals if the Soviet Union agrees to include a significant part of its own territory in the European zone.

August 21, 1957. The President announces that the United States will be willing, as part of the United States proposal for a first-step disarmament agreement, to include a suspension of testing of nuclear weapons for a period of up to two years under certain conditions and safeguards. These include Soviet acceptance of the United States position that, within that period, there will be initiated a permanent cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and installation of inspection systems to insure performance. The President also states that until such a first-step arms-control agreement comes into force, the United States will conduct such nuclear testing as the security of the United States requires.

(The Soviet Representative in the Disarmament Subcommittee on August 27 attacked the West and accused the United States of designing its inspection proposals "to contribute to the preparation of aggressive war".)

August 29, 1957. Following consultation with the NATO allies and various other nations, the four Western powers present to the Disarmament Subcommittee a working paper entitled "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament", intended as "a practical, workable plan for a start on world disarmament." This paper contemplates a convention dealing with the following subjects: (1) the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; (2) military expenditures; (3) nuclear weapons; (4) the control of fissionable material; (5) nuclear-weapons testing; (6) the

- 5 -

control of objects entering outer space; (7) safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack; (8) an International Control Organization; (9) movement of armaments; and (10) suspension of the convention. It is stated that with ratification of such an agreement, followed by honest observance, this plan would (1) stop all nuclear bomb testing; (2) bring a halt in production of nuclear-bomb materials; (3) start a reduction in nuclear-bomb stockpiles; (4) reduce the dangers of surprise attack through warning systems; and (5) start reductions in armed forces and armaments.

January 12, 1958. Replying to a letter from Premier Bulganin December 10, 1957 that had proposed a cessation of nuclear tests, President Eisenhower proposes that an agreement be made to use outer space for peaceful purposes and to cease nuclear-weapons production. The President also says that in converting nuclear-weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses the United States is willing to make a "greater transfer" than the Soviet Union.

(In a letter to the President February 1, 1958, Bulganin stated that the U.S.S.R. will discuss outer space only if the Western powers agreed to prohibit nuclear weapons, cease tests, and liquidate foreign bases.)

August 22, 1958. President Eisenhower in a public statement welcomes the successful conclusion of the Geneva Meeting of Experts and announces that the United States is prepared "to negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report." If this proposal is accepted in principle by the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, the President's statement continues, "then in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations." As a part of the agreement, on a basis of reciprocity, "the United States would be further prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the beginning of each year that: (A) the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures."

(In a Pravda interview on August 29, 1958, Khrushchev stated that the Anglo-American refusal to discontinue tests at once shows that the West is really opposed to stopping them. A Soviet note on August 30 accepted the United States invitation to a conference, but proposed that the conference be held at Geneva and demanded that it conclude an "agreement on cessation forever of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons" rather than on their suspension on a year-to-year basis.)

- 6 -

October 25, 1958. A statement by President Eisenhower reaffirms United States willingness, in order to facilitate negotiations for the suspension of nuclear-weapons tests and the establishment of an international control system, to withhold testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations on October 31, 1958. The President notes that the United Kingdom has similarly declared its willingness to suspend such tests and that the United States still hopes that the U.S.S.R. will do likewise.

April 13, 1959. In a letter to Premier Khrushchev, the President offers an alternative approach to a nuclear-test ban. He proposes that if the U.S.S.R. still continues to insist on a veto on the fact-finding activities of the control system regarding possible underground detonations, a beginning could still be made in putting a testing ban into effect by doing it in phases, starting with a prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers. Meanwhile, the negotiations could continue in an attempt to resolve the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer-space tests.

(In a letter to the President on April 23, 1959, Khrushchev rejected the President's proposal of April 13 for an immediate prohibition of nuclear tests at altitudes up to 50 kilometers on the score that it "does not solve the problem" of a complete prohibition of all nuclear testing and would, moreover, falsely mislead the public, "since in fact tests would continue to be carried out underground and at higher altitudes.")

May 5, 1959. A letter of President Eisenhower to Khrushchev urges technical discussions on the possibility of banning nuclear tests to a greater atmospheric height than that mentioned in his April 13 letter. The President again urges the U.S.S.R. either to accept the control measures which would make possible a complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests or to agree to the United States proposal for a partial ban. The President states that the United States is prepared to explore at Geneva Khrushchev's proposal for a predetermined number of inspections in the territory of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., but adds that the number should be related to scientific facts and detection capabilities.

May 14, 1959. At the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference the Western powers present "for the consideration of the Soviet Government a peace plan containing proposals on German reunification, European security, and a peace settlement. Its parts are all linked together, and it must be viewed as a whole. This plan, dovetailing the timing of conventional-force reductions with steps in the reunification of Germany, envisages a gradual and logical development through three stages of "security" and "reunification" into a fourth and conclusive stage where "a final Peace Settlement" would

- 7 -

be signed "with a Government representing all Germany." As regards reduction of armament, the three Western powers and the U.S.S.R. would in stage II restrict or reduce their armed forces to agreed maximum limits, such, for example, as 2,500,000 each for the United States and the U.S.S.R.; and in stage III they would further limit their armed forces, for example, to 2,100,000 each for the United States and the U.S.S.R., with negotiations aimed at still further reductions, for example, to 1,700,000.

(A letter from Premier Khrushchev to the President noted "with satisfaction" United States readiness to study the proposal for a previously determined number of yearly inspections if there are indications from the control posts of violations. The U.S.S.R., however, maintained that this determined number of visits precluded any necessity of voting; the U.S.S.R. agreed that the number of inspections should not be numerous, but rejected the need for any study of criteria in determining the number of inspections. The U.S.S.R. did not object to having the question of the number of inspections reexamined every two years and agreed to the United States proposal for opening talks on measures to detect high-altitude explosions.)

August 26, 1959. The Department of State announces that, under a Presidential directive, the unilateral suspension of nuclear-weapons testing by the United States, which began on October 31, 1958, and was to continue for one year, will be extended to December 31, 1959. This decision was taken, according to the announcement, in the light of the agreed six weeks' recess announced this day by the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

June 27, 1960. After a long series of proposals and counter-proposals by the West and the Soviet Union, the United States introduces a new program that provides for: prior notification of missile launchings, inspection of mutually-agreed air bases and launching sites, a nuclear production cut-off, and initial conventional force reductions in the first stage. Second-stage measures would include further reduction of nuclear stockpiles and conventional forces. In the third stage, national forces would be reduced to levels required for internal order and contingents made available for an international peace force, and all armaments not required for these retained forces would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The program emphasizes the need for technical studies, effective control organization, and verification of all measures. Transition from one stage to the next would require approval by the United Nations Security Council.

(The Soviet-bloc representatives withdrew from the U.N. Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, refusing to remain for the presentation of a new United States program. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev attacked the Western side for the failure of the Ten Nation negotiations

- 8 -

and said that the Soviet Union has decided to submit the disarmament question to the United Nations General Assembly. Also on June 27, Foreign Minister Gromyko formally requested the United Nations Secretary-General to place the question on the agenda of the General Assembly.)

August 16, 1960. Ambassador Lodge tells the Disarmament Commission that the United States is ready on a reciprocal basis, to transfer 30,000 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to peaceful uses if the Soviet Union agrees to a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. He also says that the United States is prepared "to shut down, one by one, under international inspection, our major plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium, if the Soviet Union will shut down equivalent facilities."

September 23, 1960. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Eisenhower proposes a series of steps for the peaceful use of space: (1) Celestial bodies should not be subject to national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty; (2) there should be no warlike activities on celestial bodies; (3) subject to appropriate verification, no nation should "put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction"; and (4) there should be a United Nations program of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

(Premier Khrushchev submitted a revised version of the Soviet disarmament proposal of June 2, 1960 to the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal called for reduction of Soviet and American forces to 1,700,000 men in the first stage of a three-stage program.)

(Premier Khrushchev told the General Assembly on October 3, 1960 that all nations yearn for disarmament and that this can not be satisfied by a control over armaments; that if the Soviet proposals on disarmament are accepted, it would be ready to accept any Western proposals on international control; that the Soviet Union agrees in principle that international armed forces should be created after disarmament, but cannot admit that Secretary-General Hammarskjold should command them; and that the machinery of the United Nations must be rebuilt so that the Secretariat and the Security Council will reflect the work and interests of the "three main groups" of capitalist, communist, and neutralist states -- the "Troika" concept.)

June 29, 1961. President Kennedy proposed to Congress the establishment of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

September 3, 1961. In response to Soviet resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan urged the Soviet Union to agree immediately to an uninspected ban on atmospheric

- 9 -

tests. The Western leaders asserted that existing means of detection were sufficient to identify atmospheric nuclear tests.

(Premier Khrushchev, in a New York Times interview, declared that the Soviet Union would not agree to a test ban until general and complete disarmament had been achieved and France had stopped its nuclear tests. On September 9 the Soviet Union formally rejected the Anglo-American offer of an uninspected test ban.)

September 20, 1961. Following intermittent talks, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a joint statement of principles to guide negotiations for general and complete disarmament. The statement recognized the need for international peace-keeping machinery and international control, and the possibility of taking partial measures before agreement was reached on the entire disarmament program. The Soviet Union refused to accept the U.S. position that verification should apply to forces retained as well as forces disbanded under a disarmament agreement.

September 25, 1961. President Kennedy presents to the UN a new U.S. plan for general and complete disarmament, which called upon negotiating states to seek "the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date...and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved." The President calls for (1) immediate signing of a test ban treaty, independently of other disarmament negotiations; (2) ending production of nuclear weapons and preventing their transfer to non-nuclear powers; (3) preventing transfer of control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers; (4) barring nuclear weapons in outer space; (5) gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and transferring the nuclear materials to peaceful uses; (6) halting the testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and gradually destroying existing ones; (7) earmarking national forces for call by the United Nations to perform peacekeeping duties, and improving the operation of the UN peacekeeping machinery.

(The Soviet Union the same day pressed its plan for a "troika" administration of the UN, rejected by President Kennedy. The Soviet Union proposed eight points to ease tensions and contribute to disarmament: freezing military budgets; renouncing use of nuclear weapons; prohibiting war propaganda; concluding a non-aggression pact; withdrawing troops from foreign territory; preventing further spread of nuclear weapons; establishing nuclear-free zones; and reducing the danger of surprise attack. On October 12, Premier Khrushchev proposed a ban on nuclear weapons for East and West Germany and disengagement in Central Europe. On October 30, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear bomb estimated at 57 megatons.)

- 10 -

April 18, 1962. The United States introduces new disarmament proposals. Stage one provides for a three-step, 30 percent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and other major armaments, restrictions on arms production, reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces to 2.1 million, a nuclear production cutoff and transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to powers not now possessing them, a test-ban agreement, advance notification of missile launchings, reports on military spending, measures to reduce the risk of war, establishment of an International Disarmament organization, initial peacekeeping arrangements, and a study of measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles. Stage two provides for a 50 percent cut of remaining delivery vehicles and armaments, a 50 percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces from first-stage levels, reduction of nuclear stocks, dismantling or conversion of certain bases, and further peacekeeping arrangements. Stage three provides for reduction of arms and forces to levels required for internal order, elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals, elimination of remaining bases (except those needed for retained forces), monitoring of military research and strengthening of the UN peace force so that no state could challenge it. The first stage would take three years. No time limit is specified for the other stages. Ultimate decisions on timing, etc., would rest with the Security Council.

(The Soviet Union on April 24 rejected the U.S. proposals. The USSR had on March 14 proposed a far-reaching set of measures that lacked adequate verification, suggested an accelerated timetable that could not have been fulfilled, and would have left the West at a serious disadvantage.)

August 27, 1962. The United States and the United Kingdom introduces two new draft test ban treaties. The first calls for a comprehensive ban on tests, enforced by nationally manned control posts under international supervision and obligatory on-site inspection. The second, offered as a second-choice alternative, calls for a limited ban ending testing in all environments except underground, monitored by national means without the need to establish any international verification machinery.

(The Soviet Union rejected the first U.S.-U.K. proposal and criticized the second for legalizing underground tests. It proposed an "understanding" banning underground tests until a permanent solution was found.)

December 12, 1962. At the disarmament talks, the United States introduces proposals to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication and recommended informal technical talks. The proposals include advance notification of major military movements, installation of permanent observation posts at major transportation centers, exchange of military missions to promote improved understanding,

- 11 -

the establishment of rapid and reliable communications links between major capitals, the "hot line," and the establishment of an international commission on reduction of the risk of war.

(On June 20, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the "hot line" agreement.)

June 10, 1963. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union announce that high-level talks would be held in Moscow in July to seek agreement on a test ban. In a speech on settlement of cold-war problems, President Kennedy says the United States would voluntarily suspend nuclear tests in the atmosphere pending negotiation of a test ban agreement, provided other countries would follow suit.

July 25, 1963. The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union initial a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Underground tests are also outlawed if they result in spreading radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.

September 20, 1963. President Kennedy tells the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to seek agreements to safeguard against accidental wars and surprise attacks, to control the transfer of nuclear weapons, to convert nuclear materials to peaceful uses, to ban underground testing under adequate inspection and enforcement, and to exclude weapons of mass destruction from outer space. He also proposed a joint U.S.-Soviet moon expedition.

January 21, 1964. At the 17-nation disarmament talks, the United States proposes a "verified freeze" of nuclear delivery vehicles; a verified agreement to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons, and the reciprocal closing of nuclear production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis under international verification; the establishment of observation posts against surprise attack, accident or miscalculation; and agreements to prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons to states not now controlling them, to place under international safeguards and inspection all transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful uses, and to ban all nuclear weapons tests (including underground tests) under effective verification and control.

(The Soviet Union proposed reduction of Western and Soviet forces in Germany, together with establishment of inspection posts to guard against surprise attack, a nuclear-free zone in Germany, reduction of military budgets, and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers.)

- 12 -

April 29, 1965. The United States proposes negotiations intended to prevent the use of outer space and celestial bodies for military purposes. This proposal follows similar initiatives launched by the Allies since 1959.

August 17, 1965. The United States submits a draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the UN Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee. The draft would oblige the nuclear weapons powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any country not having them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to apply International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

(The Soviet Union responded with a draft treaty submitted to the UN General Assembly September 24 that focussed on banning the transfer or emplacement "directly or indirectly" of nuclear weapons to third states not possessing weapons. This proposal was directed against the discussions of the Western Allies of the U.S. proposal for a Multilateral Force, under which the NATO Allies would have shared in the decision-making, support for and maintenance of certain nuclear weapons systems of the U.S.)

June 16, 1966. The United States and the Soviet Union submit to the UN draft treaties regarding peaceful use of outer space. The treaty was signed on January 27, 1967 and entered into force October 10, 1967.

August 24, 1967. The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate but identical texts of a draft treaty to the Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee on nuclear non-proliferation. Many revisions are considered by the Committee and changes result from debate in the UN General Assembly.

December 2, 1967. The United States announces that to help allay misgivings about its own intentions, it would place all nuclear facilities in the U.S. under treaty safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Administration, excluding only facilities with "direct national security significance."

July 1, 1968. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union and 59 other countries sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. On July 9 President Johnson submits the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dimmed prospects for early U.S. ratification of the Treaty. Subsequently in February 1969 President Richard Nixon asked Senate advice and consent of the Treaty, received in March, 1969.

March 18, 1969. President Nixon instructs the American delegation to the Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee to seek discussion of what would be needed for an international agreement prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and pointed out

- 13 -

that an agreement of this kind would, like the Antarctic and outer space treaties, "prevent an arms race before it has a chance to start."

(The Soviet Union on the same day proposed the complete demilitarization of the Seabed, compared to the U.S. focus on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. objected that the Soviet proposal was unrealistic and unverifiable and therefore not genuine.)

October 7, 1969. After several months of negotiations and consultations with Western allies, the U.S. drafts a treaty with the Soviet Union for the control of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, which is submitted to the UN Committee on Complete Disarmament. (The treaty was the subject of prolonged discussion and revision in the United Nations, winning approval on December 7, 1970.)

November 17, 1969. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union begin in Helsinki and continue to December 22, to resume in 1970.

November 25, 1969. President Richard Nixon declares that the United States unilaterally renounces first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounces all methods of biological warfare. Henceforth the U.S. biological program would be confined to research strictly on defined measures of defense such as immunization. The President further instructs the Department of Defense to draw up a plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons.

February 14, 1970. The United States extends its ban on biological weapons to include toxins (chemical weapons produced through biological or microbic processes).

(At first the Soviet Union and its allies opposed the U.S. proposal, which was supported by a number of states, but on March 30, 1971, the USSR reversed its position.)

April 16, 1970. Formal SALT negotiations open in Vienna. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continue for two years. The Soviets at first insist on including all U.S. "forward based systems," intended to protect Europe from Soviet attack, but capable of reaching the western portion of the USSR. The United States points out the inequity of such an approach without reference to the varied Soviet medium and intermediate range air and missile systems directed at Europe. Assymetries in the weapons systems and strategies of the two powers also complicate the negotiations.

May 20, 1971. The U.S. and the Soviet Union announce their intention in the SALT negotiations to complete an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

- 14 -

August 5, 1971. The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate but identical draft texts of an international convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and calling for their destruction.

September 30, 1971. After months of exploratory talks and negotiations by the SALT delegations, the U.S. signs with the U.S.S.R. an "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The agreement covers three main areas: (1) a pledge by both parties to maintain and improve safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; (2) immediate notification of each other, should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, or from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; (3) advance notice of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party.

The U.S. and USSR also sign an agreement to improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link ("hot line").

April 10, 1972. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union sign the convention against biological and toxin weapons.

May 26, 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union represented by President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev sign the basic documents of SALT I:

(1) A treaty limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems to two ABM deployment areas so restricted and located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one.

(2) An interim agreement limiting competition in offensive strategic arms and providing further time for negotiations. The agreement essentially freezes at existing levels the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers, operational or under construction on each side and permits an increase in sea-launched ballistic missile launchers up to an agreed level for each state, only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older inter-continental ballistic missile or sea-launched ballistic missile launchers.

July 26-27, 1972. U.S. Congress holds hearings on weather and other environmental modification for military purposes, and President Nixon orders the Defense Department to undertake an in-depth review of the military aspects of environmental modification techniques. As a result, the U.S. Government seeks agreement with the USSR to explore the possibilities of an international agreement.

- 15 -

June 22, 1973. The United States and the Soviet Union agree to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons a prime "objective of their policies," to practice restraint in their relations toward each other and toward all countries, and to pursue a policy dedicated toward stability and peace.

July 3, 1974. The United States and the Soviet Union sign a protocol that further limits deployment of strategic defensive armaments to one Anti-Ballistic Missile site for each country.

July 3, 1974. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign a treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. The treaty establishes a nuclear "threshold" prohibiting underground tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.

October 7, 1974. Negotiations begin between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on a treaty to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

November 24, 1974. Meeting at Vladivostok, President Gerald Ford and Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev announce agreement on a formula for the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The leaders agree that:

(1) The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977. (2) The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

(3) Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations: (a) Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; (b) Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

(4) The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985. (5) Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

August 21, 1975. Following suggestions by President Nixon to Party Secretary Brezhnev at the Moscow summit in July, 1974, U.S. and Soviet delegates to the UN Committee on Disarmament table identical draft texts of a convention prohibiting military or any other hostile environmental modification activities. After intensive negotiations at the United Nations, the convention is signed May 18, 1977.

March 31, 1976. The State Department and the White House issue an announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union expect to complete negotiations to limit peaceful nuclear explosions within the next several weeks. The talks were an outgrowth of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban treaty limiting weapons tests only.

April 13, 1976. At the Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, the United States proposes that there be an arrangement to prohibit further production of chemical weapons and to reduce existing stockpiles, as a first step toward a comprehensive ban.

May 28, 1976. In simultaneous ceremonies in Moscow and Washington, Soviet party leader Brezhnev and President Ford sign a treaty which sets a ceiling of 150 kilotons on an individual underground peaceful nuclear explosion.

- 16 -

July 29, 1976. The President submits the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

July 29, 1976. ACDA Director Fred Ikle asks the Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva to examine ways to restrict the international arms trade.

September 3, 1976. The CCD adjourns in Geneva. Among final actions is the submission of a U.S.-Soviet draft treaty banning environmental warfare, which would be forwarded to the UN General Assembly.

September 30, 1976. During a visit to the U.N., Secretary of State Kissinger states that President Ford would soon outline a three-point program on nuclear nonproliferation, in an effort to see strengthened international controls on the sale and reprocessing of nuclear fuels.

October 28, 1976. The White House releases an announcement by President Ford of a new U.S. policy on both domestic and foreign nuclear issues. Included in the plan are a proposal for an international moratorium on the export of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities for three years, and strengthening the IAEA. It is expected that a proposed U.S. reprocessing facility in South Carolina might become part of an "evaluation program" suggested in the President's statement.

November 19, 1976. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, ACDA Director Ikle proposes that the CCD discuss a ban on radiological materials as weapons.

March 30, 1977. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposes in Moscow that the two powers agree to substantial reductions of and qualitative constraints on strategic arms. At the same time, the United States presents an alternative proposal for a SALT II agreement similar to the framework agreed to at Vladivostok in 1974.

(The Soviet Union summarily rejected the U.S. appeal for significant reductions in strategic arms, disputing the value of moving away from the Vladivostok framework and claiming the United States proposal would work to the disadvantage of the USSR.)

June 18, 1979. President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev end their Vienna summit meeting with the signing of the second strategic arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. The major provisions included: (1) A ceiling of 2400 strategic missiles and bombers for both to be reached within 6 months of entry into force of the treaty, to be reduced to 2250 by 1981; (2) within the ceiling, no more than 1,320 to be equipped with multiple warheads or cruise missiles; of those, no more than

- 17 -

1200 land-based, sea-based or air-to-surface ballistic missiles with multiple warheads; of those, no more than 820 land-based ICBM's with multiple warheads; (3) Soviets to dismantle 270 missiles to reach the 2250 ceiling; (4) Soviets to stop production and deployment of the SS-16 missile; (5) both may build and deploy a single new type of ICBM; (6) on that new ICBM, no more than 10 warheads, no more than 14 warheads on SLBM's; (7) 1972 ABM Treaty remains in effect; (8) a protocol restricts deployment of land-based mobile ICBM's sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles and ICBM's, carried in aircraft until after December 31, 1981; (9) an agreement to be monitored by satellites and other intelligence means; and (10) exchange of letters in which Soviets agree not to increase production rate of Backfire bomber.

July 10, 1979. After the years of negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union present a draft treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

November 18, 1981. President Ronald Reagan in a major address proposes a framework for renewed arms control negotiations that focus on the need for major reductions in all types of arms -- a step forward from Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) to Strategic Arms Reduction (START).

As a first step, the President calls for the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces. President Reagan announces that the United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The President comments, "This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the moon, would be a giant step for mankind."

President Reagan points out that during the past six years, while the United States deployed no new intermediate range missiles, and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles.

The President proposes the opening of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in early 1982 with a pledge to make proposals for "genuinely serious nuclear arms reductions resulting in levels that are equal and verifiable."

President Reagan also calls for efforts to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. "The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on D-Day," he states. "The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe -- and in the world -- than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression," he adds.

- 18 -

The President calls for renewed efforts by both sides to develop effective measures that would reduce the danger of surprise attack. He supports a Western proposal at the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

January 30, 1982. Intermediate-range Nuclear Force negotiations between the United States and Soviets begin in Geneva.

March 31, 1982. President Reagan calls for negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. "to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth."

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